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This  thesis  is  a  study  of  the  Bengal  Army  from  c.  1800  to  c.  1870.  Its  central  aim  is  to  explain  why  the 
majority  of  the  Bengal  Army's  native  troops  mutinied  in  1857.  It  begins  by  comparing  the  pre-mutiny 
trends  in  the  Bengal  Army  to  those  in  its  sister  armies  of  Madras  and  Bombay:  in  particular  the  Bengal 
Army's  changing  pattern  of  recruitment,  its  growing  list  of  professional  grievances,  the  deteriorating 
relationship  between  its  sepoys  and  their  European  officers,  its  relaxation  of  discipline  and  its  sepoys' 
use  of  caste  issues  as  a  smokescreen  for  other  grievances.  Then  it  analyzes  the  events  of  1857:  the 
cartridge  question,  the  conspiracy  and  the  pattern  of  the  mutiny  itself.  Finally  it  outlines  the 
deliberations  of  the  post-mutiny  Peel  Commission  and  the  subsequent  army  reforms,  and  puts  the 
Indian  Mutiny  in  the  context  of  the  recent  historiography  of  military  revolts.  Its  conclusion  is  that  the 
essential  cause  of  mutiny  in  1857  was  not  the  defence  of  caste  and  religion,  as  is  generally  supposed, 
but  service  issues  particular  to  the  Bengal  Army. ii 
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Glossary 
alkaluk  Long,  loose  tunic  wom  by  irregular  cavalry 
anna  One  sixteenth  of  a  rupee 
assami  A  payment  made,  or  debt  incurred,  by  a  silladar  trooper  upon  receiving  his  uniform,  weapons 
and  horse. 
Aryan  One  belonging  to,  or  descended  from,  the  ancient  people  who  spoke  the  parent  Aryan  language 
(often  called  Indo-European)  from  which  Sanskrit,  Greek,  Latin,  Teutonic  and  Persian  (and  their 
modem  representatives)  are  derived;  one  of  those  who  invaded  and  conquered  India  c.  1500  B.  C. 
bania  (banya)  Hindu  moneylender  or  merchant 
batta  field  allowance  for  soldiers 
bell-of-arms  Conical  bell-shaped  building  used  for  storing  weapons 
Brahmin  Member  of  the  first  varna,  traditionally  priests  and  scholars;  the  highest  Hindu  caste 
caste  Ascribed  ritual  status  in  the  Hindu  social  hierarchy 
crore  One  hundred  lakhs,  or  10,000,000 
dhoti  Loin  cloth  wom  tucked  between  the  legs  and  fastened  at  the  waist 
Din  (Deen)  Faith  or  religion 
Diwan  (Dewan)  Chief  minister  of  a  royal  court 
Durbar  Royal  court  or  lev6e 
ghi  (ghee)  Clarified  butter 
havildar  Native  non-commissioned  officer,  equivalent  to  sergeant 
jagir  Assignment  of  government  revenue  from  a  district,  often  in  return  for  military  service 
jemadar  Junior  native  officer  in  regular  infantry  or  cavalry  regiment 
Hindi  Major  Aryan  vernacular  of  northern  India,  spoken  (with  many  dialects)  from  the  frontiers  of 
Bengal  to  those  of  the  Punjab  and  Sind 
Hindustan  Originally  the  region  of  the  river  Indus;  in  the  colonial  period  it  denoted  upper  India  (the 
plain  of  the  Ganges,  except  Bengal) 
Hindustani  See  Urdu viii 
kurta  Loose  frock  coat  wom  by  irregular  cavalry 
Kshatriya  Member  of  the  second,  or  warrior,  vanta 
lakh  100,000  units,  usually  rupees 
naik  Native  non-commissioned  officer,  equivalent  to  corporal 
pugri  (puggree)  Light  turban  or  thin  scarf  wom  round  hat 
Pandit  Learned  Hindu  Brahmin 
parwana  Orderorwarrant 
Peshwa  Hereditary  leader  of  the  Maratha  Confederacy;  originally  the  minister  of  the  Raja  of  Satara 
purbia  (purbiya)  Inhabitant  of  the  north  Indian  region  that  included  Oudh,  Bihar  and  Benares 
pyjamas  Loose  native  trousers 
Raja  Indian  prince  or  ruler;  title  of  nobility 
Rajput  Member  of  the  most  prominent  military  and  landholding  caste  in  northern  India;  Kshatriya 
class 
ressalah  (risala)  Troop  or  squadron  of  irregular  horse 
ressaidar  (risaidar)  Senior  native  officer  in  irregular  cavalry  regiment 
rupee  Indian  silver  coin,  valued  at  one-tenth  (two  shillings)  of  a  pound  sterling  (gold)  until  about  1870 
Sati  (Suttee)  Hindu  custom  requiring  the  self-immolation  of  a  widow  on  her  husband's  funeral  pyre 
sepoy  Infantry  private 
Shudra  Member  of  the  fourth  vania,  of  serfs  or  labourers 
Sikh  Member  of  a  monotheistic  religion  founded  in  the  Punjab  in  the  fifteenth  century 
silladar  Irregular  cavalryman  who  provides,  or  pays  for,  his  own  weapons,  horse  and 
accoutrements 
sowar  Cavalry  trooper 
subedar  Senior  native  officer  in  regular  infantry  or  cavalry  regiment 
tulipar  (talwar)  Native  sword 
Urdu  Language  of  the  Muslim  conquerors  of  Hindustan,  derived  from  Hindi,  but  written  in  Arabic 
script;  also  known  as  Hindustani 
varna  One  of  the  four  pre-ordained  classes  -  Brahmins,  Kshatriyas,  Vaishyas  and  Shudras  -  into  which 
all  Hindu  society  is  divided 
Vaishya  Member  of  the  third  vania,  of  farmers  and  merchants Source:  Wes  Mactagan,  Clemency  Canning  (London,  1962) 
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Authoes  Note 
I  have  deliberately  used  the  word  'native'  rather  than  'Indian'  to  refer  to  the  indigenous  population  of 
nineteenth  century  India.  No  offence  is  intended.  'Native'was  the  term  used  by  the  British  at  the  time 
-  as  in  native  infantry  and  native  officer  -  and  it  frequently  appears  in  direct  quotation.  I  have  favoured 
it  in  the  text  for  the  sake  of  consistency.  It  would,  in  any  case,  be  anachronistic  to  describe  an 
inhabitant  of  the  Punjab  in  1857,  for  example,  as  an  'Indian'.  He  or  she  would  not  have  done  so. 
Moreover  the  term'Indian'was  often  used  to  denote  a  European  who  was  bom  or  working  in  India, 
such  as  an  Indian  officer. 
The  spelling  of  place  names  is  generally  the  one  in  current  usage.  The  exceptions  are  those  places 
which  are  far  better  known  to  a  British  readership  by  their'colonial'  spelling:  Benares  (Varanasi), 
Cawnpore  (Kanpur),  Oudh  (Awadh),  Madras  (Chennai)  and  Bombay  (Mumbai),  among  others. Introduction 
As  every  schoolboy  knows,  the  Indian  Mutiny  of  1857  came  about  because  the  native  troops  of  the 
Bengal  Army  refused  to  bite  cartridges  greased  with  cow  and  pig  fat:  the  former  unacceptable  to  Hindu 
scpoys  and  the  latter  abhorrent  to  Muslims.  Of  course  historians  have  shown  the  underlying  causes  to 
be  far  more  complex.  Yet  certain  unresolved  questions  remain:  were  the  prime  motives  for  mutiny 
really  the  preservation  of  caste  and  religion,  or  were  grievances  particular  to  the  Bengal  Army  more  to 
blame?  Did  the  scpoys  act  of  their  own  volition,  or  was  there  an  element  of  manipulation  both  from 
within  and  without  the  military? 
The  prc-mutiny  history  of  the  Indian  Army  -  and  its  Bengal  component  in  particular  -  has  been  the 
subjcctofanumbcrofrcccnt  studies.  '  But  only  three  books  conccntratccxclusivclyon  the  prc-mutiny 
period  -Amiya  Ilarat's  7heBenga1Nafiiv1tftan1iy,  Dirk  KolfrsNaukar,  Rajj,  -u1aWSej)oy,  and  Seema 
Alavi's  7he  Selmys  mul  the  Comlxvi),  -  and  not  one  of  them  extends  beyond  1852.11cy  arc,  therefore, 
unable  to  test  their  various  theories  as  to  why  the  mutiny  took  place  by  an  analysis  of  the  actual 
sequence  orcvcnts.  This  study  is  designed  to  fill  that  void. 
It  is  also  an  attempt  to  reinstate  the  military  dimension  of  the  mutiny.  For  there  has  been  a  trend 
among  recent  scholars  -  such  as  Chaudhuri,  Stokcs,  Bayly,  Mukhedee  and  Roy'  -  to  view  the  mutiny  as 
a  rcflcction  of  what  was  happening  in  Indian  society.  The  sepoys  were  an  integral  part  of  peasant 
society,  they  argue,  and  wcrc  therefore  susceptible  to  the  same  social,  economic  and  religious  pressures 
I  11c  principal  publications  include:  Amiya  Barat,  Ae  BengaWative  Itifwary:  its  orgaiiisatioti  mid 
discipline.  1796-1852  (Calcutta,  1962);  Stephen  P.  Cohen,  Yhe  liulfan  Army.  Its  Contributioti  to  the 
A-Mopinem  ofa  Aation  (Dclhi,  197  1);  Philip  Mason,  A  Alatler  ofilowur.  A  Account  of  the  kidimi 
A  riny.  its  Offt  cers  mul  A  IM  (Lo  ndon,  1974);  T.  A.  1-1  cat  h  co  t  c,  Me  lhdimi  A  rmy.  Me  Garrismi  ofBritish 
Imperial  huha,  1822-1922  (Lo  ndon,  1974);  Di  rk  1-1.  A.  Kol  ff,  NauAvr,  I?  ajl)ul  mid  Scpoy:  Me  etlyiologý, 
(!  f  the  military  hibour  triarket  in  Himiustati,  1450-1850  (Cambridge,  1990);  Douglas  M.  Peers,  Betweet: 
Mars  widAlammon:  ColontalArtnies  mul  the  Garrisoti  State  in  Itulia  1819-1835  (London,  1995); 
Scema  Alavi.  7he  SeIK))w  mwJ  the  Cotnjxuij,.  Trculition  aW  7ýmLvitioii  M  Alortheni  bidja  1770-1830 
(Dclhi,  1995). 
2  S.  B.  Chaudhuri,  Civil  Rebellioti  hi  the  huhati  Mutinies  1857-1859  (Calcutta,  1957);  Eric  Stokes,  7he 
Pe(Lwitwulrhe  I?  cy.  -.  Vtijtlicsiti4,  fgrariaiiSocietý,  wklPeaunitRebellioii  it;  Coloniallwha  (Cambridge, 
1978)  and  7he  Pewmit  Armed:  Me  Itulicut  Revoll  of  1857  (Oxford,  1986);  C.  A.  Bayly,  Rulers, 
TowiLunett  arxllla=rs:  Morth  hidimi  Society  itt  theAge  ofBrifish  rýajvijsion,  1770-1870  (Cambridge, 
1983);  Rudrangshu  Muklicrjec,  Auadh  in  Rewill  1857-58:.  4  study  of]"opular  Resistwice  (Dclhi,  1984) 
and  '"Satan  let  loose  upon  the  canh',  Flie  Kanpur  massacres  in  India  in  the  revolt  of  1857,  Past  wAd 
Present,  No.  128,1990,  pp.  92-116;  Tapti  Roy,  7he  Politics  ofa  Popular  Uprising.,  Buiydelkhm)d  M 
1857  (Dellti,  1994). 2 
that  affected  civilians.  Seen  in  this  light  the  mutiny  was  little  more  than  a  precursor  to  a  general  revolt 
by  disaffected  elements  of  the  native  population.  Yet  by  taking  this  approach  there  is  a  tendency  to  lose 
sight  of  the  fact  that  the  mutiny  was,  first  and  foremost,  a  military  uprising  and  that,  without  it,  the  civil 
rebellion  would  almost  certainly  not  have  taken  place. 
Not  all  scholars  have  been  guilty  of  this  omission.  Sir  John  Kaye,  the  first  and  most  thorough 
historian  of  the  mutiny,  devoted  a  third  of  the  first  volume  of  his  unfinished  work  to  the  evolution  of  the 
East  India  Company's  Indian  Army  and  the  gradual  alienation  of  the  sepoys  from  their  colonial  masters. 
His  conclusion  was  that  as  the  sepoy 
grew  less  faithful  and  obedient,  he  grew  also  more  presuming;  that  whilst  he  was  less  under  the  control  of  his 
officers  and  the  dominion  of  the  State,  he  was  more  sensible  of  the  extent  to  which  we  were  dependent  upon  his 
fidelity,  and  therefore  more  capricious  and  exacting.  He  had  been  neglected  on  the  one  hand,  and  pampered  on  the 
other.  As  a  soldier,  he  had  in  many  ways  deteriorated,  but  he  was  not  to  be  regarded  only  as  a  solidcr.  He  was  a 
representative  man,  the  embodiment  of  fcclings  and  opinions  shared  by  large  classes  of  his  countrymen,  and 
circumstances  might  rcndcr  him  one  day  their  exponent. 
Kaye  was,  therefore,  able  to  take  account  of  both  the  internal  and  external  factors  which  contributed  to 
the  sepoys'  disaffection.  Yet  in  his  opinion  these  external  factors  -  the  "political  and  social  measures  of 
the  British  Government"  -  might  have  been  disregarded  by  the  sepoys  had  it  not  been  for  the  fact  that 
they  "affected  others,  wiser  in  their  generation,  more  astute,  more  designing,  who  put  upon  everything 
we  did  the  gloss  best  calculated  to  debauch  the  [sepoy's]  mind,  and  to  prepare  him,  at  a  given  signal,  for 
an  outburst  of  sudden  madness".  These  agents  provocateurs  were  able  to  point  to  a  series  of 
government  measures  -  culminating  in  the  cartridge  question  -  that  "tended  to  persuade"  the  sepoys  that 
they  "were  directed  to  one  common  end,  the  destruction  of  Caste,  and  the  general  introduction  of 
Christianity  into  the  land".  As  to  the  identity  of  these  conspirators,  Kaye  suggested  everyone  from  the 
agents  of  dispossessed  princes  to  "members  of  old  baronial  families  which  we  had  brought  to  poverty 
and  disgrace",  and  from  "emissaries  of  Brahminical  Societies"  to  "mere  visionaries  and  enthusiasts".  ' 
This  external  'conspiracy'  theory  was  downplayed  by  the  British  historian  T.  Rice  Holmes  in  his 
History  of  the  IndianMutiny,  published  in  1883.  In  his  opinion,  the  native  troops  of  the  Bengal  Army 
3  Col.  G.  B.  Mall  eson  (ed.  ),  Kaye  andMallesoiis  History  of  the  Itidiati  Mutiny  of  1857-8  (London, 
1888),  1,  pp.  255-8. 3 
were  relatively  unaffected  by  outside  influence.  They  had,  moreover,  hardly  any  substantial 
professional  grievances  beyond  the  fact  that  "a  small  fraction  of  officers  and  men  were  underpaid"  and 
"there  was  no  legitimate  outlet  for  ambition".  Yet  they  were  "less  attached  to  their  British  officers  than 
they  had  once  been"  and  a  "relaxation  of  discipline  had  encouraged  them  to  twist  into  a  grievance 
anything  that  startled  their  imaginations,  or  offended  their  caprices".  They  had,  in  conclusion,  "become 
so  powerful  and  were  so  conscious  of  their  power  that,  from  purely  selfish  causes,  they  were  ripe  for 
mutiny".  The  cartridge  question  simply  acted  like  a  "flaming  brand  hurled  into  a  mass  of  stored 
gunpowder". 
Holmes  did  not  dismiss  the  possibility  of  disgruntled  civilians  scheming  to  embarrass  the  British 
government  of  India.  But  because  of  a  lack  of  genuine  provocation,  "coupled  with  the  diversities  of 
race,  religion,  rank,  status  and  aim  among  the  discontented",  he  felt  that  they  "neither  wished  nor  were 
able  to  combine"  against  their  colonial  overlords.  Instead  they  simply  took  advantage  of  the  disorder 
created  by  the  mutiny.  The  sepoys  were  different.  Even  in  Dalhousie's  time  they  "were  in  a  mutinous 
temper,  and  doubtless  had  vague  ideas  of  rising",  though  Holmes  was  certain  that  "they  formed  no 
definite  plot  for  a  general  mutiny"  before  "the  greased  cartridge  story  got  abroad".  Thereafter  "a 
correspondence  was  kept  up  among  the  regiments  of  the  Bengal  Army"  who  "generally  agreed  to  refuse 
the  cartridges".  Holmes  therefore  placed  even  less  importance  than  Kaye  on  the  effect  external  factors 
had  in  alienating  the  sepoys  from  their  European  employers.  For  him,  the  key  to  the  mutiny  was  more  a 
question  of  minor  professional  grievances,  deteriorating  discipline,  overindulgent  officers  and  the 
sepoys'  overdeveloped  sense  of  power  -  all  factors  internal  to  the  army.  4 
However  since  the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century,  and  particularly  since  India  gained  its  independence 
in  1947,  most  Indian  and  British  historians  of  the  mutiny  have  tended  to  downgrade  the  importance  of 
these  military  factors.  In  his  1909  publication,  Ae  Indian  War  ofIndependence  of  1857,  the 
revolutionary  poet  V.  D.  Savarkar  defined  the  mutiny  and  the  rebellion  that  succeeded  it  as  a  popular 
uprising  in  defence  of  swadharina  (religion)  andiAith  the  aim  of  winning  back  a  swaraj  (kingdom). 
Kaye's  self-serving  civilian  conspirators  have  been  replaced  by  nationalist  freedom  fighters  like  Nana 
Sahib  and  Maulvi  Ahmadullah  Shah.  Savarkar  was  prepared  to  concede  that  the  sepoys  had  some 
4  T.  R.  E.  Holmes,  A  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny  (London,  1883),  p.  564-5 military  grievances,  but  they  were  minor  compared  to  the  economic,  political  and  social  factors  that  had 
alienated  Indian  society  as  a  whole.  ' 
Professional  historians  have  taken  a  less  'political'  view  of  the  revolt.  To  coincide  with  the  centenary 
of  the  mutiny,  the  Indian  government  commissioned  S.  N.  Sen  to  write  an  'official'  history.  Published 
on  10  May  1957,  Serfs  Eighteen  Fifty-Seven  rejected  Savarkaes  notion  of  a  nationalist  uprising.  Only 
in  Oudh  and  Shahabad  was  there  "evidence  of  that  general  sympathy  which  would  invest  the  Mutiny 
with  the  dignity  of  a  national  war".  Elsewhere  the  rebels  tended  to  look  back  rather  than  forward.  Sen. 
wrote:  "What  began  as  a  fight  for  religion  ended  as  a  war  of  independence  for  there  is  not  the  slightest 
doubt  that  the  rebels  wanted  to  get  rid  of  the  alien  government  and  restore  the  old  order  of  which  the 
King  of  Delhi  was  the  rightful  representative.  "  Thus  while  Sen  and  Savarkar  disagreed  about  the 
ultimate  nature  of  the  struggle,  they  were  united  in  their  belief  that  it  was  fought  initially  for  religion. 
Sen  noted:  "Religion  is  the  most  potent  force  in  the  absence  of  territorial  patriotism  and  in  1857  men 
from  all  walks  of  lifejoined  hands  with  the  sepoy  in  the  defence  of  religion.  " 
Sen  was  also  prepared  to  concede  that  the  sepoys  had  professional  grievances  -  in  particular  their 
maltreatment  by  European  officers  and  N.  C.  O.  s  and  their  lack  of  career  prospects  -  but  explained  them 
as  merely  symptoms  of  a  more  general  malaise  that  would  eventually  afflict  any  indigenous  mercenary 
army.  "The  sepoy  enlisted  for  the  sake  of  his  bread  and  sooner  or  later  he  was  bound  to  recoil  against 
the  obvious  humiliation  of  his  unnatural  position,  for  as  a  sepoy  it  was  his  duty  to  hold  his  country 
under  the  foreign  heel...  The  Mutiny  was  not  inevitable  in  1857  but  it  was  inherent  in  the  constitution 
of  the  empire.  "  6 
A  second  work  to  appear  in  1957,  Yhe  SepoyMuliny  &  Revolt  of  1857  by  R.  C.  Majumdar,  was  even 
more  categorical  in  its  insistence  that  religious  grievances  were  the  chief  cause  of  the  military  uprising. 
The  sepoys  "had  many  grievances  against  the  British  government",  wrote  Majumdar,  but  the  most 
serious  "was  the  interference  with  their  time-honoured  religious  practices  and  social  customs  and 
conventions".  Their  "deep-rooted  conviction  ...  that  it  was  the  deliberate  object  of  the  British  to  convert 
them  by  direct  or  indirect  means  to  Christianity"  was  the"reason  the  question  of  greased  cartridge 
produced  a  conflagration".  While  conceding  that  there  was  much  evidence  to  suggest  that  the 
"besetting  sin"  of  the  sepoys  during  the  mutiny  was  "greed",  Majumdar  put  this  down  to  the  fact  that 
flevil  passions,  once  aroused,  do  not  remain  confined  to  their  immediate  object"  (i.  e.  the  defence  of 
5  V.  D.  Savarkar,  7he  Indian  War  ofIndependence  of  1857  (London,  1909). religion).  As  to  the  possibility  of  a  general  conspiracy  among  the  sepoys,  Majumdar  could  not  rule  it 
out.  "It  is  likely,  "  he  wrote,  "that  some  secret  negotiations  were  going  on  between  the  leading  sepoys 
of  different  cantonments,  though  the  exact  nature  of  this  cannot  be  ascertained.  It  is  probable  that  the 
object  of  these  negotiations  was  to  organise  a  general  mutiny,  but  for  this  we  have  got  no  definite 
evidence...  But  though  there  might  have  been  understanding  and  negotiations  between  the  different 
bodies  of  troops,  the  plot  was  confined  to  them,  or  rather  to  some  leading  figures  in  each  group,  and  no 
connection  has  been  established  between  the  mutinous  sepoys  and  the  ruling  chiefs,  or  other  prominent 
leaders  mentioned  above.  "  The  furthest  that  MaJumdar  was  prepared  to  go  on  the  question  of  external 
interference  was  to  concede  that  the  sepoys  "might  have  been  excited  by  outside  agencies  like  Maulavi 
Ahmadulla  or  some  other  persons,  but  the  actual  plot  was  hatched  by  the  sepoys  themselves".  He  is 
prepared  to  accept,  however,  that  "once  the  sepoys  were  excited  by  a  mutinous  spirit  it  was  fanned  and 
inflamed  by  interested  individuals  to  serve  their  own  purpose,  so  that  what  was  in  the  first  instance  a 
mere  desire  to  resist  an  infringement  of  their  religion  took,  in  certain  cases  or  areas,  a  decidedly 
political  chracter". 
MaJumdar  is  very  clear  about  the  sequence  and  overall  nature  of  the  uprising.  The  civil  outbreak 
"was  the  direct  outcome  of  the  initial  success  of  the  Mutiny,  and  was  fed  by  the  volume  of  discontent 
and  resentment  existing  against  the  British".  But  as  there  was  "no  coherence"  between  the  "several 
distinct  elements"  of  the  general  revolt,  "each  being  limited  in  extent  and  objectives",  and  "no  definite 
plan,  method,  or  organisaton,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  national  rising,  far  less  a  war  of  independence". 
Instead  the  "miseries  and  bloodshed  of  1857-58  were  not  the  birth-pang  of  a  freedom  movement  in 
India,  but  the  dying  groans  of  an  obsolete  aristocracy  and  centrifugal  feudalism  of  the  mediaeval  age".  7 
S.  B.  Chaudhuri's  Civil  Rebellion  in  the  Indian  Mutinies  was  the  third  major  study  to  be  published  in 
1957.  Though  essentially  an  analysis  of  the  civil  uprising,  it  devoted  a  section  to  the  causes  of  the 
mutiny  in  the  army,  concluding  that  they  "were  in  part  purely  military,  in  part  a  discontent  shared  by 
the  general  population".  These  military  grievances  -  which  "flowed  independently  of  any  external 
pressure  and  originated  from  the  conditions  of  the  existing  military  service"  -  included  a  "consciousness 
of  power"  that  had  "grown  up  among  the  sepoys"  and  a  feeling  "that  India  was  weakly  guarded  by 
England".  Far  more  important  than  both,  however,  was  the  controversy  over  the  greased  cartridges  in 
6  S.  N.  Sen,  Eighteen  Fifty-Seven  (Delhi,  1957),  p.  411-12,23-8,417. 
7  R.  C.  Majumdar,  YheSepoyMutiny  and  the  Revolt  of  1857  (Calcutta,  1957),  pp.  172,174,176,218, 
210,268  and  241. 6 
early  1857  which  produced  a  genuine  fear  among  sepoys  that  their  religion  and  caste  were  in  danger. 
Such  a  fear  had  been  "reinforced  by  similar  feelings  of  the  civil  population  in  respect  of  religion 
arising  from  the  ever  increasing  pressure  of  western  civilization  including  the  whole  series  of 
progressive  measures  from  the  establishment  of  the  railways  to  the  legalisation  of  widows'  marriages 
and  the  dissemination  of  female  education",  not  to  mention  the  "missionary  activities  against  early 
marriage  and  the  purdah  system,  the  messing  in  jail,  the  compulsory  system  of  shaving,  and  the 
enlistment  order  of  1856",  all  of  which  had  "ruffled  the  feelings  of  caste  and  strengthened  the  suspicion 
that  the  government  intended  to  force  them  all  to  embrace  christianity". 
In  other  words,  the  mutiny  came  about  because  sepoys  were  just  as  susceptible  to  the  type  of  non- 
professional  grievances  -  particularly  socio-religious  and  economic  -  that  had  affected  the  rest  of  Indian 
society  for  many  years  previously.  "There  is  no  doubt,  "  wrote  Chaudhuri,  "that  the  strong  under- 
current  of  popular  disaffection  which  was  frequently  manifesting  itself  in  open  resistance  against  the 
British  in  the  early  period  culminated  in  the  sepoy  war  of  1857.  "  The  end  result  was  a  "national 
outburst  against  foreign  rule"  that  was  "an  anticipation  of  the  future  and  not  a  mere  recoil  to  the  past". 
He  thereby  rejected  the  conclusion  reached  by  his  former  teacher,  ILC.  MaJumdar.  8 
The  American  historian  Thomas  Metcalf,  in  his  1964  publication  Me  Afiermath  ofRevoll,  concurred 
with  many  of  Chaudhuri's  conclusions,  particularly  his  belief  that  it  was  a  broad,  popular  uprising.  For 
Metcalf,  the  sepoy  uprising  was  "little  more  than  the  spark  which  touched  off  a  smouldering  mass  of 
combustible  material".  Nevertheless,  when  assessing  the  causes  of  the  sepoy  mutiny,  Metcalf  is 
prepared  to  accord  professional  grievances  a  certain  weight.  "By  1857,  "  he  writes,  "the  Bengal  Army 
was  no  longer  the  vigorous  fighting  force  it  had  been  in  the  days  of  Wellesley  and  Lake.  Discipline 
had  grown  lax,  the  best  British  officers  had  abandoned  their  regiments  for  more  attractive  civil 
employment,  and  the  sepoys,  after  many  victories  in  which  British  troops  had  played  only  a  small  role, 
had  become  puffed  up  with  a  sense  of  their  own  importance.  Many  even  believed  that  British  rule  in 
India  was  dependent  upon  their  support  and  would  collapse  without  it.  "  In  addition  to  this  "slow 
deterioration  of  morale"  were  "specific  grievances  with  regard  to  pay,  pension  rights,  and  terms  of 
service",  the  loss  of  the  "special  privileges"  which  the  sepoy  had  enjoyed  as  the  "servant  of  the 
Company"  with  the  annexation  of  Oudh,  and  a  "general  dissatisfaction  at  the  limited  prospects  of 
promotion,  at  the  enervating  system  of  seniority,  and  at  the  contemptuous  arrogance  ofjunior  officers". 7 
Yet  Metcalf  identified  "professional  discontent"  as  "only  the  beginning".  Of  far  more  significance  to 
the  actual  outbreak  of  mutiny  was  the  fact  that  by  1857  "the  sepoys  were  convinced  that  the  English 
were  out  to  take  away  their  caste  and  convert  them  forcibly  to  Christianity".  A  belief  that  had  been 
brought  about,  according  to  Metcalf,  by  the  evangelical  zeal  of  Christian  missionaries  and  European 
officers,  and  the  introduction  of  greased  Enfield  cartridges  in  early  1857.9 
The  1984  publication  of  Rudrangshu  Mukhedee's  Awadh  in  Revolt,  a  micro-study  of  a  major  area  of 
rebellion,  promised  fresh  insights  into  the  cause  of  the  sepoy  mutiny  -  not  least  because  his 
geographical  choice  of  study,  the  recently-annexed  province  of  Oudh,  was  where  the  majority  of 
Bengal  sepoys  were  recruited.  Yet  his  chief  conclusions  in  this  regard  were  not  that  far  removed  from 
Chaudhuri's.  Mukherjee  was  also  convinced  that  the  primary  cause  of  mutiny  was  the  preservation  of 
religion  and  that  the  grievances  of  the  Oudh  sepoys  were  similar  to  those  held  by  their  civilian 
counterparts.  He  noted:  "Here  was  a  military  mutiny,  sparked  off  by  certain  fears  about  caste  and 
religion,  merging  itself  with  disaffection  created  by  interventions  in  the  traditional  rural  world  of  Oudh, 
using  the  loss  of  land,  loss  of  a  king  and  threats  to  religion  as  a  rallying  cry,  seeking  its  identity  in  the 
traditions  of  a  former  despotism  and  finding  its  popular  base  among  a  rural  confraternity  held  together 
by  bonds  of  mutual  interdependence.  " 
According  to  Mukhedee,  this  link  between  sepoy  and  civil  society  also  helps  to  explain  why  the 
rumour  that  the  British  were  going  to  despoil  caste  and  religion  spread  so  quickly  through  the  Bengal 
Army.  "The  ties  of  the  village  world,  "  wrote  Mukherjee,  "which  were  automatically  carried  over  into 
the  army  by  the  sepoys'common  origins,  facilitated  the  workings  of  the  grapevine.  "  The  closest  that 
Mukherjee  came  to  acknowledging  that  professional  grievances  played  an  important  part  in  the 
outbreak  of  mutiny  is  to  state  that  the  sepoys  displayed  "sheer  greed  for  money,  evident  from  the 
plunder  of  the  treasury  and  the  sepoys'  concern  about  the  movement  of  treasure".  In  his  opinion, 
however,  this  was  "a  natural  act  on  the  part  of  a  body  of  men  who  were  proverbially  ill-paid"  and  not  a 
fundamental  cause  of  mutiny.  10 
8  S.  B.  Chaudhuri,  Civil  Rehellion  in  the  IndidnMulinies  1857-1859  (Calcutta,  1957),  pp.  1,258,6,4, 
297-8 
9  Thomas  R.  Metcalf,  Yhe  Aftermath  ofRevoll:  India  1857-1870  (Princeton,  1965),  pp.  61,47-8 
10  Mukhedee,  Awadh  in  Revolt,  pp.  169,78-9,71 8 
Eric  Stokes  pioneered  the  practice  of  analytical  micro-study  in  Yhe  Peasant  and  the  Raj  (1978),  a 
collection  of  academic  articles  that  concentrated  on  a  handfiil  of  districts  in  upper  India.  "  But  it  is  in 
his  seminal  and  posthumously-published  work  Yhe  Peasant  Artned  (1986)  that  he  developed  fiirther  the 
theme  of  a  close  association  between  peasant  and  sepoy.  Though  primarily  concerned  with  the 
identification  of  rural  rebels  -  whom  he  characterized  as  pseudo-gentry  who  had  lost  out  during  British 
rule  because  of  heavy  revenue  demands,  adverse  ecology  and  poor  communications  -  Stokes  included  a 
chapter  on  'The  Sepoy  Rebels'.  He  died  before  he  could  supply  a  conclusion  to  this  collection  of 
essays,  so  his  thoughts  on  the  specific  link  between  the  mutineers  and  the  rural  rebels  were,  in  the 
words  of  his  editor  C.  A.  Bayly,  "implicit  rather  than  explicit".  Bayly's  own  interpretation,  included  in 
the  introduction,  was  that  the  "peasantry  formed  the  vital  link  between  military  mutiny  and  rural 
turbulence".  12  In  his  chapter  on  the  sepoy  rebels,  Stokes  fell  into  line  with  recent  historiography  by 
identifying  their  defence  of  caste  and  religion  as  the  primary  cause  of  mutiny.  But  his  assessment  of 
their  motives  was  far  more  sophisticated  than  anything  that  had  hitherto  been  proposed  because  it 
interlinked  socio-religious  discontent  with  grievances  that  were  particular  to  the  military.  He  wrote: 
For  the  most  part,  mutiny  required  a  successful  internal  insurrection  beforehand  within  the  rank  and  file.  This  was 
usually  the  work  of  a  small  minority  playing  upon  the  hopes  and  fears  of  their  fellows.  And  fear  was  always  a 
more  powerful  spur  to  action  than  hope  or  greed.  Fear  for  loss  of  caste  was  unquestionably  the  most  common 
sentiment  among  the  sepoys,  but  apprehension  of  defilement  in  a  purely  religious  sense  was  not  at  the  root  of  this 
sentiment,  as  was  to  be  seen  when  later  sepoys  cheerfully  used  the  Enfield  rifle.  Loss  of  caste  denoted  rather  loss 
of  that  superior  status  by  which  ashraf  (respectable)  Muslims,  Brahmins,  Rajputs,  and  all  who  aspired  to  Rajput 
status,  had  traditionally  secured  a  near  monopoly  over  entry  into  the  Bengal  Army.  If  die  British  were  to  be 
allowed  to  enforce  practices  demeaning  to  the  higher  castes,  the  respectability  of  the  military  profession  and  their 
quasi-monopoly  over  it  were  gone. 
As  evidence  that  the  British  were  preparing  to  transform  a  "loosely  disciplined  mercenary  army"  into  "a 
modem  force  yielding  unhesitating  obedience  and  prepared  to  serve  anywhere  it  was  ordered",  Stokes 
cited  "the  General  Service  Enlistment  Order  of  August  1856"  which  "ended  -  at  least  for  new  recruits  - 
the  Bengal  Army's  privilege  of  not  being  required  to  serve  overseas  except  on  a  voluntary  basis".  He 
11  Eric  Stokes,  The  Peasant  and  the  Raj.  -  Studies  inAgrarian  Society  and  Peasant  Rebellion  in  Colonial 
India  (London,  1978). 
12  Stokes,  Yhe  PeasawArmed,  p.  14. 9 
also  points  out  that  the  low  pay  of  the  sepoy  -  seven  to  nine  rupees  per  month  -  "was  an  indication  that 
he  was  driven  to  serve  by  strong  pressure  from  his  domestic  situation".  For  infantry  sepoys  in 
particular,  military  service  "was  often  the  only  honourable  escape  for  men  from  families  whose 
'ownership'of  the  land  had  failed  to  keep  pace  with  growing  numbers,  and  who  were  steadily  being 
forced  down  into  the  position  of  the  humbler  tillers  of  the  soil".  This  "attribute  of  gentility  was  their 
last  economic  asset"  and  it  underlay  their  "desire  to  retain  their  monopolistic  grip  on  the  Bengal 
regiments". 
Thus  did  Stokes  hint  at  the  connection  between  mutinous  sepoys  and  rural  rebels,  both  of  whom  came 
from  the  same  impoverished  gentry  background.  One  of  the  major  causes  of  the  mutiny,  he  insisted, 
was  the  gradual  erosion  of  the  recruitment  monopoly  enjoyed  by  high-caste  Bengal  sepoys.  "The 
'closed  shop'  of  the  Purbias  (eastemers)  of  the  middle  Ganges  was  under  obvious  threat,  "  writes  Stokes, 
"and  with  it  all  those  privileges  of'home  service'and  a  certain  independent  negotiating  power 
characteristic  of  mercenary  armies.  Hence  solid  material  fears  underlay  the  apprehension  over  any 
infiingement  of  caste  rules  by  British  authority.  "  The  only  other  relevance  that  Stokes  was  prepared  to 
attribute  to  'military'  factors  was  a  recognition  that  "slackness  of  discipline,  traditional  usage,  and 
compassionate  consideration  by  commanding  officers  for  the  susceptibilities  of  their  men  had  led  to  a 
highy  respectful  form  of  trade  union  bargaining".  Such  a  tradition  of  collective  negotiation  was 
dangerous  in  the  highly-charged  atmosphere  of  1857  because  "the  voicing  of  grievances"  tended  to 
verge  "upon  open  disobedience",  causing  the  British  authorities  to  "swing  suddenly  from  the  extreme  of 
conciliation  to  the  harshest  of  penalties".  13 
The  micro-study  tradition  was  continued  by  Tapti  Roy's  The  Politics  ofa  Popular  Uprising.  * 
Bundelkhand  in  1857  (1994)  -  but  with  a  difference.  By  concentrating  on  the  actions  of  different 
categories  of  men  in  the  province  of  Bundelkhand  -  from  ordinary  people  to  rajas,  sepoys  to  RaJput 
landowners  -  she  was  able  to  demonstrate  how  "the  rebels  of  1857,  operating  at  different  levels,  were 
involved  in  a  fight  for  power,  attempting  to  capture  nothing  less  than  the  apparatus  of  the  state".  Her 
chapter  on  the  sepoys  was  particularly  revealing.  "A  mutiny  does  not  dissolve  a  body  of  soldiers,  " 
observed  Roy,  "it  turns  them  as  a  body  from  the  side  of  the  state  to  its  opposite.  A  rebel  army,  in  other 
words,  carries  on  its  body  the  signs  of  order  and  legitimacy;  only  now  it  has  forsaken  its  old  loyalty  and 
is  looking  for  a  new  source  of  authority  to  give  it  social  recognition  as  an  instrument  of  legitimate 
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force.  "  This  attempt  to  create  "a  centralized,  supra-local  political  order,  as  an  alternative  to  the  British 
authority  they  had  displaced"  had  "never  happened  before"  and  therefore,  in  Roy's  opinion,  marked  a 
break  in  the  "linear  progression  from  the  sporadic  mutinies  of  the  early  nineteenth  century  to  this 
widespread  ferment  of  1857". 
So  Roy  rejected  the  "standard  historiographical  practice"  of  explaining  the  mutiny  "narratively  by  its 
causal  antecedents",  preferring  to  take  the  mutiny  itself  as  the  "first  term  of  narrative".  Using  this 
method,  Roy  observed  that  the  mutineers  always  spoke  "in  the  idiom  of  religion",  and  that  such  a 
"justification  for  their  actions  reads  quite  differently  from  the  historians'  analyses  of  the  causes",  which 
include  unsatisfactory  conditions  of  service,  the  growing  distance  between  the  sepoys  and  their  officers, 
and  even  their  sympathy  with  the  economic,  social  and  political  discontent  felt  by  the  rest  of  rural 
society.  Yet  Roy  believed  that  scholars  like  Stokes  and  Mukhedee  were  right  to  extend  "the  causal 
space  from  the  army  barracks  to  the  wider  society  from  which  the  soldiers  came"  because  there  was 
evidence  to  show  that  mutineers  "drew  upon  their  wider  social  traditions  when  conceiving  of  the 
struggle  in  terms  of  a  cause  and  an  ideology".  In  particular,  the  "written  addresses  sent  out  to  mobilize 
men  in  the  cause  of  rebellion"  described  the  uprising  "not  so  much  as  a  struggle  for  political  ends  as  an 
imperative,  a  sacred  duty,  for  upholding  religion  which  was  threatened  by  the  British  rule".  Roy  added: 
"The  cause  of  religion  also  enabled  the  mutineers  to  justify  and  legitimize  their  actions  which  refuted 
the  basic  norms  of  loyalty.  "  The  only  vague  concession  that  Roy  was  prepared  to  make  in  terms  of 
professional  grievances  was  that  "a  practical  need  to  mobilize  men  for  military  action  against  the 
British"  meant  that  "religious  evocations"  were  "often  juxtaposed  with  material  allurements",  and  that 
to  "separate  the  two  and  to  ask  which  was  the  'real'  incentive  for  action"  would  be  "a  useless 
exercise".  14 
For  most  of  the  twentieth  century,  therefore,  historians  tended  to  downplay  the  importance  of 
professional  grievances  and  other  specifically  'military'  factors  in  their  accounts  of  why  the  mutiny  took 
place.  The  two  exceptions  in  chief  were  Metcalf  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Stokes.  Yet  Metcalf  still 
considered  the  defence  of  caste  and  religion  to  be  the  key  factor  behind  the  mutiny,  while  Stokes  made 
much  of  the  connection  between  high-caste  sepoys  and  their  impoverished  civilian  counterparts, 
equating  the  sepoys'  fear  of  losing  their  caste  with  a  fear  of  losing  their  status  as  members  of  a 
privileged  military  'club'.  However  Stokes  seemed  to  regard  the  high-caste  sepoys'  defence  of  their 
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privileged  monopoly  as  an  issue  more  'social'than  'military'  in  nature.  The  opposite  interpretation  was 
made  by  the  young  Indian  historian  Kaushik  Roy,  who  wrote:  "Before  1857,  the  Bengal  Army  became 
dependent  on  a  particular  group,  the  Purbiyas,  when  numerical  decline  of  the  white  troops  and 
weakening  of  the  punishment  system  made  the  Purbiyas  conscious  of  their  own  power.  The  English 
tried  to  balance  them  with  the  Sikhs.  This  was  too  little  and  too  late.  Enraged  at  encroachment  into 
their  monopoly  the  Pandies  revolted.  "  Roy  added  that  "peasants  and  sepoys  were  distinct  entities"  and 
that  it  was  "problematic  to  fuse  the  sepoy  insurgency  with  peasant  insurgency".  15 
This  is  not  to  deny  either  that  there  was  a  link  between  the  sepoys  and  their  civilian  counterparts,  or 
that  many  sepoys  genuinely  feared  the  loss  of  their  caste  and  religion  in  1857.  But  the  extent  to  which 
these  factors  were  primarily  responsible  for  the  mutiny  has  perhaps  been  exaggerated.  The  evidence  of 
this  study  leads  me  to  conclude  that  caste  issues  between  Bengal  sepoys  and  the  Indian  government 
were  as  much  about  a  privileged  majority  asserting  its  exclusive  position  and  collective  bargaining 
power  as  they  were  about  religious  faith  and  social  position.  Internal  military  issues,  on  the  other  hand, 
have  been  consistently  underestimated. 
All  armies  have  generic  grievances  relating  to  conditions  of  service,  including  pay,  promotion, 
discipline  and  relations  with  officers.  What  made  colonial  armies  different  was  that  they  were 
volunteer  mercenary  forces  officered  by  men  of  a  different  race  and  religion.  Their  loyalty  to  their 
paymasters,  therefore,  was  entirely  dependent  upon  the  incentives  for  service  outweighing  the 
disincentives.  This  point  becomes  particularly  pertinent  when  considering  Tapti  Roy's  observation  that, 
in  1857-8,  the  Bundelkhand  mutineers  largely  kept  together  as  a  disciplined  body  and  actively  sought  to 
replace  their  British  employers  with  a  new  political  order.  Could  it  not  be  argued  that  this  desire  to 
replace  one  employer  for  another  is  proof  that  the  sepoys'  grievances  were  essentially  professional  in 
nature? 
This  was  exactly  the  point  made  by  two  recent  historians  of  the  Indian  military  labour  market,  Dirk 
Kolff  and  Seema  Alavi.  Kolff  s  thesis  -  in  his  book  Naukur,  Rajput  and  Sepoy.  Yhe  ethnology  of  the 
military  labour  market  in  Hindustan,  1450-1850  (1990)  -  was  that  the  Company  sepoys  were  simply 
the  latest  in  a  long  line  of  professional  soldiers  from  eastern  Hindustan  (hence  purbiyas  or'eastemers') 
available  to  the  highest  bidder.  No  sooner  did  service  under  an  alternative  employer  prove  more 
attractive  than  the  sepoys  would  unilaterally  terminate  their  contracts.  Kolff's  study  identified  two  quite 
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separate  RaJput  traditions:  "at  one  end,  mainly  in  Rajasthan,  a  genealogically  defined  RaJput  aristocracy 
and  a  centre  and  opposite  end  occupied  by  a  variety  of  peasant  groups  and  tribal  elites,  largely  in 
Hindustan,  whose  values  and  behaviour  kept  alive  a  more  ancient  layer  of  Rajputhood.  "  It  was  in  this 
"older,  pastoralist  tradition"  that  Kolff  saw  the  ethnic  connection  between  the  RaJput  mercenaries  of  the 
sixteenth  and  seventeenth  centuries  and  the  REýjputs  and  Brahmins  from  the  eastern  Hindustan  region 
who  came  to  dominate  the  Bengal  Army  in  the  late  eighteenth  and  early  nineteenth  centuries. 
"This  phenomenon,  "  wrote  Kolff,  "can  only  be  explained  as  the  successful  endeavour  of  the  dominant 
groups  in  the  Bhojpur  and  Oudh  region  to  reserve  to  themselves  what  quickly  became  the  most 
important  redistributive  institution  of  the  new  British  empire  in  India,  to  wit  the  Bengal  Army.  "  He 
added:  "An  inevitable  ritual  complement  of  this  closed  shop  social  strategy  was  a  tendency  towards 
brahminical  exclusiveness,  in  other  words,  towards  the  doctrine  of  caste.  The  new  monomania  for  the 
privileges  of  employment  soon  took  on  religious  overtones  and  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  old 
survival  strategies  characterised  by  multiple  layers  of  identity  of  Cheros,  Bhumimars  and  'spurious' 
Rajputs,  and  to  the  open  attitude  towards  adopting  and  recruitment  that  had  been  typical  of  centuries  of 
peasant  soldiering.  The  Bhojpuri  and  Avadhi  soldier-elite,  securely  ensconced  in  the  new  empire,  now 
adopted  the  'modem'  -to  use  Buchanan's  epithet  -ideology  of  caste.  it  justified  their  closed  shop 
practices.  " 
In  other  words,  said  Kolff,  Bengal  sepoys  reinvented  caste  issues  to  protect  a  monopoly  that  was 
increasingly  under  threat  as  "British  North  India  was  almost  totally  demilitarised",  the  "opportunites  for 
military  employment  had  dwindled"  and  "competition  for  service  had  become  acute".  However  Kolff 
pointed  out  that  caste  was  not  an  issue  in  the  Bombay  Army,  despite  the  fact  that  many  of  its  sepoys 
were  recruited  from  the  same  area  of  Hindustan  as  the  Bengal  Army.  In  this  respect,  "the  old  North 
Indian  tradition  of  service  suited  the  modem  state  better  than  the'modem'  emphasis  on  exclusiveness". 
Nevertheless,  wrote  Kolff,  the  1857  mutiny  "still  showed  that  two  crucial  features  of  the  old  service 
tradition  survived  when  the  old  Purbiya  gentry  closed  its  shop".  First  was  "the  sociological  link 
between  soldiering  and  agrarian  society",  in  that  sepoys  continued  to  remit  as  much  as  three-quarters  of 
their  pay  to  their  families.  Second,  and  a  "feature  that  was  lost  in  Bombay",  came  the  "peasant  soldier's 
insistence  on  what  was  his  birthright,  i.  e.  to  negotiate  his  own  alliances  or,  in  other  words,  to  choose  his 
employers  himself'.  The  threat  posed  by  such  a  tradition  was  only  broken  after  the  mutiny  when  the 
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"colonial  administration  in  disgust  dropped  I-Endustan  as  a  recruitment  area"  and  the  "market  for 
military  labour  ceased  to  be  a  sellers'  market".  16 
Kolff  therefore  made  two  important  points  with  regard  to  the  1857  mutiny:  on  the  one  hand  the 
Bengal  sepoys  were  simply  part  of  a  long  tradition  of  mercenary  soldiers  from  eastern  Hindustan  who 
were  liable  to  switch  employers  if  the  occasion  demanded;  while  on  the  other  hand  they  represented  a 
break  with  the  past  in  that  they  reinvented  caste  issues  as  a  means  to  defend  their  privileged  position. 
Both  points  support  my  own  thesis  that  issues  exclusive  to  the  military  are  more  central  to  an 
understanding  of  the  mutiny  than  has  hitherto  been  recognized.  Yet  Kolff  was  unable  to  prove  his 
theory  with  evidence  drawn  from  the  mutiny  because  his  study  ends  in  1850.  My  research  is  designed 
to  provide  that  missing  evidence.  It  will  show  that  the  cartridge  question  was  used  by  at  least  some 
sepoys  -  mainly  the  ringleaders  -  as  a  pretext  to  oppose  the  state.  It  will  also  demonstrate  the  extent  to 
which  the  sepoys  were  seeking  to  replace  one,  no  longer  acceptable,  employer  with  another.  Proof  of 
this  latter  assertion  includes  the  fact  that  many  mutinous  regiments  retained  their  organisation  and 
discipline,  that  the  ringleaders  were  in  many  cases  the  native  officers  who  simply  took  over  from  their 
European  counterparts,  and  that  these  native  officers  invariably  sought  to  legitimize  their  actions  by 
placing  their  regiments  under  the  command  of  an  alternative  political  authority. 
In  her  1995  publication,  Yhe  Sepoys  and  the  Compaqy.  ý  Tradition  and  Transition  in  Northern  India 
1770-1830,  Seema  Alavi  came  to  much  the  same  conclusion  as  Kolff-.  that  the  mutiny  came  about 
because  the  Bengal  sepoys  were  seeking  an  alternative  employer.  She  differed  from  Kolff  in  her 
explanation  why.  Her  argument  is  that,  far  from  being  simply  the  latest  in  a  long  line  of  mercenary 
paymasters,  the  Company  introduced  a  new  military  tradition  into  northern  India  by  replacing  the 
dominant  urban  Mughal  cavalry  with  high-caste  peasant  infantry  from  Benares,  Bihar  and  Oudh. 
Among  the  chief  characteristics  of  this  new  service  were  regular  pay  and  attention  to  the  recruits' 
religious  sensibilities.  The  sepoys  began  to  look  for  alternative  employers,  said  Alavi,  when  these 
financial,  social  and  religious  benefits  began  to  disappear. 
Like  Kolff,  Alavi  insisted  that  "the  high-caste  status  in  rural  north  India  was  reinvented"  by  the 
Bengal  Army.  It  "formalized"  the  "social  tensions  hinging  around  the  ritual  purity  of  the  rual  high 
caste"  and  "made  them  more  obvious  and  rigid".  But  for  the  Bengal  Army's  policy  of  selective 
recruitment,  "the  evolution  of  high-caste  status  in  rural  India  would  have  progressed  differently". 
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However,  wrote  Alavi,  while  it  was  keen  to  ensure  the  loyalty  of  its  sepoys  by  "buttressing  their 
assumed  high-caste  status",  the  East  India  Company  also  took  pains  to  abstract  them  "from  the 
constraints  and  hierarchy  of  'Hindu'  society".  It  did  this  by  "exempting"  the  scpoys  from  "certain 
religious  obligations  which  reinforced  the  superiority  of  the  priestly  class  of  Brahmins",  such  as  the 
payment  of  pilgrim  dues  and  fees  during  the  performance  of  religious  rituals  in  temples  outside  the 
cantonments.  According  to  Alavi,  this  attempt  by  the  Company  to  separate  the  Bengal  Army  from 
society  by  creating  a  "very  specific  form  of  military  Hinduism"  would  ultimately  backfire. 
Alavi's  central  thesis  is  that  the  principal  role  of  the  army  was  political  in  that  it  functioned  as  a 
cultural  link  between  the  rulers  and  the  ruled.  She  argued  that  as  the  Company  advanced  to  "a  position 
of  political  strength  and  maturity"  by  the  early  1830s,  it  instituted  a  number  of  reforms  designed  to 
"increase  its  effective  control  over  the  army".  For  example  the  establishment  of  military  offices  "to 
administer  the  settlements  of  invalid  soldiers  and  their  families",  which  would  enable  the  Company  "to 
intervene  in  the  family  affairs"  of  its  sepoys  and  thereby  increase  its  grip  over  its  peasant  regiments. 
But  instead  of  ensuring  political,  economic  and  social  stability,  these  reforms  merely  created  bad 
feeling  within  the  army. 
Though  the  stopping  point  for  Alavi's  study  is  1830,  she  attempted  to  explain  the  outbreak  of  the  1857 
mutiny  as  the  inevitable  result  of  this  policy  of  excessive  control.  While  doing  so,  she  rejected  Kolffs 
theory  of  "a  conflict  in  which  an  antique  Indian  warrior  tradition  protested  against  the  increasing 
encroachments  of  a  militarily  modernized  Company".  Instead,  wrote  Alavi,  "Company  power  was 
under  threat  from  its  military  'subaltems'who  were  incensed  because  the  reforms  of  the  1830s  had 
disturbed  the  power  relations  within  which  they  and  their  families  had  enjoyed  financial  security  and  a 
high  religious  and  social  status".  Such  resentment  was  manifested  in  their  opposition  to  the  withdrawal 
of  foreign  service  batta  in  Sind  and  the  Punjab  in  the  1840s,  in  their  postings  to  distant  military  outposts 
and,  more  importantly,  in  "their  apprehensions  over  the  infringement  of  their  high-caste  status 
which...  the  Company  had  sedulously  promoted  over  the  previous  three  generations".  In  this  respect, 
the  cartridge  question  was  the  final  straw.  The  end  result  was  the  re-emergence  in  1857  "of  that 
contested  military  labour  market  which  the  Company  had  done  its  best  to  control  since  the  beginning  of 
the  nineteenth  century".  Alavi  added:  "All  at  once  the  Company  ceased  to  be  the  most  attractive 15 
employer  in  India  and  patrons  amongst  the  rebel  leaders  were  able  to  hold  out  to  them  the  material, 
political,  and  ritual  inducements  which  the  Company  had  once  monopolized.  "  17 
While  Alavi  makes  a  number  of  good  points  -  not  least  her  assertion  that  the  mutiny  was  an  attempt 
by  sepoys  to  secure  a  more  amenable  employer  -  her  overall  thesis  is  unconvincing.  Far  from  being 
caused  by  excessive  interference,  I  wH1  argue  that  one  of  the  reasons  the  mutiny  came  about  was 
because  the  Bengal  Army's  control  over  its  sepoys  had  progressively  weakened.  This  trend  can  be  seen 
in  the  reduction  of  the  commanding  officer's  power  to  punish  and  reward,  and  in  the  relative  lack  of 
interest  shown  by  young  officers  in  the  welfare  of  their  sepoys.  Moreover  the  bulk  of  military  reforms 
in  the  1830s  were  essentially  benign  in  nature  and  designed  to  improve  the  sepoys'  conditions  of 
service.  Examples  include  the  abolition  of  flogging  for  native  troops,  the  institution  of  the  Orders  of 
British  India  and  of  Merit,  the  award  of  Good  Conduct  pay  and  an  increase  in  the  Bengal  Army's 
marching  batta  (or  extra  allowance)  to  bring  it  into  line  with  the  other  presidency  armies.  Kaushik 
Roy  was  surely  right  to  point  out  that  there  was  a  "lobby  which  constantly  cried  for  reforms  between 
1830-1856",  in  particular  the  Punjab  school  which  called  for  a  policy  of  mixed  recruitment.  "If  their 
progammes  had  been  implemented,  "  wrote  Roy,  "there  may  have  been  no  1857  mutiny".  is 
Constrained  by  the  chronological  parameters  of  her  study,  Alavi  was  forced  to  rely  mainly  on 
secondary  sources  for  her  assessment  of  the  nature  of  sepoy  grievances  in  the  25  years  that  preceded  the 
mutiny.  The  best  of  these  sources  is  Amiya  Barat's  Yhe  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  the  publication  of  her 
Ph.  D  thesis  and  the  first  scholarly  work  on  the  colonial  Indian  Army  to  appear  since  Indian 
independence.  But  even  Barat's  study  ended  in  1852,  a  full  five  years  before  the  mutiny  begins.  This  is 
deliberate.  Though  her  work  is  ultimately  geared  to  pinpointing  the  causes  of  the  1857  outbreak,  Barat 
admitted  that  she  did  not  want  to  become  involved  "in  the  very  complex  issues  raised  by  the  mutiny  of 
1857".  This  is  something  of  a  contradiction  in  terms:  for  she  cannot  hope  to  prove  her  theories  without 
a  detailed  study  of  the  mutiny  itself.  Her  thesis's  other  weaknesses  are  its  neglect  of  the  separate  arms 
that  made  up  the  Bengal  Army  -  most  notably  the  artillery  and  the  regular  and  irregular  cavalry  -  and 
her  failure  to  draw  conclusions  from  a  comparison  with  the  Bombay  Army  (which  suffered  just  a 
handful  of  mutinies)  and  the  Madras  Army  (which  was  uniformly  loyal).  This  study  will  cover  all  of 
these  areas. 
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Nevertheless  Barat  deserves  credit  for  pinpointing  a  deterioration  in  the  Bengal  sepoys'  service 
conditions  and  a  gradual  disintegration  in  the  relationship  between  sepoys  and  their  European  officers 
in  the  years  prior  to  the  mutiny.  The  thrust  of  her  argument  is  that  the  sepoys'  professional  grievances 
caused  a  number  of  "increasingly  serious  and  frequent"  mutinies  after  1824,  by  which  time  "many  of 
the  grievances  of  the  European  officers  had  been  redressed".  The  1857  mutiny  was,  therefore,  simply 
the  culmination  of  the  sepoys'various  grievances.  But  as  not  all  of  them  were  serious  enough  to  require 
such  "drastic  action",  mutiny  had  to  be  a  "sign  of  maladministration,  of  bad  man-management".  This, 
in  turn,  was  caused  partly  by  the  ambiguous  position  of  the  native  officers  who  both  identified  with 
their  men  and  yet  were  "seen  by  the  men  as  part  of  the  officers'  group,  indifferent  or  hostile  to  their 
interests".  It  was  also  caused,  said  Barat,  by  the  lack  of  contact  between  the  men  and  their  European 
officers  who  hankered  after  better  paid  detached  appointments  and  neglected  regimental  duties. 
Increasingly,  too,  young  cadets  would  arrive  from  Britain  with  a  fixed  idea  of  the  inferiority  of  Indians 
which  hardly  improved  relations.  "Another  common  feature  of  the  regiments  in  which  mutinies 
occurred,  "  wrote  Barat,  "was  the  absence  of  a  considerable  proportion  of  such  officers  as  had  been 
posted  to  them".  There  is  much  in  this.  But  the  absence  of  European  officers  is  only  relevant  in  the 
sense  that  those  left  behind  resented  being  passed  over  and  became  increasingly  lax  in  their  duty.  That 
a  large  number  of  European  officers  were  not  needed  to  ensure  the  loyalty  of  sepoys  is  proven  by  the 
fact  that  the  post-mutiny  Bengal  Army  had  far  fewer  officers  per  regiment  and  yet  rarely  displayed  a 
mutinous  disposition. 
Barat  identified  pay  and  allowances  as  one  of  the  issues  "round  which  discontent  frequently 
focussed";  such  a  preoccupation  with  financial  rewards  was  only  to  be  expected  ftom  a  mercenary 
army.  As  proof  that  the  sepoys  were  becoming  progressively  worse  off,  Barat  cited  the  fact  that  their 
pay  of  seven  rupees  a  month  stayed  constant  throughout  the  period  of  her  study,  whereas  the  cost  of 
living  and  the  average  wage  of  a  labourer  or  ploughman  was  increasing.  In  addition,  more  and  more 
sepoys  "found  themselves  posted  to  up-country  stations"  in  recently-annexed  provinces  like  Sind  and 
Punjab  "where  peace  was  of  recent  introduction",  "agriculture  was  less  prosperous"  and  prices  were 
generally  higher.  This  extension  of  the  Company's  territory  also  imposed  upon  the  sepoys  ever  longer 
marches  that  were  both  "tedious"  (their  uniforms  were  uncomfortable  and  their  equipment  unwieldy) 
and  "expensive"  (they  paid  for  their  own  carriage  and  contributed  to  new  hutting).  Other  consequences 
included  the  difficulty  for  sepoys  returning  on  leave  to  their  villages  and  the  curtailment  of  balta  for 17 
service  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  Bengal  Presidency.  The  latter  grievance  was  behind  the  serious 
mutinies  in  Sind  in  1844  and  in  the  Punjab  five  years  later.  Barat  also  pointed  to  the  diminishing 
opportunities  for  promotion  and  the  fact  that  there  was  no  "spur  for  ambition"  equivalent  to  the 
European  officer's  "opportunities  outside  the  regiment,  in  the  political  or  civil  lines,  or  in  service  with 
irregular  regiments".  19 
This  claim  that  pay  and  prospects  were  major  grievances  does  seem  to  be  borne  out  by  a  study  of  the 
mutiny  itself  In  almost  every  case,  the  first  action  of  the  mutineers  was  to  seize  or  attempt  to  seize  the 
district  treasure.  But  instead  of  simply  dividing  it  up  among  themselves,  they  often  guarded  it  until  it 
could  be  handed  over  to  the  new  military  or  political  authority  (in  effect  their  new  employers).  For 
their  part,  the  rebel  leaders  recognized  the  importance  of  financial  incentives  by  issuing  a  series  of 
proclamations  offering  increased  pay  to  all  sepoys  who  joined  them.  Improved  career  prospects  were 
also  a  factor  in  that  the  majority  of  mutinous  regiments  were  led  by  native  officers  who  had  been 
prevented  from  rising  to  pre-Company  positions  of  prominence  by  the  presence  of  European  officers. 
According  to  Barat,  the  "other  permanent  cause  of  disturbance  was  the  caste  feeling  of  the  sepoys, 
and  in  particular  the  sepoy's  dislike  of  serving  outside  India  and  of  sea  voyages".  This  she  identified  as 
the  main  cause  of  mutinies  in  1824  and  1852.  "Yet  in  1857,  "  wrote  Barat,  "when  those  same  scruples 
were  again  offended,  there  was,  initially  at  least,  a  great  readiness  [by  the  authorities]  either  to  pooh- 
pooh  or  dismiss  them,  or  to  attempt  to  overcome  them  by  force.  "  20  This  latter  statement  underlines  the 
problem  Barat  had  in  equating  the  1857  mutiny  with  previous  small-scale  mutinies  without  a  specialist 
knowledge  of  the  later  uprising.  Far  from  dismissing  the  sepoys'caste  and  religious  scruples  in  1857, 
the  authorities  did  everything  they  could  to  allay  their  fears.  The  fact  that  they  were  so  spectacularly 
unsuccessful  could  be  seen  as  an  indication  that  other  factors  lay  behind  the  mutiny.  There  is,  in 
addition,  much  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  earlier  mutinies  were  motivated  more  by  professional 
grievances  than  issues  of  caste  and  religion. 
The  argument  that  the  1857  mutiny  was  caused  by  service  issues  particular  to  the  Bengal  Army  is 
supported  by  the  bulk  of  evidence  given  to  the  Peel  Commission,  set  up  in  1858  to  report  on  the  post- 
mutiny  reorganization  of  the  Indian  Army.  Former  and  serving  officers  of  the  Indian  and  British  armies 
who  gave  oral  and  written  evidence  to  the  Commission  were  generally  agreed,  for  example,  that  the 
Bengal  Army  had  become  an  interconnected  brotherhood  because  it  was  recruited  from  too  restricted  an 
19  Baraý  Me  BengaINalive  Infantry,  pp.  xii,  294,296-7,299-302,  pp305-6 18 
area  and  among  too  few  castes.  They  also  tended  to  concur  in  the  view  that  the  sepoys  had  little  outlet 
for  ambition,  that  the  power  of  Bengal  commanding  officers  to  punish  and  reward  had  diminished  to 
the  extent  that  they  had  become  mere  cyphers,  that  Bengal  sepoys  were  overindulged  with  regard  to 
caste  issues,  and  that  the  discipline  of  the  Bengal  Army  as  a  whole  had  become  too  lax 
. 
21  There  is,  of 
course,  the  possibility  that  such  responses  contain  more  than  a  little  hindsight.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
number  of  senior  officers  and  administrators  -  including  General  Sir  Charles  Napier,  Sir  Henry 
Lawrence  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  Jacob  -  had  warned  that  reforms  in  these  areas  were  necessary 
in  the  decade  or  so  prior  to  the  mutiny. 
The  nature  of  the  subsequent  Indian  Army  reforms  also  supports  the  theory  that  military  factors  were 
central  to  the  mutiny.  The  most  far-reaching  reform  was  the  replacement  of  all  regular  native  cavalry 
and  infantry  regiments  with  irregular  ones  that  had  far  fewer  European  officers  (six,  and  later  seven,  as 
opposed  to  twenty-four).  This  had  the  effect  of  increasing  the  career  prospects  and  job  satisfaction  of 
native  officers  by  giving  them  more  responsibility.  Their  pay  was  also  increased.  Other  reforms  were 
designed  to  increase  the  authority  of  commanding  officers:  on  the  one  hand  they  were  given  complete 
authority  to  select  their  N.  C.  O.  s  on  merit;  on  the  other  they  were  accorded  the  summary  power  to 
reduce  N.  C.  O.  s  to  the  ranks  and  to  discharge  N.  C.  O.  s  and  sepoys.  Finally,  the  high-caste  Hindus  and 
well-bom  Muslims  from  north-east  India  who  had  formerly  dominated  the  Bengal  Army  were  replaced 
by  Pathan,  Sikh,  Dogra  and  Punjabi  Muslim  recruits.  22  The  result  of  these  reforms:  no  serious  mutiny 
in  any  part  of  the  Indian  Army  until  the  First  World  War.  Even  the  revolt  by  four  companies  of  the  51' 
Light  Infantry  at  Singapore  in  February  1915,  in  which  34  people  were  killed,  is  described  by  David 
Omissi  in  Me  Sepoy  and  the  Raj  (1994)  as  a  "minor"  affair.  23 
In  his  chapter  on  mutinies  in  Soldiers  of  the  Raj  (1997),  the  Indian  historian  and  former  general  S.  L. 
Menezes  put  most  of  the  post-1  858  tumults  down  to  "poor  leadership  by  the  commanding  officers 
concerned,  many  of  whom  were  removed".  The  exceptions  were  those  risings  in  the  First  World  War 
"where  a  religious  appeal  by  the  Caliph  not  to  fight  the  Turks  supervened,  or  in  the  Second  World  War, 
where  communist  influences  appear  to  have  been  at  work".  Menezes  concluded:  "In  general,  up  to  the 
20  Ibid.,  pp.  3034. 
21  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  pp.  1-645. 
22  A.  H.  Shibly,  7he  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies,  1858-1879,  Ph.  D.  Thesis,  S.  O.  A-S.,  London 
University,  1969;  Articles  of  War,  Act  XXIX  of  1861,  OIOC,  LqSflU17/11/15;  Bengal  Army 
Regulations,  1873,  OIOC,  L/MUJ17/2/443,  p.  98. 
23  David  Omissi,  7he  Sepoyandthe  Raj.,  YhebidianArmy,  1860-1940  (London,  1994),  pp.  135,151. 19 
time  of  the  British  Government's  Partition  announcement  of  3  June  1947,  the  fidelity  of  the  undivided 
Indian  Army  was  not  in  doubt".  24 
24  S.  L.  Menezes,  Race,  Caste,  Mutiny  and  Disicipline  in  the  Indian  Army,  from  its  Origins  to  1947, 
Soldiers  of  the  Raj.  -  The  Indian  Army  1600-1947  (London,  1997),  Alan  J.  Guy  and  Peter  B.  Boyden 
(eds.  ),  p.  I  11. 20 
Chapter  One  -  Recruitment 
This  chapter  will  trace  the  development  of  the  East  India  Company's  recruitment  policy  for  the  Bengal 
Army  over  the  hundred  years  that  preceded  the  Indian  mutiny,  providing  a  comparison  with  the  policies 
practised  by  the  Bombay  and  Madras  armies.  It  will  concentrate,  in  particular,  on  the  attempt  to  widen 
the  Bengal  Native  Infantry's  sphere  of  recruitment  in  the  late  1840s  and  early  1850s. 
In  1857,  the  total  strength  of  the  native  Indian  Army  was  232,224  men.  1  Of  the  three  presidency 
armies  that  made  up  the  Indian  Army,  the  Bengal  force  was  by  far  the  largest  with  135,767  troops.  2 
The  biggest  single  element  of  the  Bengal  Army,  and  therefore  the  Indian  Army  as  a  whole,  was  its 
regular  Bengal  Native  Infantry  of  74  regiments,  with  an  establishment  strength  ofjust  under  86,000 
men.  The  18  regiments  of  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  numbered  10,500  men,  while  the  regular  Bengal 
Light  Cavalry  was  just  ten  regiments  and  4,900  men  strong.  Even  smaller  was  the  artillery  component 
of  four  horse  troops  and  18  foot  companies  (3,000  men)  and  the  twelve  companies  of  sappers  &  miners 
(1,630  men).  The  balance  was  made  up  of  irregular  and  local  regiments.  It  is  because  the  Bengal 
Native  Infantry  was  so  pre-eminent  in  size,  and  because  it  was  the  arm  most  affected  by  the  shift  in  the 
Company's  recruitment  policy,  that  it  dominates  much  of  this  chapter. 
The  first  companies  of  native  infantry  sepoys  3  under  British  command  were  raised  in  the  Madras 
Presidency  by  Major  Stringer  Lawrence  in  1748.  But  Bengal  saw  the  formation  of  the  first  native 
battalion  -  the  famous  Lai  Pallan  (or  Red  Regiment'  from  the  colour  of  the  sepoy's  coats)  -  by  Robert 
Clive  at  Calcutta  in  January  1757.  Its  recruits  were  chosen  from  the  agricultural  classes  of  India 
'  'Return  showing  the  Numbers  of  the  troops,  regular  and  irregular,  which  were  serving  in  the  three 
Presidencies  immediately  before  the  Mutiny',  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  17,  p.  379.  The  same  return 
gives  the  total  number  of  European  troops  as  45,522:  6,170  officers  and  38,562  other  ranks  (24,263  of 
whom  were  Queen's  troops).  An  alternative  source  gives  a  grand  total  of  275,304  native  troops,  but  this 
includes  regular,  irregular,  local  and  contingent  forces  officered  from  the  line.  It  does  not  include  the 
Punjab  police  battalions,  the  Scinde  and  other  organized  police  who,  together,  numbered  at  least  16,000 
drilled  and  well-armed  soldiers.  To  these  could  be  added  about  one  hundred  thousand  ordinary  police 
and  revenue  peons.  [Source:  'Tabular  Statement  of  the  Army  of  India  in  January  1856',  Sir  Henry 
Lawrence,  F-vays,  Military  and  Political,  Written  in  India  (1859),  pp.  3  70-  1] 
2  Ibid.  Another  source  gives  the  total  number  of  regular,  irregular,  local,  contingent  and  military  police 
troops  officered  from  the  Bengal  Army  as  176,834  men.  [Source:  'Statement  showing  the  Number  and 
Distribution  of  all  Troops,  Native  and  European,  serving  in  the  Bengal  Presidency  in  January  1857', 
P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  VIII,  p.  13]. 21 
because  Company  officials  had  already  decided  that,  as  in  Britain,  they  would  make  the  best  soldiers. 
According  to  the  Company  ideologue  Robert  Orme,  the  inhabitants  of  the  wheat-producing  zones  of 
northern  India  were  better  built  and  thus  more  'martial'  than  the  shorter  people  in  the  rice-producing 
areas  of  the  south  and  east.  "In  practice,  "  writes  Seema  Alavi,  "this  meant  that  recruitment  was  guided 
by  two  main  considerations:  the  Company  would  only  consider  peasants  with  a  well-built  Physique  and 
an  average  height  of  5  feet  7  inches;  secondly,  at  this  stage,  at  least,  it  confined  recruitment  to  the 
Company's  territories  and  established  direct  contact  with  the  recruiting  villages  in  wheat-growing 
areas.  "  4 
After  Clive's  victory  over  the  Nawab  of  Bengal  at  Plassey  on  23  June  1757  had  established  British 
supremacy  in  the  province,  the  Company  began  to  recruit  from  the  rural  areas  of  Bengal,  particularly 
around  Burhanpur  and  Dinapore.  But  not  enough  recruits  of  the  requisite  size  were  available,  causing 
the  recruitment  base  to  be  extended  westward  to  the  wheat-growing  areas  of  north  India.  In  Kolff  s 
opinion,  the  Company's  gradual  reliance  on  recruits  from  outside  Bengal  proper  stemmed  partly  from 
the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  two  thousand  or  so  sepoys  who  fought  with  Clive  at  Plassey  were 
brought  from  Madras  but  had  names  that  "indicate  a  Rajput  or  Northern  origin".  These  new 
infantrymen  were  clothed  by  the  Company,  armed  with  firelocks  rather  than  matchlocks,  commanded 
by  European  officers  and  "drilled  and  disciplined  according  to  the  methods  first  tried  out  in  the  South  in 
the  decades  preceding  Plassey".  They  came  to  be  known  by  the  old  name  ofpurbia  and  were  simply 
"new  incarnations  of  the  same  old  soldiering  tradition  of  Hindustan"  in  which  Rajputs  and  pseudo- 
Rajputs  from  Purab  -a  term  that  describes  the  Oudh,  Bihar  and  Benares  region  -  had  travelled  far  and 
wide  to  find  employers.  5 
Most  of  these  new  recruits  from  outside  Bengal  were  high-caste  Hindu  peasants:  Rajputs,  the 
traditional  warrior  caste  of  northern  India;  or  Bhumimars,  the  military  wing  of  the  priestly  caste  of 
Brahmins;  or  Brahmins  themselves  (though,  for  official  purposes,  the  two  latter  groups  were  lumped 
together  as  Srahmins)  .  This  reliance  on  high-caste  recruits  was  partly  because  they  were  the  most 
physicially  imposing,  partly  because  the  Company  assumed  that  these  "traditional  high-caste  warriors" 
would  prove  to  be  the  most  loyal,  and  partly  because  Warren  Hastings,  the  first  Governor-General 
(1774-85),  was  keen  to  preserve  Indian  caste  roles  in  the  military  institutions  the  Company  was 
3  From  the  Persian  sipahi  (soldier) 
4  Alavi,  Ae  Sepoys  and  the  Company,  pp.  3  5-7. 
5  Kolff,  Naukur,  Rajput  and  Sepoy,  p.  177-8  and  87. 22 
gradually  imposing  upon  north  India.  The  "high-caste  overtones  of  the  army"  suited  the  political 
interests  of  the  Company,  wrote  Alavi,  because  "it  provided  the  requisite  legitimacy  to  Company  rule".  6 
The  Purab  in  general  -  but  particularly  Oudh  -  would  supply  the  majority  of  recruits  for  the  Bengal 
Native  Infantry  right  up  until  the  mutiny.  Of  the  279N.  C.  O.  s  and  sepoys  of  the  22ndN.  I.  who  deserted 
in  1824  while  on  the  march  from  Lucknow,  263  (or  941/o)  came  from  Oudh 
.7 
Major-General  Sir  Jasper 
Nicholls  told  the  select  committee  of  1831  that  "the  whole  sepoy  army  of  Bengal  is  drawn  from  the 
Company's  province  of  Bihar  and  Oudh,  with  very  few  exceptions...  "  Ten  years  later,  William 
Sleeman  noted:  "Three-fourths  of  the  recruits  of  our  Bengal  Native  Infantry  are  drawn  from  the  Rajput 
peasantry  of  the  kingdom  of  Oudh.  "9  Finally,  General  Sir  Patrick  Grant,  a  former  Adjutant-General  of 
the  Bengal  Army,  informed  the  Peel  Commission  that  recruits  for  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  were 
drawn  "chiefly  from  Oude,  a  few  from  the  the  Punjaub,  and  the  rest  from  Bhajepoor  [in  Bihar]  and  the 
Doab"ý' 
High-caste  Hindus  were  still  dominating  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  by  1857,  though  their  overall 
majority  was  under  threat.  Clive  had  recommended  in  1765  that  native  battalions  should  contain  an 
equal  number  of  Muslims  and  Hindus  to  balance  each  other,  but  this  policy  was  never  carried  out 
because  there  were  not  enough  suitable  Muslims  in  the  areas  that  had  been  targeted  for  recruitment. 
High-caste  Hindus  were,  in  any  case,  preferred  by  successive  governors-general  because  they  were  seen 
as  more  pliable  than  Muslims.  In  1789,  therefore,  Cornwallis  was  able  to  inform  the  Court  of  Directors 
that  four-fifths  of  the  Bengal  Army  -  by  now  36  native  infantry  battalions  strong  -  was  composed  of 
Hindus.  " 
The  initial  method  of  recruitment  was  for  the  commanding  officer  of  a  battalion  to  enlist  from  the 
area  in  which  his  regiment  was  stationed.  Occasionally  recruiting  parties  were  sent  out  to  neighbouring 
areas  when  sufficient  recruits  were  not  available.  But  by  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century  the 
preferred  method  was  to  encourage  sepoys  on  furlough  to  bring  recruits  from  their  own  villages.  This 
6  A]  avi,  Yhe  Sepoys  and  the  Company,  p.  45. 
7  Bengal  Military  Consultations,  OIOC,  P/3  1/10,  No.  33  of  6  Jan  1825. 
8  Quoted  in  Barat,  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  p.  119 
9  Major-General  Sir  William  Sleeman,  Rambles  andRecollections  ofan  Indian  Official  (1844,  this 
edition  1915),  p.  624 
10  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  65,  p.  481 
11  Barat,  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  p  12  1;  Kolff,  Naukur,  Rajput  and  Sepoy,  179-80 23 
was  because  the  serving  sepoy  "acted  as  the  guarantor  of  the  respectable  antecedents  and  fifture  loyalty" 
of  the  new  recruit.  12  Thus  was  the  high-caste  monopoly  perpetuated. 
One  such  recruit  was  Sitaram  Pandy,  a  high-caste  Brahmin  from  the  Rai  Bareilly  district  of  southern 
Oudh.  The  son  of  a  small  landholder,  he  was  persuaded  to  join  up  in  1812  by  his  maternal  uncle  who 
was  ajemadar  Ounior  native  officer)  on  leave  from  his  battalion  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry.  Sitaram's 
father  gave  his  permission  not  out  of  financial  necessity,  but  because  he  had  a  lawsuit  pending  over  the 
disputed  ownership  of  a  grove  of  mango  trees  "and  he  thought  that  having  a  son  in  the  Company 
Bahadu?  s  service  would  be  the  means  of  getting  his  case  attended  to  in  the  law  courts  of  Lucknow". 
For  though  Oudh  was  still  an  independent  state,  "it  was  well  known  that  a  petition  sent  by  a  soldier 
through  his  commanding  officer",  who  forwarded  it  to  the  British  Resident  in  Lucknow,  "generally  had 
prompt  attention  paid  to  it,  and  carried  more  weight  than  even  the  bribes  and  party  interest  of  a  mere 
subject  of  the  King  of  Oudh".  13  The  removal  of  this  privilege  by  the  annexation  of  Oudh  in  1856  was 
to  add  yet  another  grievance  to  the  sepoys'  growing  list. 
The  virtual  monopoly  that  high-caste  Hindus  enjoyed  over  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  is  illustrated  by 
the  ethnic  breakdown  of  officers  and  men  in  a  battalion  raised  at  Benares  in  1814-15  (see  Table  1).  " 
Table  I-  Ethnic  composition  ofa  new  battalion  ofBenizal  Native  In/antry  in  1815 
BRAHMINS  RAJPUTS  HINDUS  OF  INFERIOR  CASTES  MUSLIMS  TOTAL 
392 
(43.9%) 
304 
(34.1%) 
108 
(12.1%) 
92 
(1()-30/.  ) 
892 
High-caste  Hindus  (Brahmins  and  Rajputs)  made  up  almost  four-fifths  of  the  battalion,  while  Hindus  of 
all  castes  were  90  per  cent  of  the  whole.  Though  this  sample  is  only  one  of  many  -  the  Bengal  Native 
Infantry  had  expanded,  because  of  war,  to  27  two-battalion  regiments  by  1808  -  it  is  generally 
representative  of  the  whole.  In  1824,  for  example  -  by  which  time  a  reorganization  of  the  army  had 
12  A]  avi,  Yhe  Sepoys  and  the  Company,  p.  4  8. 
13  James  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar:  Being  the  Life  andAdventures  of  Subedar  Sita  Ram,  a 
Native  Officer  of  the  BengalArmy,  written  andrelatedby  himsey(1873,  this  edition  1970),  p.  S. 
Sitaram  completed  his  memoir  shortly  after  his  retirement  in  1861.  It  was  translated  and  first  published 
by  his  former  commanding  officer,  Lt.  -Col.  J.  T.  Norgate,  in  1873.  Doubt  has  been  cast  on  its 
authenticity  by  several  authorities,  most  recently  J.  A.  B.  Palmer.  But  Sir  Patrick  Cadell,  the 
distinguished  historian  of  the  Bombay  Army  who  devoted  many  years  to  a  study  of  the  memoir,  came 
to  the  conclusion  that  it  was  genuine.  1,  too,  am  convinced  that  only  a  genuine  Bengal  sepoy  could 
have  supplied  the  rich  and  (mostly)  accurate  detail  that  the  memoir  contains. 
14  Barat,  Yhe  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  p,  122. 24 
produced  68  single  battalion  regiments  -a  descriptive  roll  for  279  N.  C.  O.  s  and  sepoys  who  had 
deserted  from  the  22d  N.  I.  showed  that  more  than  84  per  cent  of  them  were  high-caste.  15 
Some  of  the  reasons  for  this  official  bias  are  given  in  a  journal  entry  for  May  1818  by  the  then 
Governor-General  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  Bengal,  Lord  Hastings  (1813-1823).  "Inournative 
regiments,  "  he  wrote,  "none  but  men  of  high  caste  are  suffered  to  enlist;  so  that  individuals  being 
ordinarily  connected  with  respectable  families,  have  the  best  chance  to  be  impressed  with  any  just 
sentiments  or  principles  of  rectitude  that  may  be  afloat  in  the  country.  A  dignity,  too,  is  attached  by 
general  opinion  in  India  to  the  character  of  a  soldier;  whence  the  sepoy  may  be  expected  to  habituate 
his  mind  to  a  generous  tone  of  thought.  "  16 
Lord  William  Bentinck,  Governor-General  from  1828  to  1835  (and  Commander-in-Chief  of  Bengal 
from  1833  to  1835),  also  believed  in  the  superiorcharacte?  and  physique  of  the  recruits  from  northern 
India;  but  he  did  not  confine  that  admiration  to  high-caste  I-Endus  alone.  In  his  minute  on  military 
policy  of  March  1835,  he  wrote  that  "the  Hindustani  is  larger  and  more  robust  than  the  native  south  of 
the  [River]  Narbada  and  the  presumption  must  be  that  he  is  considered  a  more  powerful  if  not  a  better 
soldier".  17  He  then  pointed  out  that  even  those  Bombay  sepoys  who  had  been  recruited  from 
Hindustan  (about  half  the  total)  were  smaller  and  lighter  than  those  in  Bengal,  while  the  incidence  of 
corporal  punishment  in  the  Bombay  Presidency  was  much  higher.  From  this  he  was  able  to  form  the 
opinion  "that  the  Hindustanis  engaged  at  Bombay"  were  "inferior  in  stature  and  character  to  those  of  the 
Bengal  Army".  Bentinck's  solution  was  to  abolish  the  Bombay  Army,  transferring  its  Hindustani  half 
to  the  Bengal  Army  and  to  allow  "the  Bombay  half  to  remain  as  a  separate  corps  to  be  recruited  always 
within  the  territories"  and  to  be  commanded  by  a  major-general  "as  any  other  division  of  the  army".  '  8 
Fortunately,  the  Court  of  Directors  did  not  agree.  If  they  had,  the  mutiny  of  1857  might  have  been 
more  widespread  still. 
15  Troceedings  of  a  Special  Committee  of  Inquiry,  Berhampore,  13  Dee  1824,  Bengal  Military 
Consultations,  OIOC,  No.  33  of  6h  Jan  1825,  P/3  1/10.  The  ethnic  breakdown  was  as  follows: 
Brahmins  122  (43.7%);  Rajputs  (Chuttrees)  113  (40.5%);  Muslims  12  (4.3%);  Other  castes  32  (11.5%). 
16  Marchioness  of  Bute  (ed.  ),  Yhe  Private  Journals  of  the  Marquess  ofHastings.  Governor-General  mid 
Commander-in-Chief  in  India  (1858),  vol.  2,  pp.  324-5. 
17  C.  H.  Philips  (ed.  ),  Yhe  Correspondence  of  Lord  William  Cavendish  Bentinck.  Governor-General  of 
India  1828-1835  (Oxford,  1977),  H,  Letter  810,  pp.  1445-6.  Bentinck  gave  the  average  height  and 
weight  of  sepoys  from  the  three  presidency  armies  as  follows:  Bengal  -  height  5'  7.82",  weight  9st 
0.8oz;  Bombay  -  height  5'4.75"-S'-6.5",  weight  8st  5.25oz  -9st  0.5oz;  Madras  -  height  5'5.36"-56.59", 
weight  7st  9.73oz-8st  5.18oz.  The  statistics  for  the  Bombay  and  Madras  Armies  are  variable  because 
some  of  their  sepoys  were  recruited  from  outside  their  presidencies;  the  higher  figures  are  those 
recruited  from  Hindustan.  Almost  all  Bengal  sepoys  were  recruited  from  Hindustan. 
18  Ibid.,  p.  1445-6. 25 
In  Bentinck's  opinion,  all  Indian  sepoys  suffered  from  a  "want  of  physical  strength,  and  of  a  moral 
energy"  which  would  prevent  them  from  defeating  a  European  invader  such  as  Russia.  Recent  wars 
with  "enemies  of  a  more  masculine  character"  like  the  Nepalese  and  Burmese  had  proved  this  to  be  the 
case.  Yet  Bentinck  believed  "that  if  the  bolder  and  larger  men  of  the  north  were  mixed  with  a  due 
proportion  of  European  troops,  and  excited  to  acts  of  valour  by  sufficient  encouragement",  there  was  no 
reason  why  they  "should  not  acquire  the  same  superior  bearing  as  the  Portugese  and  Neapolitans,  under 
British  and  French  direction".  As  for  the  sepoys  from  the  "territories  proper  of  Madras  and  Bombay" 
he  could  "entertain  no  such  hope".  Short  of  disbanding  them  entirely  -  which  was  clearly  out  of  the 
question  -  the  only  solution  he  could  suggest  was  to  increase  the  proportion  of  European  troops  to 
native  troops  in  India  from  less  than  1:  6  to  1:  4.19  But  while  considerably  more  European  troops  were 
stationed  in  India  over  the  next  20  years,  their  native  counterparts  also  increased  in  number,  so  that  the 
proportion  of  European  to  native  troops  only  improved  to  1:  5.1  (45,522  to  232,224).  In  Bengal, 
however,  the  ratio  in  1857  was  about  1:  5.6  (24,366  to  135,767).  20  If  all  native  troops  commanded  by 
European  officers  are  taken  into  account  -  including  regulars,  irregulars,  local  corps,  contingents  and 
military  police  -  then  the  ratio  falls  back  to  1:  6  for  India  generally  (45,522  to  275,304)  and  1:  7.3 
(24,366  to  176,834)  for  Bengal.  21 
If  Bentinck  had  a  marked  preference  for  sepoys  from  Hindustan,  he  and  his  government  did  not  agree 
with  the  semi-official  policy  of  confining  recruitment  to  the  highest  Hindu  castes.  They  were,  in 
particular,  convinced  that  the  army  contained  too  many  Brahmins  who  tended  to  put  caste  issues  before 
duty.  As  early  as  1830,  the  Bengal  government  had  commented  that  "an  unusally  large  number  of 
Brahmins  has  of  late  entered  the  service  [and  that]  it  would  be  desirable,  to  follow  the  proportion  which 
formerly  prevailed  by  giving  a  decided  preference  to  the  Rajputs  and  to  the  Mahomedans".  22  But  the 
Brahmins  simply  got  round  this  restriction  by  enlisting  -  in  the  59th  N.  I.,  for  example  -  as  Rajputs. 
19  Ibid.,  1450-2.  Bentinck  gives  the  relative  strength  of  the  Indian  Army  in  1835  as  follows:  European 
18,016;  Native  112,684. 
20  Return  showing  the  Numbers  of  the  troops,  regular  and  irregular,  which  were  serving  in  the  three 
Presidencies  immediately  before  the  Mutiny',  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  17,  p.  379.  The  number  of 
European  troops  in  Madras  and  Bombay  are  given  as  10,730  and  10,430  respectively.  An  alternative 
troop  breakdown  is  given  in  'A  Return  of  the  actual  Military  Force  that  was  in  India  at  the  time  of  the 
Outbreak  of  the  Mutiny  at  Meerut',  NAM,  8211-13-14.  This  source  gives  the  total  number  of  troops  in 
India  as  follows:  Bengal,  118,663  natives  and  23,13  8  Europeans;  Madras,  49,73  7  natives  and  10,194 
Europeans;  Bombay,  30,940  natives  and  9,589  Europeans.  It  appears  to  exclude  local  troops, 
contingents,  military  police  and  some  irregular  corps. 
21  'Tabular  Statement  of  the  Army  of  India  in  January  1856',  Lawrence,  Essays,  Military  andPolitical, 
p.  370-1;  'Statement  showing  the  Number  and  Distribution  of  all  Troops,  Native  and  European,  serving 
in  the  Bengal  Presidency  in  January  1857',  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  VIII,  p.  13 26 
Bentinck's  solution  was  to  issue,  in  late  1834,  a  General  Order  which  stated  that  "all  objections  to  men 
belonging  to  the  respectable  classes  of  the  native  community,  or  preferences  among  such  classes  on 
account  of  caste  or  religion,  shall  cease  to  operate  in  respect  to  their  admission  into  the  ranks  of  the 
Bengal  Army".  23  It  removed,  at  a  stroke,  the  recent  prejudice  against  Brahmins  and  the  more 
entrenched  bias  against  'respectable'Muslims  and  Hindus  who  were  not  high-caste  Brahmins  and 
Rajputs.  Among  these  'respectable'Hindu  castes  were  Ahirs  (the  cowherd  caste  of  Bihar  and  Upper 
India),  Bhats  (a  caste  of  genealogist  and  family  bards),  Kaits  (the  writer  caste  ofBengal  proper  and 
Bihar)  and  Kumbis  (a  very  large  cultivating  caste  of  upper  India,  Bihar,  Chota  Nagpur  and  Orissa).  24 
The  overall  result,  Bentinck  hoped,  would  be  an  erosion  of  the  high-caste  (particularly  Brahmin) 
monopoly. 
But  this  cleverly  disguised  assault  on  the  Brahmin-dominated  brotherhood  of  high-caste  sepoys  was  a 
far  cry  from  throwing  the  ranks  open  to  natives  of  all  castes.  For  while  this  policy  of  non-prejudice 
towards  any  particular  element  of  the  "respectable  classes"  was  re-emphasized  by  the  Bengal  Army 
regulations  of  1855  (the  first  revised  edition  for  16  years),  they  also  stipulated  that  "special  care"  had  to 
be  taken  "to  reject  all  men  of  inferior  caste"  and  "any  others  habitually  employed  in  menial 
occupations".  Moreover  the  regulations  stressed  that  "it  was  not  considered  desirable  to  have  too  large 
a  proportion  of  Brahmins  in  any  regiment",  but  added  that  appearances  of  "strength,  activity,  boldness, 
and  smartness,  should  be  the  principal  guide  in  the  selection  of  recruits".  Furthermore,  they  affirmed 
the  established  practice  of  new  recruits  being  brought  to  the  regiments  by  soldiers  returning  from  leave 
as  the  primary  method  of  recruitment,  a  policy  hardly  calculated  to  cut  the  ties  of  kinship  and  caste  that 
existed  in  the  Bengal  ArMy.  25 
Nevertheless  the  high-caste  monopoly  was  gradually  eroded.  In  1842,  according  to  figures  presented 
by  Lieutenant-General  Briggs,  the  proportion  of  Rajputs  and  Brahmins  in  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry 
was  34.9%  and  3  1.0%  respectively  (see  Table  2).  26 
Table  2-  Ethnic  composition  qf1he  Bengal  Native  Infantry  in  1842 
Rajputs  Brahmins  Hindus  of  inferior 
caste 
I  Muslims  Christians  r  Total  I 
27,993(34.91/o)_  24,840(31.0%)  13,920  (17.3%)  1  12,411  (15.4%)  1  1,076  (1.3%)  1  80,240-1 
22  Barat,  The  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  p.  123. 
23  G.  O.  G.  G.,  31  Dec  1834,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  OIOC,  L/MEU17/2/435. 
24  Barat,  7he  Bengal  Native  Inanhy,  p.  122. 
25  Bengal  Army  Regulations  1855,  OIOC,  LAIEU17/2/442,  pp.  215-16. 
26  Barat,  Yhe  Bengal  Native  hfianhy,  p.  123. 27 
It  is  not  ideal  to  compare  these  figures  with  those  for  the  single  newly-enlisted  battalion  of  1814-15. 
But  if  we  do,  then  it  becomes  clear  that  more  Muslims  and  Hindus  of  inferior  caste  have  been  recruited 
at  the  expense  of  high-caste  sepoys  (the  latter's  combined  total  having  slipped  from  80  per  cent  to  just 
under  66  per  cent),  and  that  the  RaJputs  have  replaced  the  Brahmins  as  the  dominant  caste. 
But  this  marginal  change  did  not  satisfy  Henry  Lawrence,  a  talented  artillery officer  who  had  been 
seconded  to  the  Political  Department.  In  1844,  while  serving  as  Resident  in  Nepal,  he  wrote  the  first  of 
a  number  of  anonymous  articles  for  the  Calcutta  Review  that  advocated  sweeping  military  reform. 
Entitled  'Military  Defence  and  our  Indian  Empire',  it  declared  his  belief  that  the  British  deceived 
themselves  if  they  thought  that  their  government  was  "maintained  otherwise  than  by  the  sword".  It  was 
necessary,  therefore,  to  keep  that  sword  from  rusting.  Not  least  because,  in  his  opinion,  the  greatest 
threat  to  British  rule  "is  from  our  own  troops"  and  the  recruitment  policy  of  the  Bengal  Army  was 
partly  to  blame.  He  wrote: 
Our  Scpoys  come  too  much  from  the  same  parts  of  the  country;  Oudc,  the  lower  Dooab  and  upper  Behar.  There  is 
too  much  of  clanship  among  them,  and  the  evil  should  be  rcmedicd  by  enlisting  in  the  Saharunpoor  and  Dclhi 
districts,  in  the  hill  regions,  and  in  the  Malay  and  Burmah  States...  We  would  go  farther,  and  would  encourage  the 
now  despised  Eurasians  to  enter  our  ranks,  either  into  scpoys  corps  where  one  or  two  here  and  there  would  be 
27 
useful,  or  as  detached  companies  or  corps... 
At  first  Lawrence's  warnings  fell  on  deaf  ears  as  most  Bengal  Army  offlicers  were  still  of  the  opinion 
that  high-caste  peasants  made  the  best  soldiers  But  the  two  Sikh  wars  of  the  1840s  were  to  cause  a  shift 
in  recruitment  policy  nonetheless.  After  the  successful  conclusion  of  the  first  war  (1845-6),  two  local 
regiments  of  Sikh  infantry  -  the  Ferozepore  and  Ludhiana  -  were  raised  to  protect  the  new  frontier  with 
Punjab  with  the  same  pay,  allowances  and  pensions  as  regiments  of  the  line.  28  A  further  four  regiments 
of  Sikh  frontier  infantry  (later  known  as  the  l"41'  Sikh  Infantry)  were  enlisted  in  1846  and  1847.  The 
famous  Corps  of  Guides  -  which  initially  consisted  of  two  companies  of  infantry  and  one  troop  of 
cavalry  -  was  also  formed  in  1846  to  assist  the  Sikh  rulers  of  the  Punjab  in  policing  the  turbulent  North- 
27  Lawrence,  Duqs,  Military  and  Political,  pp.  5,29-3  0. 
29  G.  O.  C.  C.,  30  July  1846,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1840  to  1847,  OlOC,  lAffUI7/2/436. 28 
West  Frontier  with  Mghanistan.  29  "The  object  of  the  corps,  "  wrote  its  first  commandant,  "was  to  have 
trustworthy  men  who  could  at  a  moment's  notice  act  as  guides  to  troops  in  the  field,  and  collect 
intelligence  beyond  as  well  as  within  the  border.  ,  30  It  was  initially  recruited  from  Hindustani  soldiers 
serving  in  the  Sikh  army,  Pathans  who  had  served  with  the  British  in  Mghanistan,  and  some  Mazbi  -  or 
low-caste  -  Sikhs. 
Following  the  second  war  (1848-9)  and  the  annexation  of  the  Punjab,  five  regiments  of  irregular 
infantry  and  five  of  cavalry  were  enlisted  in  the  province  to  pacify  and  protect  the  North-West 
Frontier.  31  This  had  the  effect  of  absorbing  some  of  the  100,000  soldiers  who  lost  employment  when 
the  Sikh  army  was  disbanded.  The  irregular  infantry  regiments,  for  example,  were  composed  of 
roughly  equal  proportions  of  Pathans,  Punjabi  Muslims,  Sikhs  and  Hindus  (many  of  whom  were  high- 
caste).  32  The  Guides  were  also  increased  to  three  troops  of  cavalry  and  six  of  infantry,  and  the  whole 
force  became  known  as  the  Punjab  Frontier  Cater  Irregular)  Force.  While  none  of  these  augmentations 
directly  threatened  the  high-caste  power  base  in  the  regular  infantry  regiments,  they  did  provide  the 
Company  with  an  alternative  instrument  of  authority  and  an  alternative  source  of  recruits. 
The  necessity  for  such  an  option  was  made  all  the  more  urgent  in  1849  when  a  number  of  Bengal 
Native  Infantry  regiments  reacted  angrily  to  the  news  that  foreign  service  batta  would  no  longer  apply 
in  the  Punjab  because  it  had  become  a  British  territory.  33  Sir  Charles  Napier,  the  Commander-in-Chief, 
would  ultimately  receive  information  that  as  many  as  24  native  infantry  regiments  (a  third  of  the  total) 
were  tainted  with  a  "mutinous  spirit".  34  The  first  sign  of  discontent  came  at  Rawalpindi  in  July  1849 
when  the  13th  and  22"d  regiments  refused  to  receive  their  reduced  pay.  Though  both  regiments  were 
eventually  persuaded  to  back  down,  Napier  was  uneasy  because  his  intelligence  indicated  that  other 
disaffected  regiments  were  in  communication  with  their  Rawalpindi  comrades  . 
35  He  decided  to  act  on 
hearing  that  high-caste  sepoys  were  to  blame.  "When  it  was  made  known  that  Brahmins  were  at  the 
29  Captain  Lionel  J.  Trotter,  Yhe  Life  ofRodsonqfRodsons  Horse  (London,  1901),  pp.  434. 
30  Lt  H.  B.  Lumsden  to  Lt.  J.  Younghusband,  P.  S.  Lumdsen  and  GR  Elsmie,  Lumsden  of  the  Guides 
jLondon,  1899),  p.  37.  Quoted  in  Shibly,  'The  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies',  Ph.  D,  p.  122. 
1  G.  O.  G.  G.  18  May  1849  and  15  February  1851,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1848  to  1853, 
OIOC,  IJMIU17/2/437. 
32  Evidence  of  Lt.  -Col.  Alfred  Wilde,  26  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  I-I.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  91. 
33  G.  O.  G.  G.  25  Oct  1849,  ibid.  The  exception  to  this  rule  were  the  troops  stationed  across  the  Indus 
because  "being  on  the  extreme  frontier  of  a  newly  conquered  country"  they  were  "required  to  be  in 
constant  readiness  to  move  at  a  moment's  notice".  As  a  result,  they  were  allowed  to  continue  to  receive 
the  same  foreign  batta  given  to  those  in  Sind,  i.  e.  two  more  rupees  for  sepoys  in  cantonment,  and  three 
and  a  half  for  those  in  the  field. 
34  Sir  Charles  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  of  the  Indian  Govemment  (London,  1853),  p.  3  8. 
35  Ibid.,  p.  25, 29 
head  of  the  insubordinate  men  of  the  13th  and  22ný"  he  wrote  later,  "and  that  in  the  first  regiment  alone 
there  were  no  less  than  four  hundred  and  thirty,  the  necessity  of  teaching  that  race  they  should  no 
longer  dictate  to  the  Sepoys  and  the  Government  struck  me,  and  my  thoughts  at  once  turned  for  means 
to  the  Goorkas.  06 
The  troops  in  question  were  the  same  hillmen  that  Henry  Lawrence  had  recommended  for  the  native 
infantryinl844.  At  that  stage  there  were  three  irregular  Gurkha  battalions  -the  Nasiri,  Sirmur  and 
Kumaon  -  which  had  been  raised  in  the  wake  of  the  I't  Nepal  War  of  1814-15.  They  were  recruited 
from  both  the  independent  kingdom  of  Nepal  and  the  neighbouring  hill  country  that  was  ruled  by  the 
British,  and  though  the  vast  majority  were  officially  described  as'Rajputs',  they  included  Gurkhas, 
Doteallies,  Ghurwallies  and  Kumaonees,  and  bore  little  relation  to  the  Rajputs  from  the  plains  of 
India.  37  According  to  Napier,  they  were  the  "bravest  of  Native  troops"  and  "at  the  battles  on  the 
Sutledge  [Sutlej  in  the  I"  Sikh  War]  displayed  such  conspicuous  gallantry  as  to  place  them  for  courage 
on  a  level  with  our  Europeans".  38 
An  even  greater  attraction  for  Napier,  however,  was  the  fact  that  they  did  not  take  their  own  caste 
rules  too  seriously.  "It  is  said  they  do  not  like  cow-beef,  "  wrote  Napier,  "yet  a  cow  would  not  be  long 
alive  with  a  hungry  Goorka  battalion;  they  mess  together,  these  Goorkas,  and  make  few  inquiries  as  to 
the  sex  of  a  beefsteaki  09  The  "higher  Hindoo  castes",  by  contrast,  were  all  "imbued  with  gross 
superstitions"  and  allowed  "their  religious  principles  to  interfere  in  many  strange  ways  with  their 
military  duties".  40  The  worst  offenders,  in  Napier's  opinion,  were  the  Brahmins:  "Having  two 
commanders  to  obey,  caste  and  captain,  if  they  are  at  variance  the  last  is  disobeyed,  or  obeyed  at  the 
cost  of  conscience  and  of  misery.  1141 
For  Napier,  the  Gurkhas  were  the  ideal  soldiers  to  combat  the  influence  of  the  Brahmins,  not  least 
because  they  were  "said  to  have  a  dislike  to  the  [Bengal]  Sepoys  amounting  to  contempt".  42  Having 
recently  heard  from  one  of  their  commanders  that  a  combination  of  high  prices  at  Simla  and  their  low 
pay  as  a  local  battalion  Oust  five  and  a  half  rupees  a  month)  meant  that  they  were  all  but  starving, 
36  Ibid.,  p.  29. 
37  Caste  Returns  of  the  Sirmoor,  Kemaon  and  New  Nusseeree  Battalions,  May  1851,  India  Military 
Consultations,  OIOC,  P/43/38,  No.  45  of  14  May  1852. 
38  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  p.  28. 
39  Ibid.,  p.  29. 
40  Ibid.,  pp.  28-9.  Napier  added:  "One  goes  to  the  devil  if  he  eats  this;  another  if  he  eats  that;  a  third 
will  not  touch  his  dinner  if  the  shadow  of  an  infidel  falls  over  it;  a  fourth  will  not  drink  water  unless  it 
has  been  drawn  by  one  of  his  own  caste.  " 
41  Ibid.,  p.  29. 30 
Napier  decided  to  "adopt  the  Goorka  regiments  into  the  line,  abolish  their  limitation  of  service  to  the 
to  43  hills,  and  give  them  pay  and  allowance  as  Sepoys  .  This  move  was  formally  sanctioned  by  the  issue 
of  a  General  Order  by  the  Governor-General  in  March  185044.  Napiees  long-term  plan  was  to  enlist  up 
to  40,000  Gurkhas.  Backed  by  them  and  30,000  European  troops,  the  British  possession  of  India  would 
no  longer  depend  on  opinion',  but  on  an  Army,  able  with  ease  to  overthrow  any  combination  among 
Hindoos  or  Mahomedans,  or  both  togetherl  "45  He  concluded:  "We  may  thus  set  the  Brahmin  at 
defiance,  if  he  behaves  ill.  "46 
Unfortunately  for  the  British,  Napier  fell  out  with  the  Governor-General,  Lord  Dalhousie  -  over  his 
unilateral  decision  to  mollify  the  sepoys  by  cancelling  an  earlier  government  order  to  reduce  the 
compensation  paid  to  them  when  their  fixed  rations  exceeded  a  certain  price  -  and  resigned  before  he 
could  undertake  such  a  radical  reform.  He  nevertheless  made  some  headway  with  his  plan  to  dilute  the 
high-caste  Bengal  sepoy.  By  far  the  most  serious  act  of  disaffection  over  the  abolished  batta  issue  took 
place  in  February  1850  when  the  66th  N.  I.  made  an  abortive  attempt  to  sieze  the  fortress  at  Govindghur 
in  the  Punjab.  Napierosimmediate  response  was  to  disband  the  regiment  and  replace  it  with  the  Nasiri 
Battalion,  henceforth  known  as  the  60h  (Gurkha)  N.  I.  "I  resolved  to  show  these  Brahmins  that  they 
cannot  control  our  enlistment,  "  he  informed  the  Governor-General,  Lord  Dalhousie,  on  27  February 
1850.  "1  mean  to  repeat  the  operation  if  another  regiment  mutinies,  unless  your  Lordship 
disapproves.  "47  However  there  were  no  more  mutinies  because,  wrote  Napier,  the  "Brahmins  saw  that 
the  Goorkas,  another  race,  could  be  brought  into  the  ranks  of  the  Company's  Army  -a  race  dreaded  as 
more  warlike  than  their  own  oM 
But  there  was  one  more  significant  change  in  the  Bengal  Army's  recruitment  policy  before  Napier 
was  replaced  by  Sir  William  Gomm  as  Commander-in-Chief  in  December  1850.  A  circular  letter  was 
sent  by  the  Government  of  India  to  all  commanding  officers  on  II  November  1850,  containing  an 
extract  of  a  letter  from  the  Court  of  Directors  which  stated  that  inhabitants  of  Punjab  "should,  under  the 
general  regulations  of  the  service,  with  respect  to  age,  height,  and  fitness,  and  with  due  advertence  to 
the  number  of  Hindoos,  Mussulmans,  and  Seikhs  in  each  Regiment,  be  considered  eligible  as  Recruits 
42  Ibid.,  pp.  29-30  and  28. 
43  Ibid.,  p.  30. 
44  G.  O.  G.  G.  22  March  1850,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1848  to  1853,  OIOC,  LMU17/2/437. 
45  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  widMilitary,  p.  3  0. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Ibid.,  p.  130. 
48  ibid.,  p.  134. 31 
for  our  Regular  Native  Army  ".  49  This  reform  was  highly  significant  because  it  made  Sikhs  and  Punjabi 
Muslims  eligible  for  service  in  regular  infantry  regiments.  Though  their  number  in  any  one  regiment, 
as  stated  by  the  Bengal  Army  Regulations  of  1855,  was  "never  to  exceed  200,  nor  are  more  than  100  of 
them  to  be  Seikhs",  the  threat  this  posed  to  the  high-caste  monopoly  was  obvious.  50 
The  effects,  however,  took  time  to  make  themselves  felt.  The  caste  breakdown  for  the  Bengal  Native 
Infantry  in  1851  -  as  given  in  evidence  to  a  Parliamentary  select  committee  by  Philip  Melvill,  Secretary 
to  the  Government  of  India  in  the  Military  Department,  the  following  year  -  is  remarkably  similar  to 
that  provided  by  General  Briggs  in  1842  (see  Table  3).  51  The  only  meaningful  changes  are  the 
increases  in  the  proportion  of  inferior  caste  Ilindus  from  17.3%  to  18.8%,  and  Brahmins  from  3  1%  to 
32.1%.  But  as  the  percentage  of  Rajputs  had  shrunk  from  34.9%  to  32.6%,  the  overall  proportion  of 
high-caste  sepoys  had  fallen  marginally  from  just  under  66%  to  64.7%,  a  decrease  ofjust  over  one  per 
cent. 
Table  3-  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  Bengal  Native  Infantry  in  1851 
Rajputs  Brahmins  Hindus  of  Muslims  Christians  Sikhs  Total 
inferior  caste 
27,335  26,983  15,761  12,699  1,118  so  83,946 
(32.6%)  (32.1%)  (18.8%)  (1.3%)  (0.1  */0) 
Part  of  the  reason  for  the  small  increase  in  the  proportion  of  Brahmin  sepoys  was  because  commanding 
officers  often  ignored  official  guidelines.  For  as  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wyllie  informed  the  post-mutiny 
Peel  Commission,  "the  feeling  was  that  [in  Brahmins]  they  have  a  more  respectable  man, 
in  the  same  way  as  in  our  country  you  would  rather  have  a  farmer's  son  than  a  man  taken  from  the 
streets".  52  In  1856,  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  -  now  Agent  to  the  Governor-General  in  Rajputana  -  argued 
against  this  practice  in  another  essay  demanding  military  reform  in  the  Calcutta  Review.  He  blamed  the 
"Hindoo  prejudices  of  commanding  off  icers"  for  the  fact  that  "scarcely  three  thousand"  Sikhs  had  been 
recruited  to  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  since  the  regulations  were  altered  in  November  1850.53  The 
actual  number  was  probably  half  as  much,  Lawrence  believed,  because  "some  Sikhs  have  abjured 
Sikhism,  others  have  been  driven  out  of  it,  and  not  a  shadow  of  encouragement  has  been  given  to 
49  Circular  No.  2346,11  Nov  1850,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1848  to  1853,  OIOC, 
L/MIU17/2/437. 
50  Bengal  Army  Regulations  1855,  OIOC,  LM1117/2/442,  p.  215. 
51  P.  P.,  H.  of  L.,  1852-3,  =,  p.  10. 
52  B  arat,  Me  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  p.  124. 
53  Lawrence,  Essays,  Military  andPolitical,  p.  423. 32 
counteract  the  quiet,  but  persistent  opposition  of  the  Oude  and  Behar  men".  Such  internal  opposition 
"to  the  introduction  of  new  classes  into  the  army"  had  even  prevented  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Patrick 
Grant,  then  a  captain,  from  recruiting  "hardy  Aheers"  and  "Ranghurs"  into  the  ranks  of  the  newly-raised 
Hurriana  Light  Infantry  in  the  late  1830s.  According  to  Lawrence,  who  heard  it  from  Grant  himself, 
"the  Rajpoots  and  Brahmins  bullied  the  new  levies  out  of  the  corps".  Lawrence's  solution  had  not 
altered  much  since  1844.  It  was  both  to  extend  the  field  of  recruitment  for  the  regular  army  and  to  have 
regiments  of  separate  classes.  He  wrote: 
Oude  should  no  longer  supply  the  mass  of  our  infantry  and  regular  cavalry;  indeed,  twenty  years  hence,  it  will  be 
unable  to  do  so.  The  Punjab,  Ncpaul,  and  the  Delhi  territory  should  be  more  largely  indented  on;  as  should  the 
whole  North-West  Provinces,  and  the  military  classes  of  Bombay  and  Madras....  The  plan  to  be  followed,  to  get 
and  to  keep  the  best  soldiers  throughout  India,  and  to  quietly  oppose  class  against  class,  and  tribe  against  tribe,  is  to 
have  separate  regiments  of  each  creed  or  class,  filling  up  half,  three-fourths,  or  even  more  of  the  commissioned  and 
non-commissioned  ranks  from  their  own  numbers...  We  have  not  a  doubt  that,  thus  organized,  the  low-caste  man, 
who,  under  present  influences,  is  the  mcre  creature  of  the  Brahmin,  would  as  readily  meet  him  with  the  bayonet,  as 
he  would  a  Mahommedan.  54 
As  before,  Lawrence's  recommendations  received  no  official  sanction.  Yet  the  high-caste  sepoys' 
defence  of  their  dominant  position  could  not  succeed  indefinitely.  It  was  to  receive  a  further  blow  in 
the  summer  of  1856  when  the  new  Governor-General,  Lord  Canning,  ordered  that  all  enlistment  to  the 
Indian  Army  would  henceforth  be  for  general  service  . 
55  I-Etherto  it  had  been  the  practice  in  Bengal  to 
ask  for  volunteers  when  troops  were  needed  for  service  beyond  sea.  This  was  in  deference  to  its 
Brahmin  and  Rajput  sepoys  who,  theoretically,  would  lose  their  caste  if  they  travelled  over  the'black 
watee.  As  a  result,  only  the  Bengal  Artillery  and  six  of  the  74  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  had 
56  been  recruited  for  general  service.  Now  all  new  recruits  would  be  taken  on  that  basis.  Leaving 
specific  caste  issues  aside  (they  will  be  dealt  with  in  a  later  chapter),  one  of  the  main  reasons  why 
Brahmin  and  Rajput  sepoys  objected  to  this  measure  was  because  they  thought  it  would  discourage 
their  brethren  from  enlisting  and  so  undermine  their  monopoly.  Sir  John  Kaye  wrote:  "There  was  an 
end,  indeed,  of  the  exclusive  privileges  which  the  Bengal  Sipahi  had  so  long  enjoyed.  The  service 
54  Ibid.,  pp.  421-2,424-5. 
55  G.  O.  G.  G.,  25  July  1856,  quoted  in  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  14,  p.  376. 33 
never  could  be  hereafter  what  it  had  been  of  old;  and  all  the  old  pride,  therefore,  with  which  the  veteran 
had  thought  of  his  boys  succeeding  him  was  now  suddenly  extinguished.  07 
Lord  Canning  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  new  regulation  was  not  in  any  way  responsible  for  the 
disaffection  shown  by  certain  regiments  of  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  in  early  1857.  "Not  a  murmur 
has  been  heard  against  it  anywhere,  "  he  informed  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Control,  "and  the  two 
regiments  who  have  shown  the  worst  spirit,  the  2  nd  and  34h  [N.  I.  ],  have  enrolled  as  many  recruits 
monthly  under  the  new  system  as  the  old  &  without  any  signs  of  difference  between  the  old  sepoys  & 
their  new  comrades".  58  But  Sir  Henry  Lawrence,  recently  appointed  Chief  Commissioner  of  Oudh, 
provided  evidence  to  the  contrary.  "The  General  Service  Enlistment  Oath  is  most  distasteful,  "  be 
informed  Canning  on  I  May  1857,  "keeps  many  out  of  the  service,  and  ffightens  the  old  Sipahis,  who 
imagine  that  the  oaths  of  the  young  recruits  affect  the  whole  regiment,  "  He  had  been  told  as  much  the 
previous  week  by  "one  of  the  best  captains  of  the  1P  N.  I.  11.  In  addition,  Mr  E.  A.  Reade  of  the  Sudder 
Board  had  "had  the  General  Service  Order  given  to  him  as  a  reason  last  year,  when  on  his  tour,  by 
Rajputs  for  not  entering  the  service".  59 
If  the  General  Service  regulation  is  seen  in  the  context  of  the  previous  20  years,  when  successive 
government  measures  had  sought  to  broaden  the  recruitment  base  of  the  Bengal  Army,  then  it  is 
possible  to  understand  why,  in  Kaye's  words,  it  caused  the  "the  old  race  of  Sipahis"  to  leap  to  the 
conclusion  "that  the  English  had  done  with  the  old  Bengal  Army,  and  were  about  to  substitute  for  it 
another  that  would  go  anywhere  and  do  anything,  like  coolies  and  pariahs".  60  Canning  may  have 
insisted  that  the  new  legislation  had  not  affected  the  recruitment  pattern  of  the  34h  N.  I.,  seven 
companes  of  which  were  disbanded  for  mutinous  conduct  in  early  May  1857,  but  the  writing  was 
61 
clearly  on  the  wall  (see  Table  4). 
Table  4-  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  34h  Bengal  Native  Infantry  on  21.4pril  1857 
Brahmins  Rajputs  Hindus  of  inferior  caste  Muslims  Sikhs  Christians  Total 
335 
(30.8%) 
237 
(21.8%) 
231 
(21.2%) 
237 
(21.8%) 
74 
(6.8%) 
12 
(1.10/.  ) 
1,089 
56  These  were  the  27'ý  47h  and  65h  N.  I.,  which  were  then  at  Pegu,  and  the  40'h,  67h  and  68h  N.  I.  which 
had  all  served  there  as  recently  as  1854. 
57  Mal  I  eso  n  (ed.  ),  Kaye  andMalleson's  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny  of  185  7-8,1,  p.  3  44. 
58  Canning  to  Vernon  Smith,  23  March  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F231/4. 
59  G.  Anderson  and  M.  Subedar  (eds.  ),  Yhe  Last  Days  of  the  Company.  A  Source  Book  ofIndian  History 
1818-1858  (London,  1918),  1,  pp.  109-10 
60  Malleson  (ed.  ),  Kaye  andMallesons  History  of  the  IndianMuliny,  1,  p.  345. 
'61  George  W. Forrest  (ed.  ),  Selectionsfrom  the  Letters,  Despatches  and  other  State  Paperspreserved  in 
the  Military  Department  of  the  Government  ofIndia  1857-58  (Calcutta,  1893),  L  p.  177. 34 
If  we  relate  the  figures  in  Table  4  to  those  for  the  whole  Bengal  Native  Infantry  in  185  1,  then  it  it  clear 
that  the  high-caste  majority  had  suffered  a  significant  erosion.  For  compared  to  an  average  ofjust 
under  65%  then,  the  high-caste  proportion  has  fallen  to  less  than  53%,  with  Rajputs  the  biggest  losers. 
The  main  beneficiaries,  on  the  other  hand,  are  the  Sikhs  (up  almost  7%  on  the  1851  average),  the 
Muslims  (up  more  than  3%)  and  low  caste  I-findus  (up  2.5%).  No  figures  relating  to  the  whole  of  the 
Bengal  Native  Infantry  are  available  for  1857,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  34h  N.  I.  was  typical  is 
difficult  to  assess  -  not  least  because  it  was  a  relatively  new  regiment,  having  replaced  the  original  340' 
on  its  disbandment  for  mutiny  in  1844.  But  even  in  its  former  guise  -  as  the  Infantry  of  the 
Bundelkhand  Legion  -  it  had  been  recruited  from  much  the  same  areas  and  castes  as  the  regular 
infantry. 
There  are,  in  any  case,  alternative  statistics  for  ethnic  composition  which  confirm  that  the  number  of 
high-caste  sepoys  had  fallen  significantly  since  1851.  The  first,  dated  September  1858,  is  an  official 
caste  breakdown  for  the  seven  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  which  had  remained  loyal  or 
partially  loyal:  the  2  1",  3  I't,  471hP  65ý  6e  (Gurkhas),  7&  and  73d  (see  Table  5) 
. 
62  Their  high-caste 
proportion  was  58%  (33.7%  Rajputs  and  26.2%  Brahmins). 
Table  5-  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  seven  loyal  regiments  ofBengal  Native  Infantry  in 
September  1858 
mputs  Hindus  of  inferior  caste  Brahmins  Muslims  Sikhs  and  Punjabi  Total 
2,676 
(33.7%) 
2,080 
(2  6.2  IYO) 
1,930 
(2 
.. 
3%) 
1,195 
(15%) 
54 
(0.7%) 
7,935 
The  first  point  that  needs  to  be  made  is  that  the  Rajput  figure  would  be  much  lower  if  it  did  not  include 
the  hill  Rajputs'who  formed  the  majority  of  the  66h  (Gurkhas)  and  who,  as  already  mentioned,  had 
little  in  common  with  their  plain-dwelling  namesakes.  If  we  take  the  66h  regiment  out  of  the  equation  - 
using  the  1851  caste  composition  of  88%  or  so!  Rajputs'  in  the  Sirmur  and  Kemaon  Battalions  as  a 
template63  -  then  the  total  number  of  Rajputs  in  the  six  remaining  regiments  would  be  1,708  out  of 
6,835,  or  25.0%.  This,  in  turn,  would  give  those  six  regiments  a  high-caste  proportion  of  53.2%,  a 
figure  remarkably  similar  to  the  53%  in  the  30  N.  I.  in  1857. 
62  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  22,  p.  382. 35 
The  second  set  of  statistics  concerns  the  ethnic  composition  of  the  whole  Bengal  Army  in  April  1858 
(see  Table  6).  64  Of  the  23,187  regular  native  soldiers  who  had  not  mutinied,  deserted  or  been  disbanded 
by  this  date,  21,928  were  infantrymen  and  the  rest  from  the  light  cavalry.  Though  the  figures  are 
slightly  distorted  by  the  presence  of  a  few  cavalrymen,  the  overall  proportion  of  high-caste  soldiers 
(56.8%)  is  still  roughly  in  line  with  the  other  statistics  for  the  native  infantry  of  1857-8.  A  comparison 
with  the  ethnic  breakdown  of  the  mutinously-disposed  34th  Regiment,  however,  raises  a  tantalizing 
question:  does  the  relatively  small  number  of  Sikhs  (0.6%)  in  the  loyal  and  disarmed  regiments  indicate 
that  those  regiments  which  had  been  least  affected  by  the  changes  in  recruitment  policy  were  the  least 
likely  to  mutiny?  For  the  mutinously-disposed  3e  N.  I.  had  a  far  higher  proportion  of  Sikhs  (7%)  and  a 
slightly  larger  share  of  low  caste  sepoys  (21.2%  compared  to  18.8%). 
Table  6-  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  regular  Bengal  native  army  on  I  April  1858 
Rajputs  Brahmins  Hindus  of  Muslims  Gurkhas  Christians  Sikhs  &  Total 
inferior  Punjabis 
caste 
6,635  6,549  4,361  4,214  590  511  327  23,187 
(28.6%) 
. 
(28.2%) 
. 
(18.8%) 
- 
(18.2%) 
, 
(2.5%) 
. 
(2.2%) 
. 
(1.4%) 
Stokes  has  suggested,  on  the  other  hand,  that  "unity  of  action  could  be  seriously  affected  by  any 
dilution  of  the  high-caste  element"  and  that  this  might  have  been  the  reason  "why  Mangal  Pande  was 
not  supported  by  his  comrades  when  he  sought  to  raise  the  34th  Regiment  at  Barrackpore  on  29  March 
1857  iv.  65  Only  a  close  study  of  the  ethnic  composition  of  all  the  mutinous  and  non-mutinous  regiments 
in  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  would  be  able  to  prove  this  point  one  way  or  the  other.  Sadly  the 
statistics  are  not  available.  Those  that  are  show  that  the  proportion  of  high-caste  sepoys  in  the  Bengal 
Native  Infantry  had  fallen  a  long  way  from  its  high  point  in  the  1810s  (when  one  newly-raised  battalion 
contained  78%  Rajputs  and  Brahmins). 
Barat  summed  up  the  "image  of  a  representative  Bengal  sepoy  recruit"  in  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century  as  follows:  "He  was  a  Hindu  of  high  caste,  a  resident  of  Bihar  and  Oudh  regions  and 
had  Hindustani  as  his  mother  tongue.  He  was  a  person  of  good  physique  and  in  sharp  contrast  to  his 
English  fellow  soldiers  [in  the  service  of  the  Company],  hailed  from  the  peasantry  and  a  station  which 
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possessed  a  social  heritage.  In  fact,  as  like  as  not,  he  was  of  the  landed  gentry  and  did  not  seek  escape 
in  the  ranks;  rather  by  enlistment  he  gained  status  in  his  society  to  which  he  continued  to  retain  his 
allegiance.  He  therefore  remained  a  civilian  at  heart  though  becoming  a  soldier  by  profession.  "66  Yet 
by  the  outbreak  of  mutiny,  just  five  years  after  Barat's  study  ends,  these  "representative"  high-caste 
sepoys  were  barely  in  a  majority.  In  1858,  summing  up  the  replies  given  by  a  number  of  senior  serving 
officers  to  the  Peel  Commission,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Durand  noted  that  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry 
"was  composed  of  Mahommedans,  Brahmins  of  all  denominations,  Chuttryas  [Rajputs],  Gwallahs, 
Kaits,  Aheers,  Jats,  and  that  some  few  low  caste  men,  such  as  Mallees,  Kuchees,  Gurrereeahs,  i.  e. 
Shepherds,  had  crept  into  corps".  67  They  came  from  "Oude,  from  North  and  South  Behar,  especially 
the  latter",  from  "the  Doab  of  the  Ganges  and  Jumna,  from  Rohilcund,  a  few  from  Bundlecund,  and 
68 
since  the  conquest  and  annexation  of  the  Punjab,  a  proportion  from  that  province". 
Some  historians  have  suggested  that  mutiny  was  a  means  of  reversing  this  trend.  In  summing  up  the 
apprehensions  of  the  19'h  and  34h  N.  I.  at  Lucknow  during  the  annexation  of  Oudh  in  early  1856,  Pandit 
Kanhyalal,  a  nineteenth  century  historian  of  Oudh,  wrote:  "They  were  discontented  because  they 
thought  that  their  rights  had  been  taken  away  from  them,  and  were  angry  over  the  introduction  of 
Punjabi  and  Sikh  soldiers  in  the  army.  They  saw  the  latter  as  the  new  recipients  of  the  Company's 
favours  which  were  now  being  denied  to  them.  `59 
This  was  also  the  conclusion  reached  by  Eric  Stokes,  who  wrote:  "The'closed  shop'of  the  Purbias 
(eastemers)  of  the  middle  Ganges  was  under  obvious  threat,  and  with  it  all  those  privileges  of  'home 
service'and  a  certain  independent  negotiating  power  charactersitic  of  mercenary  armies.  Hence  solid 
material  fears  underlay  the  apprehension  over  any  infringement  of  caste  rules  by  British  authority.  00 
Stokes  also  believed,  unlike  Barat,  that  the  main  reason  the  high-caste  sepoys  "from  southern  Oudh,  the 
eastern  part  of  the  North-Western  Provinces,  and  western  Bihar"  were  so  determined  to  "retain  their 
monopolistic  grip  on  the  Bengal  regiments"  was  because  "military  service  was  often  the  only 
honourable  escape  for  men  from  families  whose'ownership'of  the  land  had  failed  to  keep  pace  with 
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growing  numbers,  and  who  were  steadily  being  forced  down  into  the  position  of  the  humbler  tillers  of 
the  Soiln.  71 
Once  in  the  army,  however,  these  peasant  soldiers  were  relatively  insulated  from  civilian  life.  They 
sent  and  received  letters  and  went  on  leave  once  a  year.  For  the  rest  of  the  time  they  lived  and  behaved, 
in  Tapti  Roy's  words,  as  a  "corporate  body".  She  added:  "The  sense  of  belonging  to  a  corporate 
identity,  a  single  body  of  men,  was  inculcated  in  the  Company's  soldiers  in  their  everyday  life  in  the 
army.  They  lived  in  cantonments,  mostly  situated  at  some  distance  from  the  towns  and  usually 
alongside  the  civil  lines  where  the  British  officers  lived...  The  day  for  a  soldier  began  with  the  music  of 
reveille  and  closed  with  the  beating  of  the  retreat  while  the  last  post  was  played  late  at  night.  02 
One  contemporary  who  believed  that  the  mutiny  came  about  because  the  Bengal  sepoys  were  more 
influenced  by  their  intra-regimental  brotherhood  than  by  their  family  ties  was  Lord  Elphinstone,  the 
perspicacious  Governor  of  Bombay  (1853-60).  Ina  minute  on  the  future  composition  of  the  Indian 
Army  in  September  1857,  he  stated  his  opinion  that  "the  influence  of  the  family  and  the  village  was 
wholly  wanting"  in  the  regiment  of  a  high-caste  Bengal  sepoy.  73  Instead  his  family  links  "had  a  directly 
opposite  tendency,  for  the  Bengal  sepoy  had  his  relations  and  his  correspondents  in  half  the  regiments 
in  the  army",  and  "any  attack  real  or  fancied  upon  the  susceptibilities  of  one  regiment  was  thus  felt  by 
the  whole,  and  when  one  mutinied,  the  rest  followed,  as  if  impelled  by  some  unseen,  but  irresistable 
impulse,  as  if  an  electric  shock  had  been  felt  by  them  all".  74  Elphinstone  believed  that  the  Bengal 
Native  Infantry's  over-reliance  on  high-caste  men  from  the  same  province  "was  the  radical  error  to 
which  the  greatest  disasters  which  we  have  experienced  were  chiefly  to  be  attributed".  75  Yet  caste  itself 
was  not  to  blame,  rather  "a  system  of  enlistment  which  fosters  those  feelings  of  common  interest  and 
mutual  reliance  upon  each  other,  and  that  consciousness  of  power,  without  which  no  mutiny  of  an  army 
eti  masse  could  ever  be  brought  about".  76 
By  1857,  the  high-caste  Hindu  majority  in  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  was  clearly  under  threat. 
However  the  extent  to  which  this  trend  contributed  to  the  mutiny  is  difficult  to  assess.  Stokes  believed 
that  it  was  a  major  factor,  and  that  it  underlay  perceived  infiingements  of  caste  such  as  the  cartridge 
question.  That  may  have  been  true  for  many  high-caste  sepoys.  But  it  does  not  explain  why  so  many 
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lower  caste  Hindus,  Muslims  and  even  Sikhs  also  mutinied.  All  we  can  say  with  any  certainty  is  that 
the  high-caste  brotherhood  made  a  general  mutiny  possible. 
As  far  as  the  other  arms  of  the  Bengal  Army  were  concerned,  the  Company's  recruitment  policy  was 
much  less  provocative.  The  first  two  regiments  of  regular  light  cavalry  were  formed  in  1796  by  the 
conversion  of  existing  regiments  of  irregular  cavalry.  The  main  difference  between  the  two  arms  was 
in  the  number  of  European  officers:  the  regulars  then  had  15,  the  irregulars  just  two.  A  third  light 
cavalry  regiment  was  raised  in  1796  and  a  fourth  a  year  later.  Two  more  followed  in  1800,  and  a 
further  two  in  1806.  These  original  eight  regiments  were  supplemented  in  1824  by  two  Extra  regiments 
which  became  the  9h  and  W  Light  Cavalry  (L.  C.  ).  in  1826.  However  the  original  2  nd  L.  C.  was 
disbanded  in  1841  for  misbehaviour  during  the  I"  Afghan  War  and  replaced  by  the  cavalry  regiment  of 
the  Bundelkhand  Legion  which  was  renamed  the  111"  L.  C.  In  1850,  after  distinguished  service  at 
Multan  in  the  2nd  Sikh  War,  the  I  I'h  was  renumbered  the  2nd  L.  C.  When  mutiny  broke  out  in  1857,  the 
number  of  light  cavalry  regiments  was  still  ten,  each  consisting  of  24  European  officers  and  about  500 
native  officers  and  men.  77 
According  to  Alavi,  the  recruitment  pattern  of  the  regular  cavalry  after  1802  was  determined  by  the 
East  India  Company  expansion  into  the  central  and  western  Doab,  later  known  as  the  Ceded  and 
Conquered  Provinces.  "It  soon  realized,  "  writes  Alavi,  "that  a  peasant  army  recruited  on  the  basis  of  an 
assumed  high-caste  Hindu  identity  was  less  relevant  here.  08  This  was  partly  because  the  Company 
wanted  to  stem  the  migration  of  Muslim  troopers  from  the  area  to  the  Maratha  army,  partly  because 
incidents  like  the  Vellore  mutiny  of  1806  meant  that  the  peasant  army  was  "gradually  being  viewed 
with  greater  scepticism",  and  partly  because  the  "relatively  small  population  of  Brahmins  and  the 
weaker  nature  of  Hindu  social  hierarchy"  made  the  recruitment  of  respectable  Muslims  more 
attractive.  79  From  1802,  therefore,  the  Company  began  to  recruit  those  Muslim  troopers  who  were 
affluent  enough  to  provide  securities.  Many  of  them  came  from  the  princely  state  of  Rampur,  to  where 
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most  of  the  Rohilla  aristocracy  had  fled  after  their  defeat  by  the  British  in  1774.  Alayi  concluded:  "The 
Company  never  experienced  any  difficulty  in  attracting  the  landed  class  of  wealthy  Rampuri  Rohillas 
who,  once  in  Company  service,  used  their  political  connections  to  protect  their  wealth  in  Rampur. 
However,  a  recruitment  method  which  looked  for  the  wealthy  and  the  rich  was  bound  to  attract  only  a 
limited  section  of  the  Rohillas.  "80  The  regular  cavalry  was  therefore  forced  to  recruit  the  same  high- 
caste  Hindus  who  dominated  the  infantry. 
Though  there  are  no  separate  statistics  for  the  ethnic  composition  of  the  Bengal  Light  Cavalry  in 
1857,  it  has  generally  been  assumed  that  Muslims  formed  the  biggest  component.  In  his  Ph.  D.  thesis 
on  the  post-mutiny  reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Army,  A.  H.  Shibly  noted  that  the  Bengal  cavalry 
contained  a  "much  larger  infusion  of  the  Muhammadan  element"  than  the  infantry  "where  the  Hindus 
dominated".  "  George  Chesney,  a  contemporary  civil  servant,  was  even  more  specific  in  his  highly- 
regarded  book  on  British  rule  in  India.  "The  cavalry,  "  he  wrote,  "was  principally  recruited  in 
Rohilcund  and  the  country  westward  of  the  Gangetic  Doab;  it  consisted  chiefly  of  Mahomedans,  and  it 
was  generally  expected  to  prove  indifferent  to  any  passions  which  had  their  origin  in  Hindoo  caste- 
prejudices.  ss82 
Both  these  writers  seem  to  have  made  the  mistake  of  grouping  the  regular  and  irregular  cavalry 
together.  The  latter  force  was  dominated  by  Muslims  in  1857  (as  we  shall  see),  but  the  former  was  not. 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Harington  of  the  5h  Bengal  L.  C.  -  which  was  disarmed  at  Peshawur  on  22  May 
1857  -  told  the  Peel  Commission  that  his  regiment  was  composed  of  roughly  "one-fourth  Mussulmans 
and  two  thirds  Brahmins,  of  the  fighting  class,  and  the  others  a  lower  class".  83  When  asked  if  it  might 
have  mutinied  if  it  had  not  been  disarmed,  he  replied:  "Yes,  if  it  had  been  down  country,  for  the  men 
were  of  the  same  caste,  country,  and  feeling  as  the  other  corps  ...  which  murdered  their  officers.  1184  This 
explains  Sir  Henry  Lawrence's  comment  in  1856  that  "Oude  should  no  longer  supply  the  mass  of  our 
infantry  and  regular  cavalry".  85  It  also  helps  to  explain  why  the  majority  of  Bengal  Light  Cavalry 
regiments  were  so  willing  to  follow  the  lead  taken  by  mutinous  sepoys  in  1857.  Seven  out  of  ten 
mutinied,  or  partially  mutinied,  and  the  remaining  three  were  disarmed.  Of  this  latter  group,  two  -  the 
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50'and  8"'  -  were  initially  ear-marked  for  rearmament.  But  the  decision  was  reversed  by  Canning  in 
early  1858  when  he  discovered  that  their  conduct  since  disarmament  made  neither  of  them  "worthy"  of 
being  "retained  in  the  service".  86  Unlike  the  trend  in  the  native  infantry,  the  proportion  of  high-caste 
Hindu  recruits  in  the  Bengal  Light  Cavalry  seems  to  have  increased  in  the  decades  prior  to  the  mutiny. 
But  despite  being  more  secure  as  a  group,  they  would  naturally  have  sympathized  with  their  high-caste 
kinsmen. 
The  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry,  too,  was  initially  recruited  from  the  Muslims  of  northern  India  who  had 
dominated  the  pre-Company  Mughal  cavalry.  But  unlike  the  regular  cavalry,  it  retained  its 
overwhelming  Muslim  majority  until  the  mutiny.  The  first  Bengal  irregular  unit  was  the  Mughal  horse, 
raised  by  Major  Calliaund  in  1760.  It  differed  from  subsequent  regular  regiments  in  that  all  its  troopers 
provided  their  own  horses,  arms  and  equipment.  It  also  had  far  fewer  European  officers  -  the  maximum 
of  four  being  a  commandant,  second-in-command,  adjutant  and  doctor  -  giving  its  native  officers  more 
responsibility.  Such  regiments  performed  the  true  light  cavalry  work  of  escort  duty  and  reconnaissance. 
As  already  stated,  the  two  surviving  units  of  irregular  cavalry  were  converted  to  regulars  in  1796.  But 
as  the  Company  began  to  make  incursions  into  the  central  and  western  Doab  at  the  turn  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  and  its  peasant  armies  proved  incapable  of  combatting  the  Mughal  cavalry  of  the 
Marathas,  the  need  for  irregular  cavalry  returned.  So  the  government  turned  to  Eurasian  officers  who 
had  commanded  irregular  regiments  in  the  armies  of  Indian  princes  to  raise  new  regiments.  The  most 
famous  was  James  Skinner,  the  son  of  a  Bengal  officer  and  a  Rajput  woman,  who  resigned  from  the 
army  of  the  Maratha  ruler  of  Gwalior  when  the  Company  declared  war  in  1802.  The  first  corps  of 
Skinner's  Horse  (later  the  I't  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry)  was  raised  in  1803  from  a  body  of  Perron's 
Horse  in  Scindia's  service  who  had  come  over  to  the  British  after  the  Battle  of  Delhi.  Skinner  tended  to 
recruit  the  same  well-bom  Rohilla  and  Afghan  troopers  who  had  served  the  Mughals  and  later  the 
Marathas.  If  a  man  brought  100  horses,  he  was  given  the  rank  of  ressaldar;  if  he  brought  60  then  he 
was  made  a  naib  rissaldar,  and  so  on.  He  also  recruited  Ranghurs,  the  descendants  of  Rajputs  who  had 
become  Muslims,  though  he  did  not  believe  they  were  respectable  enough  to  be  made  officers.  87  By 
1809  there  were  twenty-two  ressalahs  (or  troops)  of  more  than  3,000  men  on  Skinner's  estate  which 
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stretched  from  the  Aligarh  district  to  Hansi  in  Harrianah.  But  not  all  Skinner's  recruits  were  Muslim: 
he  also  enlisted  Ahirs,  Jats  and  Gujars.  88 
With  the  successful  conclusion  of  the  Pindari  and  Third  Maratha  Wars  in  1818,  the  need  for  irregular 
cavalry  diminished  and  Skinner's  regiments  became  little  more  than  a  local  police  force.  As  a  result, 
most  of  them  were  disbanded  when  Bentinck  sought  to  reduce  military  expenditure  in  the  late  1820s. 
By  1840,  when  the  Bengal  local  horse  was  formally  renamed  irregular  cavalry,  there  were  just  six 
regiments  in  existence:  the  V'  and  4d'  had  evolved  out  of  Skinner's  Horse;  the  2'ý  P2  5h  and  6th  had 
been  raised  in  1809,1815,1823  and  1838  respectively.  But  as  the  Company  expanded  into  Sind  and 
the  Punjab  in  the  1840s,  twelve  more  regiments  were  added.  The  last  eight  were  recruited  after  the  I" 
Sikh  War  in  1846  by  the  offer  of  tenders  to  respectable  Muslims  who  brought  their  relations  and 
retainers  with  them.  89 
In  late  1844,  Henry  Lawrence  described  the  irregular  cavalry  as  "mostly  Pathans  or  Rajpoots  and 
Mahommedans  of  family".  90  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Patrick  Grant,  the  former  Adjutant-General  of  the 
Bengal  Army,  was  more  specific  in  his  evidence  to  the  Peel  Commission  in  1858.  He  stated  that  the 
regiments  were  composed  of  "Hindoostanee  Mahommedans,  Sheikhs,  Synds,  Moghuts,  and  Pathans, 
and  Hindoos,  Brahmins,  Rajpoots,  Jats,  and  some  also  of  the  inferior  castes",  as  well  as  "considerable 
numbers"  of  Ranghurs  and  "some  few  Sikhs  and  Afghans".  9'  As  in  the  regular  regiments,  recruits 
tended  to  be  the  friends  and  relations  of  those  already  serving,  while  castes  "habitually  employed  in 
menial  occupations"  were  excluded.  92  The  main  areas  of  recruitment  were  Delhi  and  Rohilkhand.  93 
Other  senior  officers  specifically  mentioned  the  towns  of  Hansi,  Hissar,  Meerut,  Moradabad,  Kumaul, 
Bareilly,  Agra,  Bharatpur,  Farruckabad,  Mainpuri,  Shabjehanpur,  Patiala  and  Ludhiana,  and  to  a  lesser 
extent  Jullundur,  Hoshiapur,  Cawnpore  and  Lucknow.  94 
Sir  James  Hope  Grant  and  Major  Daly  told  the  Peel  Commission  that  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry 
was  "composed  chiefly  of  Mahomedans  of  various  tribes  and  races"  and  that  Rajputs  "were  formerly  in 
greater  numbers  than  now,  though  there  are  still  some  to  be  found,  and  a  few  Brahmins".  95  The  method 
of  recruitment  had  also  altered.  "In  the  early  days  of  its  formation,  "  they  noted,  "the  nobles  and  chiefs 
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of  tribes  brought  their  retainers  into  the  field,  and  thus  troops  and  regiments  were  raised.  Gradually  this 
has  changed,  and  though  the  services  still  has  attractions  for  men  of  mark,  as  all  have  to  pass  through 
the  ranks  to  position,  these  have  decreased.  "96  Lately,  such  had  been  the  demand  for  irregulars,  "that  no 
man  who  could  manage  a  horse,  and  find  good  security  among  his  comrades,  has  been  refused 
service".  97  There  is,  however,  no  evidence  that  this  change  in  recruitment  policy  was  particularly 
resented  by  the  ordinary  sowars. 
The  ethnic  breakdown  for  the  76Bengal  I.  C.,  which  was  disarmed  at  Peshawur  in  May  1857,  proves 
that  Muslims  were  still  the  dominant  faction  (see  Table  7).  98  Muslims  made  up  more  than  four-fifths  of 
the  regiment,  while  fewer  than  one  in  six  were  high-caste  lEndus.  Such  a  relatively  small  proportion  of 
Brahmins  and  Rajputs  shows  that  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  was  not  linked  to  the  native  infantry  by 
ties  of  kinship  and  caste  in  the  same  way  that  the  regular  cavalry  was.  This  might  help  to  explain  why 
only  ten  out  of  eighteen  regiments  of  irregular  cavalry  mutinied  or  partially  mutinied  in  1857  (the 
lowest  proportion  of  the  three  native  arms  of  Bengal  infantry  and  cavalry),  why  three  regiments 
retained  their  weapons  and  fought  on  the  side  of  the  British,  and  why  eight  regiments  were  later 
considered  loyal  enough  to  be  incorporated  into  the  reorganized  Bengal  Army.  99 
Table  7-  Ethnic  composition  qfthe  74h  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  in  May  1857 
Muslims,  Synds  Muslim  Rajputs  Brahmins  Rajputs  Sikhs  Hindus  of  Total 
&  Pathans  an  hu  s)  inferior  caste 
392  82  62  28  20  2  586 
(66.9%)  (14.01/o)  (10.6%)  (4.8%)  (3.4%)  (0.3%) 
Alavi  insists  that  there  is  a  connection  between  the  "mutiny-rebellion"  of  1857  in  the  Ceded  and 
Conquered  Provinces  and  the  resentment  of  Company  troopers  who,  thanks  to  the  military  retrenchment 
of  the  1820s,  "had  been  forced  to  give  up  their  military  income  and  had  been  settled  on  land  which 
often  proved  insufficient  or  was  resumed  by  the  Company".  100  However  she  does  not  speculate  on  the 
extent  to  which  these  discontented  ex-troopers  influenced  their  serving  brethren.  My  own  feeling  is 
that  low  pay  and  indebtedness  were  more  important  factors  behind  the  decision  by  some  to  mutiny. 
95  Ibid. 
96  Ibid. 
97  Ibid. 
98  Ibid. 
99  The  regiments  of  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  that  mutinied  or  partially  mutinied  in  1857  were  the  3'ý 
4d'  5h  8"'  Wh  I  1'ý  12th,  13'ý  14th,  15'h.  Those  that  remained  loyal  and  retained  their  arms  were  the  I't, 
ýn' 
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It  may  not  be  a  coincidence  that  the  Bengal  Artillery  also  had  a  minority  of  high-caste  recruits  in  1857 
(though  the  proportion  was  bigger  than  in  the  irregular  cavalry)  and  a  comparatively  modest  number  of 
mutinous  units.  The  first  foot  artillery  companies  were  formed  in  all  three  presidencies  in  1748.101  But 
because  of  the  tactical  importance  of  the  arm,  the  men  who  fired  the  guns  remained  exclusively 
European  for  the  rest  of  the  century.  They  were  assisted  in  unskilled  work  by  units  of  natives  known  as 
Golatwlaze  (literally  'ball-throwers).  By  the  first  reorganization  of  the  presidency  armies  in  1796,  the 
Bengal  Foot  Artillery  had  grown  to  three  European  battalions  of  five  companies  each.  102  Early  in  the 
nineteenth  century,  however,  as  the  Bengal  Army  continued  to  expand  and  the  cost  of  forming  more 
European  artillery  became  prohibitive,  native  foot  artillery companies  were  raised.  At  around  the  same 
time,  troops  of  61ite  horse  artillery  were  formed  with  their  native  proportion.  By  1857,  the  Bengal  Foot 
Artillery  was  made  up  of  six  European  battalions  of  four  companies  each,  and  three  native  battalions  of 
six  companies  each.  The  Bengal  Horse  Artillery  comprised  three  brigades  of  three  European  troops 
and  one  native  troop.  (The  exception  was  the  I"  Brigade  which  had  a  fifth  native  troop,  a  remnant  of 
the  contingent  raised  by  the  British  to  fight  for  Shah  Shuja  in  the  I'  Afghan  War  of  183842). 
The  largest  single  grouping  in  the  Bengal  Artillery  was  Muslim.  "There  is  a  much  larger  infusion  of 
the  Mahometan  element  than  in  the  infantry",  Lord  Clyde  (the  former  General  Sir  Colin  Campbell, 
Commander-in-Chief,  India,  during  the  mutiny)  informed  the  Peel  Commission  in  1858.103  This  was 
partly  because  Muslims  had  tended  to  dominate  the  Mughal  artillery  of  pre-Company  days,  and  partly 
because  the  Golundaze  auxiliaries  of  the  eighteenth  century  had  been  recruited  from  the  Muslims  of 
lower  Bengal.  Clyde  observed:  "Some  men  (particularly  gun  lascars)  come  from  Lower  Bengal,  which 
furnishes  hardly  any  soldiers  to  any  other  branch  of  the  army.  These  are  Mahometans.  "  104  But  most 
came  from  "Oudli,  the  Doab,  Rohilcund,  and  the  districts  of  Agra".  105  While  these  were  all  former 
Mughal  areas,  Oudh  and  the  Doab  plain  between  the  rivers  Jumna  and  Ganges  contained  a  majority  of 
Hindu  inhabitants.  Recruits  from  these  areas  counterbalanced  the  Muslims. 
100  A]  avi,  Yhe  Sepoys  and  the  Company,  p.  297. 
101  Bryan  Robson,  'The  Organization  and  Command  Structure  of  the  Indian  Army',  Soldiers  of  the  Raj- 
Me  Indian  Army  1600-1947  (London,  1997),  p.  10. 
102  Shibly,  77ie  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies,  PhD  Thesis  p.  24. 
103  Lord  Clyde's  replies,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  53,  p.  423. 
104  Ibid. 
105  Ibid. 44 
According  to  the  1858  caste  return  of  the  1,017  native  officers  and  men  of  the  Bengal  horse  and  foot 
artillery who  did  not  mutiny  and  were  not  disbanded,  the  Muslims  were  not  in  an  absolute  majority  (see 
Table  8).  106  They  were,  however,  the  biggest  single  grouping,  with  high-caste  Hindus  (Brahmins  and 
Rajputs  combined)  and  ! Hindus  of  inferior  caste'  not  that  far  behind.  With  such  a  mixed  level  of 
recruitment,  it  is  perhaps  logical  that  artillerymen  rarely  took  the  intitiative  in  the  mutinies  of  1857.  Of 
the  nine  companies  of  foot  artillery  and  two  troops  of  horse  artillery  that  actually  mutinied  or  deserted, 
only  one  -  the  6h  Company,  8h  Battalion  at  Bareilly  -  seems  to  have  taken  an  active  part  in  the  plot  to 
mutiny.  Most  of  the  others  were  coerced  to  join  the  rebels  by  the  mutinous  native  infantry.  None  is 
credited  with  having  murdered  its  European  officers,  and  many  actually  helped  them  to  escape.  107  It  is 
probably  no  coincidence  that  the  5h/Ist  B.  H.  A.,  the  only  Bengal  Artillery  unit  that  actually  fought 
alongside  the  British  during  the  mutiny,  was  raised  for  service  in  Mghanistan  in  1838,  and  therefore 
had  a  different  recruitment  pattern  from  its  older  counterparts.  It  would,  for  example,  have  contained  a 
relatively  small  proportion  ofpurbiyas  because  travel  north  of  the  Indus  was  said  to  involve  loss  of 
caste.  108 
Table  8-  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  Bengal  Native  Artillery  in  1858 
Muslims  Hindus  of  inferior  caste  Raiputs  Brahmins  Gwallahs  Total 
438 
(43%) 
290 
(29%) 
162 
(16%) 
126 
(12%) 
1  1,017 
The  smallest  and  last  arm  of  the  regular  Bengal  Army  (the  irregular  cavalry  was  regular  in  all  but  name) 
was  its  Sappers  and  Miners.  Founded  in  1803  as  the  Pioneer  Corps,  within  five  years  it  had  become  the 
Corps  of  Pioneers  and  Sappers,  with  eight  companies  of  90  men  each  and  a  company  of  miners.  In 
1819  two  companies  and  contingents  from  the  rest  formed  the  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners,  while  the 
remaining  pioneers  were  absorbed  during  the  military  cutbacks  of  1833.  Fourteen  years  later,  when  it 
was  renamed  the  Bengal  Sappers  and  Pioneers,  the  corps  was  comprised  of  three  companies  of  Sappers 
and  Miners,  officered  by  engineers,  and  seven  of  pioneers,  under  infantry  officers.  The  distinction 
"'  'Return  showing  the  Number,  Caste,  and  Country  of  the  Native  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  each 
Regiment,  Regular  and  Irregular,  of  each  Presidency,  Sept  1858',  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  22,  p.  382. 
107  The  only  murders  that  appear  to  have  been  carried  out  by  artillerymen  were  those  of  a  European 
staff  sergeant's  wife  and  three  children  by  the  Golundaz  of  the  4  1h  Troop,  11  Brigade,  Bengal  Horse 
Artillery,  at  Nimach  on  3  June  1857.  (Source:  Ust  of  Regiments  and  Detachments  of  the  Native  Army 
which  have  taken  part  in  the  Mutinies',  II  Aug  1858,  F.  C.,  NAI,  17534  of  30  Dec  1859.  ) 
log  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  85.  Sitaram  writes:  "The  sepoys  dreaded  crossing  the  Indus 
because  it  was  beyond  I-Endustan;  this  is  forbidden  by  our  religion  and  the  very  act  means  loss  of  caste. 
Consequently  many  sepoys  obtained  their  discharge,  and  many  deserted.  " 45 
between  the  two  branches  ended  in  1851  and  the  title  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners  was  readopted.  By 
1857  the  number  of  companies  had  increased  to  twelve,  each  containing  two  native  officers,  14 
N.  C.  O.  s,  2  buglars  and  100  sepoys.  The  corps  was  commanded  by  four  European  officers  (a 
commandant,  an  adjutant,  an  interpreter  and  a  quartermaster),  while  each  company  was  headed  by  a 
junior  European  officer  with  a  European  N.  C.  O.  as  his  assistant. 
Although  there  are  no  ethnic  breakdowns  available  for  the  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners,  Lord  Clyde, 
Commander-in-Chief  in  India  (1857-60),  informed  the  Peel  Commission  that  the  pre-mutiny  corps  had 
been  composed  of  "mostly  Hindoostanees"  of  all  types  from  "the  usual  recruiting  grounds"  of  the 
North-Western  Provinces,  though  "there  were  probably  fewer  higher  caste  Hindoos  than  in  the 
infantry".  109  That  Brahmins  and  RaJputs  were  in  a  majority,  however,  was  confirmed  by  the  testimony 
of  Colonel  Felix,  a  former  military  secretary  to  Lord  Dalhousie,  who  agreed  that  Bengal  Sappers  and 
Miners  had  been  "enlisted  all  from  one  district"  and  belonged  "generally  to  one  caste,  namely,  the 
higher  caste  of  Hindoos".  110  Colonel  Leslie  of  the  Bombay  Artillery  concurred,  telling  the  Peel 
Commission  that  the  Bengal  sappers  he  came  across  during  the  I"  Afghan  War  "were  a  high-caste  set 
of  men"  and  "did  not  care  about  doing  their  work".  "  1  Yet  the  very  fact  that  high-caste  Hindus  were 
prepared  to  join  a  corps  that,  by  definition,  indulged  in  menial  work  such  as  digging  is  negative 
confirmation  of  the  argument  that  the  army  invented  a  tradition  of  caste  (see  Chapter  Five).  A  fellow 
feeling  towards  their  brethren  in  the  native  infantry  could  be  one  reason  why  six  out  of  twelve 
companies  of  Sappers  and  Miners  mutinied  -  including  four  at  Meerut  on  16  May  1857,  murdering  their 
commandant  and  havildar-major  in  the  process  -  while  the  remaining  six  were  disarmed. 
Madras  had  the  second  biggest  presidency  army  in  1857  with  51,244  native  troops.  '  12  Its  largest 
component  was  its  52  regiments  of  regular  native  infantry,  numbering  around  43,000  men,  It  also  had 
eight  regiments  of  regular  native  cavalry  (2,800  men),  nine  companies  of  Sappers  and  Miners  (820 
men),  one  battalion  (or  six  companies)  of  foot  artillery  and  two  troops  of  horse  artillery  (1,200  men). 
109  Lord  Clyde's  replies,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  53,  p.  425. 
110  Colonel  0.  Felix's  evidence,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  65. 
111  Colonel  JT  Leslie's  evidence,  ibid.,  p.  94. 
112  Return  showing  the  Numbers  of  the  troops,  regular  and  irregular,  which  were  serving  in  the  three 
Presidencies  immediately  before  the  Mutiny',  P.  P.,  RC.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  17,  p.  379.. 46 
However  the  ethnic  composition  of  these  native  units  bore  little  relation  to  their  counterparts  in  the 
Bengal  Army. 
This  had  not  always  been  the  case.  According  to  Kolff,  "Rajputs  were  employed  as  early  as  1664  to 
defend  Fort  St  George  and,  from  the  earliest  years  of  the  Madras  Army,  people  from  outside  the 
Presidency  had  been  generally  preferred  as  recruits  to  Madrasis".  1  13  The  eight  Circar  battalions  who 
were  disbanded  in  1785,  for  example,  were  composed  of  men  of  northern  descent  who  spoke 
Hindustani,  "though  it  may  have  been  generations  since  their  families  had  settled  in  the  South  in  search 
of  service".  114  But  unlike  its  Bombay  rival,  the  Madras  Army  began  to  confine  its  recruitment  to  its 
own  presidency  and  an  experiment,  in  the  1790s,  of  importing  sepoys  from  Bengal  was  not  repeated.  '  15 
In  his  1835  minute  on  military  policy,  Lord  William  Bentinck  noted  that  Madras  sepoys  were 
"recruited  principally  from  their  own  territories"  and  had  "only  a  small  portion  of  Bengal  men  in  their 
ranks".  '  16  Though  not  shorter  than  Bombay  sepoys  recruited  from  their  own  presidency,  the  Madras 
troops  were  lighter,  causing  Bentinck  to  doubt  their  martial  qualities.  "It  is  impossible,  "  he  wrote,  "for 
any  dispassionate  observer,  who  has  seen  the  Madras  scpoys,  not  to  say  that  their  physical  defects,  their 
small  stature,  and  delicate  frame,  supposing  all  other  qualities  equal,  render  them  very  inferior  to  the 
northern  Hindustanis,  and  that  consequently,  as  a  body  of  men,  they  are  inferior  to  either  of  the  other 
armies...  "'  17  Given  that  it  was  politically  and  logistically  impossible  to  recruit  the  southern  Madras 
Army  entirely  from  the  northern  Bengal  Presidency,  Bentinck  had  concluded  that  the  only  solution  was 
to  increase  the  number  of  European  troops  in  India.  118  But  this  was  because  he  identified  the  principal 
danger  to  British  India's  security  as  an  external  one.  If  he  had  recognized  the  threat  from  within,  he 
might  have  been  comforted  by  a  recruitment  policy  which  ensured  that  at  least  one  presidency  army  had 
virtually  no  ties  of  caste  or  kinship  with  the  other  two. 
Three  years  earlier,  the  Court  of  Directors  had  ordered  both  the  Madras  and  Bombay  governments  to 
restrict  the  recruitment  of  their  armies  to  their  own  territory.  Now  Bentinck's  government  asked  them 
to  convene  a  military  committee  to  consider  whether  the  order  "had  operated  beneficially  or  whether  it 
would  be  better  to  permit  the  Madras  and  Bombay  armies  to  recruit  as  formerly  in  Bengal  territory".  119 
113  Kolff,  Naulair,  Raiput  andSepoy,  P.  177. 
114  Ibid. 
115  Ibid. 
116  Philips  (ed.  ), Bentinck  Correspondence,  11,  p.  1444. 
117  ]bid.,  p.  1446. 
118  ]bid.,  p.  1451-2. 
119  ]bid,  p.  1446. 47 
The  response  of  the  Madras  committee  was  that  no  alterations  were  necessary  for  the  cavalry,  "the  men 
being  chiefly  Mussulmans  from  the  Carnatic",  whereas  the  number  of  Bengal  men  in  the  infantry  could 
be  increased  "with  advantage"  to  one  hundred  per  regiment.  120 
This  latter  recommendation  does  not  appear  to  have  been  carried  out.  In  his  evidence  to  the  Peel 
Commission,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Patrick  Grant,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Madras  Army  (1856- 
61),  noted:  "All  men  physically  fit  for  soldiers,  and  of  the  prescribed  age,  without  distinction  of  race, 
tribe,  or  caste,  are  eligible  for  enlistment  in  the  Madras  Army.  There  is  no  exclusion  either  by 
regulations  or  practice.  ""'  Without  specific  discrimination,  it  was  inevitable  that  the  Madras  Army  in 
general  -  and  the  native  infantry  in  particular  -  would  be  largely  representative  of  the  ethnic  groups  that 
dominated  Madras  society  (see  Tables  9  and  10).  122 
Table  9-  Ethnic  comnosition  ofthe  Madras  Native  Infantry  in  1858 
Muslims  Telingas  Tamils  Christians  &  Brahmins  Hindus  of  Total 
(Gentoo)  Eurasians; 
_ 
&  RajpUtS  inferior  caste 
15,856  15,613  4,372  2,868  2,005  2,021  42,735 
(3  7.1  */o)  (36.5%)  (10.2%)  (6.7%)  (4.7%) 
Telingas,  Tamils  and  the  vast  majority  of  Muslim  recruits  were  natives  of  the  Madras  Presidency.  Not 
surprisingly  the  chief  recruitment  areas  -  Northern  Circars,  the  Carnatics,  Tanjore  and  Mysore  -  were 
also  within  that  region.  Less  than  five  per  cent  of  Madras  sepoys  were  recruited  in  Hindustan,  and 
Table  10  -  Counirv  of  origin  of  the  Madras  Native  Infantry  in  1858 
Northern  Central  Southern  Tanjore  Mysore  Hindustan  Others 
Circars  Carnatic  Carnatic 
17,255  9,080  4,937  3,736  2,757  1,989  2,981 
_(40.4%) 
(21.21/6)  (11.61/o)  (8.71/6)  (6.5%)  (4.7%)  (7.0%) 
most  of  them  would  have  been  high-caste  Hindus.  Evidently  the  number  of  men  from  the  Bengal 
Presidency  was  far  below  the  one  hundred  per  regiment,  or  5,200  in  total,  that  the  Madras  committee 
had  recommended  in  1835.  It  is  not  particularly  suprising,  therefore,  that  just  one  of  the  52  regiments 
of  Madras  Native  Infantry  -  the  36d-  showed  any  outward  sign  of  disaffection  during  the  mutiny  of  the 
Bengal  Army  in  1857  (half  its  rifle  company  refused  to  volunteer  for  service  in  Bengal  in  August 
120  Ibid. 
121  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  65,  p.  483. 
122  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  22,  p.  382. 48 
1857).  Lord  Harris,  the  Governor  of  Madras,  put  this  down  to  Muslim  influence.  "The  men  are  not 
actually  disloyal  but  their  confidence  is  shaken,  "  he  informed  Robert  Vernon  Smith,  the  President  of  the 
Board  of  Control,  on  27  August.  This,  on  top  of  quite  separate  grievances,  had  enabled  the  "evil 
disposed"  in  regiments  dominated  by  Muslims  "to  produce  an  unfavourable  impression".  123 
The  Madras  regular  cavalry  contained  an  even  greater  proportion  of  Muslims.  According  to  General 
Grant,  it  had  "for  many  years  been  considered  the  birth  right  of  the  Mahommedans  of  the  Arcot  district" 
and,  "with  the  exception  of  a  few  Mahrattas",  commanding  officers  had  "made  little  effort  to  recruit 
elsewhere".  124  Since  1843,  some  effort  had  been  made  to  recruit  more  Rajputs  and  Marathas,  "with  but 
partial  success".  125  The  composition  of  the  regular  cavalry  in  1858,  therefore,  was  largely  the  same  as  it 
had  been  "when  the  two  senior  regiments  were  transferred  to  the  East  India  Company  in  1784  by  the 
Nawab  of  Arcot".  126  The  vast  majority  were  Muslims  from  the  Arcot  district,  Vellore  and  Madras  (see 
Tables  II  and  12).  Less  than  4%  were  Rajputs  and  fewer  than  1%  came  from  Hindustan.  They  had, 
therefore,  no  local  ties  to  the  mutineers  of  the  Bengal  Army.  Their  only  connection  to  some  of  the 
mutineers  (notably  in  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  and  artillery)  was  their  dominant  faith:  Islam. 
Table  II-  Ethnic  composition  qf1he  Madras  Light  Cavalry  in  1858 
Muslims  Marathas  Indo-Britons  Raiputs  (&  Brahmins)  Christians  I  Others  Total 
2,024 
(77.41/o) 
306 
_(11.7*/o) 
159 
(6.1-/1.  ) 
93 
(3.6%) 
32 
(1.2*/o) 
1  2 
(0.1  Vo) 
2,616 
The  only  regiment  of  Madras  Light  Cavalry  to  display  disaffection  during  the  mutiny  was  the  8h  when 
it  refused  to  sail  by  ship  to  Bengal  to  fight  the  rebels  in  August  1857.  In  a  letter  to  Vernon  Smith,  Lord 
Harris  put  this  partly  down  to  "a  disinclination  to  act  against  men  of  their  own  race  &  faith".  127  But  a 
Table  12  -  Country  of  origin  of  the  Madras  Light  Cavalry  in  1858 
C.  Carnatic  Mysore  I  S.  Carnatic  I  Tanjore  I  N.  Circars  Hindustan  Others 
1,905 
(72.8%) 
215 
8.21/6) 
1  212  1 
8.1%)  (391 
1 
. 
51/6) 
67 
(2.6%) 
22 
0.8  VO) 
104 
(4.0%) 
more  pertinent  reason,  in  his  opinion,  was  their  wish  to  have  their  old  levels  of  pay  and  pension  restored 
(both  had  been  reduced  in  1837  to  bring  them  into  line  with  Bengal  regulations).  "I  have  no  doubt,  "  he 
123  Lord  Harris  to  Verrion  Smith,  27  Aug  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F231/5. 
124  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  65,  p.  488. 
125  Ibid.,  pp.  488-9. 
126  Ibid.,  p.  488. 49 
wrote,  "that  this  was  thought  a  good  opportunity  to  make  a  stand  on  the  point  that  this  regiment  was 
considered  to  represent  the  whole  of  the  cavalry".  128 
Local  Muslims  were  also  the  biggest  group  in  the  Madras  Native  Artillery,  though  they  did  not 
represent  an  absolute  majority  (see  Tables  13).  129 
Table  13  -  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  Madras  Native,  4rtillery  in  1858 
Muslims  Tamils  Telingas  Brahmins  &  Rajputs  thas  Others  Total 
535 
(43.2%) 
243 
(ig.  6%) 
217 
17-50/-) 
62 
(5.0vo) 
26 
(2.1%) 
1  155 
(12.5%) 
_  1,238 
1 
Most  Madras  native  artillerymen  came  from  the  Central  Carnatic  and  other  Madras  regions;  only  6% 
hailed  from  Hindustan  (see  Table  14).  130 
Table  14  -  Country  oforigin  ofthe  Madras  Native  Arlillety  in  1858 
Central  Southern  Mysore  Hindustan  Nothern  Tanjore  Others 
Carnatic  Carnatic  Circars 
717  183  82  74  72  52  58 
(57.9%)  (14.8%)  (6.0%)  (5.81/o)  (4.2%)  (4.7%) 
The  Madras  corps  of  Sappers  and  Miners,  on  the  other  hand,  was  dominated  by  low-caste  Hindus  (see 
Table  15).  131 
Table  15  -  Ethnic  composition  offhe  Madras  Sappers  and  Miners  in  1858 
Hindus  of  inferior  Tamils  Christians  Telingas  (Gentoo)  Muslims  Others  Total 
caste 
358  181  120  102  51  14  826 
(43.3%)  (21.91/6)  14.5%  (12.3%)  (6.2%)  (1.7%) 
As  with  the  artillery,  most  members  of  the  Madras  Sappers  and  Miners  came  from  the  Central  Carnatic, 
the  Southern  Carnatic  and  other  parts  of  the  Madras  Presidency;  Hindustan  provided  just  3.1%  of 
recruits  (see  Table  16).  132  With  so  little  in  commonwith  their  Bengal  counterparts,  it  is  perhaps  no 
127  Lord  Harris  to  Vernon  Smith,  27  Aug  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F231/5. 
128  Ibid. 
129  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  22,  p.  382. 
130  Ibid. 
131  Ibid. 
132  Ibid. 50 
surprise  that  the  Madras  artillery  and  sappers  not  only  stayed  loyal  during  the  Indian  mutiny,  but  in 
some  cases  served  with  distinction  against  the  rebels  and  mutineers  in  central  India.  133 
Table  16  -  Country  of  origin  of  the  Madras  Sappers  and  Miners  in  1858 
Central  Southern  Tanjore  Mysore  Northern  Hindustan  Others 
Carnatic  Carnatic  Circars 
359  162  93  82  65  26  39 
(43.5%)  (19.6%)  (9.90/.  )  (7.9%)  (3.1%)  (4.7%) 
Overall  the  regular  Madras  native  army  was  dominated  by  Muslims  and  Telingas  from  its  Northern 
Circars  and  Carnatic  provinces  (see  Tables  17  and  18).  134 
Table  17  -  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  regular  Madras  native  army  in  1858 
Muslims  Telingas  Tamils  Christians  &  Brahmins  &  Others  Total 
(Gentoo)  Eurasians  Rajputs 
18,466  15,932  4,796  3,202  2,167  2,772  47,415 
(38.9%)  (33.6%)  (10.1%)  (6.8%  4.6%  fc  0041, 
This  was  hardly  surprising  given  the  fact  that  infantrymen  were  more  than  nine-tenths  of  the  total. 
Brahmins  and  Rajputs,  on  the  other  hand,  accounted  for  fewer  than  5  per  cent,  as  did  those  from 
Hindustan.  In  an  ethnic  sense,  therefore,  the  Madras  Army  had  little  in  common  with  its  northern 
Table  18  -  Countryqf  origin  of  the  regular  Madras  native  army  in  1858 
Northern  Central  Southern  Tanjore  Mysore  Hindustan  Others 
Circars  Carnatic  Carnatic 
17,459  12,061  5,494  3,972  3,136 
Y 
2,111  3,182 
(36.8V  (25.4%)  (11.6%)  (8.4%)  6 
_L 
Yc  6  6 
(4.4%)  (6.7%) 
neighbour.  This  absence  of  common  ties  would  be  reflected  in  the  fact  that  only  two  Madras  units  -  the 
8"'  L.  C.  and  the  36h  N.  I.  -  showed  any  signs  of  a  mutinous  disposition  in  1857. 
Bombay  possessed  the  smallest  presidency  army  in  1857  with  45,213  native  troops.  '"  Its  largest 
component  was  its  29  regiments  of  regular  native  infantry,  made  up  of  around  25,000  men.  It  also  had 
133  B  Company  of  the  Madras  Sappers  and  Miners,  for  example,  served  with  distinction  in  the  Deccan 
and  Central  India  Field  Forces. 51 
three  regiments  of  regular  native  cavalry  (1,500  men),  one  troop  of  horse  artillery  and  two  battalions  - 
or  twelve  companies  -  of  foot  artillery  (2,000  men),  and  five  companies  of  Sappers  and  Miners  (450 
men).  The  balance  was  made  up  of  irregular  troops.  Unlike  their  Madras  counterparts,  however,  a 
significant  proportion  of  Bombay  troops  were  recruited  from  the  same  classes  and  areas  that  supplied 
the  Bengal  Army. 
The  first  company  of  native  sepoys  under  their  own  officers  was  formed  in  Bombay  from  RaJputs  in 
1684,  though  the  first  battalion  would  not  be  created  for  another  83  years.  136  Though  it  was  said  of 
these  sepoys  in  1739  that  they  were  "formerly  subjects  and  have  relations  and  are  intermarried  with  the 
inhabitants"  of  the  Bombay  area,  Kolff  is  of  the  opinion  that  "they  may  well  have  been  of  Northern 
origin  as  in  1747  the  Council  of  Fort  St  David  on  the  Coromandel  Coast  asked  Bombay  for'the  best 
,,  137  Northern  People 
...  as  they  are  reported  to  be  much  better  than  ours,  and  not  so  liable  to  Desertion! 
. 
Kolff  adds:  "The  name  of  Purbiya 
...  was  soon  in  general  use  in  Bombay  to  denote  these  Northerners, 
thousands  of  whom  would  serve  the  company  in  Western  India  especially  after  1818.  "  138 
According  to  Sir  George  Malcolm,  Governor  of  Bombay  from  1827  to  1830,  the  number  of  sepoys 
from  Hindustan  -  generally  known  as  Pardesis  orforeigners'-  before  1817  "did  not  exceed  4,000".  139 
But  after  the  start  of  the  3rd  Maratha  War  in  that  year,  and  more  particularly  during  that  with  Burma  in 
1824-5,  the  number  steadily  increased  until  they  formed  a  slight  majority  of  the  Bombay  Army  in 
1830.140  Malcolm  was  at  a  loss  to  explain  why  this  had  come  about,  though  he  cited  the  increase  of  the 
Bombay  Native  Infantry's  establishment  in  1825  to  1,000  men  per  battalion,  with  an  addition  of  two 
extra  battalions,  as  a  point  at  which  "this  class  was  greatly  augmented,  caused  a  good  deal  perhaps  by 
the  station  of  the  Bombay  troops  at  Mhow  [formerly  a  Bengal  station  in  central  India],  where  an  officer 
was  specifically  employed  to  recruit  for  the  army".  On  the  other  hand,  noted  Malcolm,  this  "increase  of 
foreigners  over  the  natives  of  the  Bombay  territories  was  by  no  means  desired  by  the  more  experienced 
officers  of  this  army,  and  was,  moreover,  contrary  to  the  wishes  of  the  Court  of  Directors  who,  in  182  1, 
directed  that  the  armies  of  the  three  Presidencies  should  be  kept  as  distinct  as  possible  to  their 
134  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  22,  p.  382. 
135  'Return  showing  the  Numbers  of  the  troops,  regular  and  irregular,  which  were  serving  in  the  three 
Presidencies  immediately  before  the  Mutiny',  P.  P.,  RC.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  17,  p.  379. 
136  Shibly,  Yhe  Reorganisatioti  of  the  Indian  Armies,  pp.  8-10. 
137  Kolff,  Naukur,  Raipul  and  Sepoy,  p.  176. 
138  Ibid.,  pp.  176-7. 
139  Malcolm  to  Lord  George  Bentinck,  27  Nov  1830,  quoted  in  Major-General  Sir  John  Malcolm,  Yhe 
Goveniment  ofIndia  (London,  1833),  p.  233. 52 
respective  territories".  In  1824  the  recruitment  of  Bombay  sepoys  in  the  Bengal  provinces  was 
"positively  prohibited"  by  the  Indian  government.  While  the  Bombay  officers  "generally  considered  it 
beneficial  to  have  a  mixture  of  castes  in  their  regiments",  wrote  Malcolm,  including  a  proportion  of 
Hindustani  men  (though  not  more  than  200  per  battalion),  they  only  considered  them  "indispensable 
when  their  own  provinces  cannot  recruit  their  ranks".  The  officers  regarded  the  Hindustanis  as 
superior  to  their  own  men  "in  size,  appearance,  and  perhaps  in  a  certain  degree  of  military  pride",  but 
"in  nothing  else".  The  Concanis  and  Deccanis,  by  contrast,  were  thought  to  be  "more  patient  under 
,,  141 
privation  and  fatigue,  more  easily  subsisted  and  managed,  and  in  bravery  to  be  fully  their  equals  . 
Malcolm's  own  preference  was  for  less  high-caste  Hindustani  recruits  because  they  tended  to  "lower 
the  self-esteem,  and  damp  the  hopes  of  men  of  lower  caste  and  stature".  142  He  added:  "Till  within 
twelve  years  the  general  sentiment  among  (the  Bombay  Army]  was  pride  of  corps.  I  regret  to  observe 
that  the  pride  of  caste  is  now  much  cherished  by  the  men  and  considered  by  the  officers.  There  are  no 
prejudices  and  pretensions  that  will  be  found  so  injurious,  if  not  restricted,  as  those  minor  ones  of  caste, 
if  they  receive  more  attention  than  is  due  to  them.  "  143 
In  1832,  as  mentioned  above,  the  Court  of  Directors  again  instructed  the  Bombay  and  Madras 
governments  to  restrict  military  recruitment  to  their  own  territories.  But  again  the  directive  made  little 
difference.  According  to  Bentinck's  reading  of  the  report  by  the  Bombay  military  committee  in  1835, 
the  "court's  restrictive  order"  had  been  "totally  inoperative  because  though  the  order  had  been  so  far 
obeyed,  that  no  recruiting  parties  had  been  sent  to  Bengal,  yet  the  Bengal  men  having  voluntarily 
presented  themselves  for  enlistment  they  had  been  engaged  as  before  ,.  144  In  any  case,  the  Committee 
recommended  sending  recruiting  parties  to  Bengal  as  before  "for  the  purpose  of  getting  a  better 
description  of  man".  145 
In  providing  evidence  for  the  Peel  Commission  in  1858,  Lord  Elphinstone  explained  that  no  races, 
tribes  or  castes  had  been  excluded  from  enlistment  to  the  Bombay  Army  by  the  regulations,  though  in 
practice  "hardly  any  recruits  have  been  hitherto  obtained  from  Guzerat,  and  few  from  the  Southern 
Mahratta  country".  In  addition  "Bheels,  Kolies,  Beeruds,  and  other  aboriginal  tribes"  were  "virtually 
140  Ibid.  Malcolm's  place  of  origin  breakdown  for  the  24,401  native  troops  of  the  Bombay  Army  in 
1830  is  as  follows:  Hindustan  12,476  (51.10/o);  Concan  10,015  (41.0%);  Deccan  1,910  (7.8%). 
141  Ibid. 
142  Ibid.,  p.  234. 
143  Ibid.,  pp.  234-5. 
144  Philips  (ed),  Bentinck  Correspondence,  11,  p.  1444. 
145  Ibid.,  pp.  1444-5. 53 
excluded  from  the  ranks  of  the  regular  army".  As  with  the  other  presidency  armies,  recruits  were 
"brought  in  by  their  comrades  when  they  return  from  furlough",  but  recruiting  parties  were  also  sent 
out.  Elphinstone  added:  "All  castes  are  professedly  admitted,  but  most  commanding  officers  have 
hitherto  given  the  preference  to  the  higher  castes.  "  146 
This  preoccupation  with  appearance  was  to  ensure  that  the  the  proportion  of  high-caste  sepoys 
remained  almost  constant.  between  1830  and  1858  (see  Table  19).  147  During  the  same  period,  the 
Table  19  -  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  Bombay  Native  Infantry  in  1858 
Marathas  Hindus  of  Brahmins  &  Muslims  Christians  Purwarees,  Total 
inferior  caste  Rajputs  Jews  etc. 
8,096  7,918  6,609  2,159  275  376  25,433 
_(31.8%) 
(31.1%)  (25.9%)  (8.49%) 
number  of  Hindustanis  in  the  Bombay  regular  native  infantry  only  fell  by  about  five  per  cent  (see  Table 
20). 
149 
Table  20  -  Country  oforiein  ofthe  Bombay  Native  Infantry  in  1858 
Hindustan  Concan  Deccan  Central  Southern  Others  Total 
Carnatic  Carnatic 
11,357  11,051  1,877  449  216  483  25,433 
(44.7%)  (43.5)  (7.4%)  (1.8%)  1.90/0 
By  the  outbreak  of  mutiny,  therefore,  just  under  one  in  two  Bombay  sepoys  were  from  Hindustan, 
while  more  than  one  in  four  were  high-caste  Hindus,  mostly  from  Oudh.  149  Yet  only  six  of  the  29 
regiments  of  Bombay  Native  Infantry  gave  any  cause  for  anxiety  during  the  mutiny,  though  the  trouble 
was  invariably  traced  to  men  from  Hindustan.  150  When  part  of  a  detachment  of  the  12ýh  Bombay  N.  I. 
refused  orders  at  Nasirabad  on  10  August  1857,  for  example,  the  Hinclustanis  "threatened  to  shoot  the 
Marattas,  Purwarees  and  other  castes  if  they  tried  to  separate  themselves".  151  Bothoftheother 
regiments  that  actually  mutinied  -  the  2  V4  at  Karachi  on  12  September  and  the  27h  at  Kolhapur  on  31 
146  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  68,  p.  507. 
147  'Return  showing  the  Number,  Caste,  and  Country  of  the  Native  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  each 
Regiment,  Regular  and  Irregular,  of  each  Presidency,  Sept  1858',  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  22,  p.  382. 
148  Ibid 
.  149  Sir  Patrick  Cadell,  History  of  the  BombayArmy  (London,  1938),  p.  200 
150  The  six  regiments  of  Bombay  Native  Infantry  that  displayed  a  mutinous  disposition  in  1857  were  the 
2'ý  ffh,  21" 
' 
27'ý  2e  and  29h.  Only  three  partially  mutinied:  the  12'h,  21"  and  27h. 
151  Return  affording  the  information  on  MutitV  since  January  1857,  as  calledfor  by  the  Honourable 
Court  ofDirectors  ... 
in  Letter  No.  829,  dated  29  January  1858,  from  the  Military  Secretary  to  the 
Government  ofBombay,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIII. 54 
July  -  were  relatively  new  and  contained  a  high  proportion  of  Hindustanis.  152  The  27h,  the  sole 
regiment  to  murder  some  of  its  officers,  had  only  been  raised  in  1846,  following  the  conquest  of  Sind, 
and  "had  no  record  of  past  warfare  to  keep  it  steady".  153  The  28h  and  29h  regiments,  elements  of  which 
planned  to  rise  at  the  same  time  as  the  27th,  were  also  "new  regiments  with  no  tradition  behind  them, 
and  a  considerable  Pardesi  element".  154  While  the  2nd  Grenadiers,  a  part  of  which  attempted  an  uprising 
at  Ahmedabad  on  15  September  1857,  had  been  dominated  by  Hindustanis  "ever  since  such  men  had 
been  recruited  to  improve  the  appearance  of  the  regiment  when  it  had  been  made  'Grenadiers'  after  [the 
Battle  ofl  Koregaum"  (in  1818].  155  Despite  this,  the  disloyal  element  was  "overcome  by  the  Marathas 
of  the  battalion". 
156 
The  first  two  regiments  of  Bombay  regular  cavalry  were  raised  in  1817,  followed  by  a  third  three 
years  later.  According  to  Cadell,  "they  differed  markedly  from  the  infantry  battalions,  as  they  only  took 
men  of  high  caste,  and  particularly  men  of  Pathan  descent  and  Hindustani  Mussulmans".  157  This  was, 
he  claims,  in  response  to  the  Bombay  General  Order  of  5  November  1817  which  stated  that  the  first  two 
regiments  were  to  recruit  exclusively  "men  of  Musselman,  Mahratta  or  Purbee  Cast"  158  Yet  by  1851 
the  largest  ethnic  group  was  none  of  these  three  (see  Table  21).  159 
Table  21  -  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  Bombay  Light  Cavalry  in  1851 
Hindus  of  inferior  Muslims  Rajputs  (and  Brahmins)  Marathas  Christians  Total 
caste 
441  435  406  109  84  1,475 
(29.9%)  (29.5%)  (27.5%)  (7.41/6)  (5.7%) 
By  1858,  the  balance  had  tipped  even  more  in  favour  of  the  Hindus  of  inferior  caste  and  Muslims  (see 
Table  22).  160 
Table  22  -  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  Bombay  Light  Cavalry  in  1858 
Hindus  of  inferior  Muslims  Brahmins  and  Rajputs  Marathas  Christians  Total 
caste 
520  471  261  119  67  1,461 
(35.6%)  (32.2%)  (17.9%)  (8.1%)  (4.61/o) 
152  Cadell,  History  of  the  Bombay  Army,  p.  202. 
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Though  the  high-caste  representation  fell  quite  steeply  in  the  1850s,  the  vast  majority  of  Bombay 
cavalrymen  in  1858  still  came  from  Hindustan  (see  Table  23).  161  It  is,  therefore,  not  particularly 
Table  23  -  Country  oforikin  of  the  Bombay  Lieht  Cavalrv  in  1858 
Hindustan  Deccan  Concan  Central  Northern  Others  Total 
Carnatic  Circars 
1,073  127  115  30  22  94  1,461 
(73.4%)  (8.7%)  (7.9%)  (2.21/6)  (1.5110)  (6.401o) 
surprising  that  two  of  the  three  Bombay  Light  Cavalry  regiments  displayed  a  mutinous  disposition  in 
1857.  On  28  May,  the  I"  Bombay  L.  C.  (Lancers)  refused  to  follow  their  British  officers  in  a  charge  to 
recover  guns  captured  by  mutinous  Bengal  sepoys  at  Nasirabad,  two  officers  dying  as  a  result.  A 
captain  in  one  of  the  mutinous  Bengal  regiments  later  commented:  "It  is  a  well  known  fact  that  the 
Bombay  Cavalry  Regiment  here  are  ripe  for  mutiny,  but  are  only  deterred  from  breaking  out  by  a 
162 
wholesome  dread  of  being  followed  up  by  our  European  Horse  Artillery.  ".  A  trooper  of  the  V4 
Bombay  L.  C.  was  also  said  to  have  incited  the  mutiny  of  the  12th  Bombay  N.  I.  at  Nasirabad  on  10 
August  1857.163  Two  days  later,  a  conspiracy  to  mutiny  by  part  of  a  squadron  of  the  VO  Bombay  L.  C. 
was  discovered  at  Nimach  and  three  ringleaders  were  hanged;  according  to  the  commanding  officers 
report,  the  plot  was  "confined  to  a  party  of  Patan  Beloochees  and  Purdesee  [or  foreign]  sepoys"  who 
were  "associated  with  disorderly  troops  of  native  states,  many  from  same  districts,  who  had  been 
discharged  the  British  service".  164  The  mutinous  disposition  of  both  the  I"  and  2nd  regiments,  therefore, 
can  probably  be  explained  in  part  by  their  empathy  with  their  Hindustani  brethren,  and  could  even  have 
been  a  high-caste  reaction  to  their  diminishing  numbers. 
As  late  as  1839,  Bombay  possessed  just  one  regiment  of  irregular  cavalry:  the  Poona  Auxiliary  Horse 
(raised  in  1817).  In  that  year,  the  Sind  Irregular  Horse  was  formed  around  the  Cutch  levy  of  the  Poona 
Horse  which  had  been  serving  for  some  time  on  the  border  between  Cutch  and  Sind.  165  The  Gujerat 
Irregular  Horse  was  also  formed  in  1839,  followed  by  the  Southern  Maratha  Horse  in  1850,  but  both 
were  raised  for  police  duties  and  came  under  the  civil  authorities  whereas  the  Sind  Horse  was  a  purely 
161  lbid 
162  Captain  T.  Pierce  to  his  parents,  30  June  1857,  Pierce  Letters,  BL,  Add.  MSS  425000,  vol.  3. 
163  Return  affording  the  information  on  Mutiny  since  January  1857,  as  calledfor  by  the  Honourable 
Court  of  Directors 
... 
in  Letter  No.  829,  dated  29  January  1858,  from  the  Military  Secretary  to  the 
Government  ofBombay,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVHI. 
164  Ibid. 56 
military  formation.  Its  distinctive  recruitment  pattern  evolved  after  John  Jacob  became  commandant  in 
1842.  According  to  Cadelf,  the  new  commandant  "disliked  the  Baluch  and  Pathan  soldiers  and 
recruited  his  horsemen  entirely  form  Hindustani  and  Deccani  Mussulmans  and  Deccani  Marathis:  the 
Hindustanis  finally  predominating".  166  This  claim  is  largely  borne  out  by  an  1848  general  return  for  the 
two  regiments  of  Sind  Horse  (the  second  was  raised  in  1846)  which  states  that  out  of  1,600  men,  over 
1,500  came  from  Hindustan,  mainly  the  Delhi  districts  and  Oudh.  167  There  were  52  Deccanis  and  just 
three  men  -  including  two  officers  -  from  Baluchistan.  Muslims  accounted  for  about  85  per  cent  of  the 
total.  Of  the  Hindus,  34  were  Marathas  and  140  were  Brahmins  and  Rajputs.  169  in  other  words,  it  had  a 
recruitment  pattern  that  was  remarkably  similar  to  that  of  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry.  Yet  the  Sind 
Horse  never  wavered  in  its  loyalty  to  the  British  government  during  the  mutiny  despite  some  severe 
provocation,  particularly  from  disaffected  members  of  the  6  th  Bengal  I.  C.  which  was  stationed  at 
Jacobabad  -  the  regimental  headquarters  of  the  Sind  Horse  -  during  the  summer  of  1857.169  Jacob 
would  have  put  this  down  to  the  high  level  of  discipline  that  prevailed  in  the  Bombay  Army  in  general  - 
and  his  corps  in  particular  -  because  commanding  officers  still  had  sufficient  powers  to  punish  and 
reward. 
The  Bombay  artillery  contained  an  even  bigger  proportion  of  low  caste  Hindus  than  the  regular 
cavalry,  though  a  majority  still  hailed  from  Hindustan  (see  Tables  24  and  25).  170 
Table  24  -  Ethnic  comnosition  ofthe  Bombav  NativeArtillery  in  1858 
Hindus  of  inferior  caste  Marathas  Brahmins  and  Uputs  I  Muslims  Others  Total 
919 
(4  6.3  I/o) 
410 
ivC  )  (2060o  1 
340 
(17.11/6) 
1  307 
(15.4*/oy 
7 
(0.4  */o) 
19983 
As  with  the  infantry  and  cavalry,  Hindustani  golundaze  are  said  to  have  been  behind  the  foiled  plot  to 
mutiny  by  the  5h  Company,  4t"  Battalion  at  Hyderabad  in  Sind  on  8  September  and  the  partial  mutiny 
165  Cadell,  History  of  the  Bombay  Army,  p.  175 
166  Ibid.,  p.  191. 
167  'A  general  return  of  the  age,  size,  caste,  country  and  length  of  service  of  the  Indian  officers  and  men 
of  the  Scinde  Horse,  dated  21"  Sept  1848',  quoted  in  H.  T.  Lambrick,  John  Jacob  ofiacobabad 
(London,  1960),  pp.  178-9. 
168  Ibid.,  p  179. 
169  Bartle  Frere  to  Brig.  Jacob,  6  Oct  1857,  Jacob  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F  75;  Lambrick,  John  Jacob 
ofJacobabad,  pp.  3324,348-9. 
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of  the  Yd  Company,  4h  Battalion,  at  Shirkapur  in  Sind  on  23  September  1857.171  Both  companies  were 
raised  in  the  1840s  and  contained  a  large  number  of  Hindustanis. 
Table  25  -  Country  oforigin  ofthe  Bombay  Native  Artillery  in  1858 
Hindustan  Deccan  Concan  Northern  Central  Others  Total 
Circars  Carnatic 
1,190  391  338  27  22  11  1,983 
(60.0%)  (19.7%)  (17.0%)  (1.4%)  (1.10%)  (0.6%) 
The  464  Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners  had  a  similar  ethnic  make-up  to  the  artillerymen  in  1858  (see 
Table  26).  172 
Table  26  -  Ethnic  composition  Qfthe  Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners  in  1858 
Hindus  of  inferior  Marathas  Brahmins  &  Rajputs  Telingas  (Gentoo)  Muslims  Total 
caste 
200  103  63  49  46  464 
(43.1  */o)  (22.1%)  (130/6)  (10.6%)  (9-90/0) 
Though  not  an  absolute  majority,  Hinclustanis  made  up  the  biggest  single  group  (see  Table  27). 
Table  27  -  Country  ofOrigin  ofthe  Bombav  Sappers  and  Miners  in  1858 
Hindustan  Deccan  Concan  Central  Others  Total 
Carnatic 
202  194  57  6  2  464 
(43.5%)  (41.8%)  (12.3%)  (1.3%)  (0.4%) 
In  1858,  the  regular  Bombay  native  army  contained  29,341  native  officers  and  men.  The  largest  ethnic 
groups  were  (in  descending  order):  Hindus  of  inferior  caste,  Marathas,  Brahmins  and  Rajputs,  and 
Muslims  (see  Table  28),  173 
Table  28  -  Ethnic  composition  ofthe  regular  Bombay  native  army  in  1858 
Hindus  of  inferior  Marathas  Brahmins  &  Muslims  Christians  Others  Total 
caste  Rajput 
9,557  8,728  7,273  2,983  342  210  29,341 
(32.6%)  (29.7%)  (24.8%)  (10.2%)  (1.2%)  (1.5vo) 
171  Retunt  affording  the  itfiormation  on  Mutiny  s*ice  January  185  7,  as  calledfor  by  the  Honourable 
Court  ofDireclors  ...  in  Letter  No.  829,  dated  29  January  1858,  from  the  Military  Secretary  to  the 
Government  ofBombay,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVHI. 
"  'Return  showing  the  Number,  Caste,  and  Country  of  the  Native  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  each 
Regiment,  Regular  and  Irregular,  of  each  Presidency,  Sept  1858',  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  22. 
173  Ibid. 58 
Hindustan  was  the  biggest  provider  of  soldiers,  followed  by  the  Concan  and  the  Deccan  (see  Table 
29).  174  Given  the  close  ties  of  country  and  caste  that  bound  many  Bombay  and  Bengal  sepoys,  the  fact 
that  the  cavalry  was  dominated  by  Hindustani  Muslims  to  whom  the  restablishment  of  the  Moghul 
Table  29  -  Country  oforigin  ofthe  regular  Bombay  native  army  in  1858 
Hindustan  Concan  Deccan  Central  Southern  Others  Total 
Carnatic  Camatic 
13,642  11,561  2,589  509  222  818  29,341 
(46.5%)  (39.41/o)  (8.8%)  (1.7%)  (0.8-/.  )  (2.8%) 
emperor  at  Delhi  was  expected  to  appeal,  and  the  likelhihood  that  the  Maratha  element  -  the  biggest 
single  group  in  the  army  -  might  well  have  sympathized  with  rebel  Maratha  princes  like  Nana  Sahib 
(who  declared  himself  Peshwa),  the  Rani  of  Jhansi  and  the  former  ruling  families  of  Satara,  Baroda  and 
Kolhapur,  it  is  perhaps  suprising  that  more  mutinies  did  not  take  place  in  the  Bombay  Army.  Instead  a 
large  number  of  Bombay  units  played  a  key  role  in  suppressing  the  mutiny.  175  In  Cadell's  opinion,  this 
was  chiefly  because  the  Bombay  Army  was  more  disciplined,  more  meritocratic  and  less  inclined  to 
pander  to  caste  than  its  Bengal  counterpart.  He  wrote: 
In  the  Bombay  regiments  ...  men  of  all  castes,  some  high,  others  extremely  low,  stood  and  worked  together. 
Promotion  was  by  mcrit  and  selection,  and  men  of  low  caste  were  constantly  promoted  to  the  commissioned  ranks: 
while  those  of  exceptionally  intelligent,  though  numerically  small,  classes,  such  as  the  Bene  Israel,  supplied  a  large 
number  of  officers,  who  had  no  caste  tics.  In  the  Bengal  Army,  moreover,  officers  nominally  in  command  of 
regiments  had,  in  the  words  of  a  Bengal  officer,  become  Scrjcant-Majors  owing  to  excessive  centralization  and 
interference  from  above.  In  Bombay  such  officers  still  commanded  their  regiments.  To  some  extent  the  jealousy 
between  the  sepoys  of  Bengal  and  Bombay 
...  tended  to  prevent  the  Bombay  men  from  following  the  evil  example 
of  the  mutiny.  But  the  main  reason  was  the  superior  discipline  of  the  Bombay  sepoys.  Above  all  their  traditional 
attachment  to  their  regimental  colours  and  their  off  iccrs...  176 
174  Ibid. 
175  The  Bombay  native  units  that  fought  against  the  rebels  and  mutineers  inside  and  outside  their 
presidency  in  1857-9  included-  I"  VO  and  PLC-  2nd  3"d  e,  50%  7'h,  8th  Sýh  I&,  121h,  l3tý  1411%  16ý 
17'h,  I  5'h,  23d,  24h  25th  N.  I.;  ý/3ý  2/4th  and  474ý  F"A;  'Vd:  3  rd  and  5h  Coýpanies,  Bombay  Sappers 
and  Miners;  I't  and  Yd  Baluch  Irregular  Infantry;  units  of  the  Baluch,  Gujarat,  Poona,  Southern 
Mahratta  and  Sind  Irregular  Horse;  the  I"  and  Yd  Cavalry,  and  I"  and  5h  Infantry,  Hyderabad 
Contingent. 59 
Eric  Stokes  believed  that  a  major  cause  of  mutiny  in  1857  was  the  determination  by  high-caste  Bengal 
sepoys  to  retain  their  stranglehold  over  recruitment.  177  But  he  provided  no  compelling  evidence.  The 
point  is  merely  inferred  from  the  steady  decline  in  the  proportion  of  high-caste  Bengal  infantrymen, 
particularly  after  the  2nd  Sikh  War.  It  could  just  as  easily  be  argued,  as  Stokes  did  himself,  that  "unity 
of  action  could  be  seriously  affected  by  any  dilution  of  the  high-caste  element".  178  In  other  words,  the 
government's  recruitment  policy  had  succeeded  in  making  a  general  mutiny  less  likely  in  1857  than  it 
would  have  been  ten  years  earlier  because  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  was  less  homogenous.  That  it 
took  place  nonetheless  -  and  involved  many  other  Bengal  troops  who  had  little  in  common  with  the 
high-caste  sepoys  -  is  perhaps  an  indication  that  other,  more  generally  held  professional  grievances 
were  involved.  The  debt-ridden  Muslims  that  dominated  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry,  for  example, 
seem  to  have  been  motivated  by  plunder  and  the  promise  of  higher  pay  in  the  service  of  the  restored 
Mughal  emperor.  The  fact  that  service  issues  such  as  these  were  less  prominent  in  the  other  two 
presidency  armies  might  help  to  explain  why  the  Bombay  Native  Infantry,  despite  containing  a 
signficant  proportion  (25.9%)  of  high-caste  sepoys  from  11industan,  179  experienced  so  few  mutinies  in 
1857.  The  Madras  Army,  on  the  other  hand,  had  virtually  no  ethnic  ties  to  its  Bengal  counterpart.  Only 
two  of  its  regular  regiments  displayed  any  mutinous  disposition  in  1857:  on  both  occasions  the 
ostensible  reason  was  a  disinclination  to  serve  against  their  fellow  Muslims  among  the  Bengal 
mutineers;  but  the  underlying  grievances  were  identified  as  professional.  "0 
176  Cadell,  History  of  the  Bombay  Army,  pp.  201-2. 
177  Stokes,  Ae  Peasant  Armed,  pp.  51-2. 
178  ibid.,  p.  52. 
179  'Return  showing  the  Number,  Caste,  and  Country  of  the  Native  Officers  and  Soldiers  of  each 
Regiment,  Regular  and  Irregular,  of  each  Presidency,  Sept  1858',  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  22,  p.  382. 
180  Lord  Harris  to  Robert  Vernon  Smith,  27  Aug  and  10  Oct  1857,  Lyveden  Letters,  OIOC,  MSS 
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Chapter  Two  -  Professional  Grievances 
This  chapter  will  outline  the  professional  grievances  held  by  the  native  troops  of  the  Bengal  Army  in 
the  years  prior  to  the  Indian  mutiny,  particularly  those  that  were  not  shared  by  the  Madras  and  Bombay 
sepoys.  It  will  argue  that  certain  grievances  -  such  as  insufficient  pay  and  inadequate  career  prospects 
-  played  a  much  more  important  role  in  the  decision  to  mutiny  than  has  hitherto  been  acknowledged. 
All  armies  have  professional  grievances  and  none  are  more  typical  than  those  that  relate  to  their 
conditions  of  service.  Of  particular  irritation  to  the  sepoys  of  all  three  presidency  armies  were  the  rules 
and  regulations  concerning  dress  and  accoutrements  which  mirrored  those  of  the  British  Army.  In 
place  of  his  baggy  native  dress,  a  sepoy  had  to  wear  a  tight  red  coatee,  or  swallow-tail  coat,  and  close- 
fitting  dark  blue  trousers  (white  in  summer).  On  his  head  he  wore  a  shako  dress  cap  that  weighed  from 
two  and  a  half  to  three  pounds  with  its  brass  rims,  scales  and  badge,  "a  heavy  unwieldly  thing,  more 
like  an  inverted  fire-bucket  than  a  chaco".  1  Sitaram  Pandy,  who  joined  the  26h  Bengal  N.  I.  in  1814, 
recalled:  "At  first  I  found  it  very  disagreeable  wearing  the  red  coat;  although  this  was  open  in  front,  it 
was  very  tight  under  the  arms.  The  Shako  was  very  heavy  and  hurt  my  head,  but  of  course  it  was  very 
smart.  I  grew  accustomed  to  this  after  a  time,  but  I  always  found  it  a  great  relief  when  I  could  wear  my 
own  loose  [cotton]  dress.  4  Describing  other  elements  of  a  sepoy's  equipment,  Captain  Hervey  of  the 
Madras  Native  Infantry  wrote: 
On  his  back  is  slung  a  great  knapsack,  fastened  to  his  body  by  means  of  Icathcr-straps  going  round  his  shoulders 
and  his  chest,  tight  enough  to  cut  him  in  two...  Across  his  chest  he  has  two  broad  belts,  held  together  by  a  brass 
plate  passing  on  either  side  of  him.  To  one  of  these  is  fastened  his  bayonet,  and  to  the  other  his  pouch  or  cartouch- 
box,  large  enough  to  contain  some  sixty  rounds  of  ball  ammunition,  the  whole  sufficient  to  break  a  poor  man's 
1  Charles  Allen  (ed.  ),  A  Soldier  of  the  Company.  ý  Life  ofan  Indian  Ensign  1833-43  [Capt.  Albert 
Hervey]  (London,  1988),  p.  148. 
2  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  23. 61 
back.  Round  his  waist  passes  another  belt,  intended  to  keep  the  others  together,  but  tight  enough  to  cut  his  very 
intcstincs  out  of  him.  3 
Upon  his  feet  the  sepoy  wore  "a  pair  of  clumsy  things  called  sandals",  while  constricting  his  neck  was  a 
Stock 
4 
stiff  black  leather  ,  But  most  irksome  of  all  was  his  unwieldy  musket  known  as  the  'Brown  Bess', 
weighing  a  full  10  lbs.  3  ozs.  and  with  an  effective  range  of  300  yards,  though  only  accurate  up  to  one 
hundred.  5  Sitaram  found  his  musket  "very  heavy,  and  for  a  long  time  my  shoulder  ached  when  carrying 
it,,.  6  Hervey  noted  that  it  was  "heavy  enough  for  a  roast-beef-fed  Englishman  to  carry,  but  too  much  for 
the  delicately-formed  light  body  and  slender  limbs  of  the  sepoy  lad".  7  Though  Bengal  sepoys  were 
generally  bigger  than  their  Madras  counterparts,  they  still  struggled  to  carry  and  fire  this  large  weapon. 
There  were  many  calls  for  the  reform  of  sepoy  dress  and  equipment  in  the  years  prior  to  the  mutiny. 
According  to  the  Delhi  Gazelle  in  1852,  so  heavy  and  unsteady  was  the  shako  that  a  sepoy  could  barely 
move  without  using  his  free  hand  to  keep  his  hat  on.  $  The  following  year  The  Times  commented:  "The 
soldier  ought  to  be  so  clothed  that  his  natural  acquirements  may  be  as  little  cramped  as  possible.  Every 
exception  to  this  rule  diminished  his  utility  and  rendered  him  ridiculous.  "9  John  Jacob,  the  commandant 
of  the  Sind  Irregular  Horse,  was  even  more  explicit  in  an  essay  in  1854:  "A  sepoy  of  the  line,  dressed  in 
a  tight  coat;  trousers  in  which  he  can  scarcely  walk,  and  cannot  stoop  at  all;  bound  to  an  immense  and 
totally  useless  knapsack,  so  that  he  can  hardly  breathe;  strapped,  belted  and  pipeclayed  within  a  hair's- 
breadth  of  his  life;  with  a  rigid  basket-chako  on  his  head,  which  requires  the  skill  of  a  juggler  to  balance 
there,  and  which  cuts  deep  into  his  brow  if  worn  for  an  hour;  and  with  a  leather  stock  round  his  neck,  to 
complete  his  absurd  costume  -  when  compared  with  the  same  sepoy,  clothed,  armed,  and  accoutred 
solely  with  regard  to  his  comfort  and  efficiency,  forms  the  most  perfect  example  of  what  is  madly 
called  the  'regular'  system.  "  10  In  his  famous  treatise  on  the  defects  of  the  Indian  Army,  Sir  Charles 
Napier  made  many  of  the  same  points,  adding  that  the  sepoys'  muskets  were  "too  heavy"  and  "should 
3  Allen  (ed.  ),  A  Soldier  of  the  Company,  p.  148-9. 
4  Ibid.,  p.  149. 
5  Major  G.  Tylden,  'The  Principal  Small  Arms  carried  by  British  Regular  Infantry',  JSAHR,  Vol.  45, 
1967,  pp.  244-5. 
6  Lunt  (ed.  ),  Rrom  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  23. 
7  Allen  (ed.  ),  A  Soldier  of  the  Company,  p.  148. 
8  Delhi  Gazelle,  24  April  1852. 
9  Yhe  Times,  12  January  1853,  ibid. 
10  Captain  Lewis  Pelly  (ed.  ),  The  Views  and  Opinions  ofBrigadier-General  John  Jacoh  C.  B.  (London, 
1858),  p.  129. 62 
be  reduced  to  six  or  seven  pounds  weight".  "  It  is  ironic,  therefore,  that  the  only  pre-1857  reform  of 
dress  or  equipment  was  the  replacement  of  the  'Brown  Bess'  musket  with  the  lighter  Enfield  rifle  (8  lbs. 
140ZS.  )12  whose  greased  cartridge  was  the  ostensible  cause  of  mutiny. 
The  Peel  Commission  of  1858  heard  much  evidence  recommending  reform.  Major-General  Birch, 
Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India  in  the  Military  Department,  was  of  the  opinion  that  sepoys  should 
henceforth  wear  "a  loose  dress  or  tunic,  loose  trousers,  and  turbans"  ;  13  as  was,  among  others,  Major- 
General  Mansfield,  the  Adjutant-General  of  Bengal,  who  advised  that  "tight  jackets  and  shakos  should 
be  forgotten  for  ever".  14  The  Punjab  Committee  -  consisting  of  Sir  John  Lawrence,  Brigadier-General 
Chamberlain  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Edwardes  -  noted  that  "a  sepoy  in  his  European  dress  could 
neither  stoop  to  the  ground  nor  take  rest  in  his  accoutrements",  15  while  Sir  Mark  Cubbon  pointed  out 
that  more  men  had  been  "invalided  and  pensioned  from  the  chest-foundering  action  of  the  knapsack 
than  ever  would  have  been  the  ordinary  risks  of  the  sepoys".  16  During  the  mutiny  itself,  many  sepoys 
discarded  their  knapsacks  and  shakos,  and  replaced  their  trousers  with  loose-fitting  dhotis,  though  for  a 
time  they  continued  to  wear  their  red  coats  as  a  sign  of  regimental  unity.  A  contemporary  print  of  the 
siege  of  Arrah  House  in  August  1857,  shortly  after  the  mutiny  of  the  7'h,  Wh  and  4e  N.  I.  at  Dinapore, 
shows  the  mutineers  in  forage  caps,  full  dress  jackets  and  white  trousers.  In  the  background  can  be 
seen  a  full  regiment  in  parade  formation,  still  carrying  its  regimental  colours.  James  Atkinson's  pencil 
drawings  of  a  rebel  artilleryman  and  a  rebel  trooper  also  contain  many  elements  of  the  soldiers'  orginal 
uniforms.  Captain  George  Atkinson's  print  of'Mutinous  sepoys',  on  the  other  hand,  depicts  the  rebels 
in  white  turbans  or  skullcaps,  white  jackets  or  shirts,  and  white  dhotis.  Only  their  cartridge  belts, 
pouches  and  waist-belts  have  survived.  17 
The  dress  and  accoutrements  of  the  regular  light  cavalry  were  also  styled  on  the  British  Army,  though 
their  quilted  tunics  -  short-waisted  and  extremely  tight  -  were  Trench  grey'  (fight  blue)  rather  than  the 
dark  blue  or  scarlet  of  the  British  light  cavalry.  They,  too,  wore  the  awkward  shako  (made  even  more 
top-heavy  by  its  horse-hair  plume),  choking  leather  stock,  clumpy  jack-boots  and  close-fitting  leather  or 
"  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  pp.  302,307 
12  TyIden,  'The  Principal  Small  Arms  carried  by  British  Regular  Infantry',  JSAHR,  Vol.  45,1967,  pp. 
244-5. 
13  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  61,  p.  433 
14  Ibid.,  Appx.  62,  p.  452.  Colonel  J.  Holland  of  the  Bombay  Army  was  another  who  recommended 
that  turbans  and  loose-fitting  clothes  should  replace  shakos  and  coatees  (Ibid,  Appx.  7). 
15  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  VIII,  p.  28.  Quoted  in  Barat,  Yhe  Bengal  Native  Itfianlry,  p.  167. 
16  Ibid.,  p.  106.  Quoted  in  Barat,  7he  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  pp.  167-8. 
17  Boris  Mollo,  Yhe  Indian  Army  (Poole,  198  1),  pp.  90,100-1. 63 
cloth  breeches  with  straps  under  the  instep  (the  latter  were  dark  blue  until  1847  and  French  grey 
thereafter).  But  the  most  unsuitable  pieces  of  their  equipment  were  the  heavy,  slightly-curved  light 
dragoon  sword  (1821  pattern)  and  the  tall,  European-style  saddle.  The  former  was  cumbersome  and 
unwieldy,  and  could  neither  cut  nor  thrust  to  any  real  effect;  the  latter  pushed  the  rider  so  high  above 
the  horse  that  he  was  forced  to  ride  by  balance  alone.  The  irregular  cavalry,  by  contrast,  worepugris 
(turbans),  long  loose  alkaluks  (tunics),  cummerbunds,  and  baggypyjama  trousers  with  either  puttees  or 
long  boots,  They  were  armed  with  the  lightly-curved  and  extremely  sharp  native  sword  known  as  the 
tulwar,  or  the  scimitar-like  shamshir,  and  seated  on  low,  local  pattern  saddles.  ] 
Among  the  most  strident  critics  of  regular  cavalry  equipment  was  Lieutenant-Colonel  Charles 
Carmichael  Smyth  who  had  commanded  regiments  of  Bengal  light  and  irregular  cavalry.  In  1847,  in  a 
pamphlet  recommending  the  transformation  of  all  regular  cavalry  to  "demi-irregular  cavalry"  (an  idea 
first  proposed  by  James  Outram,  of  the  Bombay  Army),  he  condemned  the  regulars'  restrictive  uniform, 
pointless  headdress  and  ineffective  sword.  His  solution  was  to  clothe  and  equip  all  cavalry  like 
irregulars  with  "a  broad  cloth  Ukaluck  [sic],  or  long  native  dress,  a  pair  of  loose  trowsers,  a  turban  and 
Kummerbund,  with  Hindoostanee  saddles  and  bridles".  For  the  sake  of  uniformity  these  items  would 
be  supplied  by  the  same  clothing  agents  that  kitted  out  the  regulars,  with  troopers  charged  stoppages  of 
one  and  a  half  rupees  a  month  (out  of  a  minimum  pay  of  23  rupees  a  month)  so  that  commanding 
officers  would  continue  to  profit  from  the  off-reckoning  fund  -  unlike  British  colonels,  they  pooled  any 
profits  from  the  annual  sum  they  were  paid  to  clothe  their  men.  With  regard  to  arms,  Carmichael 
Smyth  suggested  that  each  man  "should  carry  a  sharp  sword  of  his  own  selection",  with  some  also 
carrying  lances  and  pistols  and  others  carbines.  All  weapons  would  be  "supplied  from  the  magazines, 
and  sold  to  the  men  at  prime  cost",  thereby  reducing  the  expense  to  government.  19 
Other  officers  were  quick  to  emphasise  the  detrimental  effect  that  unsuitable  equipment  had  on 
combat  effectiveness.  In  his  eye-witness  history  of  the  2  nd  Sikh  War,  for  example,  Captain  E.  J. 
Thackwell  put  the  shameful  performance  of  three  regiments  of  Bengal  Light  Cavalry  at  Chilianwalla 
down  to  inadequate  arms  and  tack.  "It  was  incontrovertibly  proved,  "  wrote  Thackwell,  "at  this  and 
subsequent  actions,  that  the  Troops  of  the  Light  Cavalry  have  no  confidence  in  their  swords  as  effective 
weapons  of  defence.  It  would  have  been  difficult  to  point  out  half-a-dozen  men  who  had  made  use  of 
18  Heathcote,  Yhe  Indian  Army,  pp.  38-9;  Mollo,  77je  IndianArtny,  pp.  55-6. 
19  Carmichael  Smyth,  A  Rough  Sketch  of  the  Mse  andProgress  of  the  Irregular  Horse  of  the  Bengal 
Anny,  pp.  22-5. 64 
their  swords.  On  approaching  the  enemy  they  have  immediate  recourse  to  their  pistols,  the  loading  and 
firing  of  which  form  their  sole  occupation...  Very  few  natives  have  ever  become  really  reconciled  to 
the  long  seat  and  powerless  bit  of  the  European  Dragoons.  "20  Thackwell's  solution,  partly  influenced 
by  the  illustrious  charge  of  Jacob's  Sind  Horse  at  the  Battle  of  Gujerat,  was  to  convert  all  light  cavalry 
into  irregulars.  21 
Another  vocal  critic  was  Captain  Nolan  of  the  15'h  Hussars  (who  was  to  die  so  infamously  with  the 
Light  Brigade  at  Balaklava).  Having  served  in  India  for  much  of  the  1840s,  he  published  a  best-selling 
book  on  cavalry  tactics  in  1853.  Its  recommendations  for  the  Indian  regular  cavalry  included  replacing 
all  European  dress  and  equipment  with  their  native  equivalents.  22  Nolan  was  partly  influenced  by  an 
officer's  letter  to  the  Delhi  Gazette  which  stated:  "A  cavalry  soldier  should  find  himself  strong  and  firm 
in  his  seat,  easy  in  his  dress,  so  as  to  have  perfect  freedom  of  action,  and  with  a  weapon  in  his  hand 
capable  ofmating  dowti  an  adversary  at  a  blow.  There  is  scarcely  a  more  pitiable  spectacle  in  the 
world  than  a  native  trooper  mounted  on  an  English  saddle,  tightened  by  his  dress  to  the  stiffness  of  a 
dummy,  half  suffocated  with  a  leather  collar,  and  a  regulation  sword  in  his  hand,  which  must  always  be 
blunted  by  the  steel  scabbard  in  which  it  is  encased.  43  Henry  Lawrence  agreed.  In  his  1856  essay 
entitled  'The  Indian  Army',  he  wrote:  "Every  trooper  should  be  permitted  to  fit  his  own  saddle,  and 
adapt  his  bit  to  his  own  horse.  Lancers  should  be  abolished,  and  the  tulwar,  the  weapon  of  the  Indian 
horseman,  should  be  allowed,  as  also  a  carbine  and  one  pistol,  to  each  trooper.  It  must  be  borne  in 
mind  that  they  are  light  horsemen,  not  heavy  dragoons.  44  The  majority  of  oral  and  written  evidence 
presented  to  the  Peel  Commission  concurred  in  that  it  recommended  replacing  regular  cavalry 
regiments  with  irregular  ones.  Colonel  Becher,  the  Quartermaster-General  of  the  Bengal  Army,  was 
typical.  When  asked  if  the  native  cavalryman  preferred  wearing  his  own  dress  and  riding  on  a  familiar 
saddle,  he  replied:  "Certainly...  I  would  have  all  cavalry  in  future  on  the  irregular  system.  ,  25 
The  East  India  Company's  native  foot  artillery  wore  shakos,  dark  blue  coatees  with  scarlet  facings, 
and  were  "virtually  indistinguishable  in  their  uniforms  from  the  Royal  Artillery".  26  The  dress  of  their 
horse  artillery  counterparts  "was,  if  anything,  even  more  splendid  than  those  of  the  British  service,  for 
20  E.  J.  Thackwell,  Narrative  of  the  Secotid  Sikh  War  (London,  1851,2  nd  edition),  pp.  180-1. 
21  Ibid.,  p.  183. 
22  Captain  L.  E.  Nolan,  Cavalry.,  Its  History  and  Tactics  (London,  1853),  p.  102 
23  Ibid.,  p.  103. 
24  Lawrence,  E  ssays,  Military  and  Political,  p.  411. 
25  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  H.  C.,  p.  26 
26  Heathcote,  The  Indiati  Army,  p.  41. 65 
although  both  wore  a  short  blue  jacket  decorated  with  rows  of  gold  lace  and  ball  buttons,  the 
Company's  men  wore,  instead  of  the  RHA  hussar  busby,  a  great  Roman  helmet,  like  that  of  the  French 
cuirassier,  with  a  long  flowing  mane  of  red  or  black  horsehair".  27  Sappers  and  Miners  in  all  three 
presidencies  wore  shakos,  scarlet  jackets  with  blue  facings  and  were  armed  with  'sapper  carbines'which 
were  considerably  longer  than  the  cavalry  version  (the  exception  being  the  Bombay  corps  which  used 
the  Brunswick  rifle)  . 
28  None  of  these  corps  are  specifically  mentioned  in  the  many  calls  for  uniform 
and  accoutrement  reform,  though  their  inclusion  is  probably  implicit. 
The  Indian  government's  failure  to  bow  to  this  pressure  for  change  is  particularly  suprisng  given  the 
alterations  that  were  made  to  the  uniforms  of  both  its  European  troops  and  the  British  Army  at  this 
time.  Criticism  of  the  top-heavy  shako  and  tight-fitting  coatee  worn  by  British  infantrymen  had  begun 
in  the  late  1820s.  Minor  improvements  were  made  to  these  items  in  the  1840s  but  it  was  not  until  two 
generals  of  royal  blood,  the  Duke  of  Cambridge  and  Lord  Frederick  Fitzclarence,  entered  the  lists  that 
real  change  became  possible.  Both  supported  the  replacement  of  the  coatee  and  leather  stock  with  a 
frock  coat  that  provided  better  protection  from  the  elements  and  was  easier  to  wear.  But  because  the 
frock  coat  was  bigger  and  therefore  more  expensive  than  the  coatee,  it  was  bound  to  reduce  the  profits 
that  many  regimental  commanding  officers  made  out  of  'off-reckonings',  the  fixed  sum  they  were  paid 
annually  to  clothe  their  regiments.  This  obstacle  was  finally  removed  in  June  1854  when  the  provision 
of  clothing  by  regimental  colonels  was  abolished  in  favour  of  a  contract  system.  Within  a  year,  the 
coatee  had  been  superseded  by  a  double-breasted  tunic  (a  modified  version  of  the  frock  coat)  and  the 
Albert-pattem  shako  by  a  lower  shako.  The  other  branches  of  the  British  Army  also  had  their  uniforms 
redesigned  on  the  basis  of  practicality.  29 
Even  the  European  troops  of  the  Indian  Army  experienced  some  relief  from  the  restriction  of  their 
uniform.  As  early  as  1845,  Sir  Charles  Napier,  then  Governor  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  Sind,  had 
complained  to  Sir  Henry  Hardinge,  the  Governor-General,  about  the  weight  of  the  shako.  He  himself 
wore  a  double-peaked  cap  with  a  white  cover  and  Hew  Strachan,  in  his  essay  on  the  pre-Crimean 
reform  of  British  uniforms,  speculated  that  this  was  the  template  for  the  "trial  frame  of  a  helmet  or  cap 
that  he  had  made  up  in  1850,  ostensibly  for  adoption  by  the  Indian  Army".  30  But  he  resigned  as 
27  Ibid. 
28  Mollo,  Yhe  Indian  A  riny,  p.  5  7. 
29  H.  F.  A.  Strachan,  'The  Origins  of  the  1855  Uniform  Changes:  An  Example  of  Pre-Crimean  Reform', 
JSAHR,  Vol.  55,1977,  pp.  85-117 
30  Ibid.,  p.  109. 66 
Commander-in-Chief  of  India  before  his  vision  could  become  reality.  More  successful  was  Lord 
Frederick  Fitzclarence  who  in  1853,  during  his  tenure  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  Bombay,  modified 
the  dress  of  his  European  troops  by  replacing  their  leather  stocks  with  square  collars.  He  also  made 
their  coatees  less  tight-fitting.  Uniforms  for  native  troops,  on  the  other  hand,  received  no  such 
modification.  There  are  two  possible  explanations:  either  Indian  colonels,  like  their  British  Army 
counterparts,  were  unwilling  to  see  a  diminution  in  their  profits  from  the  off-reckonings  system  (they 
would  have  been  supported  by  the  21  senior  officers  -  nine  from  Bengal,  eight  from  Madras  and  four 
from  Bombay  -  who  also  received  a  cut  of  the  cake);  31  or  senior  administrators  believed  that  the 
survival  of  British  India  depended  upon  the  separation  of  its  soldiers  from  civil  society,  and  that  a 
European-style  uniform  was  one  way  to  achieve  this. 
A  second  professional  grievance  held  by  native  troops  in  general  -  and  Bengal  sepoys  in  particular  - 
was  with  the  nature  of  their  duties.  "Year  after  year,  "  writes  Barat,  "[the  Bengal  sepoy]  would  have  to 
face  the  monotonous  round  of  peace  time  assignments  -  forenoon  parade  for  cleaning  his  arms  and 
accoutrement,  evening  parade  for  orders,  guard  duties,  a  brigade  exercise  once  a  week,  regimental 
exercises  four  or  five  times  a  week  -  and  would  have  to  carry  out  these  tasks  as  a  sepoy  with  years  to 
serve  before  he  could  expect  promotion.  02  Barat  argues  that  the  situation  became  particularly  acute 
after  the  1800s  because  "campaigns  were  waged  at  less  and  less  frequent  intervals  and  the  native 
soldiery  was  restricted  to  duties  which  it  considered  to  be  monotonous  and  tiring".  33  For  while 
annexations  reduced  the  chances  of  active  service,  they  increased  the  need  for  policing  the  new  areas. 
Such  duties  -  which  included  escorting  treasure  and  guarding  prisoners  -  were  increasingly  undertaken 
by  infantry  sepoys.  Ina  minute  of  1833,  Lord  William  Bentinck  quoted  the  two  most  recent  half- 
yearly  returns  for  the  "disposable  force  that  could  be  collected  upon  an  emergency  from  the  principal 
stations  of  the  Bengal  Army,  afler  providing  all  the  guards  required  for  the  headquarters  of  corps,  sick, 
baggage  etc.  04  In  one  case  54  per  cent  of  troops  were  available,  and  in  the  otherjust  42  per  cent.  35 
Bentinck  commented: 
31  Details  of  the  development  and  workings  of  the  East  India  Company  army's  off-reckonings  fund  are 
contained  in  the  Bombay  Military  Regulations,  1850,  L/MIU17/4/548,  OIOC,  ppl65-90. 
32  Barat,  7he  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  p.  154. 
33  Ibid.,  p.  155. 
34  Philips  (ed.  ),  Yhe  Correspondence  of  Lord  William  Cavendish  Bentinck,  II,  p.  1332. 67 
At  every  one  of  the  large  stations  mentioned  in  the  statemcnt,  there  are  government  establishments  of  all  kinds; 
commissariat,  ordnance  magazines,  public  cattle,  pay  office,  bazar 
,  and  other  deposits  of  public  property, 
requiring  protection  and  their  separate  guards.  The  largeness  of  the  country  ...  and  the  large  bands  of 
dacoits 
...  require  that  all  detachments  going  with  treasure  or  any  other  escort,  should  be  large  and  efficient...  No 
greater  political  error  can  be  committed  than  that  of  imposing  upon  the  scpoy  during  peace  excessive  duty,  or  by 
tormenting  him  with  an  overstrained  system  of  drill  and  discipline,  which  too  frequently  occur...  Care  should  be 
taken,  when  estimating  the  total  amount  of  force  to  be  required,  that  the  ordinary  duty  should  never  fall  hard  upon 
die  scpoy. 
36 
Yet  conditions  did  not  improve.  In  1844,  for  example,  Henry  Lawrence  suggested  that  all  treasuries 
and  magazines,  as  well  as  a  number  of  fortresses,  should  be  "garrisoned  by  invalids,  supported  by  small 
detachments  of  regulars  for  night  and  exposed  duties".  37  This  would  relieve  the  majority  of  regulars 
from  such  arduous  tasks.  Lawrence  added:  "There  should  be  no  afler  drill  and  parades  to  keep  men  out 
ofmischief  -  to  disgust  them  with  their  duty.  They  should  have  as  much  of  exercise  and  instruction  as 
should  keep  them  practised  and  able  soldiers,  and  their  lives  should  be  rendered  happy,  that  they  might 
remain  willing  and  contented  ones.  09 
But  no  reforms  were  instituted.  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Patrick  Grant  told  the  Peel  Commission  that, 
as  Adjutant-General  of  the  Bengal  Army  during  Napier's  time  as  Commander-in-Chief  (1849-50),  he 
submitted  a  return  which  showed  that  "one  third  of  the  entire  native  army  was  permanently  on  duty,  day 
and  night,  from  year's  end  to  ycar's  end  to.  39  Barat  states  that  during  1849-50  "more  than  30,000  Bengal 
native  soldiers  were  engaged  in  guarding  treasure  and  that  too  for  a  total  period  of  15  months".  40 
These  figures  did  not  escape  the  attention  of  Napier  who  informed  the  Duke  of  Wellington  in  1849  that 
it  was  necessary  to  have  a  large  and  efficient  police  force  that  would  "leave  the  military  to  their  own 
duties".  41  His  later  treatise  on  the  defects  of  the  Indian  Army  stressed  that  the  breaking  up  of  a 
regiment  into  small  detachments  for  guard  duty  made  it  "unserviceable  as  a  military  body"  and 
35  Ibid.,  pp.  1332-3.  The  figures  quoted  are  for  45  regiments  of  native  infantry,  comprising  31,320 
drummers  and  rank  and  file.  The  first  figure  of  16,833  men  is  for  I  January  1833  when  all  the  men 
were  present;  the  second  figure  of  13,213  is  for  I  August  1833  when  the  usual  proportion  were  absent 
on  furlough. 
36  Ibid.,  pp.  13334. 
37  Lawrence,  Essays,  Military  and  Political,  p.  25. 
39  Ibid.,  p.  59. 
39  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  65,  p.  485. 
40  Barat,  77ie  Bengal  Native  lifiantry,  p.  155. 68 
destroyed  discipline.  42  "Soldiers  hate  to  be  constantly  on  guard,  "  he  wrote,  "constantly  dressed  and 
accoutred  in  any  climate,  in  a  tropical  one  it  is  unendurable,  and  therefore  evaded...  Here  is  the  origin 
of  the  general  Indian  custom  of  guards  going  to  bed  and  seIf-relief  of  sentries.  oo43  Lord  Ellenborough 
(Governor-General  18424)  had  tried  to  reduce  the  number  of  sepoys  needed  for  civil  duties  by  forming 
police  battalions.  But  only  a  handful  had  been  raised  by  the  time  he  left  India.  "The  evil  therefore 
remains,  "  concluded  Napier,  "and  the  Sepoys  are  wearied  and  disgusted.  , 44 
It  was  not  a  problem  that  was  confined  to  the  Bengal  Army.  After  he  took  command  of  the  Bombay 
Anny  in  1856,  General  Grant  "made  repeated  representations"  that  that  army  was  "similarly 
overworked".  43  Yet  Napier  felt  that  the  discipline  of  the  Bengal  Army  had  suffered  the  most  as  a 
consequence.  "The  officers  of  the  Queen's  and  Bombay  Armies,  "  he  wrote,  "naturally  cry  out,  when 
they  see  sentries  self  relieved  and  guards  going  to  bed;  but  when  the  remote  causes  of  this  loose 
discipline  were  revealed,  I  saw  that  a  partial  effort  to  remedy  would  make  matters  worse.  06 
Onerous  duties  were  a  particular  irritant  for  Bengal  sepoys  because,  proportionately,  they  were  strung 
out  over  a  far  wider  area  than  their  Madras  and  Bombay  counterparts.  The  situation  was  made  even 
worse  by  the  annexation  of  the  Punjab  in  1849  and  parts  of  Burma  in  1853,  though  Bombay's  territory 
was  also  augmented  by  Sind  in  1844.  Yet  irksome  duty  remained  one  of  the  few  grievances  that 
Bengal  and  Madras  native  troops  had  in  common.  The  fact  that  no  Madras  sepoys  actually  mutinied  in 
1857  might  help  to  explain  why,  unusually,  this  professional  grievance  was  not  ameliorated  by  the  post- 
mutiny  reforms  of  the  1860s.  For,  as  late  as  1879,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  Madras  was 
complaining  that  one  of  the  reasons  his  regiments  were  undermanned  was  because  sepoys'  duties  had 
"considerably  increased  of  late  years  -  the  discipline  is  stricter  -  and  very  often  the  men  do  not  get  the 
47 
nights  in  bed  they  are  entitled  to  by  Regulation".  He  added:  "Heavy  guard  duty,  combined  with 
constant  parade  instruction  and  a  more  rigid  discipline  have  lessened  the  popularity  of  the  army.  i0g 
41  Ibid. 
42  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  p.  228. 
43  Ibid.,  pp.  229-30. 
44  Ibid.,  p.  23  1. 
45  p.  p.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  65,  p.  485. 
4f'Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  p.  23  1. 
47  Gen.  Sir  N.  Chamberlain  to  the  D.  of  Cambridge,  17  April  1879,  Chamberlain  Correspondence, 
OIOC,  MSS  Eur/C203. 
48  Ibid. 69 
The  well-being  of  voluntary  armies  has  always  depended  upon  the  adequacy  of  their  incentives  to 
serve.  These  can  be  roughly  divided  into  two  groups:  financial  reward  and  enhanced  status.  In  1845, 
Sir  Henry  Hardinge,  Governor-General  of  India,  listed  the  grounds  upon  which  the  allegiance  of  the 
native  army  rested  as  "superior  pay,  good  pensions,  just  &  kind  treatment,  high  consideration  &  respect 
for  the  profession  of  a  soldier"  and  a  "conviction  that  these  advantages  are  more  secure  under  the 
11  49  irresistable  good  fortune  of  British  rule,  than  by  taking  service  under  any  Native  Prince 
. 
MY 
contention  is  that  by  1857  the  Bengal  Army's  incentives  were  no  longer  sufficient  to  ensure  its  loyalty. 
The  chief  incentive  for  volunteer  armies  -  particularly  colonial  armies  -  is  usually  pay.  In  this  respect, 
the  East  India  Company's  army  was  an  immensely  attractive  proposition  in  the  late  eighteenth  and  early 
nineteenth  centuries  because  it  offered  regular  pay,  pensions  and  other  financial  benefits  -  perks  largely 
unheard  of  in  the  armies  of  native  states.  Yet  the  basic  pay  for  ordinary  sepoys  -  seven  rupees  or  14 
shillings  a  month  -  was  the  same  in  1857  as  it  had  been  at  the  turn  of  the  century  (and  would  remain  so 
until  it  was  raised  to  nine  rupees  in  1895).  This  figure  was  identical  in  all  three  presidencies,  although 
the  Bengal  sepoys  were  paid  a  basic  five  and  a  half  rupees  with  one  and  a  half  as  an  allowance,  known 
as  half  batta.  50  Until  1837,  the  presidencies  differed  in  the  amount  of  batta  they  paid  to  their  sepoys 
when  they  were  on  the  march  or  in  the  field.  A  Bengal  sepoy  received  an  extra  one  and  a  half  rupees  a 
month,  a  Madras  sepoy  2  rupees  5  annas  4  pice,  and  a  Bombay  sepoy  two  and  a  half  rupeeS.  51  The 
initial  justification  for  this  discrepancy  was  that  the  price  of  rice  was  higher  in  Madras  and  Bombay 
than  in  Bengal.  But  after  Bentinck  pointed  out  in  1835  that  rice  or  a  grain  substitute  was  virtually  the 
same  price  "in  all  the  interior  part  of  India  where  the  great  body  of  native  troops  are  employed",  the 
Court  of  Directors  eventually  agreed  that  the  pay  and  batta  for  all  native  regular  troops  should  be 
regulated  by  the  Bengal  standard.  52  The  alteration  was  formally  introduced  by  general  order  in  April 
1837  (and  was  still  in  operation  at  the  time  of  the  mutiny).  As  well  as  equalizing  pay,  it  reduced  the 
number  of  years  that  ordinary  sepoys  had  to  serve  to  qualify  for  a  pension  from  twenty  to  fifteen,  and 
increased  the  rate  from  three  rupees  a  month  to  four  (see  Tables  30  and  3  1).  53 
49  Hardinge  to  Sir  Charles  Napier,  31  Oct  1844,  Napier  Papers,  BL,  Add.  MSS  54517,  f  102. 
50  Barat,  Yhe  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  p,  132. 
51  Ibid.,  p.  133. 
52  Ibid.,  p.  134. 
53  G.  O.  C.  C.,  17  April  1837,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  OIOC,  L/NIIU17/2/435. 70 
Table  30  -  Pay,  allowances  andpensionsfor  Light  Cavalry  and  HorseArtilleryfrom 
1837 
Rank  Pay  (with  half 
batta) 
Extra  batta  (field)  Pension  (15  yrs' 
service) 
Pension  (Disabled 
or  40  yrs'  service) 
Subedar  Major*  105  15  25  40 
Subedar*  80  15  25  40 
Jcmadar  32  8  12  20 
Havildar  20  5  7  12 
Naik  16  4  7  12 
Trumpeter  16  4  7  12 
Trooper  9  1.8  4  7 
Table  31  -  Pay,  allowances  andpensionsfor  Native  Infantry  and  Foot  Artilleryfrom 
1837 
Rank  Pay  (with  half 
batta) 
Extra  batta  (field)  Pension  (15  yrs' 
service) 
Pension  (Disabled 
or  40  yrs'  service) 
Subcdar  Major*  92  15  25  40 
Subcdar*  67  15  25  40 
Jemadar  24.8  7.8  12  20 
Havildar  14  5  7  12 
Naik  12  5  7  12 
Trumpeter  11  5  4  7 
Sepov  7  1.8  4  7 
*  Bengal  Army  only;  Madras  and  Bombay  retained  their  own  pay  structure  for  subedars  and  subedar- 
majors  based  on  their  length  of  service. 
As  far  as  the  equalization  of  pay  and  allowances  was  concerned,  the  big  losers  were  the  ordinary 
sepoys,  sowars  and  native  officers  of  the  Madras  and  Bombay  presidencies  who  now  received  less  field 
batta.  The  Madras  troops  also  forfeited  the  full  batta  of  three  rupees  a  month  which  they  had  been  paid 
for  serving  outside  their  own  presidency,  though  all  sepoys  still  received  a  higher  rate  of  pay  for  service 
beyond  the  frontiers  of  British  India.  The  only  beneficiaries  were  N.  C.  O.  s  (naiks  and  havildars)  in  all 
arms  of  the  Madras  and  Bombay  armies  who  had  formerly  received  less  basic  pay  than  their  Bengal 
counterpartS.  54 
in  theory,  all  native  troops  stood  to  benefit  from  the  institution  of  long  service  pay  in  1837.55  Also 
recommended  by  Bentinck,  it  increased  the  monthly  pay  of  a  sepoy  by  one  rupee  after  16  years  of 
54  Barat,  YheBengaINaliteInfantry,  p.  133.  The  pre-1837  monthly  pay  for  havildars  and  naiks  was  as 
follows:  Bengal  14  rupees  and  12  rupees;  Madras  and  Bombay  10  rupees  12  annas  and  8  rupees  12 
annas.  Jemadars  were  paid  the  same  and  the  rate  for  subedars  in  the  respective  presidencies  did  not 
change. 
55  G.  O.  G.  G.,  17  April  1837,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  OIOC,  L/lVEIU17/2/435. 71 
service  and  by  two  rupees  after  20  years.  It  was,  however,  dependent  upon  good  service  and  would  be 
forfeited  by  those  who  had  been  convicted  by  a  court  martial  "of  some  serious  offence",  or  whose 
names  had  been  twice  entered  in  the  regimental  defaulter  book  during  the  two  years  prior  to  the 
completion  of  the  period  of  service.  56  Also  Bentinck's  proposal  for  a  graduated  scale  of  pay  in  every 
rank  had  not  received  the  Court  of  Directors'  approval,  resulting  in  a  standard  rate  for  all.  Yet  in  1838  a 
subedar  in  the  I"  Bengal  N.  I.  told  his  former  officer,  William  Sleeman,  that  the  introduction  of  long 
service  pay  had  increased  the  value  of  the  service  "very  much".  57  Of  the  800  or  so  men  in  his  regiment, 
"more  than"  150  received  two  extra  rupees  a  month  and  the  same  number  number  qualified  for  one.  59 
The  native  officer  continued: 
This  they  feel  as  an  immense  addition  to  the  former  seven  rupees  a  month.  A  prudent  sepoys  lives  upon  two,  or  at 
the  utmost  three,  rupees  a  month  in  seasons  of  moderate  plenty,  and  send  all  their  former  seven  to  their  families. 
The  dismissal  of  a  man  from  such  a  service  as  this  distresses,  not  only  him,  but  all  his  relations  in  the  higher  grades 
fic  native  officcrs],  who  know  how  much  of  the  comfort  and  happiness  of  his  family  depend  upon  his  remaining 
and  advancing  in  it.  59 
Writing  four  years  afler  the  new  pension  regulations  of  1837  (see  Tables  30  and  3  1),  Sleeman  noted 
that  the  pension  was  "probably  the  greatest  of  all  bonds  between  the  government  and  the  native 
army".  60  The  basic  rate  of  four  rupees  a  month  was  paid  to  sepoys  who  had  served  at  least  15  years  and 
who  had  been  pronounced  no  longer  fit  for  duty  by  a  board  of  surgeons.  The  higher  rate  of  seven 
rupees  a  month  was  given  to  those  who  had  served  40  years,  those  disabled  by  wounds,  and  the  families 
of  those  killed  in  action.  According  to  Sleeman,  there  were  22,381  military  pensioners  and  1,730 
family  pensioners  in  the  Bengal  Presidency  as  of  I  May  185  1.61  "1  question,  "  he  wrote,  "whether  the 
number  of  retired  soldiers  maintained  at  the  expense  of  government  bears  so  large  a  proportion  to  the 
number  actually  serving  in  any  other  nation  on  earth.  1162  General  Alexander,  the  former  Adjutant- 
General  of  the  Bombay  Army,  was  less  enthusiastic  because,  he  told  the  Peel  Commission  in  1858,  the 
56  G.  O.  C.  C.,  5  May  1837,  ibid. 
57  Sleeman,  Rambles  andRecollections,  p.  617. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Ibid. 
('0  Sleeman,  Rambles  andRecollections,  p.  640. 
61  ibid.,  p.  643. 
62  Ibid.  The  proportion  ofpensioned  to  serving  soldiers  was  22,381  out  of82,027  men,  or  27.3%. 72 
new  pension  regulations  favoured  sepoys  over  more  senior  rankS.  63  A  sepoy  received  almost  60  per 
cent  of  his  monthly  pay  after  15  years,  whereas  a  subedar,  with  at  least  30  years'service  behind  him, 
would  get  just  over  a  third.  The  consequence,  said  Alexander,  was  that  native  officers  appealed  to  their 
commanding  officers  t1not  to  have  them  removed  to  the  pension-list",  while  sepoys  had  a  far  greater 
inducement  to  feign  incapacity  and  leave  the  army.  64 
Yet  according  to  Colonel  Keith  Young,  Judge  Advocate-General  of  the  Bengal  Army  from  1852  to 
1862,  a  major  cause  of  discontent  was  the  fact  that  it  was  so  difficult  for  Bengal  native  officers  and 
sepoys  to  get  on  the  Pension  Establishment  in  the  first  place.  "There  is",  he  wrote  in  1857,  "no  chance 
whatever"  of  a  Bengal  soldier  "being  granted  a  pension  as  long  as  he  can  put  one  foot  before  another". 
He  added: 
So  a  commanding  officer  of  a  regiment,  do  what  he  will,  cannot  get  rid  of  useless,  wom-out  men,  who  arc  sent 
back  to  him  by  the  invaliding  committees  to  become  a  source  of  discontent  in  the  corps.  [Capt.  H.  W.  ]  Norman,  our 
Assistant  Adjutant-Gcneral  ...  told  me  of  an  instance  within  his  knowledge  of  every  man  who  was  sent  before  the 
invaliding  committees  of  a  certain  regiment  having  been  rejected,  except  one,  and  that  poor  fc1low  died  before  his 
papers  could  be  made  our  for  pension.  At  Bombay,  where  the  Army  has  always  been  in  a  more  contented  state 
than  here,  the  invaliding  rules  arc  quite  different,  and  men  arc  admitted  to  pensions  there  -  if  pronounced  unfit  by 
the  regimental  authorities  -  who  would  be  kept  on  the  strength  of  the  Army  for  years  longer  in  Bcngal.  " 
The  1840s  saw  the  native  troops  granted  a  number  of  other  financial  concessions.  From  1842,  for 
example,  they  were  allowed  to  receive  one  family  letter  per  month  free  of  charge  (they  already  had  the 
reciprocal  privilege  of  sending  one  letter  per  month  the  other  way  for  nothing).  66  But  this  privilege  was 
withdrawn  in  the  early  1850s,  prompting  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  to  describe  the  "new  post-office  rules"  in 
a  letter  to  Lord  Canning  as  "bitter  grievances"  and  one  of  the  "many  recent  acts  of  Government"  which 
67  had  "been  skilfully  played  upon  by  incendiaries".  In  1845  the  Bengal  Army  was  brought  into  line 
with  the  other  presidencies  by  the  award  of  hutting  money.  The  full  allowance  of  three  rupees  for 
63  Evidence  of  Major-General  Robert  Alexander,  25  Aug  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  pp.  79,8  1. 
64  Ibid.,  p.  81 
65  Col.  K  Young  to  Col.  H.  B.  Henderson,  2  May  1857,  in  Gen.  Sir  Henry  Norman  and  Mrs  Keith 
Young  (eds.  ),  Delhi-1857.7he  Siege,  Assault  atid  Capture  as  Giveii  hi  the  Diary  and  CorrespoWetice 
01  the  Late  Colonel  Keith  Young  CR  (London,  1902),  p.  10. 
G.  O.  P.  C.,  II  Nov  1842,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1840  to  1847,  OIOC,  IAHU17/2/436. 
67  Lawrence  to  Canning,  May  1857,  quoted  Anderson  and  Subedar  (eds.  ),  Yhe  Last  Days  of  the 
Company,  p.  I  10. 73 
sepoys  (rising  to  30  rupees  for  subedars)  was  for  the  "erection  of  huts  on  the  formation  of  new  Lines";  a 
half  allowance  was  for  repairing  those  they  moved  into  when  changing  stations.  68 
But  despite  these  boons  (one  of  which  was  only  temporary),  and  contrary  to  the  testimony  of 
Sleeman's  native  officer,  Barat  has  produced  much  evidence  to  suggest  that  many  Bengal  sepoys  found 
it  difficult  to  make  ends  meet.  This  was  partly  because  they  were  charged  for  a  number  of  items  of 
dress  and  equipment,  including  three  undress  tunics,  three  pairs  of  white  linen  trousers,  one  pair  of 
coloured  trousers,  one  set  of  beads,  one  pair  of  shoes,  one  cummerbund,  one  turban  and  cover,  one 
knapsack  and  one  greatcoat.  As  of  1828,  they  were  given  a  jacket  and  a  pair  of  woollen  pantaloons 
every  two  years  free  of  charge,  while  deductions  for  the  other  items  were  not  to  exceed  five  rupees  per 
annum.  But  this  figure  was  often  exceeded.  And  there  were  other  expenses,  such  as  buying  their  own 
food,  paying  for  the  services  of  a  washerman,  barber  and  sweeper,  and  defraying  the  cost  of 
transporting  their  baggage  when  on  the  march  (a  sum  that  generally  came  to  more  than  the  marching 
batta  of  one  and  a  half  rupees  a  month).  69  Bengal  sepoys  would  also  send  as  much  as  three-quarters  of 
their  pay  back  to  their  villages  to  support  their  families  (a  practice  that  was  not  followed  by  Madras  and 
Bombay  sepoys  because  their  families  lived  with  them  in  the  military  cantonments).  70  Was  it  any 
wonder,  asks  Barat,  that  the  Bengal  sepoy  "found  himself  in  strained  circumstances,  lived  on  the 
cheapest  kind  of  food,  and  at  times  even  starved  so  as  to  fulfil  his  various  social  obligations"  ?  71 
But  Bengal  sepoys  were  not  the  only  ones  who  found  it  difficult  to  make  ends  meet.  Captain  Hervey 
considered  the  pay  of  a  Madras  sepoy  to  be  totally  inadequate  to  convey  and  feed  himself  and  his 
family  when  on  the  line  of  march.  He  wrote: 
Before  starting  a  scpoy  generally  receives  an  advance  of  pay...  With  [it]  he  has  to  clear  himself  from  the  station 
(for  probably  he  has  incurred  debts),  besides  paying  an  advance  equal  to  one  half,  for  the  means  of  conveying  his 
goods  and  chattels,  as  well  as  his  numerous  family,  some  of  whom,  particularly  the  young  and  aged,  arc  unable  to 
walk.  Exclusively  of  all  this,  he  has  to  provide  the  means  of  sustenance  for  himself  and  dcpcndants,  and  that  with  a 
total  of  perhaps  two  rupees  in  his  pocket,  for  a  journey  of  about  two  or  three  or  four  hundred  miles  I  Howcanhcdo 
68  G.  O.  G.  G.,  15  August  1845,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1840  to  1847,  OIOC,  IJMIU17/2/436. 
69  Barat,  7he  BengalNafive  Infantry,  pp.  136-7,177. 
70  ibid.,  p.  177. 
71  Ibid. 74 
this?  Impossiblel  He  must  starve  and  so  must  his  family;  at  all  events,  they  must  from  sheer  necessity  feed 
themselves  upon  the  most  economical  plans  that  they  can  possibly  devise.  ' 
To  put  a  Bengal  sepoy's  pay  into  perspective,  Barat  states  that  domestic  servants  of  European  officers 
earned  between  four  and  20  rupees  a  month,  field  labourers  from  two  to  six  rupees,  carpenters  from  five 
to  10  rupees  and  blacksmiths  from  five  to  20  rupees.  73  She  also  points  out  that  the  cost  of  living  (in  the 
shape  of  the  price  of  grain)  "nearly  doubled  between  1796  and  1852";  but  "whereas  the  wages  of  the 
ploughman  and  the  labourer  increased  to  keep  pace  with  the  rising  prices,  that  of  the  sepoy  remained 
static".  74  In  other  words,  his  pay  fell  in  real  terms  by  almost  50  per  cent  during  the  first  half  of  the 
nineteenth  century.  By  contrast,  a  private  in  one  of  the  East  India  Company's  European  regiments  was 
given  10  rupees,  3  annas  and  2  pice  a  month  (with  an  additional  2  rupees,  6  annas  and  nine  pice  after  14 
years'  service,  and  one  rupee,  nine  annas  and  4  pice  for  service  200  miles  beyond  the  presidency 
capital)  . 
75  A  private  in  the  British  Army  was  paid  a  shilling  a  day  (or  roughly  15  rupees  a  month)  and  a 
similar  pension  after  21  years'  service  (or  10d.  if  he  was  discharged  at  his  own  request).  76  He  also 
received,  from  1839,  an  extra  Id.  a  day  and  a  ring  of  lace  around  his  arm  for  every  seven  years  of  good 
conduct  (the  term  was  reduced  to  five  years  in  1845).  77  While  such  pay  was  adequate  for  India,  it  did 
not  go  a  long  way  in  Britain  at  a  time  when  agricultural  labourers  earned  twelve  shillings  a  week  and 
skilled  labourers  more  than  11.78  In  a  comparative  sense,  therefore,  Bengal  sepoys  were  better  paid 
than  their  British  counterparts.  But  then  they  tended  to  be  drawn  from  the  rural  ilites,  whereas  most 
British  soldiers  were  either  from  the  lowly  class  of  agricultural  labourers  or  the  lowest  rungs  of  urban 
employment.  79 
72  Allen  (ed.  ),  A  Soldier  ofthe  Company,  pp.  149-50.  General  Alexander,  a  former  adjutant-general  of 
the  Bombay  Army,  supported  Hervey's  argument  by  telling  the  Peel  Commission  that  the  pay,  batta  and 
hutting  money  of  the  Madras  native  troops  was  "insufficient"  [Source:  Evidence  of  Major-General 
Robert  Alexander,  25  Aug  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  79] 
73  Baratý  The  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  pp.  138-9. 
74  Ibid.,  p.  313. 
75  Establishment  and  Allowances  of  a  Regiment  of  the  Honourable  Company's  European  Infantry,  Pay 
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At  a  time  when  the  spending  power  of  sepoys  was  being  gradually  eroded,  pay  remained  a  highly 
sensitive  issue.  "Whether  in  Bombay,  Madras  or  Bengal,  "  wrote  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  in  1856,  "doubts 
as  to  the  intentions  of  Government  in  regard  to  pay  have  been  at  the  bottom  of  most  mutinies.  "80  This 
was  certainly  the  case  with  Bengal  and  Madras  troops  in  the  1840s.  The  first  sign  of  disaffection  in  the 
Bengal  Army  arose  during  the  garrisoning  of  Sind.  The  province  had  been  annexed  in  August  1843 
after  a  successful  campaign  by  Bombay  troops.  But  the  government  decided  to  replace  them  with 
Bengal  troops  because  the  Bombay  Army  had  barely  enough  men  to  meet  its  own  presidency 
commitments.  Four  Bengal  Native  Infantry  regiments  -  the  4'i%  303  64h  and  69h  -  were  earmarked  for 
the  task.  But  all  four  objected  to  serving  in  Sind,  a  notoriously  unhealthy  and  expensive  province, 
without  the  extra  allowance  known  as  money-rations  (rations  or  their  equivalent  in  money  in  excess  of 
pay  and  field  batta)  that  had  been  granted  to  troops  in  Sind  during  the  military  operations  that  preceded 
its  annexation.  81  Some  also  demanded  that  pensions  should  be  paid  to  the  heirs  of  those  who  might  die 
of  disease  in  Sind.  Yet  the  government  had  already  authorised  the  payment  of  field  batta  to  troops  in 
cantonment  in  Sind,  while  money-rations  in  excess  of  field  batta  were  given  to  those  in  the  field.  82 
Beyond  this  it  would  not  go,  not  least  because  the  Bombay  troops  had  submitted  to  the  withdrawal  of 
money-rations  before  their  departure  in  1843.  Unfortunately  the  same  order  had  not  been 
communicated  to  the  Bengal  troops  until  mid-October  1843,  by  which  time  some  of  the  Bengal 
regiments  had  already  received  orders  to  proceed  to  Sind.  83 
The  upshot  was  that  the  34h  regiment  was  disbanded  in  March  1844,  while  38  members  of  the  64d' 
regiment  were  sentenced  to  punishments  ranging  from  death  to  five  years  in  prison.  84  Theothertwo 
regiments  discharged  a  total  of  281  men.  85  Yet  in  retrospect  the  Court  of  Directors  was  not 
unsympathetic  to  the  cause  of  the  mutineers,  declaring  that  it  would  "be  prepared  to  sanction  such  a 
regulation  for  the  future  grant  of  money  rations  to  the  troops  serving  beyond  the  boundaries  of 
Hindustan"  as  might  be  consistent  with  the  peculiar  nature  of  service,  86  The  response  of  Lord 
Hardinge,  the  new  Governor-General  (1844-8),  was  to  concede  that  Sind  was  a  special  case  by  granting 
troops  in  cantonments  there  an  extra  allowance  of  two  rupees,  while  those  in  the  field  received  three 
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and  a  half  more.  87  A  sepoy  of  under  16  years'  service  in  cantonments,  therefore,  would  be  given  pay  of 
seven  rupees,  field  batta  of  one  and  a  half  rupees,  and  this  special  Sind  allowance  of  two  rupees, 
making  a  total  of  ten  and  a  half  rupees.  Money  rations,  however,  would  cease  to  be  drawn  by  sepoys  in 
the  field,  though  compensation  would  be  paid  when  the  price  of  "provisions  forming  the  native  soldiers 
diet"  rose  beyond  an  aggregate  of  three  and  a  half  rupees  a  month.  gs  This  last  stipulation  -  applicable  to 
all  native  troops  wherever  they  were  stationed  -  actually  left  the  Sind  troops  worse  off  because  it 
superseded  Lord  Ellenborough's  general  order  of  March  1844  which  had  granted  them  compensation 
when  the  price  of  individual  items  of  food  (including  attah,  dholl,  ghee  and  salt)  became  too  high.  89 
The  disaffection  displayed  by  a  number  of  Bengal  sepoy  regiments  in  the  Punjab  in  1849  and  1850 
(see  Chapter  One)  was  linked  directly  to  the  above  settlement.  For  until  the  annexation  of  the  Punjab  in 
1849,  the  native  troops  there  had  enjoyed  the  same  allowances  granted  to  those  in  Sind.  From  the 
summer  of  1849,  however,  only  those  troops  serving  on  the  frontier  beyond  the  Indus  were  eligible  for 
foreign  batta.  90  In  early  1850,  after  the  first  flames  of  mutinous  discontent  had  died  away,  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  Napier,  tried  to  mollify  the  sepoys  in  the  Punjab  by  reinstating  the  terms  of 
Ellenborough's  1844  general  order  whereby  compensation  was  paid  whenever  the  price  of  individual 
food  items  rose  beyond  a  certain  level.  Declaring  Hardinge's  1845  regulation  -  which  denied 
compensation  unless  the  aggregate  price  of  rations  reached  a  certain  level  -  as  "both  impolitic  and 
unjust"  Napier  announced  that  henceforth  compensation  would  be  issued  under  the  terms  of  the  old 
regulation.  91  He  explained:  "As  in  the  present  state  of  transition,  from  Scinde  pay  and  allowances,  to 
the  regular  pay  of  the  troops,  a  transition  which  has  produced  a  most  unprovoked  state  of 
insurbordination  in  some  regiments,  the  Commander-in-Chief  thinks  that  no  cause  of  dissatisfaction 
should  be  given  to  the  troops,  "92  Napier's  failure  to  consult  the  government  before  making  his  decision, 
however,  was  to  result  in  the  protracted  dispute  with  the  Governor-General,  Lord  Dalhousie,  that  was  to 
culminate  in  his  departure  from  India  in  December  1850. 
The  mutinies  in  Sind  in  1843  and  the  Punjab  in  1849-50  emphasize  how  sensitive  the  Bengal  sepoys 
were  to  minor  adustments  in  their  pay.  This  was  partly  because  most  sepoys  were  genuinely  hard  up 
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87  G.  O.  G.  G.,  IS  August  1845,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1840  to  1847,  OIOC,  LMU17/2/436. 
"  Ibid. 
89  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  p.  140-  1. 
90  G.  O.  G.  G.  25  Oct  1849,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1848  to  1853,  OIOC,  L/MUJ17/2/437. 
91  Col.  Grant,  Adjt.  -Gen.  of  the  Bengal  army,  to  the  Pres.  of  the  Council,  20  Jan  1850,  quoted  in  Napier, 
Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  p.  13  8. 77 
and  found  it  difficult  to  support  their  families  when  serving  in  distant  and  expensive  provinces,  and 
partly  because,  as  Sir  Henry  Hardinge  noted  in  1844,  native  troops  did  not  consider  collective 
bargaining  "leading  to  mutiny"  as  a  disloyal  act,  but  rather  a  legitimate  "means  to  obtain  a  justifiable 
end  it.  93  This  was  particularly  so  in  the  Bengal  Army  where  the  brotherhood  of  high-caste  sepoys 
regarded  mutiny  as  away  of  asserting  their  authority  vis-d-vis  the  government.  YheMofiissilife,  a  pro- 
British  newspaper  founded  at  Meerut  in  1845,  referred  to  both  factors  in  an  article  of  8  February  1850. 
Native  soldiers  served  only  for  their  pay,  it  commented,  and  unless  that  pay  enabled  them  to  send 
money  back  to  their  families  then  they  would  quickly  become  sullen,  insolent  and  even  mutinous.  94 
Yet,  it  added,  the  Bengal  sepoy  had  been  "so  petted,  belauded  and  indulged  [that  he  was]  quite  spoilt" 
and  "should  be  kept  well  under  and  taught  to  think  less  of  himself  than  he  does  at  present".  95 
Given  that  only  Bengal  Native  Infantry  regiments  were  involved  in  the  more  serious  mutinies  prior  to 
1857,  it  is  tempting  to  conclude  that  pay  was  not  an  issue  that  affected  the  other  arms  of  the  Bengal 
Army,  or  indeed  the  other  presidency  armies.  Yet,  as  already  noted,  the  simmering  discontent  in  the 
Bombay  Army  over  the  1837  abolition  of  foreign  service  batta  was  to  resurface  20  years  later  when  the 
8th  L.  C.  refused  to  sail  to  Bengal  to  fight  the  mutineers.  The  1840s  also  saw  Madras  troops  involved  in 
two  mutinies  over  the  issue  of  pay.  The  first  involved  the  e  L.  C.  which,  towards  the  end  of  1843,  was 
ordered  to  Jabalpur  in  central  India  to  replace  Bengal  troops  needed  on  the  Indus.  Madras  troops 
generally  suffered  more  than  their  Bengal  counterparts  when  sent  to  distant  stations  because  they  had  to 
pay  for  the  transport  of  their  families.  Madras  cavalrymen  suffered  the  most  because  they  were 
principally  well-bom  Muslims,  and  the  rigid  seclusion  in  which  their  women  were  kept  greatly  added 
to  the  cost  of  transport.  So  when  the  troopers  of  the  Oh  L.  C.  were  told  that  not  only  was  their  posting 
permanent  (it  had  earlier  been  declared  temporary)  but  that  they  would  not  receive  extra  allowances, 
"they  broke  into  open  manifestations  of  discontent,  and  bound  themselves  by  oaths  to  stand  by  each 
96 
other  whilst  they  resisted  the  unjust  decree".  They  only  agreed  to  return  to  their  duty  after  increased 
rates  of  pay  were  granted.  But  no  sooner  had  one  Madras  regiment  been  mollified  than  another  refused 
to  obey  orders.  This  time  it  was  the  47th  N.  I.  which  had  been  ordered  to  supplement  Sir  Charles 
Napier's  force  in  Sind  because  the  Bombay  Army  was  so  stretched.  Previously  under  orders  to  proceed 
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to  Moulmein  on  the  east  coast  of  the  Bay  of  Bengal  where  foreign  batta  and  ration  allowances  applied, 
the  47th  was  promised  by  its  government  that  the  same  allowances  would  be  paid  in  Sind.  But  the 
Supreme  Government  disagreed  and  informed  the  sepoys  at  Bombay  in  February  1844  that  they  would 
not  receive  the  advantages  of  foreign  service.  The  tumult  died  down  only  afler  advances  of  pay  were 
given  to  the  near-starving  sepoys.  However  Sir  John  Kaye  is  of  the  opinion  that  these  two  examples  of 
disaffection  were  far  less  ominous  than  those  displayed  by  the  Bengal  Army  in  the  1840s.  "The  Madras 
Army,  "  he  wrote,  "was  not  destined  to  supply  the  want  accruing  from  the  defective  loyalty  of  Bengal. 
It  broke  down  at  a  critical  time;  but  only  under  such  a  weight  of  mismanagement  as  might  have  crushed 
out  the  fidelity  of  the  best  mercenaries  in  the  world.  07 
There  is,  on  the  other  hand,  much  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  possibility  of  loot  and  increased  pay 
was  a  major  incentive  to  mutiny  for  all  arms  of  the  Bengal  Army  in  1857,  particularly  its  irregular 
cavalry.  Of  the  regular  Bengal  troops,  only  the  cavalry  and  horse  artillery  received  more  pay  than  the 
infantry,  with  a  trooper  given  nine  rupees  a  month,  a  subedar  80  and  a  subedar-major  (the  highest 
commissioned  rank  a  native  could  obtain)  105.  The  Bengal  foot  artillery  and  Sappers  and  Miners  were 
paid  the  same  as  their  infantry  counterparts,  with  sepoys  receiving  seven  rupees  a  month,  subedars  67 
and  subedar-majors  92.  In  an  essay  for  the  Calcutta  Review  in  1856,  Henry  Lawrence  advised  that  the 
pay  of  specialist  arms  like  the  foot  artillery  and  sappers  "should  be  higher"  than  the  infantry.  98  In  a 
subsequent  essay  that  year,  he  added:  "In  all  Native  armies  the  artillery  are  the  best  and  trustiest  men. 
They  are  always  true  to  their  guns;  they  worship  them...  A  thousand  Golundauze  cost  no  more  than  as 
many  sepoys.  The  more  is  the  pity.  They  should  be  taught  to  consider  themselves  a  separate  and 
selected  body...  Their  number  should  not  exceed  the  European  artillery,  but,  whatever  the  number  and 
proportions,  let  the  Golundauze  receive  the  one  extra  rupee.  It  would  be  good  economy.  "99  The 
opportunity  to  secure  more  pay  with  an  alternative  native  employer  during  the  mutiny  may  well  have 
tipped  the  balance  for  a  number  of  wavering  artillerymen. 
For  members  of  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry,  this  was  almost  certainly  the  case.  Though  paid  more 
than  the  regulars,  their  expenses  were  far  higher.  This  was  because  the  irregular  horse  was  organized 
on  what  was  known  as  the  silladar  principle.  In  return  for  a  higher  rate  of  pay,  the  silladar  (or  recruit) 
agreed  to  provide  and  maintain  his  own  horse  and  equipment.  To  ensure  uniformity,  these  items  were 
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provided  by  the  regiment.  The  recruit  simply  paid  the  regiment  a  sum  corresponding  to  the  value  of 
these  items  known  as  an  assami.  Alternatively,  a  recruit's  assami  could  be  paid  for  by  a  native 
gentleman  who  often  became  his  native  officer.  When  the  recruit  left  the  regiment,  either  the  value  of 
his  assami  was  refunded  to  him  (or  his  benefactor)  or  he  kept  his  horse  and  equipment.  If  he  was 
dishonourably  discharged  he  forfeited  his  assami,  which  thus  "acted  as  a  bond  for  good  behaviour".  100 
But  the  irregular  cavalryman  had  so  many  expenses  that  his  basic  pay  of  20  rupees  a  month  (rising  to 
150  rupees  for  a  rissaldar,  the  senior  rank)  was  not  nearly  enough  to  keep  him  out  of  debt.  101  In  an 
essay  published  in  1844,  Henry  Lawrence  pointed  out  that  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalrymen  were  mostly 
well-born  Muslims  with  "expensive  habits".  102  To  make  matters  worse,  they  rarely  received  their  full 
pay.  He  wrote: 
Every  man  entering,  in  (we  believe)  seven  out  of  the  nine  corps  [in  existence  in  1844],  has  not  only  to  purchase  his 
horse  and  equipments,  but  to  pay  one  hundred  and  fifty  rupees  or  thereabouts  to  the  estate  or  family  of  the  man 
whose  decease  or  invaliding  caused  the  vacancy.  Such  donation  of  course  throws  the  recruit  at  once  into  the 
moneylender's  hands,  and  often  leaves  him for  life  a  debtor.  If  the  man  again  has  not  the  cash  to  purchase  a  horse, 
he  rides  one  belonging  to  a  Native  officer  or  to  some  privileged  person,  and  becomes  what  is  called  a  bargeer  -  the 
soldier  receiving  only  seven  or  eight  rupees  a  month,  and  the  owner  of  the  horse  the  balance  of  the  twenty  allowed 
by  Ciovernment.  "' 
Lawrence  considered  the  "evil"  of  this  system  to  be  "so  great"  that  "Government  would  do  well  to 
redeem  all  debts  as  they  now  stand  and  forbid  the  system  for  the  future".  104  Instead  irregular  regiments 
should  be  open  to  all  men  of  respectability  who  could  bring  their  own  horse  or  were  in  a  position  to 
"purchase  that  of  the  man  who  created  the  vacancy".  105  Broadly  similar  views  were  expressed  by  John 
Jacob,  the  founder  of  the  Sind  Irregular  Horse  (part  of  the  Bombay  Army),  in  an  article  for  the  Calcutta 
Review  of  March  1846.  He  was  particularly  critical  of  the  existence  of  a  regimental  bank  in  irregular 
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regiments.  "It  paralyses  every  energy,  "  he  wrote,  "nearly  every  man  is  hopelessly  in  debt;  frequently  he 
cannot  even  pay  the  interest  of  these  debts.  "  Jacob  knew  of  one  commandant  who  had  "to  borrow,  on 
his  own  personal  responsibility,  some  three  lakhs  of  rupees  to  pay  off  the  men's  debts,  so  as  to  get  rid  of 
the  ruinous  rate  of  interest  they  were  then  paying".  His  solution  was  to  introduce  the  system  that 
operated  in  his  own  regiment.  "There  is,  "  he  wrote,  "a  regimental  fund,  formed  by  the  subscription 
monthly  of  fourteen  annas  per  horse,  and  two  annas  per  man;  all  fines  etc.  also  go  into  the  fund.  On  the 
death  of  a  horse,  the  owner  receives  Rs.  100  from  the  fund,  to  assist  him  in  the  purchase  of  another... 
There  is  no  regimental  banker,  and  no  shop-keeper  in  the  regiment  bazar  dare  give  a  man  credit  beyond 
the  end  of  the  month  (this  rule  is  strictly  enforced).  Any  man  getting  into  debt  to  purchase  a  horse 
forfeits  his  assamee...  In  consequence,  the  men  are  not  in  debt  at  all,  as  they  never  need  be,  and 
therefore  are  always  ready  for  service.  "  Jacob  also  believed  that  an  irregular  sowars  pay  of  20  rupees  a 
month  was  insufficient.  His  own  sowars  received  30  rupees,  and  even  that  was  not  enough  "to  maintain 
the  horseman  as  he  ought  to  be".  106 
Lord  Gough,  Commander-in-Chief  in  India  from  1843-9,  strongly  urged  a  parliamentary  select 
committee  in  1853  to  recommend  a  pay  increase  for  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  to  25  rupees  a  month. 
"The  rate  of  pay  is  not  suff  icient  in  many  parts  of  Bengal,  and  particularly  in  going  upon  service,  "  he 
declared.  "Those  soldiers  are  very  hard  pressed;  they  get  into  debt,  they  get  involved,  and  they  borrow 
money,  which  is  a  bad  thing  always  in  any  country,  but  particularly  in  India.  "  107  Yet  by  the  time  Henry 
Lawrence  wrote  another  article  demanding  military  reform  in  early  1856,  nothing  had  been  done, 
despite  the  fact  that  Sir  Charles  Napier  and  "almost  all  irregular  cavalry  officers"  had  joined  Gough  in 
calling  for  a  pay  increase  of  five  rupees  a  month.  108  In  September  of  that  year,  Lawrence  again 
recommended  an  increase: 
Government  allow  mounted  officers  thirty  rupees  a  month  for  each  horse;  few  gain  materially  by  such  contract;  and 
yet  twenty  is  given  to  the  trooper,  who  ought  not  to  be  materially  worse  mounted!  Of  this  twenty,  after  deductions 
for  the  remount-fund,  clothing,  gear,  washing,  watermen,  barber,  etc.,  there  is  not,  we  fmnly  believe,  a  sowar  in  the 
service  who  receives  more  than  seventeen,  to  feed  himself,  his  family,  and  his  horse,  and  to  provide  arms,  a  tent, 
and  a  bull  Fix,  then,  twenty  as  the  sum  to  be  actuallypaid  to  each  man,  every  month.  Let  the  balance,  whether 
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four  or  five  rupees,  be  retained  in  the  commandant's  hands  for  remounts,  clothing,  etc...  The  proposed  scheme 
would  prevent  the  necessity  of  debt,  and  would  enable  every  sowar  to  ride  a  threc-hundred-rupee  horse.  109 
The  Peel  Commission  also  heard  much  evidence  of  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry's  indebtedness. 
Colonel  Harington  of  the  5th  L.  C.  told  the  commission  that  the  "regiment  disbanded  at  Peshawur  for 
mutiny  last  year  [the  I&  I.  C.  ]  owed  nearly  110,000"  to  its  regimental  banker.  '  10  Colonel  Becher,  the 
Quartermaster-General  of  the  Bengal  Army,  insisted  that  the  irregulars  were  always  "very  much 
embarrassed  and  in  debt"  and  that  shortly  before  the  mutiny  "General  Anson  and  the  Government"  had 
been  asked  to  raise  their  pay.  Others  -  including  Sir  J.  H.  Grant,  Sir  George  Clerk  and  Major  Daly  - 
repeated  many  of  Jacob's  recommendations  by  calling  for  a  post-mutiny  increase  in  pay  (to  25  rupees), 
the  abolition  of  regimental  banks,  a  subsidy  to  help  pay  for  arms  and  accoutrements,  and  the  discharge 
ofanymenfoundtobeindebt.  111  The  only  contrary  note  was  struck  by  Lieutenant  General  Sir  Patrick 
Grant  who  stated  that  20  rupees  a  month  was  "sufficient  on  ordinary  occasions  to  keep  a  sowar  and  his 
horse  well".  112  While  he  was  prepared  to  admit  that  most  irregulars  were  "more  or  less  in  debt",  he  put 
this  down  to  the  fact  that  Muslims  generally  spent  all  they  received.  '  13  But  as  a  former  Adjutant- 
General  of  the  Bengal  Army  (1846-50)  who  may  well  have  blocked  earlier  demands  for  a  pay  increase 
on  the  ground  of  economy,  Grant  is  hardly  an  objective  witness. 
The  bulk  of  this  evidence  confirms  that  the  sowars  of  the  pre-mutiny  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  were 
underpaid  and  hopelessly  in  debt.  They  therefore  had  a  very  strong  financial  incentive  to  mutiny 
which,  in  certain  instances  in  1857,  may  have  overridden  the  fact  that  (as  stated  in  the  previous  chapter) 
only  a  small  proportion  of  them  were  linked  to  the  mutinous  native  infantry  by  ties  of  kinship  and  caste. 
All  native  troops  suffered  a  reduction  in  the  real  value  of  their  pay  in  the  decades  prior  to  the  mutiny. 
But  the  consequences  of  lower  pay  were  partially  offset  by  successul  military  campaigns  and  the 
accumulation  of  war  booty.  Plunder  had  long  been  a  welcome  supplement  to  the  ordinary  pay  of 
Indian  mercenaries;  the  East  India  Company  had  even  legitimised  the  practice  in  the  form  of  prize 
money.  By  the  1850s,  however,  the  internal  conquest  of  India  was  complete  and  the  occasional  action 
against  the  tribes  of  the  Sonthal  and  North-West  Frontier  did  not  provide  the  same  opportunity  to  loot 
as  a  conventional  campaign.  Henceforth  native  troops  would  have  to  fight  in  wars  outside  India  -  with 
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Hindu  sepoys  risking  a  theoretical  loss  of  caste  -  if  they  wished  to  supplement  their  diminishing  pay. 
For  this  reason  an  uprising  against  their  colonial  masters,  and  a  return  to  the  traditional  cycle  of  war, 
would  have  appealed  to  many  native  troops. 
A  professional  grievance  that  may  have  been  even  more  influential  than  low  pay  as  a  motive  to  mutiny 
in  1857  was  the  inadequacy  of  career  prospects.  The  highest  commissioned  rank  to  which  a  native 
could  rise  in  all  three  presidency  armies  was  subedar-major  in  the  regular  units  and  rissaldar-major  in 
theirregulars.  Yet  both  were  inferior  in  rank  to  the  most  junior  European  officer  -ensign  in  the 
infantry,  comet  in  the  cavalry  and  second-lieutenant  in  the  artillery  -  nor  could  they  give  orders  to  the 
two  European  N.  C.  O.  s  present  in  Bengal  native  units.  114 
In  an  article  for  the  Calcutta  Review  in  1844,  Henry  Lawrence  pointed  out  the  absurdity  of  this 
situation  "in  a  land,..  that  above  all  others,  has  been  accustomed  to  see  military  merit  rewarded,  and  to 
witness  the  successive  rise  of  families  from  the  lowest  conditions".  The  East  India  Company  army,  he 
added,  "offered  no  inducement  to  superior  intellects,  or  more  stirring  spirits"  who  left  in  disgust.  There 
were,  as  a  result,  "many  commandants  in  the  Mahrattah  and  Seikh  service,  who  were  privates  in  our 
army",  including  General  Dhokul  Singh  who  had  risen  to  the  exalted  rank  of  drill  naik  (corporal)  in  the 
Bengal  Army  before  transferring  his  allegiance  to  the  Maharaja  of  Lahore.  While  nine  out  of  ten 
sepoys  were  no  doubt  satisfied  with  the  possibility  of  reaching  the  rank  of  subedar-major  by  the  age  of 
sixty,  noted  Lawrence,  it  was  for  the  tenth  -  "the  bold  and  daring  spirit  that  disdains  to  live  for  ever  in 
subordinate  place"  -  that  a  greater  stimulus  was  necessary.  Among  his  recommendations  were 
commands  of  irregular  corps,  grants  of  land  and  "pensions  to  the  second  and  third  generation".  He  also 
believed  that  "no  place  or  office  should  be  absolutely  barred  to  the  native  solider,  although  the 
promotion  of  every  individual  should  be  grounded  on  his  individual  merits".  115  On  all  counts  his  advice 
fell  on  deaf  ears. 
So  Lawrence  repeated  these  arguments  in  an  1856  article.  Now  he  believed  up  to  three  sepoys  in  a 
hundred  were  "thoroughly  and  dangerously  discontented'  because  "they  feel  they  have  that  in  them 
which  elsewhere  would  rise  them  to  distinction".  His  solution  was  to  allow  a  certain  number  of 
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irregular  corps  to  be  commanded  by  a  native  officer  on  at  least  400  rupees  a  month,  while  subedars  in 
other  irregular  corps  should  be  given  company  allowances  and  an  increase  in  pay  from  "67  rupees  a 
month  to  140,  or  about  one-third  that  of  captains  doing  the  same  work",  with  jemadars  given  a 
proportionate  increase.  The  ordinary  sepoy,  on  the  other  hand,  was  "amplypaid'.  Lawrence  added: 
"He  has  even  been  pampered  and  petted.  The  extra  batta  and  donatives  that  he  has  received,  have  done 
him  harm,  and  induced  greed...  The  many  are  usefully  provided  for,  but  honours  and  rewards,  present 
and  future,  are  still  wanted  for  the  few.  "'  16 
Napier,  too,  appreciated  the  danger  of  thwarting  ambition.  In  his  posthumously-published  book,  he 
noted  that  native  officers  had  "a  full  share  of  Eastern  daring,  genius,  and  ambition",  but  to  nourish  these 
qualities  they  had  to  "be  placed  on  a  par  with  European  officers".  To  allow  a  veteran  subedar  to  "be 
commanded  by  a  fair-faced  beardless  Ensign,  just  arrived  from  England"  was  the  "imposition  of 
conquerors"  and  "one  which  the  Native  gentlemen  feel  deeply  and  silently  resent".  Equality  between 
natives  and  Europeans  was  being  ceded  in  the  civil  service,  wrote  Napier,  "so  it  must  be  for  the 
military".  '  17 
Yet  no  reforms  had  been  instituted  by  the  time  Lawrence  wrote  to  Canning  on  2  May  1857,  warning 
him  that  "until  we  treat  Natives,  and  especially  Native  soldiers,  as  having  much  the  same  feelings,  the 
same  ambition,  the  same  perception  of  ability  and  imbecility  as  ourselves,  we  shall  never  be  safe".  118 
The  accuracy  of  Lawrence's  prediction  was  proven  during  the  mutiny.  In  the  majority  of  mutinous 
regiments  in  1857  (as  we  shall  see),  native  officers  were  either  behind  the  plot  to  rise  or  they  quickly 
assumed  control  once  their  European  counterparts  had  been  driven  off  or  killed.  A  few  were  appointed 
to  command  rebel  brigades  and  even  armies.  The  incentive  to  mutiny  for  ambitious  yet  frustrated 
native  officers  was  obvious. 
A  complementary  grievance  that  particularly  affected  the  native  troops  of  the  regular  Bengal  Army 
was  the  system  of  promotion  by  seniority.  According  to  Barat,  promotion  in  Bengal  regiments  "was 
generally  made  on  the  basis  of  seniority"  or  length  of  service  even  before  the  reorganisation  of  the  army 
in  1796.  The  regulations  of  that  year  reaffirmed  the  seniority  principle,  though  merit  was  also  to  be 
taken  into  consideration.  In  the  event  of  a  vacancy  for  a  native  officer,  the  commanding  officer  would 
generally  recommend  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  the  senior  soldier  in  the  rank  below.  A  similar 
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process  applied  for  N.  C.  O.  vacancies,  though  recommendations  were  made  by  company  officers  to  the 
commanding  officer  and  higher  authority  was  not  involved.  All  recommendations  were  subject  to  the 
proviso  that  "the  fullest  consideration  and  attention  should  invariably  be  given  to  the  claim  of  seniority 
in  every  grade  where  no  such  disqualifications  as  want  of  respectability  of  character  or  other  equally 
proper  and  just  cause  of  objection  to  the  advancement  of  the  seniors  should  exist".  119 
Though  the  system  of  promotion  for  the  regular  Bengal  Army  was  in  theory  a  combination  of 
seniority  and  merit,  in  practice  merit  was  rarely  rewarded.  Bentinck  acknowledged  as  much  when  he 
recommended  the  establishment  of  the  Orders  of  British  India  and  Merit  for  native  troops  in  1834  as  a 
"counterpoise  to  the  paralysing  effects  of  rise  by  seniority,  a  principle  of  advancement  indispensable  to 
the  fidelity  and  allegiance  of  our  native  troops,  though  injurious  in  many  respects  to  discipline  and 
efficiency".  "0  The  two  orders  were  eventually  confirmed  by  the  same  General  Order  of  April  1837  that 
brought  in  long  service  pay.  The  Order  of  British  India,  which  was  to  be  given  to  native  officers  "for 
long  and  honorable  service",  had  two  classes:  first  class,  for  100  subedars  and  rissaldars,  conferring  the 
title  sirdar  bahadoor  and  two  rupees  a  day;  and  second  class,  for  100  native  officers  of  all  grades, 
conferring  the  title  bahadoor  and  one  rupee  a  day.  Half  the  appointments  would  go  to  Bengal  native 
officers,  a  third  to  those  of  Madras,  and  one-sixth  to  those  of  Bombay.  But  given  that  the  Bengal  native 
army  was  about  a  third  bigger  than  the  other  two  presidency  armies  combined,  its  native  officers  would 
receive  fewer  orders  than  was  their  due.  The  Order  of  Merit,  on  the  other  hand,  was  open  to  to  all 
native  ranks  for  "distinguished  service  in  action"  and  had  three  classes:  I"  class,  which  entitled  the 
holder  to  double  pay,  or  full  pay  if  he  was  a  pensioner,  2nd  class  (two-thirds  of  full  pay);  and  3rd  class 
(one-third  of  full  pay).  To  receive  the  Order  of  Merit,  Pt  class,  however,  a  soldier  would  have  to 
commit  three  acts  of  outstanding  valour  as  only  the  holders  of  3rd  class  orders  were  eligible  for 
advancement  to  the  2  nd  class,  and  so  on.  121 
Bentinck's  hope  that  these  two  orders  would  compensate  ambitious  and  gallant  soldiers  for  the  time- 
serving  nature  of  promotion  by  seniority  was  not  realized.  Henry  Lawrence  put  his  finger  on  the 
reasons  why  in  the  first  of  two  articles  for  the  Calcutta  Review  in  1856.  The  Order  of  British  India  he 
dismissed  as  "virtually  the  reward  of  old  age"  with  its  wearers  "mostly  invalids  at  their  homes",  while 
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the  Order  of  Merit,  "though  its  numbers  are  not  positively  limited,  had  "so  many  restrictions  to  its 
obtainment,  that'the  decorated'are  so  few  as  to  be  hardly  discoverable".  Despite  a  "very  large 
acquaintance  with  the  Native  army",  he  could  not  recollect  seeing  more  than  a  dozen  silver  stars 
(denoting  the  2nd  and  Yd  classes  of  the  order)  and  not  "a  single  golden  one"  (1'  class).  As  for  the  scales 
of  extra  pay,  "what  reward  are  they  to  the  adventurer  whose  sword,  under  a  different  regime,  would 
have  carved  out  for  himself  a  principality?  "  he  asked,  before  providing  the  answer:  "None 
." 
122 
As  well  as  the  introduction  of  these  orders,  the  1830s  also  saw  an  attempt  by  the  military  authorities 
in  Bengal  to  emphasize  that  merit  should  take  prececedence  over  seniority  when  sepoys  or  sowars  were 
promoted  to  naik  (juniorN.  C.  O.  ).  In  December  1836,  after  a  subedar  of  the  I&  Light  Cavalry  had 
been  court-martialled  for  encouraging  his  subordinates  to  complain  that  junior  soldiers  had  been 
"unfairly  promoted  over  the  heads  of  their  seniors",  Sir  Henry  Fane,  the  Commander-in-Chief  (1835-9), 
issued  a  General  Order  to  clarify  the  matter.  The  subedar,  wrote  Fane,  should  have  referred  his  troopers 
to  section  16  of  the  standing  orders  of  the  Bengal  Army  which  state  "that  'vacancies  in  the  rank  of 
Naick  are  to  be  filled  up  from  the  most  deserving  sepoys,  '  (not  the  oldest)  and  it  is  particularly  pointed 
out  to  'the  young  and  aspiring  soldier,  that  he  may  rely  on  his  own  exertions  for  the  notice  of  his 
officers  and  advancement  in  the  service"'.  This  would  have  left  the  troopers  in  no  doubt  that  "merit, 
which  renders  itself  conspicuous,  gives  the  claim  for  promotion  from  the  ranks,  and  not  mere 
seniority".  123  In  May  1837,  to  hammer  home  the  point,  part  of  section  16  of  the  standing  orders  was 
revised  by  Fane  to  read:  "Vacancies  in  the  rank  of  Naik  are  to  be  filled  by  selection  from  the  best 
qualified  and  most  deserving  sepoys...  Seniority  can  be  permitted  to  operate  in  this  selection  only  when 
the  qualifications  and  fitness  of  two  or  more  sepoys  are  equal  in  which  case  the  Senior  is  always  to  be 
preferred.  Sepoys  whose  merits  are  merely  negative  and  are  based  on  long  service  only,  will  now  be 
otherwise  rewarded  [by  Good  Conduct  pay].  it  124 
Despite  these  new  guidelines,  the  majority  of  promotions  in  the  Bengal  Army  continued  to  be  made 
on  the  principle  of  seniority.  In  December  1838,  Subedar  Shaikh  Mahub  Ali  of  the  V;,  Bengal  N.  I. 
(who  had  recently  been  awarded  the  Order  of  British  India,  I'  class)  told  Captain  Sleeman  that  only 
two  men  in  their  regiment  "had  been  that  year  superseded,  one  for  insolence,  and  the  other  for  neglect 
of  duty",  and  "that  officers  and  sepoys  were  all  happy  in  consequence  -  the  young,  because  they  felt 
122  Lawrence,  Fssays,  Military  and  Political,  p.  3  93. 
123  G.  O.  C.  C.,  21  Dec  1836,  Bengal  Standing  Orders  and  Regulations  1830-6,  OIOC,  LftvfIU17/2/413, 
p.  38. 86 
more  secure  of  being  promoted  if  they  did  their  duty,  and  the  old  because  they  felt  an  interest  in  their 
young  relations".  Sleeman  himself  commented:  "We  might,  no  doubt,  have  in  every  regiment  a  few 
smarter  native  officers  by  disregarding  this  rule  than  by  adhering  to  it;  but  we  should,  in  the  diminution 
of  the  good  feeling  towards  the  European  officers  and  the  Government,  lose  a  thousand  times  more  than 
we  gained.  "  125 
However  there  were  enough  examples  of  Bengal  commanding  officers  promoting  without  regard  to 
seniority  to  set  alarm  bells  ringing  in  London  and  Calcutta.  In  October  1850,  therefore,  after 
representations  from  the  Court  of  Directors,  the  Bengal  government  issued  a  general  order  (drafted  by 
the  Adjutant-General  of  the  Bengal  Army,  Colonel  Tucker)  criticizing  a  number  of  recent  promotions, 
including  "a  Naick  superseding  17  seniors,  and  a  sepoy,  23d  on  the  roll  of  the  Company  and  216  on  the 
gradation  roll  of  the  regiment",  and  reiterating  its  rule  that  "full  consideration  be  given  to  the  point  of 
seniority".  126  Privately  Napier,  the  Commander-in-Chief,  preferred  the  Bombay  system  of  promotion 
where  merit  took  precedence.  But  publicly,  in  his  posthumous  book,  he  accepted  that  he  had  had  "no 
right  to  alter  the  Court  of  Directoes  rule  and  break  Government  faith  with  the  sepoys".  He  added:  "This 
faith,  respected  by  all  my  predecessors  in  command,  was  by  the  oldest  and  most  distinguished  officers 
of  the  Bengal  Army  judged  not  only  binding  but  vital,  and  the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  has  not  the 
right  to  order  the  change  of  a  button  in  the  uniform,  could  not  alter  an  organic  regulation.  "  127 
Major  Jacob,  the  commandant  of  the  Sind  Horse,  was  unconvinced  by  this  argument.  In  an  1854 
essay  responding  to  comments  in  Napiees  book,  he  wrote:  "It  is  a  fatal  error  to  suppose  that  we  are 
guilty  of  breach  of  faith  in  promoting  according  to  merit,  instead  of  according  to  seniority;  for  the 
sepoys,  on  enlistment,  know  and  think  nothing  about  their  rights  to  promotion;  they  enlist  to  obey 
orders,  and  serve  the  State;  and  their  notions  of  seniority  are  always  acquired  after  they  enter  the 
service,  under  the  influence  of  a  vicious  system.  "  In  his  opinion,  the  "unavoidable"  outcome  "of 
promoting  according  to  the  seniority  system  only"  was  "the  paralysation  and  ultimate  ruin  of  the  army", 
because  under  its  operation  "talent,  skill,  energy,  high  principle,  and  soldierlike  pride"  fell  "crushed  and 
powerless".  "'  In  an  earlier  essay,  Jacob  had  argued  that  the  Bengal  system  of  promotion  undermined 
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discipline  and  efficiency:  "The  men,  not  feeling  that  their  prospects  of  advancement  in  the  service 
depend  on  the  favourable  opinions  of  their  European  officers,  want  the  most  powerfW  stimulus  to  good 
conduct.  They  are  never  disciplined  (as  I  understand  the  word),  are  often  mutinous,  and  never  acquire 
the  knowledge  of  their  profession  which  may  qualify  them  to  hold  commissions  with  advantage  to  the 
service.  "  129 
One  consequence  of  the  1850  general  order  was  that  native  troops  were  confirmed  in  their  belief  that 
promotion  by  seniority  was  a  right  "irrespective  of  past  conduct  and  general  qualification".  130  In  the 
summer  of  185  1,  therefore,  the  new  Commander-in-Chief,  General  Gomm,  issued  a  general  order 
reminding  troops  that  while  claims  of  seniority  would  "always  be  taken  into  account",  they  would 
"never  be  allowed  to  prevail  against  proved  disqualification  in  other  respects".  13  1  This  proviso  -which 
had  existed  since  1796  -  was  still  in  place  when  the  last  pre-mutiny  Bengal  Army  regulations  were 
published  in  1855.  So  that  it  could  be  strictly  observed,  commanding  officers  were  instructed  to 
publish  in  the  same  regimental  orders  that  announced  promotions  "the  names  of  those  passed  over,  and 
the  causes  of  their  supersession".  The  only  major  change  from  the  rules  that  applied  at  the  beginning  of 
the  century  was  the  disqualification  from  promotion  of  sepoys  "without  a  competent  knowledge  of 
reading  and  writing  in  at  least  one  character".  132  Though  this  rule  had  been  introduced  some  years 
before,  Lord  Clyde  informed  the  Peel  Commission,  it  was  widely  disregarded  and  considered  "a  dead 
letter".  But  after  1855  it  "was  very  generally  enforced"  and  "occasioned  much  dissatisfaction  amongst 
men  who  had  expected  promotion,  and  were  thus  suddenly  superseded  owing  to  the  revival  of  this 
rule". 
133 
According  to  Henry  Lawrence,  the  end  result  of  all  these  orders  and  counter-orders  was  that  Bengal 
commanding  officers  pursued  very  different  policies  with  regard  to  promotion.  "There  is  authority  [in 
Bengal],  though  not  very  explicit,  for  promotion  by  merit,  "  he  wrote  in  1856,  "and  provision  is  made, 
by  increase  of  pay  after  terms  of  seven  years,  for  the  superseded,  but  recent  orders  have  directed 
differently.  The  consequence  is,  that  commanding  officers  do  much  as  they  like.  One  finds  reason  for 
129  'Comparison  between  the  Systems  obtaining  in  the  Armies  of  Bengal  and  Bombay',  ibid.,  p.  120. 
130  G.  O.  C.  C.,  29  July  1851,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1848  to  1853,  OIOC,  LWU17/2/437. 
131  Ibid. 
132  Bengal  Army  Regulations  1855,  OIOC,  L/MIU17/2/442,  pp.  397-8. 
133  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  53,  p.  421. 88 
promoting  all  the  old,  another  all  the  young...  Discipline  suffers,  and  deserving  Native  soldiers  of  all 
ranks  suffer,  and  are  often  driven  with  disgust  from  the  service.  "  134 
However,  most  of  the  officers  who  gave  evidence  to  the  Peel  Commission  agreed  that  seniority  took 
precedence.  The  Punjab  Committee,  for  example,  testified  that  the  system  of  promotion  in  the  regular 
Bengal  native  army  was  "based  nominally  on  seniority  and  merit,  but  really  on  seniority,  as  the  senior 
was  never  passed  over  unless  he  was  imbecile".  135  The  opinion  of  another  group  of  senior  officers 
(including  Generals  Hearsey,  Cotton,  Hope  Grant  and  Brigadiers  Farquharson,  Coke  and  Troup), 
summarized  by  Colonel  Durand,  was  that  "the  general  rule  in  the  native  infantry  of  the  Bengal  Army 
was  promotion  by  seniority"  and  that  "exceptions  were  rare",  hence  "the  noted  inefficiency  of  superior 
grades  of  native  officers".  136  This  latter  point  was  confirmed  by  Sitaram  Pandy  who  served  "forty-eight 
years  of  hard  wear  and  tear"  before  being  promoted  to  subedar.  "I  was  an  old  man  of  sixty-five  years  of 
age,  "  he  wrote  in  his  memoirs,  "and  had  attained  the  highest  rank  to  be  gained  in  the  Native  Army,  but  I 
would  have  been  much  better  fitted  for  this  position  thirty  years  earlier.  "  137  When  part  of  the  7th  L.  C. 
mutinied  at  Lucknow  on  31  May  1857,  its  subedar-major  was  70-years-old 
. 
138 
A  signficant  number  of  witnesses  thought  that  promotion  by  seniority  had  weakened  the  authority  of 
commanding  officers.  Colonel  Wintle,  who  left  India  in  1856  after  thirty-nine  years  in  the  Bengal 
Native  Infantry,  told  the  commission  that  he  knew  of  instances  where  the  Commander-in-Chief  had 
disregarded  a  commanding  officer's  recommendation  for  promotion  to  native  officer  because  he  was 
not  the  most  senior.  139  Colonel  Wyllie  agreed  that  many  Bengal  commanding  officers  were  even  afraid 
to  promote  to  the  rank  ofjunior  N.  C.  O.  on  merit  because  the  soldiers  passed  over  might  send  petitions 
to  headquarters  which  would  cause  them  to  be  rebuked.  140  As  a  former  member  of  the  Adjutant- 
General's  office,  he  knew  of  many  instances  in  which  -  contrary  to  regulations  -  such  petitions  had  been 
sent  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  direct.  A  great  many  other  officers  shared  the  views  of  the  Punjab 
Committee,  which  noted:  141 
134  Lawrence,  Fssays,  Military  and  Political,  p.  388-9. 
135  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  71,  p.  549. 
136  Ibid. 
137  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  172. 
13'  Evidence  of  Lt.  Col.  Robert  Master,  24  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  59 
139  Evidence  of  Colonel  Edmund  Wintle,  28  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  p.  130-1. 
"  Evidence  of  Colonel  Wyllie,  10  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  p.  22. 89 
Rewards  and  punishments  are  the  two  great  sources  of  a  commanding  officers  influence  over  his  men,  and  both 
seem  to  have  been  almost  taken  out  of  his  hands.  The  principle  Of  seniority  Promotion  has  been  so  hedged  in, 
watched  and  enforced,  (even  by  such  a  professed  military  reformer  as  Sir  Charles  Napier,  whose  general  order  on 
the  subject  is,  perhaps  the  strongest  on  record),  that  practically  the  commanding  officer  has  no  discretion  whatever, 
and  promoted  the  senior  on  the  roll,  rather  than  enter  upon  a  vain  struggle  to  prefer  a  better  man.  The  regimental 
commandant  was  interested  in  superseding  the  inefficicm;  and  the  incfficicnt  found  a  readiness  at  head-quartcrs;  to 
believe  injustice  had  been  committed.  142 
Commandants  of  Bengal  irregular  units,  on  the  other  hand,  generally  had  more  say  in  the  promotion  of 
their  men.  According  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wilde,  the  men  of  the  Punjab  Irregular  Force  were 
"selected  for  promotion  according  to  their  merits,  and  not  by  seniority".  In  his  own  regiment,  the  4' 
Punjab  I.  I.,  the  average  age  of  native  officers  was  26  years.  These  handpicked  men  -  some  of  whom 
had  been  commisssioned  on  recruitment  -  had  real  authority  in  that  they  were  company  commanders, 
rather  than  powerless  adjuncts  to  the  authority  of  European  officers  in  regular  regiments.  Such  an 
atypical  system  of  promotion  had  come  about,  said  Wilde,  because  the  Punjab  Irregular  Force  was 
under  the  authority  of  the  Punjab  government  rather  than  the  Commander-in-Chief.  143  On  the  question 
of  promotion  in  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry,  however,  opinion  was  divided.  Brigadier  Christie 
claimed  that  it  was  "based  on  merit",  while  Major-General  Cotton  noted  that  there  was  "no  rule" 
regarding  seniority  and  that  the  system  varied  "according  to  the  ideas  of  the  commandant",  144  whereas 
Sir  Patrick  Grant  and  Sir  J.  H.  Grant  thought  promotion  was  based  chiefly  on  seniority.  145 
There  was  also  some  disagreement  as  to  best  system  of  promotion  for  the  post-mutiny  Bengal  Army. 
Lord  Ellenborough,  Lord  Clyde  and  General  Grant  all  thought  that  seniority  should  continue  to  play  a 
dominant  role.  '46  But  the  vast  majority  of  officers  thought  that  the  authority  of  the  commanding  officer 
needed  to  be  bolstered  by  an  extension  of  his  discretion  to  promote.  These  views  were  reflected  in 
statements  by  the  members  of  the  Commission  themselves.  General  the  Marquess  of  Tweeddale  and 
Major-General  Montgomerie  both  thought  that  the  selection  of  naiks  should  be  left  to  the  commanding 
141  They  included:  the  Oude  committee;  Generals  Cotton,  Hearsey,  Hope  Grant  and  Griffith;  Brigadiers 
Farquharson,  Coke,  Steel  and  Troup;  Colonel  Bum,  Lieutenant  Colonels  Master  and  Wilde,  Major 
Williams,  Captain  Browne  (Source:  Ibid.,  pp.  15,34,91,119,556-7) 
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145  Ibid.,  Appendices  65  and  72,  pp.  490  and  567. 
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officer  without  regard  to  seniority.  147  Major-General  Viscount  Melville,  Lieutenant-Generals  Harry 
Smith  and  Sir  George  Wetherall,  and  Colonels  Burlton  and  Tait,  went  even  further  by  saying  that 
commanding  officers  should  choose  both  N.  C.  O.  s  and  native  officers  on  merit.  148 
But  the  most  forthright  opinion  was  expressed  by  Major-General  Hancock,  a  former  Adjutant- 
General  of  the  Bombay  Army,  who  produced  his  own  report  because  he  did  not  believe  the  official 
version  went  far  enough.  Like  the  Punjab  Committee,  Hancock  was  convinced  that  a  major  cause  of 
mutiny  was  the  "fatal  policy"  of  reducing  the  Bengal  commanding  officers'powers  of  reward  and 
punishment  to  a  "minimum",  thereby  reducing  those  officers  to  mere  "cyphers"  and  making  "the 
maintenance  of  sound  discipline,  even  by  commanders  of  the  highest  ability,  _  absolutely  impossible". 
They  had,  in  particular,  been  "deprived  of  the  principal  means  of  rewarding  merit,  by  being  compelled 
to  make  promotions  in  all  the  native  ranks  by  seniority".  His  solution,  therefore,  was  to  give 
commanding  officers  "the  power  to  enlist  and  to  promote,  upon  their  own  authority  alone,  as  regards  all 
non-commissioned  ranks"  and  "to  select  for  all  promotions  to  and  in  the  commission  grade,  and  for  the 
appointments  of  subedar-major  and  native  adjutant".  Other  powers  to  reward  should  include  the  right 
"to  confer  good  conduct  badges,  with  additional  pay,  by  selection  from  the  entire  list  of  privates",  to 
select  for  appointment  to  the  Order  of  British  India  and  the  Order  of  Merit,  and  to  grant  "leave  of 
absence  in  time  of  peace  to  all  native  ranks".  149 
The  inevitable  outcome  of  this  waning  power  to  reward  or  punish  was  that  sepoys;  ceased  to  regard 
their  colonels  with  the  same  amount  of  awe  and  respect  as  hitherto,  and  discipline  suffered  as  a  result. 
The  system  of  promotion  that  General  Hancock  wished  to  impose  upon  the  post-mutiny  Bengal  Army 
was  essentially  that  which  operated  in  his  former  presidency  of  Bombay.  In  theory,  the  system  was 
similar  to  Bengal's  in  that  it  was  a  mixture  of  merit  and  seniority;  in  practice  merit  was  the  dominant 
principle.  Testifying  before  a  Parliamentary  select  committee  in  1853,  Lieutenant-General  Sir 
Willoughby  Cotton,  a  former  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Bombay  Army,  stated  that  promotion  in 
Bombay  was  usually  by  selection.  He  went  on  to  say  that  selection  was  "so  much  preferable  to 
seniority"  that  if  he  had  been  the  Commander-in-Chief  in  Bengal  he  would  have  tried  to  introduce  such 
147  ibid.,  Appendices  74  and  78,  pp.  583  and  597. 
148  ibid.,  Appendices  75,76,77,79  and  80,  pp.  587-8,594,601,607. 
149  Report  of  Major-General  Hancock,  5  March  1859,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  641-2. 91 
a  system  there.  150  In  his  posthumous  book,  Sir  Charles  Napier  observed  that  "to  disregard  seniority  is 
the  custom"  in  the  Bombay  Army,  which  in  turn  brought  on  "Native  officers  and  non-commissioned 
officers,  younger,  more  active,  and  more  ambitious  than  those  of  Bengal".  But,  as  already  noted,  he 
also  believed  that  the  introduction  of  this  system  in  the  Bengal  Army  would  have  been  interpreted  by  its 
sepoys  as  a  breach  of  government  faith.  151 
A  number  of  Bombay  officers  who  gave  evidence  to  the  Peel  Commission  in  1858  confirmed  that 
merit  took  precedence  over  seniority.  Colonel  Poole,  with  30  years'  service  in  the  Bombay  Light 
Cavalry,  explained  that  men  from  the  ranks  were  "generally  recommended"  for  promotion  by  their 
company  officers  on  the  grounds  of  "smartness",  "being  good  drills"  and  "general  good  conduct". 
Promotion  to  the  commissioned  ranks  was  also  "entirely  by  selection"  and  Poole  had  known  "a  havildar 
promoted  to  be  a  native  officer  who  had  only  been  a  short  time  in  that  grade".  The  average  age  of 
native  officers  in  the  Bombay  Army,  added  Poole,  was  "about  35"  which  was  "rather  young".  152 
Colonel  Hill,  who  commanded  the  Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners  during  the  mutiny,  insisted  that  the 
Bombay  system  of  promoting  by  "general  merit"  was  a  "very  excellent  one  indeed",  though  it  did  not 
always  operate  as  well  as  it  could  have.  Partiality  was  "sometimes  shown"  and  "sufficient  general 
attention"  was  "not  given  to  the  qualifications  of  the  men".  Yet  he  still  regarded  it  as  "the  only  just 
system  which  can  be  pursued  with  regard  to  the  promotion  of  natives  or  Europeans".  153  Major-General 
Capon,  who  retired  in  1850  after  40  years'service,  thought  that  promotion  by  merit  "made  the  whole 
regiment  smart  and  willing  to  be  brought  into  notice",  whereas  under  the  seniority  system  "they  do  not 
care  a  pin  about  the  officers,  because  they  know  they  cannot  do  them  good  or  harm".  The  European 
officer,  in  turn,  had  no  incentive  to  discover  "the  character  of  the  men  under  him"  because  he  simply 
promoted  the  "first  man  on  the  roster".  On  the  subject  of  promoting  a  havildar  to  the  rank  ofjemadar 
(orjunior  officer),  Capon  stated  that  a  Bombay  commanding  officer's  selection  was  "always"  confirmed 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  that  he  "never  had  any  instance  of  it  being  otherwise".  154  This  was  in 
direct  contrast  to  the  practice  in  Bengal  whereby  the  commanding  officer's  choice  could  be  -  and  often 
was  -  overridden  by  his  Commander-in-Chief  if  it  infringed  the  principle  of  seniority. 
"'  Evidence  of  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  W.  Cotton,  24  Feb  1853,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1852-3,  XXVIL  p.  20, 
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Promotion  by  merit  was  even  more  strictly  observed  in  Bombay's  irregular  regiments.  According  to 
Major  Merewether  of  the  Sind  Irregular  Horse,  his  sowars  had  to  pass  an  examination  by  the  adjutant 
before  even  being  considered  for  promotion  to  naik.  Of  those  who  passed,  the  ones  considered  to  have 
the  best  characters  would  then  be  examined  a  second  time  before  the  best  candidate  was  promoted. 
"And  so  on  throughout,  "  noted  Merewether,  "only  that  the  standard  of  efficiency  is  of  course  raised  as 
you  go  up  the  list".  '"  Merewhether's  claim  is  supported  by  an  1848  return  for  the  two  regiments  of 
Sind  Irregular  Horse  which  lists  ten  native  officers  with  less  than  ten  years'  total  service,  and  three 
under  the  age  of  30.  Jacob,  the  founder  of  the  regiment,  noted  many  instances  of  sons  overtaking  their 
fathers  in  rank,  one  becoming  a  jemadar  while  his  father,  "a  most  respectable  and  efficient  soldier,  but, 
as  he  knew  himself,  unfit  for  further  promotion",  remained  a  naik.  156 
In  Madras  the  system  of  promotion  was  a  genuine  combination  of  seniority  and  merit,  though  the 
crucial  first  step  from  sepoy  to  lance-naik  was  on  the  latter  princple.  "It  must  ... 
be  bome  in  mind,  in  all 
promotions  up  to  the  commissioned  ranks,  "  stated  the  Bombay  Army  regulations  of  1849,  "that  while 
on  the  one  hand  a  system  of  succession  by  mere  seniority  cannot  but  fail  in  exciting  the  men  to  zeal  and 
exertion  in  the  performance  of  their  duty,  on  the  other  hand  the  supercession  of  seniors,  without  a 
specific  and  sufficient  cause,  is  no  less  injurious  by  creating  feelings  of  dissatisfaction  and  inducing  a 
want  of  confidence  in  the  impartiality  of  their  superiors.  "  The  regulations  also  stressed  that,  providing 
he  could  read  and  write,  a  private  might  be  promoted  to  lance  naik  after  just  three  years  in  a  regiment, 
and  that  such  selections  should  be  left  to  troop  or  company  commanders.  Thereafter  they  were  to  be 
"promoted  according  to  their  standing  in  the  Roll"  unless  their  commanding  officerjudged  them  to  be 
unfit  for  further  advancement.  157 
Merit  therefore  played  a  more  important  role  than  seniority.  Major-General  Alexander  explained: 
"The  officer  of  a  company  has  the  first  promotion  to  a  lance-naik;  he  selects  the  fittest  man  that  he 
thinks  proper,  and  if  on  trial  that  man  is  unfit  he  is  remanded  to  the  ranks.  When  he  is  promoted  to  be  a 
naik  ... 
he  is  brought  into  a  general  regimental  list,  and  he  rises  in  it  if  he  behaves  well;  if  not,  he  is 
brought  to  court-martial  and  reduced.  So  far  the  seniority  goes  on  in  that  way,  but  no  man  is  ever 
promoted  by  seniority  unless  he  is  competent.  "  A  fortunate  man  could  expect  to  become  a  native 
officer  within  15  years  of  enlistment,  said  Alexander,  though  18  or  20  years  were  probably  more 
155  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  6,  p.  367. 
156  Quoted  in  Lambfický  John  Jacob  ofJacobabad,  p.  179. 
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typical.  Given  that  most  sepoys  enlisted  at  19,  the  average  age  of  Madras  jemadars  was  about  37  to  40, 
and  the  average  age  of  subedars  "above  50"  158 
-  older  than  in  Bombay,  but  younger  than  in  Bengal 
where  sepoys  were  rarely  promoted  to  the  rank  ofjunior  N.  C.  O.  until  they  had  reached  the  top  of  the 
regimental  seniority  list.  A  Madras  practice  that  did  mirror  Bombay,  however  -  according  to  Colonel 
Felix,  a  former  private  secretary  to  Lord  Tweeddale  -  was  the  Commander-in-Chief  s  habit  of  bolstering 
the  authority  of  his  commanding  officers  by  always  confirming  their  recommendations  for  promotion 
to  native  officer.  159 
While  all  the  professional  grievances  mentioned  in  this  chapter  contributed  in  some  way  to  the  growing 
level  of  disaffection  felt  by  Bengal  native  troops  in  the  years  prior  to  1857,  some  were  more  particular 
to  them  -  and  therefore  more  relevant  to  their  decision  to  mutiny  -  than  others.  A  dissatisfaction  with 
European-style  dress  and  accoutrements,  for  example,  was  present  in  all  three  presidency  armies.  As, 
to  a  certain  extent,  was  the  belief  that  their  duties  were  unnecessarily  onerous,  though  Bengal  troops 
probably  suffered  the  most  because,  proportionately,  they  had  to  cover  a  far  larger  area.  Also,  as 
Napier  pointed  out,  irksome  duties  seem  to  have  had  a  more  deletorious  effect  on  the  discipline  of  the 
Bengal  Army  (which  was,  as  we  shall  see,  being  simultaneously  undermined  by  a  number  of  other 
factors),  Low  pay  was  another  issue  that  affected  all  three  armies,  particularly  after  their  pay  scales 
were  equalized  in  1837.  They  were  all  hit  by  the  50  per  cent  reduction  in  the  real  value  of  pay  during 
the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Indeed  it  could  be  argued  that  Madras  and  Bombay  troops  were 
relatively  worse  off  after  1837  because  they  received  less  batta  than  hitherto.  There  is,  however,  no 
doubt  that  many  Bengal  native  troops  -  particularly  irregular  sowars  -  were  in  financially  straitened 
circumstances  in  the  decade  or  so  prior  to  the  mutiny.  Extra  pay  and  booty  were  very  real  incentives  to 
rebel.  Yet  the  real  significance  of  the  mutinies  over  pay  in  the  1840s  is  that  they  demonstrate  a 
willingness  by  the  brotherhood  of  high-caste  Bengal  sepoys  to  ameliorate  a  professional  grievance  by 
collective  action. 
The  one  professional  grievance  that  was  confined  mainly  to  the  Bengal  Army  was  that  of 
inadequate  career  prospects.  This  was  because  the  Bengal  system  of  promotion  was  dominated  by 
seniority,  whereas  merit  held  sway  in  Bombay  and  Madras.  The  dire  consequences  of  this  seniority 
I"  Evidence  of  Maj.  -Gen.  R.  Alexander,  25  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  81. 94 
system  were  as  follows:  it  deprived  the  commanding  officer  of  an  important  power  to  reward,  thereby 
reducing  his  authority  over  his  men;  it  frustrated  ambitious  and  talented  sepoys  who  had  to  wait  in  line 
for  promotion;  and  it  produced  old,  inefficent  and  often  bitter  native  officers  who  had  no  worthwhile 
occupation.  These  two  latter  groups  may  hold  the  key  to  the  mutiny.  Lawrence  believed  that  three  out 
of  a  hundred  sepoys  were  "dangerously  discontented"  in  1856  because  they  "they  feel  they  have  that  in 
them  which  elsewhere  would  rise  them  to  distinction".  160  It  is  highly  probable  that  such  men  were  the 
instigators  of  the  mutinies  in  1857,  and  that  they  used  the  religious  and  caste  implications  of  the 
cartridge  question  to  persuade  the  rank  and  file  to  join  them  in  rebellion.  Yet  the  vast  majority  of  rebel 
regiments  were  led  by  their  old  native  officers.  The  implications  of  this  observation  are  twofold:  first, 
that  the  mutinous  regiments  retained  their  cohesiveness  and  former  command  structure,  and  that  they 
did  so  because  their  rebellion  was  simply  an  attempt  to  find  an  employer  who  could  offer  them  more 
attractive  incentives  to  serve;  second,  that  a  significant  number  of  native  officers  were  so  alienated  by 
service  under  the  British  that  they  were  prepared  to  put  both  their  lives  and  their  future  pensions  at  risk. 
Twelve  years  before  the  mutiny,  Sir  Henry  Hardinge  applauded  the  Bengal  policy  of  "preferring 
inefficiency  &  seniority,  to  activity  and  selection"  because  aged  and  inactive  native  officers  were  less 
likely  to  lead  an  armed  insurrection  than  their  younger  and  more  zealous  counterparts.  161  He  could  not 
have  been  more  wrong. 
So  why  did  the  native  officers  of  the  Bengal  Army  become  so  despondent?  With  regard  to  the  native 
officers  of  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  Barat  cites  a  number  of  reaons:  the  relatively  low  pay  of  a 
subedar  (67  rupees  a  month)  compared  to  that  of  a  fresh-faced  English  ensign  (180  rupees)  or  a  native 
civil  officer  (250  rupees  on  average,  rising  to  a  maximum  of  500  rupees);  the  gradual  curtailment  of  the 
authority  of  Bengal  native  officers  from  1786  onwards  when  European  officers  were  assigned  to  each 
company  ("From  being  leaders  of  their  men,  "  writes  Barat,  "the  native  officers  were  reduced  to  playing 
the  role  of  contact-men  between  the  sepoys  and  the  commanding  officers  of  their  reginients...  ");  and 
the  deteriorating  relationship  between  native  officers  and  their  European  counterparts  in  the  years  prior 
to  the  mutiny  (a  theme  I  will  consider  in  the  next  chapter).  162  There  was  also  the  fact  that  the  new 
pension  regulations  of  183  7  favoured  the  junior  ranks.  It  could  be  argued,  therefore,  that  fewer  Bengal 
15'  Evidence  of  Colonel  Orlando  Felix,  25  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  p.  62. 
160  Lawrence,  E:  Kms,  Militwy  and  Political,  p.  3  95 
16  1  Hardinge  to  Sir  Charles  Napier,  31  Oct  1844,  Napier  Papers,  B.  L.,  Add.  MSS  54517,  f  104. 
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native  officers  would  have  mutinied  in  1857  if  pensions  had  been  more  generous.  They  certainly  had 
relatively  little  to  lose  in  a  financial  sense  by  rebelling  -  and  much  to  gain. 
While  such  professional  grievances  were  not  exclusive  to  the  Bengal  Army,  they  were  certainly 
exacerbated  by  its  seniority  system  of  promotion.  "The  Bengal  native  officers  are  inefficient,  and 
necessarily  so  under  the  present  system,  "  wrote  John  Jacob  in  1850,  "because  they  are  chosen  without 
any  regard  whatever  to  their  fitness  to  hold  commissions,  and  because  they  are  almost  always  worn.  out 
with  age  before  they  receive  them.  "  163  In  an  earlier  essay,  he  commented: 
[The]  value  of  native  off  iccrs  is  not  properly  understood  in  the  army  of  Bengal.  They  have  in  that  army  little 
power  over  the  men,  are  perfectly  separated  in  heart  and  feeling  from  the  European  officers,  and  only  half 
understand  each  other:  moreover,  they  arc  very  often  old  imbeciles,  incapable  of  active  exertion,  whether  of  mind 
orbody.  Butitisnotsowithus.  A  native  officer  or  soldier  after  twenty  ycars'servicc  in  the  Bombay  Army  is  half 
an  Englishman  in feeling.  He  is  not  valued,  either  by  himself  or  others,  on  account  of  his  caste,  etc.,  but  according 
to  his  abilities  as  a  soldier,  and  his  conduct  as  a  man.  164 
163  'Comparison  between  the  Systems  obtaining  in  the  Armies  of  Bengal  and  Bombay,  1850,  Pelly 
(ed.  ),  Views  and  Opinions,  p.  120. 
164  'Remarks  on  an  Article  in  the  "Calcutta  Review"  for  March  1846,  entitled  "Hints  on  Irregular 
Cavalry",  etc.  ',  ibid.,  p.  148. 96 
Chapter  Three  -  European  Officers 
The  deteriorating  relationship  between  the  native  troops  of  the  Bengal  Army  and  their  European 
officers  was,  arguably,  one  of  the  principal  causes  of  the  Indian  mutiny.  This  chapter  will  cover  some 
of  the  factors  which  contributed  to  that  breakdown  of  trust. 
With  regard  to  relations  with  their  troops,  the  social  origins  of  the  European  officers  of  the  East  India 
Company  army  are  particularly  revealing.  In  the  early  days  of  Company  service  the  military  officers 
were  not  even  gentlemen.  "Pay  was  extremely  low,  and  attracted  none  with  pretensions  to  gentility,  or 
indeed  even  to  respectability,  "  wrote  T.  A.  Heathcote.  "In  1753  it  was  stated  that  one  of  the  Company's 
military  officers  had  been  a  trumpeter  at  a  travelling  circus  in  England,  while  another  had  previously 
been  a  barber.  "  As  the  Company's  army  increased  in  size  in  the  1750s  and  60s,  and  the  end  of  the  War 
of  Austrian  Succession  and  the  Seven  Years'War  left  a  large  number  of  British  Army  officers  on  half- 
pay,  efforts  were  made  to  recruit  a  "better  class  of  men".  '  This  policy  was  bolstered  by  the  decision,  in 
1794,  to  grant  Company  commissions  in  the  name  of  the  Crown  so  that  Indian  officers  could  command 
troops  of  the  British  Army  in  India.  Yet  these  commissions  ceased  to  have  any  authority  west  of  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  Company  officers  could  not  appear  at  their  sovereign's  court  in  uniform. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  still  commonly  believed  that  Company  officers  in  the  early  nineteenth  century  were 
drawn  from  the  same  social  Mite  -  the  aristocracy,  gentry  and  rich  upper  middle-classes  -  that  supplied 
the  bulk  of  British  Army  officers.  In  fact,  according  to  the  unpublished  doctoral  thesis  of  J.  M.  Boume, 
they  came  from  "the  'pseudo-gentry',  from  the  genteel  poor  and  from  the  sons  of  East  India  Company 
servants  who  were  effectively  barred,  by  their  lack  of  connexions  and  lack  of  cash,  from  access  to  the 
traditional  areas  of  gentlemanly  employment  -  government  service,  the  established  church,  medicine, 
the  armed  forces  of  the  Crown  and  the  English  bar".  These  poor  middle-class  parents  could  not  have 
afforded  the  high  purchase  price  of  a  commission  in  the  British  Army.  Commissions  in  the  East  India 
Company  army,  on  the  other  hand,  were  in  the  gift  of  the  Court  of  Directors  whose  members,  wrote 
Boume,  "were  not  forgetful  of  their  less  fortunate  comrades  at  home  and  in  India".  During  the  period 
1796-1854,  the  "most  significant  change  in  the  pattern  of  recruitment"  to  the  Company's  service  "came 97 
in  the  proportion  of  recruits  born  in  India":  2.7%  in  1800  compared  to  36.8%  in  1854.  Boume 
concluded  that  recruits  to  the  Indian  services  "were  drawn  overwhelmingly  from  the  service,  business, 
leisured  and  professional  middle  classes,  with  a  significant  minority  from  the  sons  of  manual  workers 
and  tradesmen",  and  that  "very  few  were  connected  with  the  aristocracy  or  gentry".  2 
This  claim  is  supported  by  Heathcote!  s  analysis  of  the  class  origin  of  2,000  officers  who  served  in  the 
Bengal  Army  between  1820  and  1834,  which  reveals  that  twelve  were  sons  of  peers  and  26  sons  of 
baronets.  Only  one  succeeded  to  a  peerage  (the  second  son  of  the  Earl  of  Carnwath)  and  six  to 
3 
baronetcies  (three  of  whom  were  originally  younger  sons).  A  similar  analysis  of  the  social  origins  of 
British  Army  off  icers  in  1830  by  Hew  Strachan,  author  of  Wellington's  Legacy,  shows  that  21  per  cent 
were  aristocrats,  32  per  cent  landed  gentry  and  47  per  cent  rich  middle-class.  "It  was  not  birth  that 
dictated  the  grant  of  commissions,  "  comments  Strachan,  "so  much  as  the  wealth  to  purchase  and  to 
provide  a  private  income.  it  4  Many  Company  officers,  by  contrast,  were  either  illegitimate  or  orphans, 
both  categories  that  were  treated  with  kindly  compassion  by  the  Court  of  Directors.  According  to 
Bourrie,  one  in  four  cadets  who  entered  the  Company's  service  between  1810  and  1854  "came  from 
families  in  which  the  head  of  the  household  was  dead".  5 
Given  that  the  economic  status  of  cadets  was  "predominantly  poor",  it  follows  that  their  chief  motive 
for  entering  the  Company's  service  was  because  it  was  well  paid  and  "offered  an  accessible  avenue  to 
social  status  and  financial  security"  .6  In  1849,  a  lieutenant-colonel  in  a  native  infantry  regiment 
received  1,227  rupees  and  14  annas  (orjust  under  1123)  a  month;  if  he  was  in  the  field  or  stationed  200 
miles  from  the  seat  of  his  presidency's  government,  he  was  paid  1,432  rupees  and  4  annas  (or  1143)  a 
month.  At  the  other  end  of  the  scale  a  lieutenant  received  a  basic  225  rupees  and  12  annas  (L22  10s.  )  a 
month,  rising  to  256  rupees  and  10  annas  (L25  14s.  )  with  batta,  and  an  extra  30  rupees  (13)  if  he 
commanded  a  company.  An  ensign,  the  lowest  commissioned  rank,  was  paid  just  over  182  rupees 
(J18)  a  month,  or  202  rupees  (L20)  including  batta.  7  In  the  British  Army,  by  contrast,  an  infantry 
lieutenant-colonel  received  the  equivalent  ofjust  253  rupees  (or  125)  a  month,  a  lieutenant  between  96 
(L9  12s.  )  and  III  rupees  (;  El  I  2s.  )  depending  upon  his  length  of  service,  and  an  ensign  a  mere  78 
'  Heathcote,  Yhe  Indian  Army,  p.  122. 
2  j.  M.  Bourne,  'The  Civil  and  Military  Patronage  of  the  East  India  Company,  1784-1858',  Ph.  D.  thesis, 
Univ.  of  Leicester,  1977,  pp.  169,172,1834,192. 
3  Heathcote,  Yhe  Indian  Army,  p.  123. 
4  Strachan,  Wellington's  Legacy,  p.  I  10. 
5  Bourne,  'Civil  and  Military  Patronage',  Ph.  D  thesis,  p.  197. 
6  Ibid.,  pp.  194,200. 98 
rupees  (V  l6s.  ).  8  According  to  Strachan,  a  private  income  of  at  least  150  to  1100  a  year  was  "essential 
for  any  rank  under  that  of  major".  9  However,  British  Army  officers  were  paid  Company  allowances 
when  in  India,  which  is  why  those  without  sizeable  private  incomes  were  keen  to  serve  there. 
All  of  the  Company's  irregular  regiments  were  officered  by  men  on  detachment  from  regular  units. 
They  were  paid  a  fixed  sum  that  varied  from  regiment  to  regiment.  The  commandant  of  a  regiment  of 
Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry,  for  example,  received  1,000  rupees  (LIOO)  a  month,  his  second-in-command 
500  rupees  (150),  and  the  adjutant  an  allowance  of  170  rupees  and  14  annas  (114  4s.  )  in  addition  to  his 
normal  pay.  Whereas  the  commandant  of  an  infantry  regiment  of  the  Gwalior  Contingent  was  paid 
845  rupees  (184  10s.  ),  his  second-in-command  600  rupees  (160)  and  the  adjutant  500  rupees  (150).  10 
The  competition  for  these  lucrative  appointments  was  understandably  intense. 
Before  1836,  Company  officers  could  retire  on  the  full  pay  of  their  rank  after  twenty-five  years' 
service,  of  which  three  could  be  spent  on  furlough.  But  in  that  year,  because  the  vagaries  of  regimental 
promotion  meant  that  some  could  attain  the  rank  of  major  in  12  years  while  others  would  take  more 
than  30,  the  principle  of  granting  pensions  for  length  of  service  was  introduced.  "  Henceforth  all 
officers  could  retire  on  the  pay  of  a  captain  after  23  years,  of  a  major  after  27  years,  of  a  lieutenant- 
colonel  after  31  years,  and  of  a  colonel  after  35  years,  including  three  years  furlough.  Alternatively, 
they  could  retire  on  half-pay  after  ten  years  (though  a  lieutenant  had  the  option  to  leave  after  six  on  the 
half-pay  of  an  ensign,  comet  or  second-lieutenant).  12 
in  this  struggle  to  "maintain  a  social  position  in  British  life",  wrote  Bourne,  the  "needs  of  India  were 
secondary,  if  considered  at  all".  He  adds: 
The  Bengal  Army,  in  particular,  was  tragically  undermined  by  the  nature  of  its  [officers  who]...  looked  to  transfers 
in  the  more  lucrative  stations,  which  paid  full  hatta,  or  to  employment  on  the  staff,  the  superior  status,  emoluments 
and  opportunities  of  which  deprived  regimental  officers  of  all  effective  decision-making  and  lowered  their  prestige 
in  native  eyes.  Financial  considerations  produced  a  distaste  for  the  ordinary  round  of  sepoy  management  and 
7  Pay  and  Audit  Regulations  1849,  OIOC,  L/MIU17/2/459,  p.  273. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  124c. 
9  Strachan,  Wellington's  Legacy,  p.  112. 
10  Pay  and  Audit  Regulations  1849,  OIOC,  IAlIL/17/2/459,  p.  222a. 
11  Evidence  of  Philip  Melvill,  14  Dec  1852,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1852-3,  )ONH,  p.  10. 
12  B  arat,  Ae  Bengal  Native  ItIfantry,  pp.  10  1-2. 99 
training  and  conspired  to  create  a  positive  dislike  of  the  sepoy  and  of  all  things  Indian,  a  development  pregnant 
with  danger.  13 
It  did  not  help  that  the  standard  of  training  and  education  that  Company  officers  received  before  joining 
their  regiments  was  generally  poor.  A  Military  Seminary  was  established  at  Addiscombe,  near 
Croydon,  in  1809  but  it  only  educated  artillery  and  engineer  officers  until  the  admission  of"general 
service'  cadets  in  1827.  From  that  date  on,  Addiscombe  produced  an  average  of  seventy-five  cadets  a 
year,  with  60  per  cent  joining  the  artillery  or  engineers  and  40  per  cent  the  infantry.  But  even  for  these 
fortunate  officers,  the  system  of  education  was  highly  unsatisfactory.  The  curriculum  was  dominated 
by  mathematics  (which  occupied  22  hours  of  a  54  hour  academic  week),  while  fortification,  based  on 
Vauban,  "was  largely  obsolete  and  irrelevant  to  Indian  conditions",  chemistry  and  classics  too  narrow 
in  their  focus,  and  the  study  of  Hindustani  "perfunctory".  The  aim  of  the  seminary,  wrote  Boume,  was 
"to  cram  into  [the  cadet's]  mind  the  greatest  number  of  facts  in  the  shortest  possible  time,  a  system 
which  at  best  produced  cultivated  pedants,  and  at  worst  cramped  and  desiccated  intellects  incapable  of 
original  thought  and  swift  action".  14 
Even  Addiscombe,  however,  was  preferable  to  the  sketchy  education  received  by  direct-entry  cadets 
(who  accounted  for  two-thirds  of  all  new  officers),  particularly  after  the  closure  of  Baraset  college  near 
Calcutta  in  1811,  just  seven  years  since  it  had  been  established  to  provide  newly-anived  cadets  with 
basic  instruction  in  military  duties  and  Indian  languages.  Until  1851  -  when  the  Company  instituted 
exams  for  direct-entry  cadets  in  arithmetic,  English,  Latin,  French  or  Hindustani,  History,  geography, 
elementary  drawing  and  fortification  -  there  was  no  academic  requirement.  As  a  result,  most  direct- 
entry  cadets  had  "received  the  bare  minimum  of  education"  by  the  time  they  reached  India.  15 
Company  officers,  therefore,  were  characterized  by  poor  education  and  an  unseemly  desire  to 
abandon  regular  regimental  duty  for  more  lucrative  detached  appointments  (in  civil  posts  such  as 
assistant  commissioners,  for  example,  officers  continued  to  receive  regimental  pay  as  well  as  civil 
allowances).  This  was  a  particular  problem  in  Bengal  because  the  large  expansion  of  its  territory  in  the 
first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  meant  an  increasing  demand  for  civil  administrators,  political 
officers,  staff  officers,  surveyors,  engineers  and  commandants  of  local  and  irregular  corps.  The 
13  Bourne,  'Civil  and  Mlitary  Patronage',  Ph.  D  thesis,  pp.  2  10-11. 
14  Ibid.,  pp.  254,258-9,294. 
15  Ibid.,  p.  250. 100 
potential  consequences  of  too  many  officers  on  detached  employ  were  twofold:  first,  the  regiment  was 
left  underofficered  and  efficiency  suffered;  second,  the  most  talented  and  best-connected  officers  were 
taken,  leaving  their  less  fortunate  comrades  to  regard  regimental  duty  as  a  sign  of  failure  rather  than 
pride. 
Before  1796,  the  withdrawal  of  officers  for  detached  duties  did  not  affect  regimental  establishments 
because  they  were  simply  replaced  from  a  general  list  for  each  branch.  But  with  the  introduction  of 
regimental  lists  in  that  year,  whereby  an  officer  was  allotted  to  a  specific  regiment  and  promoted 
according  to  his  seniority  within  it,  any  future  withdrawals  were  absorbed  by  a  regiment's  fixed 
establishment.  At  first  the  number  of  absentees  was  relatively  small.  In  1805,  out  of  a  total  of  803 
officers,  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  had  132  (16.4%)  absent  on  civilian  and  staff  duties  and  a  further  49 
(6.1%)  on  furlough.  By  1825,  however,  the  number  of  absentees  had  risen  steadily  to  379  out  of  1,237 
(or  30.6  %),  with  93  (7.5%)  on  furlough.  16  And  these  figures  do  not  include  officers  on  sick  leave.  In 
1827,  with  Bengal  infantry  regiments  down  to  about  60  per  cent  of  their  fixed  establishment,  the  Indian 
government  ordered  that  no  more  than  five  officers  per  regiment  were  to  be  absent  on  staff 
employment.  17  But  this  restriction  was  not  strictly  adhered  to.  In  1830,  for  example,  less  than  half  the 
Bengal  Native  Infantry's  1,400  officers  were  present  with  their  regiments:  547  (39%)  were  absent  on 
detached  duty  and  185  (13.2%)  on  furlough.  18  Though  the  incidence  was  not  as  high  in  Bombay,  the 
outgoing  governor,  Sir  John  Malcolm,  was  sufficiently  alarmed  to  pen  a  minute  to  the  Court  of 
Directors  in  November  1830,  deploring  the  fact  that  many  "excellent"  officers  preferred  junior  staff 
appointments  to  the  command  of  a  regiment.  His  solution  was  to  insist  that  officers  had  passed  their 
native  language  certificate  and  had  served  a  minimum  period  with  their  regiments  before  they  could 
take  up  staff  appointments;  he  also  suggested  changing  brigade  and  line  staff  every  three  years.  19  In  a 
subsequent  book,  Malcolm  recommended  the  formation  of  a  "corps  of  officers  without  men,  from 
whom  vacancies  caused  by  appointments  to  the  staff  could  be  filled,  who  might  be  employed  on  the 
staff,  and  would  join  corps  with  whom  their  services  might  be  required...,  but  should  rise  in  unattached 
CorpSvi.  20  A  number  of  other  officers  suggested  the  institution  of  a  Staff  Corps,  in  one  form  or  another, 
16  Barat,  Yhe  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  Appx.  C.,  p.  3  08. 
17  G.  O.  V.  P.,  17  Aug  1827,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  LAffUI7/2/435,  OIOC. 
18Barat,  The  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  Appx.  C.,  p.  308. 
19  Minute  of  30  Nov  1830,  Malcolm,  Yhe  Government  ofIndia,  Appx.  A.,  p.  33. 
20  Sir  John  Malcolm,  Political  History  ofIndia,  R,  p.  234. 101 
in  the  years  prior  to  the  mutiny.  21  Even  Lord  Dalhousie  was  sympathetic.  22  But  the  scheme  was  always 
rejected  "on  account  of  its  enormous  CoStii.  23  Only  after  the  mutiny  did  it  come  into  being. 
The  first  of  Malcolm's  recommendations  was  partially  implemented  in  1837  when  the  Court  of 
Directors  ordered  that  all  officers  who  entered  the  service  after  that  date  would  need  to  have  passed  an 
examination  in  the  Hindustani  language  to  be  eligible  for  detached  dUty.  24  Four  years  earlier,  however, 
Bentinck  had  exempted  officers  on  the  personal  staff  of  senior  civilian  and  military  officials  from  the 
five  officers  absent  per  regiment  rule  . 
25  The  net  result  was  that  the  number  of  absentee  Bengal  Native 
Infantry  officers  dropped  to  344  in  1835,  before  rising  steadily  to  549  in  1852.26  Yet  the  percentage  of 
absenteeism  never  reached  the  1830  level  because  the  total  number  of  officers  continued  to  rise, 
particularly  after  the  addition  of  one  extra  captain  per  regiment  in  1845.27 
In  general,  the  number  of  absentee  officers  throughout  India  was  on  the  increase  prior  to  the  mutiny, 
with  the  greatest  burden  falling  on  the  Bengal  Army.  In  1852,  Philip  Melvill  told  a  Parliamentary 
select  committee  that  the  "number  of  officers  required  for  detached  employments"  had  risen  from  532 
in  1834-5  to  the  latest  figure  of  1,040.  With  regard  to  this  latter  figure,  the  Bengal  Army  was  supplying 
an  average  of  six  officers  per  regiment,  the  Bombay  Army  five,  and  the  Madras  Army  three  and  a  half. 
Each  regiment  had,  in  addition,  an  average  of  one  officer  absent  in  Britain  on  private  affairs  and  two- 
and-a-half  because  of  ill  health 
. 
28  The  Bengal  Army  was  proportionately  the  hardest  hit  because  most 
of  the  new  civil  appointments  were  in  the  recently-annexed  Punjab.  Bombay  was  next  because  it  had 
absorbed  Sind  and  was  geographically  closer  to  Bengal  where  the  vast  majority  of  extra-regimental 
appointments  were  available.  To  accommodate  the  rising  demand,  the  Indian  government  increased  the 
number  of  officers  eligible  for  detached  duty  to  six  per  regiment  in  1851  and  seven  -  "in  cases  of  great 
emergency"  -  in  1853  . 
29  But  so  great  had  become  the  need  for  staff  officers  in  Bombay  by  May  1854 
that  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Lord  Frederick  Fitzclarence,  informed  the  Governor,  Lord  Elphinstone, 
21  They  included  General  Sir  Charles  Napier,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton,  John  Jacob 
and  Henry  Lawrence. 
22  Shibly,  'The  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies',  Ph.  D  thesis,  p.  200 
23  Dissent  by  J.  P.  Willoughby,  4  July  1860,  quoted  in  Shibly,  ibid.,  p.  201. 
24  G.  O.  G.  G.,  9  Jan  1837,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  OIOC,  L/N4EL/17/2/435. 
25  G.  O.  G.  G.,  19  Oct  1833,  ibid. 
26  Barat,  The  BengaiNative  Infantry,  Appx.  C.,  p.  308. 
27  Ibid.  In  1835,  for  example,  the  established  officer  strength  of  the  74  Bengal  Native  Infantry 
regiments  was  1,702,  the  actual  strength  1,416,  the  number  of  absentees  344  (24.2%)  and  the  number 
on  furlough  154  (10.9%).  In  1852,  the  established  strength  was  1,776,  the  actual  strength  1,741,  the 
number  of  absentees  549  (31.5%)  and  the  number  on  furlough  172  (9.9%). 
28  Evidence  of  Philip  Melvill,  14  December  1852,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1852-3,  MMI,  pp.  9-10. 102 
that  he  did  not  know  how  he  could  supply  them.  There  were,  he  wrote,  only  five  regiments  who  were 
"not  up  to  their  number,  6,  and  in  these  none  I  fear  are  passed  in  surveying";  his  only  hope  was  to  make 
up  the  shortfall  "from  the  Queen's  troops".  30 
So  worried  was  Lord  Canning,  the  newly-arrived  Governor-General,  by  the  high  number  of  officer 
absentees  that,  in  April  1856,  he  asked  the  Board  of  Control  to  authorise  two  extra  subalterns  for  each 
31  native  regiment,  and  four  for  each  European  corps,  the  necessity  of  which  was  "patent  and  urgent". 
His  request  was  rejected  -  presumably  on  the  ground  of  expense  -  and  the  problem  simply  got  worse. 
By  1857,  the  total  number  of  Indian  officers  on  detached  employ  had  risen  to  1,237.32  In  April  of  that 
year,  to  reduce  the  pressure  on  the  Indian  Army  generally,  and  the  Bengal  Army  in  particular,  Canning 
opened  staff  appointments  to  British  Army  officers.  33  But  the  mutiny  broke  out  before  this  order  had 
time  to  take  effect.  At  this  point,  most  Bengal  Native  Infantry  regiments  had  fewer  than  12  of  their  24 
European  officers  present.  According  to  General  Grant,  the  first  twelve  regiments  of  Bengal  Native 
Infantry  had  a  total  of  133  officers,  or  eleven  and  a  half  per  regiment.  34  Even  more  alarming  was  the 
fact  that  they  had  just  10  field  officers  and  34  captains  out  of  the  established  totals  of  36  and  96 
respectively.  Grant  added:  "Deduct  commanding  officer,  adjutant  and  quartermaster,  and  all  ensigns 
under  two  years'  service,  and  there  remains  five  and  three  quarter  officers  per  regiment  for  company 
duty.  "  Ina  regiment  often  companies,  this  meant  just  over  one  qualified  officer  for  every  two 
companies.  The  official  returns  for  a  further  24  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  give  a  total  of  235 
officers,  orjust  under  ten  European  officers  per  regiment,  present  when  the  mutiny  began.  35  The  58th 
and  W  regiments  had  the  highest  number  of  officers  with  15;  the  16'h  regiment  the  lowest  with  six. 
Yet  there  does  not  seem  to  be  any  obvious  correlation  between  a  lack  of  officers  and  a  tendency  to 
mutiny.  The  60'h  N.  I.  mutinied  while  the  3  1"  N.  I.,  with  just  nine  officers  present  in  May  1857,  was  one 
of  the  few  to  remain  loyal.  On  the  other  hand,  the  55th  and  72ýd  regiments  had  nine  officers  and  both 
29  G.  O.  G.  G.,  10  Feb  1851  and  10  June  1853,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1848  to  1853,  OIOC, 
LJMIU17/2/437. 
30  Fitzclarence  to  Elphinstone,  16  May  1854,  Elphinstone  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F87A30x  7A/26. 
31  Canning  to  Vernon  Smith,  8  April  1857,  quoted  in  Maclagan,  `Clenlenq.  ýV,  Canning,  p.  62. 
32  Colonel  Holland's  memorandum,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  7,  p.  371. 
33  G.  O.  G.  G.,  9  April  1857,  Sandhurst  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/D174,  p.  238. 
34  Memorandum  by  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  Patrick  Grant  to  the  Governor-General,  29  June  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C., 
1859,  V,  Appx.  66,  p.  497. 
35  'A  Return  of  the  Name  or  Number  of  each  Regiment  and  Regular  and  Irregular  Corps  in  India  which 
has  mutinied,  or  manifested  a  disposition  to  mutiny,  since  the  I"  day  of  January  1857',  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859, 
XVIII,  pp.  1-64.  The  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  referred  to  were  the  15d' 
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mutinied,  but  so  did  the  360'and  37'ý  regiments  with  thirteen  and  fourteen  respectively.  The  10h  and 
58  th  regiments  were  both  disarmed. 
The  Bombay  Native  Infantry  had  a  similar  number  of  absentees.  According  to  a  return  of  July  1858, 
only  362  -  or  half  -  the  established  strength  of  725  officers  were  available  for  regimental  duty:  218  were 
absent  on  staff  employ,  78  ensign  vacancies  were  waiting  to  be  filled,  and  67  were  on  furlough,  36 
The  consequence  of  such  high  levels  of  absenteeism  was  much  debated  before  and  after  the  mutiny. 
Generally,  however,  it  was  felt  to  have  had  a  detrimental  effect  on  regimental  morale  and  discipline, 
particularly  in  the  Bengal  Army.  Referring  to  the  period  before  the  mutiny,  Sitaram  Pandy  recalled  that 
"any  clever  officer  was  always  taken  away  from  his  regiment  for  some  appointment"  and  that  when  he 
returned  many  years  later  "he  knew  very  little  about  the  men".  37  One  of  the  reasons  that  Sir  Charles 
Napier  gave  for  first  tendering  his  resignation  in  April  1850  was  "that  the  officers  of  the  Indian  Army 
looked  at  their  regiments  merely  as  stepping  stones  to  lucrative  civil  appointments"  which  were  not 
dependent  upon  "professional  character".  He  added:  "No  fewer  than  443  officers  in  the  Bengal  Army 
had  thus  been  withdrawn  from  their  regiments  and  placed  in  lucrative  employments  by  the  civil 
authorities,  without  any  distinct  recommendation  through  the  military  authorities...  Thusthe 
mainspring  of  the  Army  was  relaxed.  The  officers  saw  that  the  posts  of  emoluments  were  not  granted 
for  military  duties,  and  military  duty  became  a  painful  task.  "  This  in  turn  made  it  "impossible  for  the 
Commander-in-Chief  to  maintain  the  requisite  degree  of  military  spirit,  discipline,  and  efficiency,  in  the 
Army  of 
. 
38 
Napier  expanded  on  this  theme  after  his  return  to  England.  The  absence  of  senior  officers  meant  that 
subalterns  were  "constantly  in  command  of  regiments  without  being,  as  in  the  Irregular  Corps,  selected 
for  command".  Their  inexperience  caused  the  sepoys  to  lose  their  respect  for  their  British  officers  and 
"the  regiment  goes  to  pieces".  Instead  it  was  necessary  to  keep  field  officers  and  captains  with  their 
regiments.  "Dull  Generals,  Colonels  and  Majors  there  are,  "  wrote  Napier,  "yet  white  hairs  meet  with 
respect,  and  veteran  commanders  know  at  least  the  routine  of  service.  "  He  also  believed  that  each 
company  need  a  captain:  "Experienced  Captains  are  the  pillars  of  discipline,  but  scarce  in  Native 
regiments,  the  best  being  taken  for  staff,  or  civil  employments,  which  generally  turns  a  good  Captain  in 
to  a  bad  "political".  His  solution,  like  Malcolm  before  him,  was  to  recommend  "a  Staff  Corps  of 
36  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  69,  p.  522. 
37  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  77. 
3'  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  pp.  195,198. 104 
officers,  having  no  more  pay  than  in  the  line,  and  no  extra  advantage  than  allowance  for  horses, 
39 
according  to  rank"  . 
Napier's  fears  were  confirmed  by  Montagu  Hall,  who  in  1852  did  duty  as  an  ensign  with  the  16  th  N.  I., 
a  regiment  with  a  "very  distinguished  record  of  war  service".  Hall  remembered:  "I  was  awfully 
disappointed  with  what  I  saw  of  native  Regiments;  the  whole  thing  seemed  to  be  a  sham  and  a 
delusion...  The  16th  had  a  nicely  appointed  Mess,  but  the  senior  officers  were  all  either  absent  on  Staff 
employ,  leave,  or  married.  We  went  most  mornings  to  be  drilled  under  the  European  Sergeant-Major, 
but  parades  of  the  regiment,  there  seemed  none.  The  Adjutant  did  all  the  work  and  the  chief  idea  of  the 
officers  seemed  to  be  how  to  get  away  from  regimental  duty.  o00 
John  Jacob  expanded  on  this  theme  in  an  essay  written  in  1854.  "The  'REFUSE'  only  remain,  "  he 
wrote.  "All  proper  feeling  is  thus  totally  destroyed  between  the  native  soldier  and  his  European 
superior.  "  This  was  not  because  there  were  too  few  officers,  but  rather  because  too  many  of  those  left 
were  mediocre  and  uninterested  in  their  duty  or  their  men.  Jacob  believed  that  "one  active,  energetic, 
right-feeling,  and  right-thinking  English  gentleman  can,  even  when  alone,  infuse  an  excellent  spirit  into 
thousands  of  these  Eastern  soldiers".  His  solution,  therefore,  was  to  appoint  only  three  European 
officers,  "carefully  selected  and  entrusted  with  full  powers",  to  each  native  regiment,  drawn  either  from 
the  strength  of  the  Indian  Army's  European  regiments  or  from  a  single  unattached  list  (similar  to 
Malcolm's  Staff  Corps).  41  In  an  essay  published  in  the  Calcutta  Review  in  1856,  Sir  Henry  Lawrence 
also  suggested  a  Staff  Corps,  but  only  to  provide  officers  for  staff  appointments;  he  believed  that 
regular  regiments  needed  more,  not  fewer  officers,  and  that  native  officers  would  have  to  be  abolished 
to  make  way  for  them.  42 
By  the  outbreak  of  mutiny,  however,  nothing  had  changed.  "It  ought  not  to  be  the  aim  of  every 
officer,  or  of  most  of  them,  to  leave  the  Army  for  a  Civil  appointment,  but  so  it  is,  "  wrote  Lieutenant 
Chamier,  interpreter  to  the  recently-disbanded  34th  Bengal  N.  I.,  in  early  June  1857.  "One  can  rarely 
rely  on  a  fortune  by  serving  with  a  corps.  v03  Yhe  United  Service  Gazette,  in  an  article  a  week  later, 
went  so  far  as  to  identify  absenteeism  by  officers  as  a  key  cause  of  mutiny.  The  best  way  to  restore 
discipline,  it  argued,  was  "by  compelling  the  Officers  to  make  their  regiments  more  distinctly  their 
39  Ibid.,  p.  247-8. 
40  Hall  Papers,  NAM,  '1857'(54)/11919,  p.  4. 
41  Pelly  (ed.  ),  Views  and  Opinions,  pp.  124,126,130-2. 
42  Lawrence,  Fssays,  Military  and  Political,  p.  3  98-9. 
43  Chamier  to  his  father,  5  June  1857,  Chamier  Letters,  NAM,  7510-3  1. 105 
homes  by  associating  with  the  men,  entering  into  their  feelings,  respecting  their  prejudices,  sharing  in 
their  games,  and  keeping  them  to  their  duty".  This  could  only  be  achieved  by  "limiting  the  number  of 
Staff  absentees  in  each  Corps,  and  placing  the  qualifications  for  the  Staff  so  high,  that  very  few  Officers 
44 
will  go  out  of  their  way  to  seek  such  preferment"  . 
General  Grant  was  also  convinced  that  the  absence  of  officers  in  the  Bengal  Army  was  central  to  the 
outbreak  of  mutiny.  In  a  memorandum  to  Lord  Canning,  during  his  brief  stint  as  Commander-in-Chief 
in  Bengal  after  the  death  of  General  Anson  in  May  1857,  Grant  identified  a  "want  of  officers  in  whom 
the  sepoy  could  confide"  as  one  of  the  four  factors  that  had  given  rise  to  a  feeling  of  "dissatisfaction  and 
distrust"  among  the  Bengal  sepoys  long  before  their  religious  fears  were  played  upon  by  conspirators. 
This,  in  turn,  was  caused  by  the  fact  that  so  few  officers  were  present  with  their  regiments.  "Further, 
these  officers  are  discontented,  "  wrote  Grant,  "only  looking  forward  to  leaving  their  regiments  for  some 
more  pleasant  employment,  so  that  they  perform,  and  unwillingly,  the  bare  outline  of  their  duty;  and 
never,  as  a  general  rule,  mix  or  converse  with  their  men;  but,  on  the  contrary,  too  often  refuse  to  listen 
to  their  complaints,  at  the  best  telling  them  to  go  to  the  adjutant,  and  not  unfrequently,  "Go  to  hell  - 
45 
don't  bother  me". 
Similar  sentiments  were  expressed  by  many  of  the  officers  who  gave  written  or  oral  evidence  to  the 
Peel  Commission.  46  They  did  not,  on  the  other  hand,  necesssarily  believe  that  a  regiment  would  be  less 
efficient  if  it  had  a  high  number  of  officers  absent.  Major-General  Birch,  the  former  Secretary  to  the 
Government  of  India  in  the  Military  Department,  repeated  Jacob's  argument  "that  a  regiment  well 
commanded  will  be  quite  as  efficient  with  but  a  few  officers  as  a  regiment  indifferently  commanded 
with  a  larger  number  of  officers,  and  even  more  so".  Yet  he  also  believed  that  European  officers 
needed  to  fulfil  their  duties  more  "punctually  and  exactly"  as  an  "example  to  their  men",  and  that  they 
needed  to  "go  more  often  into  the  lines  and  among  the  men  than  is  generally  done".  47  As  to  whether  a 
regiment  with  a  small  number  of  officers  had  been  more  susceptible  to  mutiny,  most  witnesses  did  not 
believe  that  to  be  the  case.  48  If  the  influence  of  a  European  officer  had  kept  any  regiment  from 
44  7he  UnitedService  Gazelle,  13  June  1857. 
43  Memorandum  by  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  Patrick  Grant  to  the  Governor-General,  29  June  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859, 
V,  Appx.  66,  p.  496. 
46  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  pp.  25,72,486-7.  They  included  Lt.  Col.  Becher,  Maj.  -Gen.  Sir  Scudamore 
Steel,  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  Patrick  Grant. 
47  Ibid.,  Appx.  61,  p.  441. 
48  Ibid.,  pp.  133,215,441-2,562,571-3.  Among  the  witnesses  holding  this  opinion  were  Lord 
Canning,  Lord  Clyde,  the  Punjab  committee,  Major-General  Birch,  the  Oude  committee,  Sir  Sydney 106 
mutinying,  noted  Birch,  it  was  that  exercised  by  the  "commanding  officer,  or  the  adjutant,  or  some 
highly  respected  and  efficient  officers  in  the  corps".  49  In  other  words,  quality  was  more  important  than 
quantity.  This  argument  was  underlined  by  Lord  Tweeddale,  a  member  of  the  Peel  Commission,  who 
noted: 
The  discipline  of  a  native  regiment  does  not  depend  so  much  on  the  number  of  European  officers  present  with  the 
regiment,  as  it  does  on  the  commanding  officer  and  adjutant,  and  one  officer  to  each  company,  being  thoroughly 
masters  of  their  business  and  able  to  instruct  others.  Example  and  regularity  in  carrying  on  duty  commands  the 
respect  of  a  native  soldier  more  than  any  other  cause.  50 
That  the  problem  of  officer  absenteeism  affected  all  three  presidency  armies  is  proven  by  the  written 
answers  provided  by  the  Commanders-in-Chief  of  Madras  and  Bombay.  In  a  memorandum  dated  July 
1858,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Patrict  Grant  noted  that  the  efficiency  of  Madras  regiments  was  "most 
injuriously  affected  by  the  number  of  officers  taken  from  corps  for  staff  employment".  He  added: 
"Either  regiments  are  drained  of  their  best  and  most  deserving  officers,  or  patronage  is  not  dispensed 
with  justice  to  individuals,  and  solely  with  reference  to  superior  merit.  "  He  also  quoted  from  a  minute 
he  had  sent  to  the  Supreme  Government  and  to  the  home  authorities  on  21  May  1857,  warning  that  the 
principal  causes  of  complaint  in  the  Madras  Army  were  "the  unceasing  demands  upon  the  energies  of 
the  men,  their  poverty,  and,  more  than  all,  the  great  paucity  of  European  officers  of  standing  and 
experience  present  with  regiments".  Officers  "must  be  taught  to  look  upon  their  regiments  as  their 
home",  he  advised,  "and  not  to  fix  their  whole  thoughts,  as  they  now  do,  on  devising  means  of  getting 
away  to  staff  or  other  detached  employment".  The  consequences  of  this  "craving"  were  "utter 
indifference,  not  to  say  positive  dislike,  towards  their  men,  and  the  engendering  of  a  restless, 
discontented  disposition,  which  is,  I  doubt  not,  communicated  to  the  soldier".  51 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  Henry  Somerset,  also  writing  in  July  1858,  bemoaned  the  fact  that  a  cadet's 
first  priority  was  to  find  a  good  staff  appointment.  "The  young  man  joins  his  regiment,  "  wrote 
Somerset,  "learns  a  little  of  his  drill,  but  very  shortly  finds  himself  selected  for  military  or  political 
employ  on  the  staff,  and  this  without  any  reference  to  his  qualifications,  and  invariably  without  any 
Cotton,  Sir  John  Hearsey,  Sir  George  Clerk,  Brigadiers  Farguharson,  Steel,  Coke,  Troup,  Colonel 
Wintle  and  Major  Williams. 
49  Ibid.,  Appx.  71,  p.  562. 
50  Ibid.,  Appx.  74,  p.  583. 107 
reference  to  his  commanding  officer.  "  This  trend  was  exacerbated  by  the  fact  that  the  rule  stating  that 
no  more  than  a  certain  number  of  officers  could  be  taken  from  each  regiment  was  "frequently  broken 
through",  leaving  regiments  "almost  entirely  without  officers".  He  had  known  of  officers  who,  after 
absences  of  up  to  18  years,  had  returned  to  command  their  regiments.  "How  can  such  a  man  know 
anything  of  his  duty?  "  asked  Somerset.  "And  how  can  any  discipline  be  carried  on  in  any  army  where 
such  a  system  exists?  "  52 
The  consequences  of  absenteeism  for  the  Bengal  Army  were  neatly  summed-up  by  George  Chesney 
in  his  perceptive  study  of  pre-mutiny  British  India.  The  "paucity  of  officers",  wrote  Chesney,  "was  the 
smallest  part  of  the  evil,  for  a  dozen  officers  under  a  good  system  should  have  been  an  ample 
complement  for  a  native  battalion".  Instead  the  "mischief  lay  in  the  unhealthy  feeling  of  dissatisfaction 
with  which  regimental  duty  came  to  be  regarded,  as  the  last  course,  only  to  be  undergone  by  the 
minority  who  could  get  nothing  better".  As  this  "degeneracy  of  feeling"  was  bound  to  be  "reflected  by 
the  men",  wrote  Chesney,  the  absence  of  officers,  "from  the  manner  in  which  it  came  about,  "was 
unquestionably  one  of  the  many  causes  which  led  up  to  the  great  mutiny".  53 
Though  officer  absenteeism  was  clearly  a  problem  for  all  three  presidency  armies,  it  would  only 
prove  fatal  for  the  Bengal  Army  when  it  was  combined  with  other  factors  unique  to  that  army  which 
were  also  working  to  undermine  the  relationship  between  the  officers  and  the  sepoys.  The  most 
important  of  these  factors  was  the  diminishing  power  of  the  Bengal  commanding  officer  to  reward  and 
punish.  But  there  were  others. 
When  Sitaram  Pandy  joined  the  2/26h  Bengal  N.  I.  in  1814,  the  relationship  between  sepoys  and  officers 
was  very  close.  "The  sahibs  often  used  to  give  nautches  [erotic  entertainment  by  professional  dancers] 
for  the  regiment,  "  he  recalled  many  years  later,  "and  they  attended  all  the  men's  games.  They  also  took 
us  with  them  when  they  went  out  hunting,  or  at  least  those  of  us  who  wanted  to  go.  Nowadays  they 
seldom  attend  nautches  because  their  Padre  sahibs  have  told  them  it  is  wrong.  "  Sitaram  also 
remembered  his  company  commander  -  whose  nickname  was  the'Wrestler'  because  he  used  tojoin  the 
men  in  their  wrestling  arena  -  entertaining  a  constant  stream  of  men  at  his  house.  Some  went  to  further 
51  Ibid.,  Appx.  65,  p.  486-7. 
52  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  Henry  Somerset's  replies,  24  July  1858,  ibid.,  Appx.  69,  p.  521. 
53  Chesney,  Indian  Polity,  p.  288-9. 108 
their  chances  of  promotion,  but  most  "because  we  liked  the  sahib  who  always  treated  us  as  if  we  were 
his  children".  Part  of  the  reason  for  this  closeness,  said  Sitaram,  was  because  most  of  the  officers  "had 
Indian  women  living  with  them",  which  naturally  facilitated  their  grasp  of  Hindustani  and  the  ease  with 
which  they  could  communicate  with  their  men.  The  practice  began  to  die  out  in  the  1820s  and  30s  as 
more  and  more  wives  and  female  relatives  of  civil  and  military  officers  came  to  live  in  India  and  it 
became  socially  unacceptable  to  keep  a  native  mistress  (or  bibi)  or  many  a  Eurasian.  This,  in  turn, 
meant  that  Europeans  began  to  keep  their  own  society  and  contact  between  officers  and  men  was 
reduced  to  a  minimum.  "I  have  lived  to  see  great  changes  in  the  sahibs'  attitude  towards  us,  "  recalled 
Sitaram.  "I  know  that  many  officers  nowadays  only  speak  to  their  men  when  obliged  to  do  so,  and  they 
show  that  the  business  is  irksome  and  try  to  get  rid  of  the  sepoys  as  quickly  as  possible.  One  sahib  told 
us  that  he  never  knew  what  to  say  to  us.  The  sahibs  always  knew  what  to  say,  and  how  to  say  it,  when  I 
was  a  young  soldier..  - 
04  It  is  surely  no  coincidence  that  the  commanding  officers  of  the  only  two 
traditionally-recruited  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  to  remain  loyal  and  keep  their  weapons  in 
1857  both  had  native  family  ties:  Major  Henry  Milne  of  the  21'  regiment  had  married  the  Eurasian 
grand-daughter  of  Colonel  James  Skinner;  Major  William  Hampton  of  the  3  1"  regiment  had  two 
55 
daughters  by  a  native  mistress. 
But  even  in  the  early  years  of  Sitaram's  service  the  relationship  between  European  officers  and  native 
troops  (particularly  native  officers)  was  not  always  harmonious.  In  December  1826,  for  example,  Lord 
Combermere,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Bengal  Army,  felt  it  necessary  to  issue  a  circular  urging 
junior  officers  to  be  more  respectful  to  native  officers.  To  ensure  cordial  relations,  subalterns  were 
instructed  never  to  leave  native  officers  standing  when  they  were  waiting  to  report;  instead  they  were  to 
be  invited  to  sit.  Furthermore,  it  was  the  responsibility  of  ensigns  and  comets  to  learn  the  various 
modes  of  address  in  Hindustani  to  avoid  giving  offence  to  native  gentlemen.  Finally,  Combermere 
wished  it  to  be  understood  that  he  considered  "a  conciliatory  disposition  and  manner  towards  the  Native 
Soldiers,  and  a  due  courtesy  towards  the  Native  Officers"  as  essential  qualifications  for  those  officers 
aspiring  to  the  command  of  a  troop  or  company.  56 
But  this  was  not  always  the  case.  In  1841,  William  Sleeman  noted  that  the  "good  tone  of  feeling 
between  the  European  officers  and  their  men"  had  become  "somewhat  impaired"  when  regiments  were 
54  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  pp.  24-5. 
55  Service  Records  of  the  officers  of  the  East  India  Company  Army,  Hodson  Index,  NAM. 109 
concentrated  at  large  stations.  "In  such  places,  "  he  wrote,  "  the  European  society  is  commonly  large 
and  gay;  and  the  officers  of  our  native  regiments  become  too  much  occupied  in  its  pleasures  and 
ceremonies  to  attend  to  their  native  officers  or  sepoys...  The  consequence  is  that  they  often  become 
entirely  alienated  from  their  men,  and  betray  signs  of  the  greatest  impatience  while  they  listen  to  the 
necessary  reports  of  their  native  officers,  as  they  come  on  or  go  off  duty.  1157 
In  an  attempt  to  halt  this  trend,  the  Indian  government  issued  a  general  order  in  1844  to  the  effect  that 
no  subaltern  would  be  allowed  to  take  command  of  a  troop  or  company  until  he  had  passed  a  colloquial 
examination  in  the  Hindustani  language  which  would  prove  his  competence  to  converse  with  the  men 
under  his  command.  58  For  officers  who  had  joined  since  183  7,  the  appointments  of  adjutant  and 
regimental  interpreter  were  already  dependent  upon  the  possession  of  the  basic  qualification  in  written 
59 
and  spoken  Hindustani  (which  itself  was  worth  500  rupees).  Yet,  according  to  a  letter  to  the  editor  of 
the  United  Service  Magazine  from  a  Madras  officer  in  1853,  the  number  of  Indian  Army  officers  who 
were  qualified  as  interpreters  in  two  languages  -  Hindustani  and  Persian  -  was  becoming  "small  by 
degrees  and  beautifully  less".  The  correspondent  put  this  down  to  the  fact  that  young  officers  had 
begun  to  realize  that,  as  far  as  their  career  prospects  were  concerned,  patronage  was  far  more  important 
than  a  knowledge  of  native  languages:  "The  cadet  comes  out,  studies  hard,  and  then  finds  that  without 
interest  all  his  efforts  and  money  have  been  thrown  away.  His  brother  cadets  seeing  this,  are  warned  in 
time,  and  consequently  resolve  to  pitch  Hindustani  books  and  moonshees  [native  language  teachers]  to 
the  devil.  n60 
The  consequences  were  inevitably  harmful  to  officer/soldier  relations.  During  his  time  as 
Commander-in-Chief,  Sir  Charles  Napier  knew  of  a  number  of  cases  in  which  sepoys  had  been  court- 
martialled  for  insolence  when  they  were  simply  trying  to  make  their  officer  understand  what  they  were 
saying;  the  other  side  of  the  coin  was  that  an  officer's  language  deficiencies  enabled  some  of  his  men  to 
be  deliberately  insolent.  Part  of  the  problem,  according  to  Napier,  was  that  officers  were  "now  more 
numerous  than  formerly,  and  associate  apart".  He  added:  "All  old  officers  of  name  in  the  Company's 
service  ...  have  complained  that  the  younger  race  of  Europeans  keep  aloof  from  Native  officers;  showing 
56  Circular  No.  23  99  of  29  December  1826,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  OIOC, 
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57  Sleeman,  Rambles  andRecollections,  pp.  63  8-9. 
58  G.  O.  G.  G,,  I"  March  1844,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1840  to  1847,  OIOC,  L/MEL/17/2/436. 
59  Bengal  Army  Regulations  1855,  OIOC,  L/MIL/17/2/442,  p.  237. 
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thereby  want  of  foresight,  and  casting  away,  as  of  no  value,  the  strong  attachment  these  natives  are  so 
susceptible  of  forming  for  them.  How  different  this  from  the  spirit  which  actuated  the  old  men  of 
Indian  renown...  j116l 
One  of  these  "old  officers"  was  Brigadier  J.  S.  Hodgson  who  wrote,  in  1850,  that  "the  reserved  and 
exclusive  habits"  of  European  officers  were  gaining  ground,  and  that  most  of  them  "took  but  little 
interest  in  their  men,  who,  on  their  part,  ceased  to  feel  either  love  or  reverence  for  superiors  who  were 
virtually  strangers  to  them  and  powerless,  besides,  to  reward  or  punish".  62  This  lack  of  sympathy 
between  officers  and  men  appeared  to  Hodgson  as  "fraught  with  impending  peril".  Lord  Dalhousie 
agreed.  A  few  months  after  arriving  in  India  in  1848,  he  informed  a  close  friend  in  Scotland  that  if 
there  was  a  danger  to  the  loyalty  of  the  Indian  Army  it  was  "in  the  growing  distance  between  European 
officers  and  the  native  soldiers"  and  in  "the  diminished  interest  those  officers  are  now  said  to  take  in  the 
native  troops  under  their  orders".  In  particular,  Dalhousie  regretted  the  low  status  accorded  to  native 
officers  who,  except  on  parade,  were  no  more  important  than  sepoys.  They  were  "never  received  by 
European  officers,  never  consorted  with"  and  when  they  went  to  make  a  report  they  were,  despite 
Combermere's  order  to  the  contrary,  "probably  left  to  stand  in  the  lobby".  How  could  such  a  man  "have 
respect  in  his  own  eyes"?  asked  Dalhousie.  How  could  he  have  "authority  in  the  eyes  of  his  men"  ?  63 
In  an  1851  article  entitled  'The  Defects  of  the  Bengal  Army',  John  Jacob  identified  the  "entire  absence 
of  a  proper  confidence  between  the  officers  and  the  native  soldiers"  as  one  of  the  most  serious  faults 
particular  to  that  army.  Recent  proof  of  this,  he  added,  was  the  tendency  of  men  to  desert  their  officers 
in  the  field  and  the  fact  that  no  officers  had  received  any  forewarning  of  the  recent  spate  of  mutinies.  64 
Jacob's  first  point  probably  refers  to  the  infamous  behaviour  of  three  regiments  of  Bengal  native  cavalry 
at  Chilianwalla  during  the  2nd  Punjab  War  in  1849:  two  retreated  without  orders  (though  the  stampede 
was  said  to  have  been  precipitated  by  a  British  regiment)65  and  a  third  -  the  5dBengat  L.  C.  -  refused  to 
advance.  66  There  were  similar  episodes  during  the  I"  Sikh  War,  such  as  the  abandonment  of  their 
officers  by  the  men  of  the  260'Bengal  N.  I.  at  the  Battle  of  Ferozshah  in  December  1845.  "It  was  a 
fearful  crisis,  "  wrote  William  Hodson,  a  recently-arrived  ensign,  "but  the  bravery  of  the  English 
61  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitaty,  pp.  23  940,248,250. 
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Dalhousie  (London,  19  10),  p.  3  1. 
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regiments  saved  us.  The  Colonel,  the  greater  part  of  my  brother  officers,  and  myself,  were  left  with  the 
colours  and  about  thirty  men  immediately  in  front  of  the  batteries  1  ""  So  mistrustful  of  native  troops 
did  Hodson  become  after  this  experience  that  he  requested,  and  was  granted,  a  transfer  to  the  I"  Bengal 
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European  Fusiliers,  "the  finest  regiment  in  India,  with  white  faces  too". 
The  deterioration  of  the  officer/soldier  relationship  was  emphasized  by  Colonel  (later  General  Sir) 
Patrick  Grant,  the  former  Adjutant-General  of  the  Bengal  Army,  who  told  a  parliamentary  select 
committee  in  1853  that  the  "confidence  and  attachment"  between  European  officers  and  native  troops 
was  less  than  it  had  been  when  he  had  entered  the  service  because  officers  were  more  self-important 
and  treated  their  men  with  more  contempt  than  had  formerly  been  the  case.  69  This  attitude  was 
illustrated  by  the  anonymous  British  author  of  Yhe  Rebellion  in  India,  who  wrote:  "The  officers  and 
men  have  not  been  friends  but  strangers  to  one  another.  The  sepoy  is  esteemed  an  inferior  creature.  He 
is  sworn  at.  He  is  treated  roughly.  He  is  spoken  of  as  a'nigger'.  He  is  addressed  as  a'suar'or  pig,  an 
epithet  most  opprobrious  to  a  respectable  native,  especially  the  Mussalman...  The  old  men  are  less 
guilty  as  they  sober  down.  But  the  younger  men  seem  to  regard  it  as  an  excellent  joke...  "70 
Like  officer  absenteeism,  it  was  not  a  problem  that  was  confined  to  Bengal.  According  to  Captain 
Hervey,  who  published  his  memoirs  in  1850,  many  young  Madras  officers  arrived  in  India  with  scant 
respect  for  the  natives,  referring  to  their  men  as  "those  horrible  black  nigger  sepoys"  and  cursing  them 
on  parade.  But  Hervey  also  gave  many  examples  of  the  close  bond  that  existed  between  the  officers 
and  men  of  his  second  regiment,  the  40th  Madras  N.  I.:  of  cricket  matches,  hunting  expeditions  and 
picnics  enjoyed  by  both,  and  of  one  incident  where  a  sepoy  saved  his  adjutant's  life  by  tackling  a 
cheetah  armed  only  with  a  knife.  71  Part  of  the  reason  for  the  closeness  of  this  bond  may  have  been  the 
fact  that,  according  to  Colonel  Felix,  English  was  much  more  commonly  spoken  in  Madras  than  in 
other  parts  of  India,  making  communication  between  officers  and  men  easier.  72 
In  Bombay,  too,  the  pre-mutiny  relationship  between  officers  and  men  was  not  always  harmonious. 
In  a  letter  to  Lord  Elphinstone  of  22  January  1854,  Lord  Frederick  Fitzclarence  contrasted  the 
"ignorance"  with  which  his  officers  went  about  their  duty  with  the  "intelligence  &  knowledge  of  the 
66  Lanibrick,  John  Jacob  ofJacobabad,  p.  18  1. 
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sepoy,  added  to  the  enviable  correctness  of  the  native  officer",  and  concluded  that  such  a  state  of  affairs 
was  "dangerous  to  the  Empire".  His  solution  was  to  extend  the  examination  already  instituted  by  him 
for  extra-regimental  military  appointments  -  which  tested  ensigns  on  the  duty  of  a  captain,  and 
lieutenants  and  captains  on  the  duty  of  a  major  -  to  civil  appointments  as  well.  "These  examinations,  " 
wrote  Fitzclarence,  "added  to  those  I  have  ordered  for  passing  an  officer  to  be  an  adjutant,  to  have  the 
payment  of  a  company,  to  the  Brigadier's  examination  of  all  the  officers  at  his  yearly  review,  & 
occasionally  during  the  year  of  all  young  &  nearly  joined  officers,  will  place  the  army  in  the  state  it 
should  be  in.  ".  73  The  Bombay  government's  compliance  with  this  scheme,  not  to  mention 
Fitzclarence's  other  reforms,  undoubtedly  improved  the  efficiency  and  knowledge  of  its  European 
officers  and,  by  extension,  their  relationship  with  their  men.  The  unfortunate  consequences  of  officer 
absenteeism  that  was  such  a  feature  of  the  Bengal  Army  -  neglect  of  duty  and  worsening  relations  with 
the  native  troops  -  were  thereby  counteracted.  Many  of  the  Bombay  officers  who  gave  evidence  to  the 
Peel  Commission  were  certainly  keen  to  emphasize  the  depth  of  mutual  respect  that  existed  between 
them  and  their  men.  Colonel  Poole  of  the  Bombay  Lancers,  for  example,  recalled  how  he  would  leave 
for  evening  parade  half  an  hour  early  if  one  of  his  native  officers  was  ill,  to  give  him  time  to  sit  and  talk 
with  the  convalescent.  74 
Relations  between  Bengal  officers  and  their  men,  on  the  other  hand,  continued  to  deteriorate  in  the 
years  leading  up  to  the  mutiny.  In  1856,  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  recommended  the  abolition  of  native 
officers  because  it  would  give  European  officers  the  opportunity  to  look  into  "the  interior  economy"  of 
their  regiments  or  companies.  "Seldom  is  anything  of  the  kind  done  at  present,  "  wrote  Lawrence.  "So 
long  as  all  is  smooth  and  quiet  on  the  surface,  few  inquiries  are  made.  All  may  be  rotten  below;  the 
jog-trot  is  followed  -a  mine  may  be  ready  to  be  sprung,  for  all  that  nine-tenths  of  the  officers  would 
know.  Many  do  not  know  the  very  names  of  the  men  of  their  own  company.  "  75  Referring  to  the 
incident  at  Barrackpore  in  March  1857  when  most  of  the  34ýh  Bengal  N.  I.  stood  idly  by  as  one  of  their 
number  attempted  to  murder  the  adjutant,  Yhe  Hindoo  Patriot  could  only  conclude  that  "the  system  of 
officering  the  native  army"  had  resulted  in  "the  annihilation  ofall  moral  influence  ofofficers  over  their 
men".  It  added:  "That  the  Sepoy  should  see  his  officer  set  upon  by  an  assassin  and  that  the  officer 
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should  cry  for  help,  and  in  vain  ... 
is  an  occurrence  which  can  be  accounted  for  only  on  the  hypothesis 
that  the  European  Commissioned  officers  of  the  Bengal  army  have  utterly  lost  their  prestige.  o  76 
Sir  George  Clerk,  a  former  Commissioner  to  the  Punjab  and  Governor  of  Bombay,  summed  up  many 
of  the  reasons  for  this  loss  of  "moral  influence"  in  his  evidence  to  the  Peel  Commission.  Asked 
whether  there  had  been  a  "more  intimate  association"  between  European  officers  and  native  troops 
twenty  or  thirty  years  earlier,  he  replied: 
Yes.  That  association  was  not  a  preference.  Formerly  the  officer  had  fewer  comrades,  the  civilian  no  associate. 
Their  duties  were  more  pressing  and  uninterrupted.  They  therefore  found  more  objects  of  interest  in  attending  to 
those  duties.  They  had  not  everywhere  large  stations,  with  a  variety  of  permanent  English  society,  with  its 
amusements  and  connexions  of  every  sort.  There  were  not  reinforcements  of  European  troops  close  at  hand...  The 
necessity  of  knowing  the  native  soldiers  and  the  people  was  imposed  on  them  in  order  to  continue  our  dominion.  77 
Two  other  factors  contributed  to  the  worsening  relations  between  officers  and  men:  the  generally  poor 
quality  of  commanding  officers  in  the  Indian  Army,  and  the  fact  that  a  great  number  of  them  were 
relatively  unfamiliar  to  their  troops  in  1857.  Both  factors  were  the  result  of  the  same  system  of 
promotion  by  seniority  that  applied  to  their  sepoys.  On  arrival  in  India,  newly  appointed  officers 
hurried  to  join  their  regiments  because  their  pay  and  seniority  did  not  begin  until  they  had.  Thereafter 
their  promotion  was  strictly  on  the  basis  of  regimental  seniority.  Officers  were  promoted  from  senior 
ensign  to  lieutenant,  and  from  senior  lieutenant  to  captain  when  a  vacancy  arose  within  the  regiment 
(though  all  lieutenants  who  had  failed  to  reach  the  higher  rank  after  15  years'  service  were  awarded  a 
brevet  captaincy  without  additional  pay).  The  senior  captain  also  had  to  wait  for  a  vacancy  before  he 
could  be  promoted  to  the  single  majority,  and  so  some  officers  never  attained  the  latter  rank.  Only 
when  regimental  officers  died,  became  invalids  or  agreed  to  retire  in  return  for  a  lump  sum  or 
'subscription'  from  their  juniors  -  an  infantry  major,  for  example,  would  receive  Rs.  30,000,  Rs.  12,000 
of  which  would  be  subscribed  by  the  senior  captain  and  only  Rs.  ISO  by  the  junior  ensign  -  was  this 
78 
extremely  slow  system  accelerated. 
On  promotion  to  lieutenant-colonel  the  officer  was  removed  from  his  regimental  list  to  a  branch  list 
for  the  whole  army.  Once  on  that  general  list,  he  would  only  be  appointed  to  command  his  own 
76  The  Hindoo,  Patriot,  7  May  1857 
77  Evidence  of  Sir  George  Clerk,  24  August  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  43. 114 
regiment  if  the  major  was  either  absent  (most  took  their  home  furlough  of  three  years  after  reaching  that 
rank)  or  the  most  junior  in  the  branch.  Otherwise  he  would  take  command  of  the  regiment  with  the 
most  junior  commander;  which  is  why  so  many  regiments  were  commanded  by  men  who  had  spent  the 
majority  of  their  service  elsewhere.  79  In  May  1857,  twenty-six  of  the  74  regiments  of  Bengal  Native 
Infantry  were  commanded  by  officers  who  had  been  present  for  less  than  three  of  the  previous  20 
years,  80  five  by  officers  who  had  been  present  for  more  than  three  and  less  than  five,  81  and  nine  by 
officers  who  had  been  present  for  more  than  five  but  less  than  ten.  82  In  other  words,  forty  (54.1  %)  of 
the  74  regiments  were  commanded  by  officers  who  had  been  present  for  less  than  half  the  previous  20 
years.  On  the  other  hand,  thirty  regiments  were  commanded  by  officers  who  had  been  present  for 
more  than  15  of  the  previous  20  years,  83  and  four  by  officers  who  had  been  present  from  between  10 
and  15  years.  84  But  of  these  thirty-four  officers  who  had  served  more  than  ten  of  the  previous  20  years, 
nineteen  -  or  more  than  half  -  were  majors  or  captains  in  temporary  command  . 
85 
An  interesting  pattern  emerges  when  we  equate  a  commanding  officer's  time  with  his  regiment  to  its 
behaviour  during  the  mutiny.  Of  the  54  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  that  mutinied  or  partially 
mutinied  in  1857,  twenty-three  (or  42.6%)  were  commanded  by  officers  who  had  served  with  them  for 
86  less  than  three  of  the  previous  20  years  ,  two  (3.71/o)  by  officers  who  had  served  for  more  than  three 
and  less  than  five  years,  87  and  eight  (14.8%)  by  officers  who  had  served  for  more  than  five  and  less  than 
88  10  years.  On  the  other  hand,  nineteen  (or  35.2%)  were  commanded  by  officers  who  had  served  with 
them  for  more  than  15  of  the  previous  20  years",  and  two  (3.7%)  by  those  who  had  served  more  than 
"  Heathcote,  7he  Indian  Army,  p.  132. 
79  Notes  by  the  Marquess  of  Tweeddale,  I  Jan  1859,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  74.,  p.  583. 
80  Service  Records  of  the  officers  of  the  East  India  Company  Army,  Hodson  Index,  NAM.  The  twenty- 
s  regiments  were:  Pt  4h  6h  8h  10h,  I  Ph,  14'h  Who  22d,  37th,  39h,  4&,  44th,  45'hl  5  1ý  54  th 
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71  and  73  Bengal  N. 
.  81  The  five  regiments  were:  5th,  15th,  16th,  25h  and  49ýh  Bengal  N.  I. 
82  The  nine  regiments  were:  9ýh  12'h  20'h  23rd  32  nd 
9  34thp  41ý  42nd  and  66h  Bengal  N.  I. 
ýd 
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"  ibid.  The  four  regiments  were:  35  th  38  th 
, 
46th  and  63rd  Bengal  N.  I. 
15  The  nineteen  regiments  commanded  by  temporary  C.  O.  s  (captains  or  majors)  who  had  served  more 
than  ten  ofthe  previous  20  years  were:  2ýd,  l3thý  17'h9  18hi  21"t  24thP  26th,  28hi  291h,  31  a,  43dý  46th,  501h, 
53  d'  58'ý  59h,  61" 
' 
650'  and  74h  Bengal  N.  I.  Another  four  regiments  were  commanded  by  temporary 
officers  who  had  served  less  than  ten  ofthe  previous  20  years:  4ý  5h)  9th  and  12th  Bengal  N.  I.  Overall, 
therefore,  23  out  of  74  regiments  were  commanded  by  temporary  officers. 
1ý6  The  regiments  were-  1".  4hi  6th 
' 
8th 
'I 
O'h,  11"',  14'h,  19'h,  22d 
, 
37th9  40th,  44h,  45"',  51",  54th,  55tý  56th 
, 
6&,  67th,  68th$  69thý  71"  and  73  rd  Bengal  N.  I. 
87  The  regiments  were:  5  th  and  15'h  Bengal  N.  I. 
nd  88  The  regiments  were:  9th,  12'h 
' 
2&  23rd  32nd  34th  41"  and  42  Bengal  N.  I. 
89  The  ýe 
th  th  ' 
290%  30'h,  36th  48th  50th  52nd  53'ý  57tý  61",  viments  were:  Yd,  7,13 
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17'h,  18'h,  26d, 
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ten  and  less  than  15  years,  90  though  ten  of  these  twenty-one  regiments  had  captains  or  majors  in 
temporary  command9'.  Of  the  17  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  that  were  disarmed  and  did  not 
mutiny,  only  three  (17.6%)  were  commanded  by  officers  who  had  been  present  for  less  than  three  of  the 
previous  20  years,  92  while  another  three  had  served  more  than  three  and  less  than  five  years,  93  whereas 
nine  (52.9%)  were  commanded  by  officers  who  had  been  present  for  more  than  15  of  the  previous  20 
years,  94  and  two  (11.8%)  by  those  who  had  served  between  10  and  15  years.  95  Both  regiments  of 
traditionally-recruited  Bengal  Native  Infantry  that  did  not  mutiny  and  retained  their  arms  -  the  21'  and 
3  1"  N.  I.  -  were  commanded  by  officers  who  had  been  present  for  more  than  15  of  the  previous  20 
years.  The  only  other  loyal  regiment  -  the  660'  Gurkhas  -  had  no  ties  of  kinship  or  caste  with  the  rest  of 
the  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  and  therefore  the  time  its  commanding  officer  had  spent  with  it  (more  than 
five  and  less  than  ten  of  the  previous  20  years)  was  not  so  relevant  to  its  decision  to  stay  true  to  its  salt. 
There  were  a  number  of  factors  that  determined  whether  a  regiment  would  mutiny  or  not  in  1857. 
proximity  to  other  mutinous  regiments;  the  presence  of  European  troops;  and,  among  others,  the 
relationship  between  the  sepoys  and  their  senior  officers,  particularly  the  adjutant  and  the  commanding 
officer.  The  above  data  would  seem  to  suggest  that  a  regiment  was  more  likely  to  mutiny  if  it  was 
commanded  by  a  relatively  unfamiliar  officer  (i.  e.  one  who  had  spent  less  than  half  the  previous  20 
years  with  it).  If,  on  the  other  hand,  it  had  a  commander  -  particularly  a  permanent  commander  -  who 
had  been  with  it  for  more  than  ten  of  the  previous  20  years,  it  was  more  likely  to  stay  loyal  or  allow 
itself  to  be  disarmed.  Sitaram  Pandy  stressed  the  importance  of  continuity  when  he  noted  that  there  was 
"always  discontent"  in  a  regiment  when  "someone  completely  strange"  was  sent  to  command  it. 
"Among  us  there  is  a  great  dislike  for  new  ways,  "  he  added.  "One  sahib  upsets  what  the  other  has 
done,  and  we  do  not  know  what  to  do  because  what  we  have  been  taught  one  day  is  wrong  the  next.  I 
have  known  four  Commanding  Officers  come  to  a  regiment  within  a  year,  and  three  Adjutants,  and  two 
Quartermasters...  It  takes  us  a  long  time  to  learn  the  ways  of  a  sahib  and  once  the  men  have  got  used  to 
him  it  is  wrong  to  have  him  removed.  "  96  Sitaram's  regiment,  the  63rd,  was  disarmed  as  a  precaution  in 
August  1857  and  became  one  of  only  eight  disarmed  native  infantry  regiments  to  be  incorporated  into 
'0  The  additional  regiments  were:  38h  and  46h  Bengal  N.  I. 
d  91  The  regiments  were:  13'h,  170%  l8thP  260,28"')  29hs  46h,  5e,  53" 
1 
61"  and  74h  Bengal  N.  I. 
92  The  regiments  were:  39th,  64  th  and  70'h  Bengal  N.  I. 
93  The  regiments  were:  16'h,  25h  and  49ýh  Bengal  N.  I. 
94  The  regiments  were:  2nd  24ý  27"'  33  rd 
I 
Vdý  47h,  58thl  59h  and  65h  Bengal  N.  I. 
95  The  regiments  were:  35th  and  63d'Bengal  N.  I. 
96  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  77. 116 
the  post-mutiny  Bengal  Army.  It  was  commanded  by  Brevet  Colonel  Houghton,  53,  who  had  joined 
the  regiment  as  a  subaltern  in  1823  and  remained  with  it  for  most  of  the  next  34  years  (though  he  was 
absent  on  staff  duties  for  much  of  the  1840s).  The  presence  of  such  an  "old"  hand  in  1857  may  well 
have  prevented  his  regiment  from  mutinying. 
The  overall  effect  of  promotion  by  seniority  was  that  officers  did  not  reach  the  upper  ranks  of  the  army 
until  a  relatively  late  age  (see  Tables  32  and  33).  97 
Table  32  -Average  length  of  service  (in  years)  of  infantry  officers  on  promotion  to  their  rank  in 
Ocloher  1853 
Colonels  Lt.  Colonels  Majors  Captains  Lieutenants 
Bengal  Army  43.8  32.0  28.0  13.4  4.7 
Madras  Army  39.4  31.3  26.5  12.8  4.3 
Bombay  Army  39.3  31.2  27.8  12.2  4.6 
Table  33-  Average  age  of  infantry  officers  on  promotion  to  their  rank  in  October  1853 
Colonels  Lt.  Colonels  Majors  Captains  Lieutenants 
Bengal  Army  60.8  49.0  45.0  30.4  21.7 
Madras  Army  56.4  48.3  43.5  29.8  21.3 
Bombay  Army  56.3  48.2  44.8  29.2  21.6 
In  the  Bengal  Army  in  1853,  some  majors  had  been  promoted  afterjust  18  years'service,  while  others 
had  to  wait  35  years.  In  Madras  and  Bombay  the  most  fortunate  majors  were  promoted  in  14  and  13 
years,  and  the  least  fortunate  in  34  and  33  years  respectively.  Amongst  the  captains  of  the  three 
armies,  the  most  fortunate  were  of  nine,  eight  and  seven  years'  standing,  while  the  least  fortunate  had 
been  subalterns  for  26,20  and  17  years  respectively.  "  Overall  Bengal  infantry  officers  had  to  wait  the 
longest  for  promotion,  but  officers  in  the  other  two  armies  were  not  that  far  behind.  No  native  infantry 
officer,  for  example,  could  expect  to  receive  the  permanent  command  of  a  regiment  much  before  his 
481  birthday,  or  31  years  of  service.  My  own  study  of  the  service  records  of  the  officers  commanding 
all  74  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  in  May  1857  gives  an  average  age  of  50.5  years,  though  this 
figure  includes  23  officers  in  temporary  command.  99  The  eldest  was  61  (Lieutenant  Colonel  John 
Liptrap  of  the  45th  N.  I.  )  and  the  youngest  35  (Major  John  Shakespear  of  the  24th  N.  I.  ).  Of  the  51 
97  Lawrence,  Essays,  Military  andPolitical,  pp.  457-8. 
98  Ibid.,  p.  458. 117 
officers  in  permanent  command  (with  a  rank  of  brevet  lieutenant-colonel  or  higher),  the  average  age 
was  53  years. 
The  youngest  of  these  permanent  commanders,  Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel  David  Pott  of  the  47g'N.  I., 
was  45  (and  just  43  when  he  received  his  promotion).  Apart  from  furlough  and  sick  leave,  Pott  had 
served  with  the  regiment  since  joining  it  as  a  17-year-old  ensign  in  1829,  seeing  action  in  both  the  I' 
Sikh  War  (when  he  was  a  captain  in  temporary  command)  and  the  2nd  Burma  War.  It  may  not  be  a 
coincidence  that  his  corps  was  one  of  only  eight  disarmed  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  to  be 
incorporated  into  the  post-mutiny  Bengal  Army  (i.  e.  they  were  considered  to  be  the  least  disaffected). 
Of  the  other  seven,  five  were  commanded  by  officers  who  had  joined  them  as  ensigns  and  since  served 
more  than  10  of  the  previous  20  years'00  (and  four  by  officers  who  had  served  more  than  15  of  those 
years).  101  Only  one,  the  70",  was  commanded  by  an  officer  who  had  been  present  for  less  than  three  of 
the  previous  20  years,  while  the  commander  of  the  remaining  regiment,  the  32nd,  had  served  between 
five  and  ten  years.  The  age  of  these  eight  officers  ranged  from  45  to  54,  with  an  average  of  49.9  years 
(almost  identical  to  the  average  for  the  whole  Bengal  Native  Infantry).  Four  were  permanent 
commanders  and  four  in  temporary  command.  These  statistics  would  lead  one  to  conclude  that  the 
familiarity  of  a  commanding  officer  was  a  more  important  factor  than  his  age  in  determining  whether  or 
not  his  regiment  remained  loyal.  Younger  officers  were  probably  more  efficient;  older  officers  more 
respected. 
The  average  age  of  the  officers  commanding  the  ten  regiments  of  Bengal  Light  Cavalry  in  May  1857 
was,  at  49.7,  only  marginally  younger  than  that  of  their  native  infantry  counterparts.  The  eldest  was  53 
(Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel  Barton  of  the  6th  L.  C.  )  and  the  youngest  42  (Major  Alfred  Harris  of  the  I' 
L.  C.  ).  102  But  there  was  little  difference  between  the  average  age  of  the  commanding  officers  of  the 
seven  regiments  that  mutinied  and  the  three  that  were  disarmed,  and  therefore  age  can  be  discounted  as 
99  Service  Records  of  the  officers  of  the  East  India  Company  Army,  Hodson  Index,  NAM.  The  average 
, 
Ae  of  the  23  officers  in  temporary  command  was  45.7  years.  a 
The  regiments  were:  33rý  43'd.  59P,  63rd  and  650'Bengal  N.  I. 
'0'  The  regiments  were:  33d 
' 
43rd 
' 
59h  and  65h  Bengal  N.  I. 
102  The  name  and  age  of  the  Company  officers  commanding  the  10  regiments  of  Bengal  Light  Cavalry 
in  May  1857  were  as  follows:  Major  Alfred  Harris,  42,1"  L.  C.;  Brevet  Major  Edward  Vibart,  49,2nd 
L.  C.;  Brevet  Col.  George  Carmichael-Smyth,  53,3  rd  L.  C.;  Brevet  Col.  Henry  Clayton,  52,  e  L.  C.; 
Brevet  Lt.  -Col.  Thomas  Harington,  46,5th  L.  C.;  Brevet  Lt.  -Col,  Nathaniel  Barton,  53,  Oh  L.  C.;  Lt.  -Col. 
Robert  Master,  50,7h  L.  C.;  Brevet  Col.  James  Mackenzie,  52,8h  L.  C.;  Lt.  -Col.  Archibald  Campbell, 
52,9h  L.  C.;  Major  Ronald  McDonell,  48,1  Oth  L.  C. 118 
a  factor.  103  Commandants  of  the  18  regiments  of  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry,  on  the  other  hand,  were 
generally  much  younger  because  they  had  been  appointed  on  the  basis  of  selection  rather  than  seniority. 
Their  average  age  was  only  39.7  years,  with  the  eldest  52  (Brevet  Major  James  Verner  of  the  10  th 
regiment)  and  the  youngest  just  23  (Lieutenant  James  Campbell  of  the  14'h  regiment).  104  Their  ranks 
reflect  this:  two  were  lieutenants  (in  temporary  command),  three  were  captains,  eight  were  brevet 
majors,  one  was  a  major,  two  were  brevet  lieutenant-colonels  and  only  one  was  a  substantive 
lieutenant-colonel  (and  he  was  a  British  Army  officer).  105  But  unlike  the  light  cavalry,  there  is  a 
noticeable  difference  between  the  average  age  of  the  Company  officers  who  commanded  the  nine 
regiments  that  mutinied  (36.8  years),  and  of  those  who  commanded  the  three  loyal  and  five  disarmed 
regiments  (42.1  years).  Taken  in  conjunction  with  the  earlier  data  relating  to  officer  familiarity  in  the 
Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry,  these  statistics  would  seem  to  suggest  that  the  older  and  more  experienced  a 
commandant  was,  the  better  chance  he  had  of  preventing  his  troops  from  mutinying, 
Henry  Lawrence  addressed  the  problem  of  aged  senior  officers  in  1844  by  recommending  that  all 
European  and  native  officers  be  either  sent  to  the  invalids  at  the  age  of  50  or,  if  their  health  was  up  to  it, 
allowed  to  serve  for  another  five  years;  but  no  officer  was  to  be  allowed  to  remain  with  his  regiment 
beyond  the  age  of  55,  or  60  in  the  case  of  the  invalids.  Lawrence  was  also  concerned  that  the  seniority 
system  of  promotion  failed  to  weed  out  those  unsuitable  for  higher  command.  Every  officer  was  "not 
fitted  for  command",  he  stressed,  "much  less  to  command  soldiers  of  a  different  religion  and  country"; 
those  that  could  not  manage  their  regiments  because  they  were  either  too  severe  or  too  weak  "should  be 
removed  from  them,  and  that  quickly,  before  their  corps  are  irredemiably  destroyed".  106  But  this  rarely 
happened.  In  1853,  Colonel  Grant  told  the  Select  Committee  on  Indian  Territories  that  he  had  "never 
seen  an  officer  withdrawn  from  the  command  of  a  regiment  on  account  of  age  and  infirmity",  and  knew 
103  The  average  age  of  the  commanding  officers  of  the  seven  regiments  of  Bengal  Light  Cavalry  that 
mutinied  was  49.6  years;  the  average  age  of  the  commanding  officers  of  the  three  regiments  of  Bengal 
Li  lit  Cavalry  that  were  disarmed  was  50.0  years. 
16TThis  average  age  is  for  the  Company  officers  who  commanded  17  out  of  the  18  regiments  of  Bengal 
irregular  Cavalry.  Lieutenant-Colonel  S.  Fisher  of  the  150'I.  C.  is  not  included  because  he  was  a  British 
Army  officer. 
105  The  name  and  age  of  the  commandants  of  the  18  regiments  of  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  in  May  1857 
were  as  follows:  Brevet  Major  Crawford  Chamberlain,  36,1"  I.  C.;  Brevet  Major  George  Jackson,  44, 
2nd  I.  C.;  Brevet  Major  Sydney  Hire,  34,3rd  I.  C.;  Brevet  Major  Anthony  Martin,  46,4th  I.  C.;  Brevet 
Major  John  Macdonald,  48,5th  I.  C.;  Captain  James  Curtis,  37,6th  I.  C.;  Brevet  Lt.  -Col.  William 
Mulcaster,  36,7h  I.  C.;  Lt.  Alexander  Mackenzie,  32,8"'  I.  C.;  Brevet  Lt.  -Col.  James  Fraser-Tytler,  35, 
1h  SP  I.  C.;  Brevet  Major  James  Verner,  52,  lOh  I.  C.;  Captain  William  Alexander,  39,11  I.  C.;  Brevet 
Major  James  Holmes,  40,  ffh  I.  C.;  Captain  Henry  Guise,  39,13"'  I.  C.;  Lt.  James  CaTXbell,  23,10 
I.  C.;  Lt.  -Col.  S.  Fisher,  age  uncertain,  15"'  I.  C.;  Brevet  Major  Wright  Davison,  46,16  I.  C.;  Major  John 
Liptrott,  44,17th  I.  C.;  Brevet  Major  William  Ryves,  45,18'h  I.  C.. 119 
of  only  "one  instance  of  a  commanding  officer  having  been  reported  by  the  inspecting  officer  as  unfit  to 
exercise  command".  But  in  the  latter  case  the  officer  refused  to  transfer  to  the  invalid  establishment 
and  the  matter  was  dropped.  When  asked  whether  an  officer  was  given  the  command  of  a  regiment  on 
account  of  seniority,  and  regardless  of  his  suitability,  Grant  replied:  "He  must  be  promoted;  but  it  rests 
with  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  withhold  a  command  of  that  sort  from  him  or  not.  But  I  have  never 
known  that  power  exercised.  "  The  system  of  seniority  therefore  affected  the  discipline  of  Bengal 
regiments,  Grant  believed,  "inasmuch  as,  with  very  few  exceptions,  an  officer  is  far  advanced  in  years 
before  he  attains  the  rank  which  would  entitle  him  to  the  command  of  a  regiment".  In  his  opinion,  the 
service  would  greatly  benefit  from  younger  senior  officers  as  few  men  were  "as  efficient  at  60  or  70  as 
they  are  at  40  or  50".  107  He  himself,  at  48,  was  the  youngest  fUll  colonel  in  the  Bengal  Army,  though  he 
did  not  expect  his  energies  to  be  unimpaired  by  the  time  he  succeeded  to  the  command  of  a  division  in 
not  less  than  15  years.  As  it  happened,  Grant  was  promoted  to  major-general  the  following  year,  and 
lieutenant-general  commanding  the  Madras  Army  within  three  years.  But  he  was  the  exception  to  the 
rule. 
Promotion  to  the  higher  ranks  of  brigadier  and  general  was  theoretically  on  the  basis  of  merit,  with 
the  Commander-in-Chief  s  selection  confirmed  by  the  Indian  government.  But  in  practice  the  claim  of 
seniority  was  rarely  ignored.  The  Court  of  Directors  underlined  this  principle  in  1835  by  pointing  out 
that  while  officers  had  no  right  to  succeed  to  the  appointments  of  brigadier  or  brigadier-general  "on  the 
ground  of  mere  seniority,  these  being  staff  appointments,  involving  both  confidence  and  responsibility", 
they  had  every  right  to  expect  that  their  respective  governments  would  never  set  aside  their  claims 
"arising  out  of  length  of  service"  except  on  public  grounds.  In  effect,  Colonel  Durand  told  the  Peel 
Commission,  the  rule  was  one  of  selection  but  "with  a  strong  preference  to  the  claims  of  the  senior 
officer,  if  not  unfit".  108  The  average  age  of  Company  officers  who  had  reached  the  rank  of  brigadier 
and  major-general  (in  command  of  a  division)  in  the  Bengal  Army  in  May  1857  was  55.6  and  66.4 
years  respectively.  109  The  average  ages  in  Madras  were  slightly  lower  at  55.1  and  62.5  years 
106  Lawrence,  Essays,  Military  and  Political,  p.  25. 
107  Evidence  of  Col.  Patrick  Grant,  14  March  1853,  P.  P.,  H.  C.  1852-3,  XXVII,  p.  127. 
'08  Evidence  of  Col.  Henry  Durand  C.  B.,  25  November  1858,  ibid.,  p.  243. 
109  Service  Records  of  the  officers  of  the  East  India  Company  Army,  Hodson  Index,  NAM.  The 
youngest  Bengal  brigadier  in  May  1857  was  Alexander  Jack,  5  1,  commander  of  the  Cawnpore  station 
(Neville  Chamberlain,  37,  the  commander  of  the  Punjab  Irregular  Force,  had  the  responsibility  of  a 
brigadier  but  his  substantive  rank  was  only  captain);  and  the  oldest  was  Hugh  Sibbald,  66,  commander 
of  the  Bareilly  brigade.  The  youngest  Bengal  major-general  was  John  Hearsey,  64,  commander  of  the 
Presidency  Division;  and  the  oldest  was  George  Gowan,  68,  commander  of  the  Lahore  Division. 120 
respectively,  '  10  while  in  Bombay  they  were  lower  still  at  53.4  and  60.0  years  respectively.  "'  ABengal 
Army  officer,  therefore,  was  the  last  to  receive  promotion  in  every  rank. 
Ina  private  letter  of  January  1851,  Lord  Dalhousie  underlined  the  consequences.  "TheCourt;  "he 
wrote,  "refuse  to  believe  in  the  inferiority  of  the  Bengal  Army  in  discipline  and  order;  nevertheless,  it  is 
true...  [The]  supervision  of  the  boys  when  they  join,  the  maintenance  of  order  in  a  corps,  the 
discouragement  of  extravagance  and  vice,  are  things  which  each  commanding  officer  in  his  own  corps 
alone  can  effect.  But  commanding  officers  are  inefficient;  brigadiers  are  no  better;  divisional  officers 
are  worse  than  either,  because  they  are  older  and  more  done;  and  at  the  top  of  all  they  send 
commanders-in-chief  seventy  years  old  [Napier].  How  can  things  go  on  right  under  such  a  system?  "  To 
rectify  the  situation,  Dalhousie  stated  his  determination  not  to  confirm  any  promotion  to  brigadier  or 
major-general  unless  his  new  Commander-in-Chief,  Gomm,  could  tell  him  that  the  officer  was 
"undeniably  competent  for  the  efficient  and  active  discharge  of  his  duties".  112  But  this  was  wishful 
thinking  and  senior  officers  continued  to  be  promoted  on  the  basis  of  seniority. 
In  March  1856,  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  warned  that  there  had  to  be  a  "bar  against  the  command  of 
regiments  being  the  reward  of  thirty  and  forty  years  of  incompetence"  because  bad  colonels  were  even 
more  harmful  to  an  army  than  bad  generals.  He  conceded  that  some  commanding  officers,  "to  the 
injury  of  the  service,  were  good  men  and  true  twenty  years  ago",  but  others  "were  never  fit  for  a 
corporal's  charge"  and  could  only  have  risen  from  the  subaltern  ranks  in  a  seniority  service.  "'  In  a 
second  essay  that  year,  he  embellished  this  point  by  stating  that  the  British  Army  had  only  ever  escaped 
disaster  by  superseding  its  senior  officers  after  the  first  disastrous  campaign  of  each  war.  And  yet  the 
Bengal  Army  was  full  of  officers  -  "not  one  of  whom  would  have  been  instrusted  in  his  youth,  health, 
and  strength  with  the  charge  of  a  mill,  by  a  sensible  cotton-spinner,  during  a  disturbance"  -  who  had 
been  placed  in  commands  "where  their  incompetence  may  any  day  blow  a  spark  into  a  flame  that  may 
cost  hundreds  of  lives  and  millions  of  money".  The  answer,  he  said,  was  to  create  an  unattached  list  for 
superannuated  colonels  that  would  free  up  promotion  below  them  and  reduce  the  average  period  of 
110  Ibid.  The  youngest  Madras  brigadier  in  May  1857  was  Edward  Messiter,  53,  commander  at  Thayet 
Mew;  and  the  oldest  was  George  Whitlock,  58,  commander  at  Bangalore.  The  youngest  Madras  major- 
general  was  James  Bell,  55,  commander  of  the  Pegu  Division;  and  the  oldest  was  Alexander  Tulloch, 
68,  commander  of  the  Northern  Division. 
"'Ibid.  The  youngest  Bombay  brigadier  in  May  1857  was  Willoughby  Trevelyan,  51,  commander  at 
Rajcote;  and  the  eldest  was  Robert  Hormer,  57,  on  field  service  in  Persia.  The  youngest  Bombay 
major-general  was  Sir  James  Outram,  54,  commander  of  the  Persian  Expeditionary  Force;  and  the 
oldest  was  George  Wilson,  67,  commander  of  the  Southern  Division. 
112  Dalhousie  to  Sir  George  Couper,  13  Jan  1851,  Baird  (ed.  ),  Dalhousie  Letters,  p.  108. 121 
service  in  the  grade  of  lieutenant-colonel  from  10  years  2  months  to  5  years  and  10  months.  '  14  But  as 
with  all  Lawrence's  suggestions  for  army  reform  prior  to  the  Indian  mutiny,  this  measure  was  not  taken 
up  by  the  Indian  government. 
The  deteriorating  relationship  between  the  native  troops  of  the  Bengal  Army  and  their  European 
officers  was  probably  the  single  most  important  cause  of  the  mutiny.  A  series  of  factors  contributed  to 
this  breakdown  of  trust,  not  least  the  arrival  of  an  increasing  number  of  poor,  badly-educated  officer 
cadets  whose  chief  motives  for  entering  the  Company's  service  were  social  advancement  and  financical 
gain.  "It  was,  therefore,  the  object  of  every  ambitious  and  capable  officer  to  secure"  one  of  the  more 
lucrative  extra-regimental  appointments,  observed  Field-Marshal  Lord  Roberts,  a  Bengal  subaltern  in 
the  1850s,  "and  escape  as  soon  as  possible  from  a  service  in  which  ability  and  professional  zeal  counted 
for  nothing".  '  15  For  the  mediocre  majority  who  possessed  neither  the  talent  nor  connections  necessary 
to  obtain  a  detached  appointment,  regimental  duty  came  to  be  regarded  as  a  sign  of  failure  rather  than 
of  pride  -  and  was  despised  as  a  consequence.  Such  dissatisfied  officers  had  little  interest  in  the  welfare 
of  their  men. 
But  perhaps  the  biggest  factor  in  the  breakdown  of  officer/sepoy  relations  -  and  one  that  was 
particular  to  the  Bengal  Army  -  was  the  gradual  reduction  in  the  authority  of  the  commanding  officer. 
This  was  partly  the  result  of  the  seniority  system  of  promotion  which  failed  to  weed  out  old,  unsuitable 
and  inefficient  officers,  and  which  caused  a  significant  number  of  regiments  to  be  commanded  by 
unfamiliar  officers.  An  even  more  important  antecedent,  however,  was  the  gradual  weakening  of  the 
commanding  officer's  power  to  reward  and  punish.  The  former  trend  was  considered  in  the  previous 
chapter;  the  latter  will  form  the  basis  of  the  next  chapter.  Yet  it  is  worth  pointing  out  that  this  reduction 
in  power  was  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  seniority  system.  "The  seniority  rise  among  the  officers 
of  a  native  regiment,  originally  appointed  at  hazard,  "  wrote  John  Jacob  in  1854,  "renders  it  impossible 
at  present  to  ensure  there  being  at  the  head  of  each  native  regiment  a  man  capable  of  wielding  the 
113  Lawrence,  Essays,  Military  andPolitical,  pp.  383-4. 
114  Ibid.,  p.  415-16,455-61. 
113  Field  Marshal  Lord  Roberts,  For4-one  Years  in  India:  From  Subaltern  to  Commander-in-Chief 
(London,  1898),  p.  244. 122 
powers  necessary  to  govern  it  efficiently  and  well.  This  is  the  great  difficulty  experienced  at  head- 
quarters;  this  is  the  stumbling-block  of  all  honest  reformers...  116 
In  other  words,  the  lack  of  a  process  of  selection  meant  that  the  commanding  officers  of  the  Bengal 
Army  were  a  mixed  bunch  who  could  not  be  trusted  with  the  powers  necessary  to  gain  the  respect  and 
devotion  of  their  native  troops.  And  yet,  in  a  foreign  mercenary  army  more  than  any  other,  the 
attainment  of  such  respect  was  crucial.  Sitaram  Pandy  noted: 
The  Sirkar  should  remember  that  the  value  of  a  regiment  of  scpoys  greatly  depends  on  the  Commanding  Officer. 
If  the  men  like  him,  if  he  understands  them  and  can  enter  their  fcclings  and  has  their  confidence  -  which  is  not  to  be 
done  in  one  day,  or  even  in  one  year  -  and  above  all  if  he  has  power  and  is  just,  they  will  do  anything,  will  go 
anywhere,  and  his  word  is  law.  117 
Sitararn  does  not  bother  to  spell  out  the  alternative.  But  it  is  only  too  clear  that  most  Bengal 
commanding  officers  had  neither  the  physical  nor  moral  authority  to  avert  mutiny  in  1857. 
116  Pelly  (ed.  ),  Views  and  Opinims,  p.  126. 
117  Lunt  (ed.  ),  Rrom  Sepoy  lo  Subedar,  p.  77. 123 
Chapter  Four  -  Discipline 
Regimental  commanding  officers  in  all  three  presidency  armies  experienced  some  diminution  in  their 
power  to  punish  in  the  decades  prior  to  the  mutiny,  but  Bengal  colonels  suffered  the  most  severe 
reductions  as  more  authority  was  concentrated  in  the  offices  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  Adjutant- 
General.  This  move  towards  a  more  centralized  military  system  was  part  of  a  wider  process  of 
government  reform  in  India  from  the  1820s  which,  wrote  Stokes,  "was  to  eradicate  in  the  name  of 
utility  all  the  historical  associations  connected  with  the  rise  of  British  power;  and  in  the  cause  of 
efficiency,  simplicity,  and  economy,  sought  to  reduce  the  historical  modes  of  government  to  one 
centralized,  uniform  practice".  ' 
Driving  these  reforms  was  the  political  philosophy  of  Utilitarianism:  a  belief  that  until  humans  "had 
sufficiently  disciplined  themselves  to  forgo  immediate  pleasure  for  the  sake  of  lasting  happiness,  a 
'severe  schoolmastee  was  necessary  in  the  form  of  law";  human  legislators  were  required  to  "assist  men 
to  avoid  harmful  acts  by  artificially  weighting  such  acts  with  the  pains  of  punishment".  Utilitarianism 
retained,  therefore,  an  immense  faith  in  the  power  of  law  and  government  to  shape  conduct  and 
transform  character.  With  regard  to  India,  its  chief  proponents  were  men  like  James  Mill,  his  son  John 
Stuart  Mill  and  Edward  Strachey,  all  senior  officials  of  the  East  India  Company  in  London  in  the  1820s 
and  30s,  and  Lord  William  Bentinck,  Governor-General  of  India  from  1827  to  1835  (and  also 
Commander-in-Chief  from  1833  to  1835).  At  a  farewell  dinner  in  London,  attended  by  a  number  of 
leading  Utilitarians  including  Jeremy  Bentham,  Bentinck  is  said  to  have  remarked  to  James  Mill:  "I  am 
going  to  British  India,  but 
... 
it  is  you  that  will  be  Governor-General.  0 
The  Utilitarian  passion  for  uniformity,  mechanistic  administration  and  legislative  regulation  was  not 
shared  by  the  Monro  school  which  had  dominated  Indian  policy  until  the  1820s.  3  The  latter's  members 
made  a  careful  distinction  between  uniformity  and  unity.  Sir  John  Malcolm,  for  example,  was  the  first 
to  recognize  the  need  for  a  more  unified  system  of  government  as  the  Company  expanded  its  territory. 
But  he  believed  that  economy,  efficiency  and  a  greater  consistency  of  principle  could  be  achieved  "by 
1  Eric  Stokes,  Yhe  Diglish  Ulifilariata  andIndia  (Oxford,  1959),  p.  14. 
2  Ibid.,  pp.  55,5  1. 
3  The  Monro  school  was  named  after  Sir  Thomas  Munro,  Governor  of  Madras  from  1819  to  1827.  Its 
leading  members  were:  the  Hon.  Mountstuart  Elphinstone,  Governor  of  Bombay  from  1819  to  1827;  Sir 124 
the  delegation  of  full  powers  to  trusted  individuals,  and  not  through  a  deadening  centralized 
administration".  4  Among  the  natural  heirs  to  the  Monro  school  were  the  Lawrence  brothers,  Lord 
Elphinstone,  Sir  Charles  Napier  and  John  Jacob.  For  most  of  the  30  years  or  so  that  preceded  the 
mutiny,  however,  Utilitarian  policy  was  in  the  ascendancy  at  Calcutta  and  the  consequent  move  towards 
a  more  centralized  military  justice  system  was  to  prove  disastrous  for  the  Bengal  Army. 
Until  1845,  when  the  first  Articles  of  War  were  enacted  for  the  whole  Indian  army,  each  presidency 
army  was  regulated  by  its  own  articles.  But  only  one  section  of  the  Bengal  articles,  which  dated  from 
1796,  alluded  to  the  power  of  a  commanding  officer  to  punish  without  the  intercession  of  a  court- 
martial.  It  stated:  "Every  non-commissioned  officer  and  soldier  shall  retire  to  his  quarters  or  tent  at  the 
beating  of  retreat,  in  default  of  which  he  shall  be  punished,  according  to  the  nature  of  his  offence,  by 
the  commanding  oficer.  "  In  lieu  of  any  specific  guidelines,  therefore,  Bengal  commanding  officers 
were  able  to  impose  a  wide  range  of  summary  punishments  -  including  dismissal,  corporal  punishment 
with  a  rattan  cane,  reduction  of  N.  C.  O.  s  to  the  ranks,  refusing  furlough  and  awarding  extra  drill  and 
duty  -  for  most  of  the  first  three  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century.  But  these  powers,  never 
"authoritatively  conferred  upon  commanding  officers",  were  gradually  reduced  by  the  introduction  of 
official  regulations.  5 
In  1828,  shortly  after  the  arrival  of  Lord  William  Bentinck  at  Calcutta,  new  standing  orders  for  the 
Bengal  Native  Infantry  limited  the  power  to  discharge  sepoys  to  those  who  were  either  physically  unfit 
or  awkward  at  drill.  In  all  other  cases  of  unfitness  for  service,  the  sanction  of  the  Commander-in-Chief 
was  required.  "In  other  words,  "  Major-General  Birch  told  the  Peel  Commission,  "commanding  officers 
were  declared  to  havc,  no  power  to  dismiss  men  as  a  punishment  for  offences  committed.  "  This 
regulation  was  eventually  enshrined  in  the  1845  Articles  of  War.  Article  2  provided  that  "no 
Commissioned  Officer  shall  be  dismissed  except  by  the  Sentence  of  a  General  Court  Martial"  and  "no 
Non-Commissioned  Officer  or  Soldier  shall  be  Discharged  as  a  punishment  except  by  the  Sentence  of  a 
Court  Martial,  or  by  order  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  at  the  Presidency  to  which  he  may  belong".  7 
When  the  revised  code  of  regulations  was  published  in  1855,  it  took  away  from  commanding  officers 
John  Malcom,  Governor  of  Bombay  from  1827  to  1830;  and  Sir  Charles  (later  Lord)  Metcalfe,  a 
longtime  Resident  at  Delhi  and  Member  of  the  Supreme  Council  from  1827  to  1834. 
4  Stokes,  7he  English  Uldilarians  and  India,  p.  22. 
5  Replies  by  Major-General  Birch,  28  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  61,  p.  436. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Articles  of  War,  Act  No.  XX  of  6  September  1845,  OIOC,  V/8/32. 125 
the  power  even  to  discharge  men  who  were  physically  unfit.  Henceforth  all  such  cases  would  have  to 
be  referred  to  the  Commander-in-Chiefg 
Corporal  punishment  with  a  rattan  cane  was  generally  carried  out  on  incompetent  drill  recruits  or 
sepoys  who  displayed  stupidity  or  obstinacy  during  regimental  parades.  It  was  abolished  for  native 
troops  throughout  India  by  Bentinck's  General  Order  of  February  1835  (the  same  order  that  did  away 
with  flogging).  9  But  not  all  native  soldiers  thought  abolition  was  a  good  thing.  In  1838,  a  senior 
subedar  told  Captain  Sleeman,  formerly  of  his  regiment,  that  "doing  away  with  the  rattan  at  drill  had  a 
very  bad  effect".  He  added:  "Young  men  were  formerly,  with  the  judicious  use  of  the  rattan,  made  fit 
to  join  the  regiment  at  furthest  in  six  months;  but  since  the  abolition  of  the  rattan  it  takes  twelve  months 
to  make  them  fit  to  be  seen  in  the  ranks.  "  There  was  much  virtue  in  its  use,  he  believed,  and  "it  should 
never  have  been  given  up".  10  But  it  was  not  reintroduced,  even  when  flogging  was  brought  back  for 
certain  offences  in  1845.  The  "punishment  of  soldiers  with  a  rattan,  "  stated  the  Bengal  Army 
Regulations  of  1855,  "at  the  pleasure  of  individuals  entrusted  with  the  instruction  of  recruits,  or  on  any 
other  occasion  whatever,  is  strictly  prohibited".  " 
The  practice  of  commanding  officers  demoting  N.  C.  O.  s  was  not  curbed  until  the  enactment  of  the 
Articles  of  War  of  1845.  Article  107  stipulated  that  "no  Non-Commissioned  Officer  shall  be  reduced  to 
the  ranks  but  by  the  sentence  of  a  Court  Martial,  or  by  order  of  the  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
Presidency  to  which  the  offender  shall  belong".  Article  109  outlined  the  remaining  summary 
punishments  that  a  commanding  officer  could  award  his  native  troops.  They  included:  extra  drill,  with 
or  without  pack,  for  a  period  not  exceeding  fifteen  days;  restriction  to  barrack  limits,  not  exceeding  15 
days;  confinement  in  the  quarter  guard  or  defaulter's  room,  not  exceeding  seven  days;  solitary 
confinement,  not  exceeding  seven  days;  removal  from  staff  situations  or  acting  appointments;  piling 
shot  and  cleaning  accoutrements.  12  But  even  these  modest  powers  were  further  reduced  in  Bengal  by 
General  Gomm's  general  order  of  November  1854  which  stipulated  that  any  man  awarded  drill 
exceeding  six  days  or  confinement  to  barracks  for  six  days  -  adjusted  two  months  later  to  drill  for  15 
days,  imprisonment  in  the  quarter-guard  or  defaulter  room,  or  confinement  to  barracks  for  six  days  - 
8  Bengal  Army  Regulations  1855,  OIOC,  L/NHU17/2/442,  pp.  189-90. 
9  G.  O.  G.  G.,  24  February  1835,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  OIOC,  lAffUI7/2/435. 
11)  Sleeman,  Rambles  andRecollectiotis,  p.  621. 
11  Bengal  Army  Regulations  1855,  OIOC,  L/MIU17/2/442,  p.  390. 
12  Articles  of  War,  Act  No.  XX  of  6  September  1845,  OIOC,  V/8132. 126 
could  choose  to  be  court-martialled  instead.  13  In  his  own  report  (separate  to  the  official  report  of  the 
Peel  Commission),  Major-General  Hancock  referred  to  the  absurdity  of  a  system  in  which  Bengal 
commanding  officers  "were  so  completely  stripped  of  all  power  to  punish,  upon  their  own  authority 
alone,  that  private  soldiers  were  allowed  to  claim  a  court-martial  at  their  option,  on  their  commanding 
officers  awarding  a  punishment  of  only  a  few  days'  drill,  and  to  forward  written  complaints  against  him 
direct  to  the  Commander-in-Chief'.  14  The  effect  this  reduction  of  power  could  have  on  the  discipline 
of  a  regiment  is  illustrated  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Drought  who,  afler  three  years  furlough,  resumed 
command  of  the  60'h  N.  I.  in  January  1857.  He  wrote: 
I  saw  very  great  laxity  in  all ranks,  worse  even  than  when  I  got  command  of  the  regiment  in  1849.  The  authority  of 
the  commanding  officer  had  become  less  than  mine  was  as  a  subaltern,  as  regards  punishment  drill  to  non- 
commissioned  officers,  owing  to  army  standing  orders  being  set  aside  by  circulars,  and  by  station  orders  issued  by 
officers  perfectly  ignorant  of  the  proper  method  of  keeping  sepoys  in  subjection,  and  thereby  interfering  with  a 
commanding  officcr's  authority,  and  rendering  him  a  mere  cipher  in  the  eyes  of  his  men...  is 
By  comparision,  regimental  commanding  officers  in  the  British  Army  had  the  summary  power  to  award 
stoppages  of  pay  (to  make  up  losses  incurred  by  damage  or  for  habitual  drunkenness),  extra  drill  or 
guard  duty,  'billing  up'  men  in  the  'black  hole'  for  up  to  two  days,  and  confinement  to  barracks  for  up  to 
two  months.  But  these  relatively  minor  punishments  were  backed  up  by  the  ultimate  threat  of  corporal 
punishment,  a  recourse  not  available  to  Indian  army  colonels  from  1835  to  1845,  and  only  for  the  most 
serious  offences  thereafter.  16 
As  well  as  the  curtailment  of  their  powers  of  summary  punishment,  Bengal  commanding  officers  also 
experienced  considerable  interference  in  their  authority  to  convene  court-martials  and  to  confirm  their 
sentences.  At  the  same  time  the  range  of  sentences  those  courts-martial  could  impose  was  reduced. 
Native  troops  could  be  tried  by  three  types  of  court-martial:  regimental,  district  (or  garrison  in  larger 
cantonments)  and  general.  Only  a  general  court-martial  could  sit  in  judgement  on  a  native  officer  (or  a 
European  officer  for  that  matter),  whereas  all  three  could  try  privates  and  non-commissioned  officers. 
A  general  court-martial  was  also  the  only  tribunal  that  could  pass  a  sentence  of  death.  It  was 
13  G.  O.  C.  C.,  16  Nov.  1854,  quoted  in  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  61,  p.  439. 
14  Report  of  Maj.  -Gen.  Hancock,  5  March  1859,  P.  P.,  H.  C,,  1859,  V,  p.  642. 
15  Brevet  Lt.  -Col.  R.  Drought  to  Major  Ewart,  23  March  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIIII,  p.  63. 
16  Strachan,  Wellingtons  Legacy,  pp.  81,83. 127 
composed  of  no  less  than  13  native  officers;  regimental  and  district  courts-martial  had  a  minimum  of 
three  and  five  native  officers  respectively.  All  three  were  superintended  by  a  single  European  officer 
who  exerted  a  disproportionate  influence.  The  native  officers  "remain  in  a  state  of  mesmerism  during 
the  whole  of  the  proceedings,  "  noted  one  Bengal  officer,  "and  when  finally  called  upon  for  their 
opinion,  invariably  answer  the  superintending  officer  with'Jo  apkee  khooshee  (What  your  honour 
pleases)',  and  can  seldom,  if  ever,  be  induced  to  give  any  other  reply".  17 
The  1796  Bengal  Articles  of  War  had  directed  that  no  sentence  of  a  regimental  court-martial  could  be 
carried  out  until  the  commanding  officer  (not  being  a  member  of  the  court)  or  the  garrison  commander 
had  confirmed  it.  18  But  all  this  changed  in  1818  when  Lord  Hastings,  the  Governor-General  and 
Commander-in-Chief,  came  to  the  conclusion  that  regimental  and  district  courts-martial  were  not  being 
conducted  "with  the  strictest  adherence  to  legal  Form,  and  the  Laws  of  evidence".  In  other  words,  he 
did  not  believe  that  commanding  officers  and  brigadiers  (who  confirmed  district  courts-martial)  were 
capable  of  ensuring  that  all  native  troops  received  a  fair  trial.  He  therefore  issued  a  general  order  which 
stated  that  all  sentences  by  courts-martial  inferior  to  general  courts-martial  would  henceforth  be 
confirmed  by  the  local  divisional  commander,  or  major-general.  He  also  ordered  the  deputy  judge 
advocate-general  in  each  division  to  keep  a  register  of  all  courts-martial,  in  which  the  confirming 
general  had  noted  his  opinion  on  "the  quality  of  the  proceedings,  the  aptitude  of  the  finding  and 
sentence,  and  of  the  Commanding  Officer's  procedure  thereon".  19  If  the  proceedings  were  not 
satisfactory,  the  general  could  set  aside  the  sentence  of  the  court-martial.  "Reversal  of  sentence  was 
never  directed  without  the  most  cogent  reasons,  "  commented  Major-General  Birch,  "but  no  doubt  the 
practice  was  one  which  worked  ill  for  the  discipline  of  the  regiments.  40 
The  authority  of  commanding  officers  with  regard  to  courts-martial  was  further  reduced  by  Lord 
Combermere's  general  order  of  March  1827,  which  limited  the  award  of  corporal  punishment  in  the 
Bengal  native  army  to  the  crimes  of  stealing,  marauding  or  gross  insubordination.  It  also  directed  that 
dismissal  from  the  service  would  invariably  follow  the  infliction  of  such  punishment  and  that,  in  line 
with  Hastings'  general  order,  the  divisional  commander's  sanction  would  be  required.  21  In  Madras  and 
17  Col.  J.  S.  Hodgson,  Opinionson  the  IndianArmy.  ofiginallypublishedatMeerutin  1850,  under  the 
title  qfMusings  on  Military  Matters  (London,  1857),  p.  136. 
18  Replies  by  Major-General  Birch,  28  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  61,  p.  439. 
19  G.  O.  C.  C.,  6  Nov.  1818,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  OIOC,  L/MIL/17/2/435. 
20  Replies  by  Major-General  Birch,  28  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  I-LC.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  61,  p.  440. 
21  Bentincles  minute  on  army  corporal  punishment,  16  Feb.  1835,  Philips  (ed.  ),  Bentinck 
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Bombay,  meanwhile,  commanding  officers  still  had  the  authority  to  confirm  the  sentences  of 
regimental  courts-martial,  including  flogging  for  a  whole  host  of  minor  offences.  This  was  probably 
down  to  the  influence  of  the  Governors  of  Madras  and  Bombay,  Sir  Thomas  Munro  and  the  Hon. 
Mountstuart  Elphinstone,  neither  of  whom  were  convinced  by  the  Utilitarian  creed  of  centralization. 
Some  temporary  relief  was  provided  for  commanding  officers  in  Bengal  by  Sir  Edward  Bames, 
Commander-in-Chief  of  India  (1832-33),  who  came  to  the  conclusion  that  this  interference  in  inferior 
courts-martial  by  divisional  commanders  had  led  to  "some  injurious  consequences".  His  circular  of 
November  1832,  therefore,  overturned  Hastings'  general  order  by  authorizing  the  convening  officers  of 
all  courts-martial  to  confirm  and  carry  into  effect  the  sentences  (the  only  exception  being  a  sentence  of 
22  imprisonment  with  or  without  hard  labour).  The  circular  also  undermined  Combermere's  general 
order  by  giving  a  commanding  officer  "the  power  to  confirm  or  not  a  sentence  of  corporal  punishment, 
and  to  discharge  a  sepoy  sentenced  to  flogging  instead  of  inflicting  that  punishment".  23  But  this  power 
would  not  be  enjoyed  for  long. 
On  succeeding  Barnes  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  India  in  late  1833  (whilst  also  retaining  the  civil 
post  of  Governor-General),  Lord  William  Bentinck  set  up  military  committees  in  each  presidency  to 
report  upon  the  well  being  of  their  respective  armies.  Of  particular  interest  to  Bentinck  was  the 
expediency  of  abolishing  flogging.  "I  had  long  been  of  opinion,  "  he  wrote  in  1835,  "that  without  some 
reason  of  much  more  urgent  necessity  than  any  I  had  heard  this  degradation  could  no  longer  be  inflicted 
upon  the  high  caste  sepoy  of  the  Bengal  Army".  The  general  feeling  among  all  three  military 
committees  was  that  flogging  could  not  be  abolished  entirely  without  endangering  the  discipline  of  the 
service,  though  some  form  of  restriction  was  desirable.  The  Madras  Committee,  for  example, 
suggested  giving  courts-martial  the  authority  to  award  solitary  confinement  instead  of  corporal 
punishment,  while  the  Bengal  and  Bombay  Committees  advised  limiting  the  award  of  corporal 
punishment  to  general  courts-martial  (though  the  Bombay  Committee  also  thought  that  offences  which 
regimental  courts-martial  could  punish  by  dismissal  should  also  incur  sentences  of  flogging).  But 
Bentinck  condemned  these  recommendations  as  "prejudice"  and  "opposed  to  reason",  highlighting 
instead  comments  made  by  a  majority  of  the  Madras  Committee  and  a  minority  of  the  Bengal 
Committee  that  "young  men  of  respectable  connections  are  deterred  from  entering  the  ranks,  and  that  it 
22  Circular  No.  1661A,  2  Nov.  1832,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,010C, 
L/MIL/17/2/435. 
23  Replies  by  Major-General  Birch,  28  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx,  61,  p.  440. 129 
produces  a  baneful  moral  influence  upon  the  pride,  the  manly  feeling  and  character  of  the  whole 
service".  24  The  fear  of  discouraging  high-caste  recruits  was  the  main  reason  the  lash  was  already  less 
prominent  in  Bengal  than  in  the  other  two  presidencies.  From  1829  to  1833,  the  average  annual 
incidence  of  flogging  was  7.59  men  per  Bengal  regiment  (or  roughly  one  per  cent),  23.79  men  per 
Madras  regiment  (roughly  three  per  cent),  and  36.54  men  per  Bombay  regiment  (roughly  four  and  a 
half  per  cent).  25 
Such  arguments  dovetailed  nicely  with  Bentinck's  Utilitarian  belief  that  human  character  could  be 
transformed  by  enlightened  legislation.  With  the  concurrence  of  the  Council  of  India,  therefore,  he 
abolished  corporal  punishment  (the  cat  o'  nine  tails  and  the  rattan)  throughout  the  native  Indian  army  by 
a  general  order  of  February  1835.  Henceforth,  minor  courts-martial  were  empowered  to  dismiss 
soldiers  for  offences  that  had  formerly  been  punishable  by  flogging,  though  all  such  sentences  had  to  be 
confirmed  by  divisional  commanders.  26  Thus  were  some  of  the  powers  conferred  on  commanding 
officers  by  Barnes's  order  of  1832  removed. 
Most  of  the  Indian  military  regarded  the  abolition  of  flogging  as  a  mistake,  particularly  those  British 
Army  officers  who  occupied  the  senior  commands.  Their  colleagues  were  in  the  process  of  seeing  off  a 
sustained  campaign  by  Radical  Ws  to  abolish  flogging  in  the  British  Army,  though  the  maximum 
number  of  lashes  awardable  by  regimental  and  district  courts-martial  had  been  limited  in  1833  to  200 
and  300  respectively.  27  Wellington  was  the  most  strident  supporter  of  corporal  punishment.  He 
believed,  as  did  many  in  India,  that  army  discipline  depended  upon  the  regimental  commanding  officer 
having  the  ultimate  threat  of  flogging  to  back  up  his  power  to  impose  summary  punishments.  Without 
it,  he  informed  the  Adjutant-General,  "We  might  as  well  pretend  to  extinguish  the  lights  in  our  houses 
or  theatres  by  extinguishers  made  of  paper  as  to  maintain  the  discipline  of  the  army".  The  statistics 
seemed  to  confirm  Wellington's  argument.  In  1826,5,524  courts-martial  resulted  in  2,242  cases  of 
flogging,  in  1834  (despite  a  reduction  in  the  establishment  of  the  British  Army  by  8,000  men),  10,212 
courts-martial  resulted  in  just  963  cases  of  flogging.  In  other  words,  as  the  use  of  flogging  declined  the 
overall  crime  rate  increased.  Yet  more  parliamentary  calls  for  abolition  in  1833  forced  the  military 
24  Bentinck's  minute  on  army  corporal  punishment,  16  Feb.  1835,  Philips  (ed.  ),  Bentinck 
Correspondence,  II,  pp.  1426,143  0-  1. 
25  Douglas  M.  Peers,  'Sepoys,  Soldiers  and  the  Lash:  Race,  Caste  and  Army  Discipline  in  India,  1820- 
501,  JICH,  Vol.  23:  2,1995,  p.  229. 
26  G.  O.  G.  G.,  24  February  1835,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  OIOC, 
L/MIL/17/2/435. 
27  Peers,  'Sepoys,  Soldiers  and  the  Lash',  XCH,  23:  2,1995,  p.  233. 130 
authorities  to  agree  to  restrict  flogging  to  the  punishment  of  mutiny,  insubordination  or  violence, 
drunkenness  on  duty,  the  sale  of  equipment,  stealing  or  disgraceful  conduct.  Only  thus  could  they  save 
for  regimental  courts-martial  the  right  to  award  corporal  punishment.  The  calls  for  abolition  were 
temporarily  silenced  by  the  setting  up  of  a  Royal  Commission  on  corporal  punishment  which  published 
its  report  in  1836.  "It  endorsed  the  views  of  the  vast  majority  of  commanding  officers,  "  writes  Hew 
Strachan,  "who  agreed  that  corporal  punishment  should  be  inflicted  as  rarely  as  possible  and  anticipated 
its  eventual  abolition,  but  who  were  extremely  reluctant  to  answer  for  their  regiments  without  the  lash.  " 
"  As  a  result,  regimental,  district  and  general  courts-martial  were  limited  to  100,150  and  200  lashes 
respectively.  But  after  the  death  of  a  private  who  had  received  150  lashes  in  1846,  the  maximum 
punishment  was  further  reduced  to  50  lashes  and  restricted  to  general  and  district  courts-martial. 
Corporal  punishment  was  finally  abolished  in  the  British  Army  in  1868. 
Back  in  India  in  the  1830s,  most  senior  officers  of  the  native  armies  were  vehemently  opposed  to 
abolition.  In  a  memorandum  of  November  1836,  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Robert  O'Callaghan, 
Commander-in-Chief  of  Madras  (1831-8),  stated  his  belief  "that  there  may  be  occasions,  even  in 
cantonment,  when  the  power  of  resorting  to  corporal  punishment  would  alone  prove  adequate  to  the 
maintenance  of  order,  while  in  the  field,  on  the  march,  the  want  of  that  power  may  lead  to  the  most 
disastrous  consequence".  These  remarks  were  prompted  in  part  by  the  high  incidence  of  indiscipline 
displayed  by  Madras  troops  during  their  service  in  Goomsur  in  1836,  the  first  time  they  had  seen  action 
since  the  end  of  flogging.  His  advice  therefore  was  for  flogging  to  be  reintroduced  "in  cantonments  for 
acts  of  mutiny  or  violence  against  a  superior  officer,  or  disgraceful  crimes,  and  when  marching  in  the 
field  for  all  offences  at  discretion  09  Sir  Henry  Fane,  Commander-in-Chief  of  India  (1835-39),  was 
sufficiently  impressed  by  the  concerns  expressed  by  O'Callaghan  and  other  Madras  officers  to  pass 
them  on  to  Lord  Auckland,  the  new  Governor-General  (183  6-42) 
. 
30  Further  representations  were  made 
in  1838  by  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Peregrine  Maitland,  O'Callaghan's  successor,  who  called  for  the 
reintroduction  of  corporal  punishment  "in  extreme  or  disgraceful  cases  11,3  1  and  in  1839  by  Sir  Jasper 
Nicolls,  Fane's  succesor,  who  noted  that  the  abolition  of  flogging  "has  been  productive  of  the  worst 
consequences  to  the  discipline  of  the  Native  Army,  and  probably  of  serious  discontent  amongst  the 
28  Strachan,  Wellington's  Legacy,  p.  81. 
29  Memorandum  by  the  Adjutant-General  of  Madras,  8  March  1836,  'Copy  of  Correspondence  & 
Minutes  from  C-in-C  India  &  others  on  Bentinck's  G.  O.  of  1835  abolishing  corporal  punishment, 
OIOC,  L/MIL/5/417/341. 
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European  soldiery,  the  sooner  it  can  be  restored  the  better".  32  Additional  pressure  for  the  reintroduction 
of  flogging  was  brought  to  bear  by  the  Madras  government,  the  Court  of  Directors  and  the  Board  of 
Control.  33 
But  Auckland  -  who,  like  Bentinck,  had  a  strong  moral  objection  to  flogging  -  retorted  by  pointing  out 
that  the  recent  high  incidence  of  indiscipline  in  the  Bengal  Army  was  caused  by  a  sudden  influx  of 
34 
recruits  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Afghan  War  in  1838.  His  position  was  bolstered  by  the  opinion  of 
officers  like  Major-General  Sir  William  Casement,  the  Military  Member  of  the  Supreme  Council  and  a 
former  native  infantry  commanding  officer,  who  argued  that  the  "recent  addition  to  the  flower  of  our 
native  army"  was  due  to  the  abolition  of  corporal  punishment  and  that  its  restoration  would  "create 
extensive  disgust  with  our  service"  . 
35  The  only  concession  Auckland  was  prepared  to  make  was  the 
reintroduction  of  flogging  for  camp  followers  in  1839. 
Most  native  troops  were  naturally  pleased  with  abolition.  In  1838,  a  senior  Bengal  subedar  told 
Captain  Sleeman,  his  former  officer,  that  there  was  not  one  native  officer  in  a  hundred  who  did  not 
regard  the  end  of  the  lash  in  a  positive  light.  "Flogging  was  an  odious  thing,  "  he  explained.  "A  man 
was  disgraced,  not  only  before  his  regiment,  but  before  the  crowd  that  assembled  to  witness  the 
punishment.  "  Abolition,  on  the  other  hand,  had  "reduced  the  number  of  courts-martial  to  one-quarter  of 
what  they  were  before,  and  thereby  lightened  the  duties  of  the  officer".  It  had  also  made  bad  men  more 
orderly.  The  subedar  explained: 
A  bad  man  formerly  went  on  reck-Icssly  from  small  offences  to  great  ones  in  the  hope  of  impunity.  He  knew  that 
no  regimental,  cantonment  or  brigade  court-martial  could  sentence  him  to  be  dismissed  the  service;  and  that  they 
would  not  sentence  him  to  be  flogged,  except  for  great  crimes,  because  it  involved  at  the  same  time  dismissal  from 
the  service.  If  they  sentenced  him  to  be  flogged,  he  still  hoped  that  the  punishment  would  be  remitted...  Now  he 
knows  that  these  courts  can  sentence  him  to  be  dismissed  from  the  service  -  that  he  is  liable  to  lose  his  bread  for 
ordinary  transgressions,  and  be  sentenced  to  work  on  the  roads  for  graver  ones.  He  is  in  consequence  much  more 
under  restraint  than  he  used  to  be.  36 
31  Maitland  to  Fane,  18  Dec.  1838,  ibid. 
32  Minute  by  Sir  Jasper  Nicolls,  7  Jan.  1839,  ibid. 
33  Peers,  'Sepoys,  Soldiers  and  the  Lash',  XCH,  23:  2,1995,  p.  236. 
34  Ibid.,  p.  239. 
35  Minute  by  Sir  William  Casement,  29  July  1839,  OIOC,  L/MIU5/417/341. 
36  Sleeman,  Rambles  andRecollections,  p.  616. 132 
On  the  other  hand,  this  same  subedar  (as  already  mentioned)  did  not  believe  that  abolishing  the  use  of 
the  rattan  was  in  the  interest  of  regimental  discipline.  And  not  all  native  soldiers  were  glad  to  see  the 
end  of  the  lash.  One  old  Bengal  subedar  of  more  than  30  years'service  remarked:  "Tauj  be  dar  hoaa 
(The  army  has  lost  its  fear).  07  Sitaram  Pandy  was  of  a  similar  opinion,  38  as  were  most  European 
officers.  According  to  Sleeman,  the  vast  majority  thought  that  the  abolition  of  corporal  punishment  in 
general  had  been,  or  would  be,  "attended  with  bad  consequences".  In  the  early  1840s,  Sleeman  himself 
condemned  the  "odious  distinction  which  it  leaves  in  the  punishments  to  which  our  European  and  our 
native  soldiers  are  liable",  arguing  instead  that  corporal  punishment  should  apply  to  all  soldiers  in  India 
for  mutiny  and  gross  insubordination  in  cantonments,  and  for  plunder  or  violence  while  in  the  field.  39 
In  1839,  in  response  to  this  chorus  of  criticism  by  European  officers,  the  Supreme  Council  of  India 
gave  regimental,  district  and  general  courts-martial  the  additional  authority  to  sentence  native  soldiers 
to  periods  of  imprisonment  with  or  without  hard  labour  for  up  to  six  months,  one  year  and  two  years 
respectively  for  the  same  crimes  that  had  formerly  been  punishable  by  flogging.  The  down  side  for 
regimental  colonels  was  that  only  those  sentenced  to  imprisonment  with  hard  labour  for  any  period,  or 
to  imprisonment  without  hard  labour  for  periods  exceeding  six  months  -  and  therefore  outside  the  remit 
of  regimental  courts-martial  -  would  also  be  dismissed.  Furthermore,  all  sentences  of  imprisonment 
required  the  confirmation  of  the  local  major-general  . 
40  As  if  this  was  not  enough,  Bengal  commanding 
officers  were  then  denied  the  right  to  try  sepoys  for  desertion  before  a  regimental  court-martial  by  Sir 
Jasper  Nicholls'  general  order  of  1840.  In  future  just  general  courts-martial  were  to  have  that  power; 
inferior  courts  could  only  try  soldiers  on  the  lesser  charge  of  absence  without  leave.  41  A  year  later, 
Nicholls  restricted  the  sentences  of  regimental  courts-martial  to  six  months'  deprivation  of  pay  and  20 
days'  solitary  confinement.  42 
It  was  not  until  the  Governor-Generalship  of  Sir  Henry  (later  Lord)  Hardinge  (1844-8),  a  Tory,  that 
various  measures  were  introduced  to  bolster  the  powers  of  commanding  officers.  Chief  among  them 
was  the  reintroduction  of  flogging.  Even  before  leaving  London,  Hardinge  had  sounded  out  Sir  Charles 
Napier,  then  Governor  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  Sind,  as  to  the  feasibility  of  bringing  back  the 
37  Barat,  Yhe  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  p.  165. 
38  Lunt  (ed.  ).  F-rom  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  75. 
39  Sleeman,  Rambles  andRecolleclions,  pp.  619  &  621. 
40  G.  O.  P.  C.,  2  Oct.  1839,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1817  to  1840,  OIOC,  LIMIU17/2/435. 
41  G.  O.  C.  C.,  5  May  1840,  ibid. 
42  G.  O.  C.  C.,  29  March  1841,  ibid. 133 
43  ca  lash.  His  reason  for  so  doing,  he  told  the  Queen  in  a  letter  of  October  1845,  was  be  use  the  most 
experienced  ofticers  in  India  believed  that  the  discipline  of  the  army  had  "greatly  degenerated  since 
1835",  as  proved  by  the  recent  rash  of  mutinies  by  Bengal  and  Madras  regiments,  particularly  those 
ordered  to  serve  in  Sind.  Hardinge's  own  conviction  was  that  the  introduction  of  imprisonment  with 
hard  labour  for  offences  formerly  punishable  with  flogging  had  not  been  a  success,  not  least  because 
the  sepoys  considered  it  to  be  "more  hurtful  to  their  feelings  by  the  loss  of  caste  than  the  former 
punishment  of  corporal  punishment".  His  preference  was  for  the  reinstatement  of  flogging  without 
mandatory  dismissal  for  "military  offences  such  as  insubordination  and  other  irregularities  incident  to 
the  life  of  a  soldier"  committed  on  the  line  of  march  or  in  the  field,  while  disgracefiil  crimes  such  as 
stealing  would  continue  to  be  punished  by  imprisonment  with  hard  labour  and  the  loss  of  livelihood.  44 
In  other  words,  he  believed  that  high-caste  Hindus  would  regard  being  flogged  and  retained  in  the 
service  as  less  disgraceful  than  being  sent  to  work  in  a  chain-gang  with  common  felons  before  being 
discharged.  Bentinck  had  regarded  immediate  discharge  as  less  disgracefiil  than  flogging.  Both  were 
eager  to  placate  the  high-caste  sepoys  who  dominated  the  Bengal  Army. 
But  the  "uncertain  temper"  of  the  native  army  -  thanks  to  the  recent  disasters  in  Afghanistan  and  the 
spate  of  mutinies  over  pay  -  required  Hardinge  to  proceed  with  caution.  He  therefore  made  discreet 
enquiries  of  the  senior  civil  and  military  officers  in  India  as  to  the  desirability  of  restoring  corporal 
punishment.  The  response  was  all  but  unanimous.  "Every  Governor,  Councillor,  and  Commander  in 
Chief  and  the  great  majority  of  the  General  and  field  officers  have  concurred  in  the  necessity  of  this 
measure,  "  he  informed  the  Queen.  "The  public  press  of  India  have  taken  the  same  view.  "  In  August 
1845,  to  sweeten  the  pill,  he  made  the  native  army  a  number  of  financial  concesssions  such  as  increased 
allowances  for  those  serving  in  Sind  and  hutting  money  (see  Chapter  2).  45 
Flogging  was  formally  reintroduced  by  the  enactment  of  the  first  Articles  of  War  that  applied  to  all 
three  presidency  armies  in  September  1845.  They  empowered  all  courts-martial  to  award  up  to  50 
lashes  for  a  wide  range  of  offences,  including  'disgraceful'  crimes  such  as  stealing,  embezzlement  and 
the  self-infliction  of  wounds  to  avoid  service.  46  But  because  Hardinge  was  anxious  to  restrict  the 
infliction  of  corporal  punishment  "to  offences  of  a  strictly  military  nature,  the  delinquent  remaining 
43  Hardinge  to  Napier,  7  June  1844,  Napier  Papers,  BL,  Add.  MSS  54517,  ff.  55-8. 
44  Hardinge  to  the  Queen,  22  Oct  1845,  Peel  Papers,  BL,  Add.  MSS  40475,  ff.  45-7. 
45  Ibid.,  ff.  51-2. 
46  Articles  of  War,  Act  No.  XX  of  6  September  1845,  OIOC,  W8/32. 134 
within  the  service,,  '47 
he  also  announced  a  resolution  of  the  Supreme  Council  which  stated  that 
flogging  could  only  be  awarded  for  the  crimes  of  mutiny,  insubordination,  violence,  using  or  offering 
violence  to  superior  officers  and  drunkenness  on  duty.  In  ordinary  circumstances  and  in  cantonments  it 
was  not  to  be  inflicted  for  disgraceful  conduct.  But  on  the  line  of  march,  on  board  a  ship  or  on  service 
in  the  field  the  full  power  of  the  Articles  of  War  could  "be  exercised  according  to  the  absolute  necessity 
of  the  case".  Officers  in  command  of  troops  were  to  "clearly  understand"  that  the  object  of  the 
resolution  was  to  "inflict  corporal  punishment  as  seldom  as  possible,  commuting  it  for  other 
punishment  in  all  cases  where  it  can  be  done  with  safety  to  the  discipline  of  the  army".  48  A  further 
restriction  was  imposed  in  Bengal  by  the  issue  of  an  Adjutant-General's  circular  in  1846  which  warned 
commanding  officers  to  take  account  of  the  "state  of  the  weather  at  the  time  of  inflicting  punishment" 
because  "extreme  heat,  cold  or  damp"  might  affect  the  health  of  the  flogged  soldier.  49 
The  overall  effect  of  these  restrictions  was  that  flogging  was  used  sparingly  in  all  three  presidencies 
(see  Tables  34  ,  35  and  36).  50  During  the  period  1850  to  1854,  the  lash  was  inflicted  upon  an  average 
ofjust  24.2  Bengal  sepoys  per  annum,  20.2  Madras  sepoys  and  12.6  Bombay  sepoys.  If  we  take  into 
account  the  relative  size  of  the  Bengal  Army  -  two  and  half  times  that  of  Madras  and  three  times  that  of 
Bombay  -  it  had  by  far  the  lowest  incidence  of  corporal  punishment:  an  average  of  0.02%,  compared 
with  0.04%  in  Madras  and  0.03%  in  Bombay.  By  contrast,  the  average  annual  incidence  of  flogging  in 
the  pre-abolition  period  of  1829  to  1833  was  about  1%  (50  times  greater)  in  the  Bengal  Army,  3%  (75 
times  greater)  in  the  Madras  Army  and  4.5%  (more  than  a  ISO  times  greater)  in  the  Bombay  Army. 
The  disparity  in  the  incidence  of  flogging  between  Bengal  and  the  other  presidencies  was  therefore  not 
as  great  as  it  had  been  before  abolition.  But  the  frequency  of  corporal  punishment  after  reintroduction 
was  much,  much  lower.  So  low,  in  fact,  that  Bengal  sepoys  did  not  regard  it  as  a  deterrent  to 
indiscipline.  In  his  evidence  to  the  Peel  Commission,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Master  of  the  7h  Bengal  L.  C. 
made  no  distinction  between  abolition  and  reinstatement.  "I  think  that  the  abolition  of  flogging  did 
more  harm  to  the  army  than  anything  else,  "  he  declared.  "My  own  native  officers  have  often  said  to 
47  Replies  by  Major-General  Birch,  28  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  61,  p.  436. 
48  Resolution  of  the  Supreme  Council  of  India,  30  Aug.  1845,  ibid. 
49  Adjt.  -Gen.  's  Circular,  No.  2317,20  Oct.  1846,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1840  to  1847,  OIOC, 
IJMUJ17/2/436. 
50  India  Military  Consulations,  OIOC,  P/43/37,  P/44/18  and  P/45/59,  No.  5  of  30  April  1852,  No.  333 
of  4  April  1853  and  No.  41  of  13  April  1855. 135 
me,  'As  long  as  that  rod  was  hanging  over  that  bad  man's  head  he  was  all  right,  but  now  they  do  not 
care  for  the  commanding  officer  or  anyone  else.  ,,  51 
Table  34  -  Corporal  punishment  in  the  Bengal  Native  Army  1850-4 
Year  Corporal  punishment  inflicted  Corporal  punishment  not  inflicted 
With 
discharge 
Without 
discharge 
Total  Remitted  Set  aside  Total 
1850  0  25  25  0  0  0 
1851  1  0  17  17  0  0  0 
1852  0  21  1  21  9  11  10 
1853  2  27  29  1  0  1 
1854  0  29  29  0  0  0 
As  well  as  reintroducing  corporal  punishment  on  a  limited  scale,  the  1845  Articles  of  War  were  also 
designed  to  bolster  the  authority  of  commanding  officers  in  all  three  armies  by  restoring  to  them  the 
power  to  confirm  all  sentences  passed  by  a  regimental  court-martial,  including  flogging,  reduction  to 
Table  35  -  Corporal  punishment  in  the  Madras  Native  Army  1850-4 
Year  Corporal  punishment  inflicted  Corporal  punishment  not  inflicted 
With 
discharge 
Without 
discharge 
Total  Remitted  Set  aside  Total 
1850  0  14  14  0  1  1 
1851  0  19  19  0  2  2 
1852  0  21  1  21  1  01  1 
1853  0  19  19  3  0  3 
1854  1  27  28  2  1  3 
the  ranks,  loss  of  seniority,  up  to  six  months'  imprisonment  with  or  withour  hard  labour,  solitary 
confinement  and  dismissal,  They  also  gave  them  extensive  powers  to  commute  and  mitigate  sentences. 
But  commanding  officers  could  not  carry  into  effect  the  sentences  of  corporal  punishment,  dismissal  or 
Table  36  -  Corporal  punishment  in  the  Bombay  Native  Army  1850-4 
Year  Corporal  punishment  inflicted  Corporal  punishment  not  inflicted 
With 
discharge 
Without 
discharge 
Total  Remitted  Set  aside  1  Total  1 
1850  2  8  10  5  0  5 
1851  1  7  8  2  0  2 
1852  L  13  14  1  0  0  0 
1853  0  21  21  0  0 
1854  2  8  10  0  0  0 
51  Evidence  of  Lt.  -Col.  R.  Master,  P.  P.,  RC.,  1959,  V,  p.  61. 136 
imprisonment  with  hard  labour,  nor  could  they  mitigate  or  commute  such  sentences,  without  higher 
authority.  52  These  limitations  were  removed  by  the  revised  Articles  of  War  in  1847  which  gave 
commanding  officers  the  "power  to  confirm  and  carry  into  effect,  or  to  mitigate,  all  Sentences 
whatever"  passed  by  a  regimental  court-martial.  53 
However,  regimental  courts-martial  were  excluded  from  trying  a  range  of  offences,  including 
insubordination  and  'disgraceful'  crimes  such  as  stealing  and  fraud.  Commanding  officers  were 
therefore  allowed  to  try  in  regimental  courts-martial  some  of  the  less  serious  crimes  normally  reserved 
for  district  or  garrison  courts-martial  -  but  only  after  permission  had  been  obtained  from  higher 
authority.  54  In  practice,  however,  this  discretionary  power  was  quickly  abused.  In  1846,  Lord  Gough, 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  was  forced  to  issue  a  general  order  informing  commanding  officers  that  he 
had  had  to  overturn  a  number  of  sentences  of  dismissal  because,  though  "convicted  on  clear  evidence  of 
disgraceful  conduct  or  of  insubordination",  the  sepoys  had  been  "tried  by  inferior  Courts  Martial 
without  due  permission  obtained,  or  tried  under  inaccurate  charges,  or  sentenced  to  punishments  not  in 
accordance  with  the  Articles  of  War  and  the  Orders  of  Government".  In  future,  commanding  officers 
were  directed  to  pay  special  attention  to  all  these  requirements.  " 
But  even  when  courts-martial  were  legitimate,  Bengal  sepoys  had  the  opportunity  to  overturn 
convictions  by  petitioning  the  Commander-in-Chief.  Sitaram  recalled  one  particularly  farcical  episode 
when  a  havildar,  on  being  sentenced  to  dismissal  for  insolence  to  a  superior  officer,  turned  to  his 
commanding  officer  and  told  him  that  he  would  go  straight  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  lodge  an 
appeal.  The  result  of  that  appeal  was  that  he  was  restored  to  his  regiment,  "thereby  laughing  in  the  face 
of  the  General,  Brigadier  and  his  Commanding  Officer".  Sitaram  added:  "No  sepoy  worried  about  a 
court-martial  at  that  time,  but  this  was  in  the  days  when  any  complaint  received  attention  from  the 
Commander-in-ChieC  The  Colonel  sahib  was  furious,  but  he  had  no  power,  and  what  could  he  do?  06 
In  theory,  no  native  soldier  could  petition  his  Commander-in-Chief  except  through  the  medium  of  his 
commanding  officer.  Yet  in  the  Bengal  Army  petitions  were  regularly  sent  from  sepoys  directly  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  without  censure;  and  to  add  insult  to  injury,  these  appeals  were  oflen  upheld. 
Brigadier  Coke  told  the  Royal  Commission  that  many  Bengal  commanding  officers  had  had  men  who 
52  Article  76,  Articles  of  War,  Act  XX  of  6  Sept  1845,  OIOC,  V/8/32. 
53  Article  79,  Articles  of  War,  Act  MIX  of  18  Dec  1847,  OIOC,  LIMIU17/11/14. 
54  Article  65,  Articles  of  War,  Act  XX  of  6  Sept  1845,  OIOC,  V/8/32. 
55  G.  O.  C.  C.,  15  May  1846,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1840  to  1847,  OIOC,  LMIU17/2/436. 137 
had  been  dismissed  as  unfit,  or  by  sentence  of  a  court-martial,  returned  to  their  regiments  afler  they  had 
presented  petitions  at  headquarters.  The  general  feeling  engendered  among  sepoys  by  these  and  other 
similar  acts  (such  as  the  lack  of  "discretion  to  promote,  save  by  seniority"),  thought  Coke,  was  "that 
their  commanding  officer  was  helpless  to  punish  or  reward".  This  gradual  erosion  of  a  commanding 
57 
officer's  power  was,  in  Coke's  opinion,  "one  of  the  principal  causes  of  bringing  about  the  mutiny". 
Many  other  officers  agreed.  In  an  1851  essay,  John  Jacob  listed  eight  serious  defects  of  the  Bengal 
Army,  the  second  of  which  was  the  "want  of  power  placed  in  the  hands  of  regimental  commanding 
officers"  and  the  "want  of  confidence  reposed  in,  and  support  afforded  to  them,  by  the  Commander  in 
Chief  and  by  Government".  58  Three  years  later,  in  a  subsequent  essay,  he  expanded  upon  this  point. 
To  be  in  a  "really  efficient  state",  sepoys  needed  to  regard  their  commanding  officer  as  "their  absolute 
prince  -  as  the  paramount  authority".  Yet  by  concentrating  all  real  power  at  army  headquarters,  the 
authorities  had  done  considerable  harm.  "In  many  instances,  "  wrote  Jacob,  "the  sepoy  has  been  allowed 
and  encouraged  to  look  on  his  regimental  commander  as  his  natural  enemy;  and,  in  the  Bengal  Army,  at 
least,  to  forward  secret  complaints  against  him  to  army  head-quarters.  While  courts-martial,  articles  of 
war,  rules  and  regulations,  bewilder  the  native  soldier,  and  fill  his  mind  with  the  idea  that  his  officers 
are  wishing  to  keep  him  out  of  his  rights".  In  Jacob's  opinion,  the  only  principle  of  military  discipline 
which  a  native  soldier  "thoroughly  understands  is  obedience  to  his  commanding  officer".  As  such,  it 
was  vitally  important  that  "enlistment,  discharge,  promotion  to  all  ranks,  and  everything  else  should  rest 
with  the  regimental  commander  alone".  59  These  were,  of  course,  the  very  powers  that  Jacob  enjoyed  as 
commanding  officer  of  the  Sind  Irregular  Horse  (a  system  of  command  that,  according  to  his  successor, 
Major  Merewether,  produced  "perfect  trust,  confidence,  and  mutual  respect  on  all  sides"  and  the  "best 
and  most  satisfactory  state  of  discipline").  60  Yet  Jacob  was  well  aware  that  he  and  other  irregular 
officers  had  been  selected,  whereas  regular  commanding  officers  had  risen  through  seniority,  and  that 
something  had  to  be  done  about  the  quality  of  the  latter  before  they  could  be  entrusted  with  more 
power. 
Many  of  these  points  were  echoed  by  Subedar  Sitaram  Pandy  after  the  mutiny.  He  wrote: 
56  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  75. 
57  Replies  of  Lt.  Col.  H.  M.  Durand,  4  September  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  71,  p.  557. 
58  'The  Defects  of  theBengal  Army,  1851,  Pelly  (ed.  ),  Views  and  Opinions,  p.  102. 
59  'Remarks  on  the  State  of  the  Native  Army  of  India  in  General',  1854,  ibid.,  p.  125. 
60  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  6,  p.  367. 138 
The  Articles  of  War  are  often  read  out  to  regiments,  but  the  language  is  seldom  understood,  being  nearly  all  Persian 
and  Arabic...  [A]  sepoy  does  not  require  a  lot  of  rules  and  regulations  to  be  read  out  to  him.  They  only  fill  his  head 
with  doubts  and  fears.  He  should  look  upon  his  Commander  as  his  father  and  mother,  his  protector,  his  god,  and  as 
such  be  taught  to  obey  him.  We  do  not  understand  divided  power;  absolute  power  is  what  we  worship.  Power  is 
much  divided  among  the  English...  The  Commanding  Officer  has  to  ask  half  a  dozen  off  icers:  before  he  can  punish 
a  scpoy  and  the  permission  takes  months  before  it  is  received.  By  the  time  the  punishment  is  inflicted,  half  the  men 
will  have  forgotten  all  about  the  case  and  the  effect  of  the  punishment  entirely  lost.  "' 
As  the  extent  of  the  disaffection  in  the  Bengal  Army  became  evident  in  1857,  an  increasing  number  of 
military  and  civilian  officials  identified  the  weakening  of  commanding  officers'  authority  as  a 
contributory  factor.  In  May  1857,  before  he  had  learned  of  the  outbreak  proper,  Robert  Vernon  Smith, 
the  President  of  the  Board  of  Control,  was  informed  by  Colonel  Tait  of  the  3d  Bengal  I.  C.  that  there 
was  "a  severance  between  the  officers  &  men  of  the  Native  Infantry"  that  was  likely  to  interfere  with 
the  good  feeling  that  used  to  exist,  and  that  he  attributed  it  "very  much  to  the  late  regulation  for 
transferring  all  power  to  the  C-in-C  which  used  to  be  given  more  to  Regimental  officers".  Vernon 
Smith  told  Canning  that  he  had  heard  similar  comments  from  "many  quarters"  and  that  "all  recent 
changes"  had  "tended  towards  the  same  severance".  62 
In  mid-June,  Vernon  Smith  received  a  letter  from  Lord  Elphinstone,  the  Governor  of  Bombay,  which 
repeated  the  point  Jacob  had  made  in  his  1854  essay  on  the  state  of  the  native  army.  It  was  because  the 
seniority  system  had  produced  "the  most  incapable  officers  in  command  of  regiments  &  even  of 
stations  &  divisions",  wrote  Elphinstone,  that  it  had  become  necessary  to  "concentrate  authority  as 
much  as  possible  in  the  hands  of  the  Commander-in-Chief".  The  evil  effects  of  such  a  system  of 
concentration  were  "more  felt  in  the  large  army  of  Bengal,  occupying  such  an  immense  extent  of 
country,  than  in  the  smaller  armies  of  the  subordinate  Presidencies".  As  a  result,  discipline  in  the 
Bengal  Army  had  "relaxed  to  a  degree  which  appears  hardly  credible".  63 
But  most  telling  of  all  were  the  assertions  made  by  Sir  Patrick  Grant  in  a  memorandum  to  Canning 
during  his  brief  stint  as  acting  Commander-in-Chief  of  India  in  the  summer  of  1857.  Four  years  earlier, 
while  giving  evidence  to  a  Parliamentary  select  committee,  Grant  had  insisted  that  the  powers  of 
61  Lunt  (ed.  ),  Rrom  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  74-5. 
62  Vernon  Smith  to  Canning,  26  May  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F231/4. 
63  Elphinstone  to  Vernon  Smith,  14  June  1857,  ibid.,  MSS  Eur/F231/5. 139 
Bengal  commanding  officers  were  "sufficient  ifjudiciously  exercised".  64  By  the  outbreak  of  mutiny, 
however,  the  former  Adjutant-General  of  the  Bengal  Army  (and  therefore  a  man  partially  responsible 
for  the  erosion  of  those  powers)  had  altered  his  opinion.  One  of  the  four  main  reasons  why 
dissatisfaction  and  distrust  had  developed  in  the  Bengal  Army,  he  told  Canning,  was  because  officers 
did  not  have  "sufficient  control  over  their  men"  and  were  therefore  "not  looked  up  to  and  respected  as 
they  should  be".  He  cited  four  contributory  factors:  the  "order  preventing  officers  from  punishing  non- 
commissioned  officers  except  by  sentence  of  a  court-martial",  which  was  tantamount  to  saying  that  an 
officer  had  no  authority  over  them  because  it  was  "impossible  to  try  a  man  for  the  thousand  and  one 
trifling  faults  which  made  up  the  sum of  a  bad"  N.  C.  O.;  the  "inability  to  reduce  a  bad  and  careless  non- 
commissioned  officer  except  by  sentence  of  a  court-martial  for  some  very  gross  fault,  and  the 
consequent  laxity  of  discipline  in  the  army";  the  "difficulty  experienced  in  punishing  even  bad  men  by  a 
court-martial,  as  any  legal  flaw,  however,  trifling,  is  sufficient  to  invalidate  the  proceedings",  so  that 
officers  preferred  to  ignore  indiscipline  than  to  demonstrate  "their  own  powerlessness  to  their  men"; 
and  the  encouragement  of  petitions  against  officers  "who  have  either  to  prove  their  case  or  submit  to 
reproof',  while  the  presenter  of  an  unfounded  petition  -  which  was  the  case  99  times  out  of  a  hundred  - 
65 
escaped  "scot  free" 
. 
Grant  then  gave  two  examples  of  how  the  authority  of  regimental  commanding  officers  was  routinely 
undermined  (related  to  him  by  "one  of  the  most  intelligent  field  officers"  in  the  Bengal  Army).  In  the 
first  case,  a  non-commissioned  officer,  who  had  plundered  property  and  then  pedured  himself  to 
conceal  his  crime,  took  his  discharge  to  avoid  a  court-martial.  Some  months  later,  having  petitioned  the 
Commander-in-Chief  to  be  reinstated,  he  was  found  guilty  of  his  offences,  but  still  allowed  to  remain  in 
the  service  and  returned  to  his  regiment.  In  the  second  case,  a  native  officer  tried  to  gain  a  second 
month's  extension  to  his  leave  by  pleading  urgent  business  in  the  civil  courts,  even  though  he  knew  his 
commanding  officer  had  no  power  to  make  such  a  concession.  The  colonel  duly  refused,  instructing 
him  to  return  immediately,  but  despite  several  orders  to  this  effect  the  native  officer  stayed  away  until 
the  end  of  the  second  month.  Arrested  on  his  return,  he  pleaded  illness  as  the  reason  for  his  absence. 
His  commanding  officer's  response  was  to  apply  for  permission  to  court-martial  him  for  disobedience 
and  falsehood.  But  the  divisional  commander  would  not  agree,  pointing  out  that  a  "native  officer  had  a 
64  Evidence  of  Col.  Patrick  Grant,  14  March  1853,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1852-3,  XXVII,  p.  129. 
65  Memorandum  by  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  Patrick  Grant  to  the  Governor-General,  29  June  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859, 
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right  to  expect  that  his  application  would  be  attended  to,  and  the  man  was  released  with  a  reprimand". 
A  few  days  later,  a  "very  excellent  native  officer"  requested  two  months  leave,  and  the  same 
commanding  officer  applied  to  the  same  general  of  division  that  it  should  be  granted.  The  general's 
response  was  that  the  government  was  already  so  liberal  in  its  leave  to  soldiers  that  he  could  not 
consider  such  an  application.  Grant's  only  comment  was  that  "the  system  which  allows  a  commanding 
officer  of  a  regiment  to  be  so  lowered  in  the  eyes  of  his  men,  calls  loudly  for  amendment".  66 
Yhe  United  Service  Gazette,  which  received  much  correspondence  from  both  British  and  East  India 
Company  officers,  was  under  no  illusion  as  to  one  of  the  major  causes  of  disaffection  in  the  Bengal 
Army.  In  early  June  1857,  before  news  of  the  Meerut  and  Delhi  uprisings  had  reached  England,  it 
commented:  "Disipline  has  been  relaxed  by  the  tendency  to  deprive  Commanding  Officers  of  power.  " 
A  month  later,  by  which  time  the  full  picture  was  known,  it  recommended  the  restoration  of 
commanding  officers'powers  of  summary  punishment  and  reward,  including  corporal  punishment,  to 
prevent  mutinies  in  the  future.  "The  old  bonds  which  united  the  Sepoy  to  his  European  Officer  have 
been  loosening  for  a  quarter  of  a  century,  "  opined  its  editor.  "Let  them  be  drawn  closer  by  the  return  to 
the  system  which  prevailed  before  the  late  Lord  W.  Bentinck  assumed  the  command  of  the  Army.  "  67 
Much  of  the  evidence  given  to  the  Peel  Commission  was  in  a  similar  vein.  In  Lord  Clyde's  opinion, 
the  reduced  power  of  Bengal  commanding  officers  had  rendered  them  "almost  cyphers".  He  added: 
"The  commanding  officer  being  thus  crippled,  found  his  only  means  of  getting  influence  with  the  men 
was  by  flattering  and  coaxing  them,  and  thus  discipline  was  still  further  shaken.  In  truth,  it  was  only 
when  it  suited  the  pleasure  and  convenience  of  the  sepoy  that  he  went  heartily  with  the  commanding 
officer.  "  Clyde's  solution  was  to  give  commanding  officers  the  power  to  discharge  sepoys,  demote  non- 
commissioned  officers,  curtail  furlough  and  confine  sepoys  with  stoppages  of  pay,  as  in  the  Queen's 
service.  "But  above  all,  "  he  wrote,  "they  should  be  as  little  interfered  with  as  possible  by  superior 
authorities  in  matters  of  regimental  detail.  The  Asiatic  soldier  must  look  to  his  commanding  officers  as 
very  powerful.  "  If  he  was  inefficient  then  the  Commander-in-Chief  should  have  the  power  to  replace 
him.  68 
The  Punjab  Committee  considered  a  Bengal  commanding  officer's  powers  of  summary  punishment 
to  be  wholly  inadequate: 
66  Ibid.,  p.  497. 
67  yhe  United  Service  Gazette,  6  June  and  II  July  1857. 
68  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  53,  pp.  422-3. 141 
He  could  neither  flog  for  insubordination,  nor  dismiss  for  general  bad  character;  he  could  not  give  extra  duty  to  the 
negligent  soldier,  nor  refuse  furlough  to  an  habitual  offender;  he  could  not  send  a  non-commissioncd  officer  to 
drill,  nor  reduce  without  formal  trial;  and  he  was  even  prohibited  from  confining  one  before  trial,  and  required  to 
put  him  simply  under  arrest.  When  to  all  these  restrictions  is  added  the  facility  of  direct  appeal  through  the  post 
office  by  any  scpoy  to  the  commander-in-chief,  and  even  the  reception  of  anonymous  petitions,  we  can  understand 
how  such  a  system  in  course  of  years  undermined  the  legitimate  influence  of  the  cormnanding  officers,  and 
gradually  reduced  them  to  the  cyphers  which  they  were  found  to  be  in  1857.69 
The  Committee!  s  recommendation  was  simple:  "Trust  the  European  officers  with  power;  train  them  to 
its  exercise;  supersede  them  unhesitatingly  if  they  prove  unequal  to  the  trust;  and  heavily  punish  them  if 
they  abuse  it.  We  may  then  hope  to  hear  no  more  of  mutiny.  00 
According  to  Colonel  Durand,  virtually  all  the  senior  British  and  East  India  Company  officers  he 
consulted  in  India  in  1858  on  behalf  of  the  Peel  Commission  expressed  views  broadly  similar  to  those 
of  the  Punjab  Committee.  They  included  the  Oudh  Committee,  Major-Generals  Sir  Sydney  Cotton,  Sir 
James  Hearsey  and  Sir  James  Hope  Grant,  Brigadiers  Farquharson,  Coke,  Steel  and  Troup,  Colonel 
Burn,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Macpherson  and  Major  Williams.  All  believed  that  the  authority  of 
commanding  officers  needed  to  be  enhanced.  The  Oude  Committee  suggested  that  they  should  have 
the  summary  power  to  flog.  Brigadiers  Farquharson  and  Coke,  and  Colonel  Burn,  went  even  further  by 
recommending  magisterial  powers  (similar  to  those  enjoyed  by  the  commander  of  the  Sind  Irregular 
Horse),  as  well  as  the  power  to  promote,  demote,  dismiss  and  inflict  corporal  punishment.  Coke  would 
have  no  Articles  of  War  and  no  oath  of  loyalty;  standing  orders  and  field  exercise  would  be  sufficient  to 
maintain  drill  and  discipline.  71  General  Mansfield,  Clyde's  chief  of  staff  during  the  mutiny  campaign, 
also  recommended  abolishing  the  Articles  of  War  and  replacing  them  with  "a  set  of  simple  regulations". 
He  too  believed  that  the  power  of  commanding  officers  needed  to  be  increased.  "In  the  eye  of  the 
native,  "  he  noted,  "there  should  be  no  apparent  limit  to  the  power  of  his  immediate  chief  02 
The  lone  voice  of  dissent  was  that  of  Major-General  Birch,  the  Military  Secretary  to  the  Government 
of  India,  who  insisted  that  the  powers  of  regimental  officers  had  neither  increased  nor  diminished  in 
any  perceptible  degree  during  his  period  of  service  in  India.  Birch,  it  will  be  recalled,  had  helped  to 
69  Replies  of  Lt.  -Col.  H.  M.  Durand,  4  Sept  1858,  ibid.,  Appx.  71,  p.  557. 
70  Ibid.,  p.  559. 
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frame  the  Articles  of  War  of  1845  and  1847.  He  now  stated  his  belief  that  the  "greatly  extended  powers 
granted  to  officers  commanding  regiments"  by  those  articles  "must  have  had  at  least  a  beneficial 
tendency  on  the  discipline  of  regiments",  and  where  that  had  not  been  the  case  the  fault  lay  "with  the 
officers  themselves".  Nevertheless  he  was  prepared  to  recommend  an  enhancement  of  certain  powers, 
including  a  commanding  officer's  summary  power  to  demote  N.  C.  O.  s  and  to  award  corporal 
punishment  with  a  rattan  cane.  He  also  believed  that  once  a  commanding  officer  had  confirmed  a 
court-martial's  sentence  of  dismissal,  there  should  be  no  right  of  appeal.  73 
Many  of  the  witnesses  who  appeared  before  the  Peel  Commission  in  London  were  likewise  of  the 
opinion  that  Bengal  commanding  officers  needed  more  authority  over  their  men,  including  enhanced 
powers  to  punish  and  reward.  They  included:  Major-General  Low,  the  former  military  member  of  the 
Supreme  Council  of  India;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wyllie,  a  former  Assistant  Adjutant-General  of  the 
Bengal  Army;  Colonel  Becher,  the  Quartermaster-General  of  the  Bengal  Army;  Sir  George  Clerk,  the 
former  Governor  of  Bombay;  Sir  Charles  Trevelyan,  a  former  deputy  secretary  of  the  Political 
Department  of  the  Government  of  India;  Colonel  Henry  Durand,  the  former  Agent  for  the  Governor- 
General  in  Central  India;  Colonel  Wintle,  a  former  commander  of  a  regiment  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry; 
and  Lieutenant-Colonels  Harington  and  Master,  both  former  commanders  of  regiments  of  Bengal  light 
cavaly.  74  Typical  of  those  witnesses  with  regimental  experience  was  Wintle,  an  officer  of  39  years' 
service,  who  particularly  regretted  the  loss  of  the  summary  power  to  dismiss,  adding:  "We  certainly  felt 
as  regimental  officers  that  the  men  did  not  care  about  our  authority.  "75 
Of  the  eleven  members  of  the  Peel  Commission,  four  made  specific  written  references  to  this  issue. 
The  most  forthright  was  Major-General  Hancock  who  recommended  that  commanding  officers  be 
granted  the  summary  power  to  demote,  to  dismiss  and  to  award  up  to  50  lashes.  He  also  believed  they 
should  have  the  authority  to  convene  and  confirm  regimental  courts-martial  for  more  serious  offences, 
and  the  power  to  recommend  that  non-commissioned  officers  be  removed  to  the  pension  establishment, 
awarded  a  reduced  pension,  or  dismissed  altogether  for  repeated  dereliction  of  duty.  76  Lieutenant- 
General  Sir  Harry  Smith  thought  that  "every  power  consistent  with  judgement  and  discretion  should  be 
72  Replies  by  Maj.  -Gen.  W.  R.  Mansfield,  4  Sept  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  62,  p.  452. 
73  Replies  by  Maj.  -Gen.  Birch,  28  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  61,  pp.  436  &  440. 
74  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  pp.  13-14,21,28,42,107,315,131,51  and  61. 
75  Evidence  of  Brevet  Col.  Wintle's,  24  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  p.  13  1. 
76  Report  of  Major-General  Hancock,  5  March  1859,  ibid.,  pp.  642-3. 143 
restored  or  established  for  the  officers  commanding  corps  and  regiments".  77  General  the  Marquess  of 
Tweeddale  considered  the  summary  power  to  dismiss  to  be  a  sufficient  enhancement  of  authority, 
though  he  also  suggested  replacing  regimental  courts-martial  with  the  punchayet  system  (see  belOW).  78 
Colonel  Tait,  the  only  former  or  serving  Bengal  officer  on  the  Royal  Commission,  wanted  a  complete 
revision  of  the  Bengal  regulations  and  the  less  the  discretion  of  commanding  officers  was  limited  the 
better.  "I  believe,  "  he  added,  "that  the  limitations  placed  on  their  power  of  late  years  have  been  greatly 
instrumental  in  causing  an  entire  separation  between  the  native  soldiery  and  their  European  officers, 
from  whom  they  had  nothing  to  hope  or  fear.  09 
Most  of  the  foregoing  evidence  refers  to  the  inadequate  powers  possessed  by  the  commanding  officers 
of  regular  Bengal  corps  -  including  the  artillery  and  the  Sappers  and  Miners.  After  1846,  it  could  just 
as  easily  apply  to  the  commandants  of  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  regiments.  For  much  of  the  first  half  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  the  system  of  discipline  in  those  regiments  was  similar  to  that  in  the  Sind 
Irregular  Horse.  Commandants  had  complete  authority  over  their  men  and  could  flog,  demote  and 
dismiss  at  will.  According  to  one  irregular  officer,  even  the  legendary  Colonel  Skinner  "was  a  great 
advocate  for  strict  discipline,  and  though  loved  for  his  benevolence  and  justice,  he  was  feared  for  his 
habit  of  punishing  defaulters"  by  flogging  them  with  a  zeerbund  (or  martingale).  80  But  all  this  changed 
in  1846  when  the  branch  was  brought  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  made 
subject  to  the  Articles  of  War.  81  The  following  year,  an  Adjutant-General's  circular  removed  the  power 
of  the  punchayet  court  -  the  irregular  cavalry's  less  formal  equivalent  of  a  regimental  court-martial  in 
which  an  offender  was  tried  by  a  "jury  of  native  officers,  under  the  guidance  of  the  commandant  1182  _  to 
rule  on  anything  other  than  private  disputes.  Henceforth,  all  "offences  of  a  public  nature,  involving  the 
discipline  of  a  Corps  and  Criminal  cases",  had  to  be  referred  to  regular  courts-martial  . 
"3 
The  outcome  of  these  reforms,  the  Punjab  Committee  told  the  Peel  Commission,  was  that  the 
authority  of  an  irregular  cavalry  commandant  had  diminished  even  more  than  that  of  his  regular 
77  Lt.  -Gen.  Smith's  answers,  3  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  Appx.  76,  p.  588. 
78  Notes  by  the  Marquess  of  Tweeddale,  I  Jan  1859,  ibid.,  Appx.  74.,  p.  583. 
79  Colonel  Tait's  answers,  3  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  Appx.  80,  p.  607. 
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81  Replies  by  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  Patrick  Grant,  16  July  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  65,  p.  490. 
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infantry  counterpart.  Men  could  no  longer  be  discharged  or  demoted  without  a  court-martial.  "The 
commandant,  "  it  wrote,  "has  not  even  the  power  to  order  any  man  in  his  regiment  to  be  given  an  extra 
allowance  of  grain  to  a  horse  out  of  condition.  All  minor  punishments  must  be  dealt  out  according  to 
regulation.  In  fact,  the  thing  has  been  laid  down  by  Procustean  rule,  and  the'irregular  cavalry'has  long 
been  a  misnomer.  "  The  end  result  was  "to  reduce  the  efficiency  of  the  regiments,  and  to  render  them 
dangerous  to  the  state".  Similar  opinions  were  expressed  by  Sir Sydney  Cotton,  Sir  J.  H.  Grant, 
Brigadier-General  John  Jacob  and  Brigadier  Christie,  the  latter  commenting:  "In  former  days  the  men 
looked  up  to  their  commanding  officer,  and  did  everything  in  their  power  to  please  him.  Now  matters 
are  greatly  changed,  knowing  that  all  power  has  been  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  commanding  officers.  "" 
Not  surprisingly,  all  recommended  an  increase  of  the  commandant's  powers.  The  Marquess  of 
Tweeddale  went  even  further,  it  will  be  recalled,  by  suggesting  the  replacement  of  all  regimental 
courts-martial  with  punchayet  courts.  85  Even  Sir  Patrick  Grant,  whose  circular  had  abolished 
punchayets  in  1847,  was  able  to  comment  with  hindsight  that  the  erosion  of  the  irregular  cavalry 
commandant's  "almost  absolute  authority"  had  been  "very  injurious".  He  now  believed  a  resumption  of 
these  former  powers  to  be  desirable.  86 
The  Punjab  Irregular  Force  was  the  branch  of  the  Bengal  Army  that  experienced  the  least  weakening 
of  its  commanding  officers'  power  to  punish  in  the  years  prior  to  the  mutiny.  It  was  also  the  most  loyal 
with  just  one  minor  example  of  disaffection  in  1857.87  Formed  in  1849  and  placed  under  the  civil 
authority  of  the  Punjab  government  rather  than  the  Commander-in-Chief,  the  five  regiments  of  irregular 
cavalry  and  five  (later  six)  of  irregular  infantry  were  not  at  first  bound  by  the  Articles  of  War.  Instead 
the  commandants  were  given  the  summary  powers  of  a  civil  magistrate  and  could  sentence  their  men  to 
50  lashes,  a  fine  of  50  rupees,  dismissal  from  the  service  and  up  to  three  years'  imprisonment  with  hard 
labour.  In  theory  all  this  changed  in  1852  when,  against  the  wishes  of  the  commandants,  the  whole 
Punjab  Irregular  Force  was  made  subject  to  the  Articles  of  War  and  courts-martial  were  required  for 
most  serious  offences.  One  unfortunate  consequence,  according  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wilde  of  the  e 
Punjab  I.  I.,  was  that  the  "men  began  to  look  beyond  their  commandants  to  get  their  punishments 
83  Adjutant-General's  Circular,  No.  1408,19  June  1847,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1840  to  1847, 
OIOC,  L/NW17/2/436. 
"  Precis  of  Replies  on  Subject  of  Irregular  Cavalry,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  72,  p.  571. 
85  Notes  by  the  Marquess  of  Tweeddale,  I  Jan  1859,  ibid.,  Appx.  74.,  p.  583. 
86  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  Patrick  Grant's  Replies,  16  July  1858,  ibid.,  Appx.  65,  p.  49  1. 145 
reprieved  or  remitted,  or  their  promotion  granted".  Yet  some  commandants  still  used  their  discretion 
and  would  "flog  the  first  man  that  refused  obedience".  Wilde  explained:  "In  any  extreme  case,  we 
should  have  taken  the  law  into  or  own  hands,  as  we  always  felt  we  should  be  fully  supported  by  the 
brigadier  and  government.  "  In  1857,  as  a  number  of  Punjab  regiments  were  ordered  south  to  retake 
Delhi,  Wilde  and  the  other  commandants  asked  the  local  government  to  reconfer  their  old  power  of 
magistrates.  "It  was  granted,  "  Wilde  told  the  Peel  Commission,  "and  from  that  time  to  this  we  have 
never  had  any  difficulty.  "88 
Given  that  the  Articles  of  War  of  1845  and  1847  applied  to  all  three  presidencies,  it  follows  that  regular 
commanding  officers  in  the  Madras  and  Bombay  armies  also  experienced  a  marked  restriction  in  their 
power  to  punish  in  the  years  prior  to  the  mutiny.  By  1857,  their  power  to  award  summary  punishment 
and  to  convene  and  confirm  courts-martial  was  almost  identical  to  that  exercised  by  their  Bengal 
counterparts.  89  The  only  significant  difference  was  that  Bengal  sepoys  awarded  the  summary 
punishments  of  extra  drill  and  confinement  to  barracks  were  able  to  opt  for  a  court-martial  instead. 
Even  the  Bengal  practice  of  appealing  against  punishment  by  sending  a  petition  direct  to  the 
Commander-in-Chief  was  mirrored  by  some  Madras  sepoys.  "They  ought  not  to  do  so,  "  Major-General 
Steel  told  the  Peet  Commission,  "but  they  have  done  so.  "  He  also  admitted  that  they  were  rarely 
punished  for  this  breach  of  regulations,  and  that,  as  a  result  of  such  petitions,  the  Adjutant-General  had 
sometimes  interfered  with  the  decision  of  a  commanding  officer.  90  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Patrick 
Grant,  Commander-in-Chief  of  Madras,  explained  the  erosion  of  power  in  the  following  terms: 
If  we  could  always  arrange  to  have  none  but  sensible,  judicious,  and  thoroughly  competent  officers  in  command  of 
regiments,  it  would  certainly  be  desirable  to  increase  their  powers  and  to  give  them  every  latitude.  But  constituted 
as  the  service  is,  and  that  an  officer  not  notoriously  incompetent  must  obtain  command  of  a  regiment  when  he 
attains  a  certain  rank-  and  standing,  the  restrictions  imposed  on  the  powers  of  commanding  officers  have  been 
salutary  I  concieve. 
87  Three  Hindustani  native  officers  of  the  2rd  Punjab  Irregular  Cavalry  were  executed  for  inciting  others 
to  mutiny  during  the  siege  of  Delhi  (Source:  Precis  of  Replies  on  Subject  of  Irregular  Cavalry,  P.  P., 
H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  72,  p.  571). 
88  Evidence  of  Lt.  -Col.  Alfred  Wilde,  26  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  pp.  90-2. 
'9  Madras  Army  Regulations  1849,  OIOC,  L/MIL/17/3/491;  Bombay  Army  Regulations  1850,  OIOC, 
UMIL/17/4/548. 146 
Nevertheless  he  was  prepared  to  recommend  that  commanding  officers  be  given  the  additional  power  to 
confirm  and  execute  the  sentences  of  all  regimental  courts-martial  "without  referring  to  any  superior 
authority",  to  award  non-commissioned  officers  the  summary  punishments  of  extra  drill  (with  or 
without  packs)  and  loss  of  seniority,  and  to  cane  sepoys  and  recruits  at  drill.  If  any  officer  was  %0 
wanting  in  judgement,  temper  and  discretion  as  to  be  incapable  of  fitly  exercising  these  increased 
powers",  he  was  unfit  for  command  and  should  be  removed.  "' 
Bombay  differed  from  Madras  in  that  it  did  not  allow  its  sepoys  to  appeal  directly  to  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  over  the  heads  of  their  commanding  officers.  When  a  havildar  in  the  Bombay  Light  Cavalry 
did  just  this  in  an  attempt  to  overturn  the  sentence  of  a  court-martial,  he  was  tried  a  second  time  and 
dismissed  the  service.  According  to  his  commanding  officer,  Colonel  Poole,  the  submission  of  a 
petition  without  going  through  the  proper  channel  was  "considered  a  great  military  offence"  and  "dealt 
with  accordingly".  92  Yet  most  Bombay  officers  were  of  the  opinion  that  regular  commanding  officers 
had  inadequate  powers  to  punish.  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Henry  Somerset,  Commander-in-Chief  of 
Bombay,  told  the  Peel  Commission  that  the  magisterial  power  which  "answers  admirably  in  the 
irregular  regiments"  might  "with  advantage  by  introduced  generally".  He  referred  particularly  to  the 
summary  award  of  flogging  "for  theft,  insubordination,  and  any  disgraceful  conduct,  to  which  should  be 
added  imprisonment,  and  as  a  consequence  expulsion".  93  Colonel  Willoughby  concurred  by  noting  that 
commanding  officers  should  always  have  the  power  to  inflict  summary  punishment  "for  any  offence" 
that  was  given  to  them  on  the  outbreak  of  mutiny.  94  A  minimum  requirement,  according  to  Colonel 
Sinclair,  was  the  summary  power  to  discharge.  95  Both  Sinclair  and  Willoughby  contrasted  the  Bombay 
commanding  officer's  lack  of  power  to  punish  with  his  ample  power  to  promote. 
Thus  while  regular  commanding  officers  in  all  three  presidency  armies  suffered  a  broadly  similar 
reduction  in  their  theoretical  power  to  punish,  the  effect  in  Bengal  was  exacerbated  by  the  way  the 
military  authorities  were  prepared  to  receive  and  act  upon  petitions  from  native  soldiers  that  bypassed 
commanding  officers.  In  Madras  the  authorities  were  also  prepared  to  tolerate  such  an  irregular 
practice,  though  it  was  much  less  frequent.  In  Bombay  it  was  punished  severely.  When  asked  by  the 
90  Evidence  of  Maj.  -Gen.  Sir  S.  Steel,  25  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  73. 
91  Replies  by  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  Patrick  Grant,  6  July  1858,  ibid.,  Appx.  65,  p.  485. 
92  Evidence  of  Colonel  S.  Poole,  27  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  p.  118. 
93  Replies  by  Lt.  -Gen.  Sir  H.  Somerset,  24  July  1858,  ibid.,  Appx.  69,  p.  521. 
94  Evidence  of  Col.  M.  Willougby,  26  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  p.  103. 147 
Peel  Commission  if  such  a  practice  was  likely  "to  shake  discipline  almost  more  than  anything",  Colonel 
Felix  replied:  "Certainly.  , 96 
If  we  accept  that  Bengal  commanding  officers  experienced  the  most  serious  diminution  of  their 
authority  in  the  years  prior  to  the  mutiny,  then  it  would  follow  that  the  Bengal  Army  was  more 
indisciplined  than  its  Madras  and  Bombay  counterparts.  But  does  the  evidence  bear  this  out?  In  the 
early  1850s  there  were,  in  a  proportionate  sense,  many  fewer  court-martial  convictions  in  Bengal  than 
in  the  other  presidencies  (see  Tables  37,38  and  3  9).  97  In  1854,  for  example,  the  Bengal  Army  had  less 
than  twice  the  number  of  convictions  of  the  Bombay  Army  and  only  50  per  cent  more  than  Madras. 
Such  statistics  can  be  viewed  in  one  of  two  ways:  either  the  Bengal  Army  required  proportionately 
fewer  courts-martial  because  it  contained  men  of  a  better  character  who  were  in  a  higher  state  of 
discipline  (as  Bentinck  believed  in  the  1830s);  or  the  low  figures  are  a  reflection  of  the  fact  that  Bengal 
commanding  officers  preferred  to  turn  a  blind  eye  to  indiscipline  rather  than  risk  the  humiliation  of  an 
acquittal  or  the  overturning  of  a  sentence  on  appeal  (a  point  made  by  Sir  Patrick  Grant  in  his 
memorandum  of  May  1857).  The  evidence  would  seem  to  support  the  latter  interpretation. 
That  the  Bengal  Army  was  the  least  disciplined  of  the  three  is  confirmed  by  contemporary  opinion.  In 
1846,  shortly  before  his  transfer  from  the  260'N.  I.,  Ensign  Hodson  informed  a  friend  that  in  "discipline 
and  subordination  [the  sepoys]  seem  to  be  lamentably  deficient".  A  couple  of  months  later,  having 
joined  the  I"  Bengal  European  Fusiliers  (renamed  fusiliers  in  recognition  of  their  excellent  service 
during  the  I"  Sikh  War),  he  commented:  "We  are  under  much  stricter 
Table  37  -  Sentences  ofBengal  native  courts-martial  1850-4 
Year  Inflicted  Remitted  Set  aside  for  irregularities  Total 
1850  824  25  17  866 
1851  635  49  29  713 
1852  616  35  10  661 
1853  727  44  14  78 
L  1854  845  36  14  895 
95  Evidence  of  Col.  I  Sinclair,  26  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  p.  101. 
96  Evidence  of  Col.  0.  Felix,  25  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  p.  68. 148 
discipline  in  this  corps,  both  officers  and  men,  and  obliged  to  be  orderly  and  submissive.  No  bad  thing 
for  us  either.  I  hold  there  is  more  real  liberty  in  being  under  a  decent  restraint  than  in  absolute  freedom 
from  any  check.  "98 
Table  38  -  Sentences  ofMadras  native  courts-martial  1850-4 
Year  Inflicted  Remitted  Set  aside  for  irregularities  Total 
1850  649  22  17  688 
1851  591  16  14  621 
1852  600  31  25  656 
1853  562  17  23  602 
1854  513  34  15  7  tlýl 
Sir  Charles  Napier  was  even  more  explicit.  On  assuming  command  of  the  Bengal  Army  in  the  early 
summer  of  1849,  he  found  it  "in  a  state  of  gross  undiscipline,  and  grievously  inexpert  in  military 
movements".  99  In  the  same  year  Brigadier  the  Hon.  Henry  Dundas  (later  Major-General  Lord 
Table  39  -  Sentences  ofBombay  native  courts-martial  1850-4 
Year  Inflicted  Remitted  Set  aside  for  irregularities  Total 
1850  361  16  1  378 
1851  428  24  12  464 
1852  381  41  6  428 
1853  425  17  7  449 
1854  429  19  16  7  týý 
Melville,  a  member  of  the  Peel  Commission),  commanding  the  Bombay  Field  Forces  13'Cavalry 
Brigade  in  the  2d  Sikh  War,  offended  some  Bengal  officers  -  who  were  "boastful  that  their  army  had 
been  the  one  that  had  conquered  India"  -  by  telling  them  that  the  indisicipline  of  the  Bengal  Army 
"would  be  the  means  of  losing  India".  100 
Though  a  Bombay  officer,  John  Jacob  had  seen  much  of  the  Bengal  Army  and  had  had  many 
conversations  with  its  officers  during  his  long  years  of  service.  In  an  essay  published  in  1850,  he  noted 
that,  to  an  outsider  like  himself,  the  Bengal  Army  appeared  to  be  in  a  permanent  "state  of  muliny".  The 
sepoys  "are  not  taught  and  trained  instinctively  to  obey  orders",  he  added,  "and  even  the  European 
97  India  Military  Consulations,  OIOC,  P/43/37,  P/44/18  and  P/45/59,  No.  5  of  30  April  1852,  No.  333 
of  4  April  1853  and  No.  41  of  13  April  1855. 
98  Trotter,  Life  of  Hodson  of  Hodsons  Horse,  pp.  33  -3.  99  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  p.  194. 
100  Lord  Melville  to  Jacob,  18  Nov  1857,  Jacob  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F75/5. 149 
officers  are  afraid  of  them".  101  So  struck  was  he  with  the  Bengal  Army's  "defects  and  indiscipline" 
that,  the  following  year,  he  wrote  an  article  on  that  subject  alone.  In  it  he  identified  eight  "serious 
faults"  that  were  particular  to  the  Bengal  Army.  They  included:  the  "want  of  power  placed  in  the  hands 
of  regimental  commanding  officers";  the  "entire  absence  of  a  proper  confidence  between  the  officers 
and  the  native  soldiers";  the  "very  bad  and  fatally  injurious"  system  of  promotion  by  seniority";  and  the 
"entire  absence  of  proper  discipline  throughout  the  native  part  of  the  Bengal  Army".  This  latter  fault 
was  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  rest.  It  manifested  itself  not  only  in  the  more  serious  cases  of 
mutiny,  but  in  everyday  military  life.  Citing  the  example  of  sentry  duty,  Jacob  explained  that  only  one 
Bengal  sepoy  would  remain  at  his  post  while,  contrary  to  regulations,  the  rest  of  the  guard  undressed 
and  went  to  sleep.  Eventually,  when  he  had  had  enough,  the  sentry  would  relieve  himself  by  handing 
his  musket  to  the  first  man  he  could  wake.  All  the  while  the  naik  was  fast  asleep  under  his  sheet. 
According  to  Jacob,  he  had  been  "assured  by  numerous  Bengal  officers  that  this  is  the  regular  way  of 
mounting  guard".  Such  slackness  was  even  more  extraordinary  given  the  fact  that  there  were  four  men 
to  a  guard  party  in  Bengal,  but  only  three  in  Bombay  and  Madras,  meaning  that  Bengal  sepoys  would 
be  on  duty  for  just  six  hours  in  every  24,  instead  of  eight.  Part  of  the  problem,  wrote  Jacob,  was  that 
many  Bengal  guards  were  only  relieved  once  a  week,  and  sometimes  at  even  longer  intervals.  When 
Henry  Dundas  took  command  at  Peshawur  during  the  latter  stages  of  the  2nd  Sikh  War,  he  caused  much 
"grumbling  and  complaining"  by  insisting  that  the  Bengal  guards  be  relieved  daily.  In  Jacob's  opinion, 
"where  guards  are  relieved  weekly,  where  the  sentries  relieve  each  other  as  they  please,  and  where  the 
whole  guard  strips  naked,  there  can  be  no  discipline  whatever".  102 
A  number  of  other  Bombay  and  Madras  officers  made  the  same  point  about  lax  Bengal  sentries  in 
their  evidence  to  the  Peel  Commission.  During  the  siege  of  Multan  in  1848,  Major-General  Capon  was 
astonished  to  see  a  half-dressed  and  lackadaisical  Bengal  sepoy  guarding  the  divisional  commander's 
tent.  103  General  Alexander  recalled  that  some  lazy  Madras  sepoys,  having  served  with  Bengal  troops  at 
Sagar  in  central  India,  "used  to  grumble  and  send  in  anonymous  petitions,  stating  that  the  Bengal  Army 
were  allowed  to  do  so-and-so,  and  asking  for  the  same  privileges".  104  The  root  of  the  problem, 
according  to  Captain  Browne,  was  that  while  Madras  sepoys  were  forbidden  to  take  off  their 
accoutrements  for  the  24  hours  they  were  on  guard  duty,  Bengal  sepoys  could  do  so  when  eating.  The 
'01  Pelly  (ed.  ),  Views  and  Opinions,  pp.  122-3. 
102  Ibid.,  pp.  103,115-16. 
103  Evidence  of  Maj.  -Gen.  David  Capon,  28  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  126. 150 
practice  of  Bengal  sentries  sleeping  naked  was  clearly  a  manipulation  of  this  privilege.  They  had  got 
into  the  "habit  of  taking  great  liberties",  said  Browne,  which  would  never  have  been  allowed  in  his  own 
regiment.  105  Napier  put  the  laxity  of  Bengal  sentries  down  to  fact  that  they  were  constantly  on 
detached  guard  duty  and  only  rarely  relieved  (see  Chapter  2).  The  Bombay  Army  was  more 
disciplined,  he  explained,  because  its  troops  were  spread  out  over  a  much  smaller  area.  106  Onamore 
general  level,  Herbert  Edwardes,  a  Bengal  officer  on  detached  Political  employ  who  saw  both  armies  in 
action  during  the  2nd  Sikh  War,  gave  "the  palm  of  discipline  to  the  Bombay  sepoys".  107 
By  1857,  the  indiscipline  of  the  Bengal  Army  was  notorious.  In  February  1857,  before  the  first  news 
of  the  cartridge  question  had  reached  Britain,  7he  United  Service  Gazelle  described  the  sepoy  in  the 
heart  of  India  as  a  "lackadaisical,  discontented  idler,  prompt  to  seize  excuses  for  refusing  to  do  his  duty, 
and  absolutely  rendering  the  presence  of  Europeans  necessary  ...  to  keep  him  to  his  allegiance".  log  On 
28  May,  with  the  mutiny  in  full  swing,  a  lieutenant  in  the  47h  N.  I.  informed  his  wife:  "There  is  no 
doubt  that  all  this  will  turn  out  for  the  benefit  of  the  army;  discipline  was  at  the  lowest  ebb,  and 
something  like  this  must  have  taken  place  before  Government  would  do  anything  for  the  Army.  They 
have  had  warning  enough,  for  the  papers  have  been  teeming  with  it  for  the  last  6  years.  "  109  The 
magistrate  of  Benares,  in  a  letter  of  31  May,  blamed  the  "fake  and  hollow"  system  of  military 
government.  He  added:  "The  system  of  centralization  has  proved  to  be  the  ruin  of  the  native  army.  All 
power  is  centred  in  the  highest  authority.  Regimental  officers  have  no  authority,  they  are  mere  puppets, 
and  the  sepoys,  cannot  look  up  to  such  weak  and  powerless  men  with  respect.  In  days  of  yore  the 
commanding  officer  was  the  [lord]  of  every  sepoy,  he  could  punish  neglect  &  reward  [diligence].  He 
was  therefore  respected  and  beloved.  Now  he  cannot  promote  a  sepoy  to  be  a  naik  without  the  sanction 
of  proper  authority.  "  110  In  a  letter  to  Lord  Elphinstone  of  9  June,  Bartle  Frere,  the  Commissioner  of 
Sind,  rejected  the  fashionable  opinion  that  the  disaffection  in  the  Bengal  Army  was  "attributable  to 
anything  but  bad  system"  as  a  dangerous  fallacy.  A  week  later,  continuing  this  theme,  Frere  voiced  his 
regret  at  John  Lawrence's  recommendation  of  Sir  Patrick  Grant  as  acting  Commander-in-Chief  of  India. 
"He  cannot  be  the  man  to  eradicate  the  evils  which  have  ruined  the  Bengal  Army,  "  wrote  Frere  (with 
"'  Evidence  of  Maj.  -Gen.  R.  Alexander,  ibid.,  p.  82. 
105  Evidence  of  Captain  Brown,  ibid.,  p.  34. 
"'  Napier,  Defects,  Civil  andMilitary,  p.  228. 
107  Quoted  in  Cadell,  History  of  the  BombayArmy,  p.  194. 
108  Rie  UnifedService  Gazette,  21  Feb  1857 
109  Lt.  Walcot  to  his  wife,  28  May  1857,  Walcot  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/B227. 
110  Francis  Lind  to  his  mother,  31  May  1857,  Lind  Papers,  NAM,  51084. 151 
reference  to  Grant's  time  as  Adjutant-General  of  the  Bengal  Army),  "evils  with  the  creation  of  which  he 
has  had  much  to  do.  ""'  Elphinstone  agreed,  telling  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Control  that  the  revolt 
had  been  caused  by  the  "faulty  system  &  want  of  discipline  in  the  Bengal  Army".  "' 
There  was  also  a  belief  that  the  laxity  of  discipline  in  the  Bengal  Army  had  inflated  the  sepoys'  sense 
of  self-importance,  and  that  confrontation  had  been  inevitable.  "The  [Bengal  sepoys]  are  confident  of 
their  power  to  dictate  terms  to  their  masters,  "  remarked  the  pro-government  Friend  ofIndia  on  7  May 
1857.  "l  13  The  following  March,  during  his  closing  speech  at  the  trial  of  the  rebel  King  of  Delhi,  the 
prosecutor  described  the  Bengal  mutineers  in  the  following  terms:  "Pampered  in  their  pride  and 
besotted  in  their  ignorance,  they  had  as  a  body  become  too  self-sufficient  for  military  subordination  and 
unhesitating  obedience.  "  114  Giving  evidence  to  the  Peel  Commission,  Major-General  Cotton  remarked 
upon  the  "leniency  with  which  varous  acts  of  misconduct,  all  more  or  less  bordering  on  mutiny,  were 
on  several  occasions  dealt  with",  in  consequence  of  which  the  Bengal  sepoys,  "who  under  their  own 
system  of  government  would  have  been  ruled  with  a  rod  of  iron,  lost  the  awe  necessary  to  the 
preservation  of  discipline  in  a  large  army".  '  15  The  loyal  native  officer  SitaramPandy  expressed  a 
similar  opinion.  "The  principal  cause  of  the  rebellion,  "  he  wrote  in  his  post-mutiny  memoirs,  "was  the 
feeling  of  power  that  the  sepoys  had 
,  and  the  little  control  the  sahibs  were  allowed  to  exert  over  them. 
Naturally,  they  assumed  from  this  that  the  Sirkar  must  be  afraid  of  them,  whereas  it  only  trusted  them 
too  well.  016  The  final  word  on  discipline  must  go  to  the  distinguished  Victorian  historian  T.  Rice 
Holmes,  who  wrote: 
The  relaxation  of  discipline  had  encouraged  [the  Bengal  sepoys]  to  twist  into  a  grievance  anything  that  startled 
their  imaginations,  or  offended  their  caprices:  they  were  from  various  causes  far  less  attached  to  their  British 
officers  than  they  had  once  been:  it  was  in  the  nature  of  things  impossible  that,  without  such  attachment,  they 
should  feel  active  loyalty  towards  the  British  Government;  and  they  had  become  so  powerful  and  were  so 
conscious  of  their  power  that,  from  purely  selfish  causes,  they  were  ripe  for  mutiny.  117 
111  Frere  to  Elphinstone,  9  and  15  June  1857,  Elphinstone  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F87/Box  6B/8/1. 
112  Elphinstone  to  Vernon  Smith,  14  June  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  NISS  Eur/F231/5. 
113  Quoted  in  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Struggle,  I,  p.  328. 
114  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIIL  p.  257. 
115  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx.  72,  p.  557. 
116  Lunt  (ed.  )  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  174. 
117  Holmes,  A  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  p.  564. 152 
Chapter  Five  -  Caste  and  Religion 
Most  recent  historians  agree  that  the  defence  of  caste  and  religion  was  the  chief  cause  of  mutiny  in 
1857.  Moreover  some  scholars  of  the  Company  army,  like  Barat  and  Alavi,  are  convinced  that  the 
caste  feeling  of  Hindu  sepoys  -  in  particular  their  dislike  of  serving  outside  India  and  of  sea  voyages  - 
was  a  permanent  cause  of  disaffection  in  the  decades  prior  to  the  mutiny.  Yet  the  evidence  suggests 
that  caste  awareness  in  the  Bengal  Army  was  partly  a  British  invention,  that  caste  rules  were  not  as 
inflexible  as  Bengal  sepoys  would  have  their  European  officers  believe,  and  that  they  provided  a  useful 
excuse  both  to  avoid  unwelcome  duty  and  to  provide  redress  for  other  grievances. 
The  ancient  religious  scriptures  divided  Hindu  society  into  four  pre-ordained  and  mutually  exclusive 
varna  (classes):  Brahmin  (priest),  Kshatriya  (warrior),  Vaishya  (farmer  and  merchant)  and  Shudra 
(serO.  To  marry,  take  food  from  or  mix  with  a  person  from  a  lower  class  was  to  become  ritually 
polluted.  The  Mleccha  (Untouchables)  were  outside  the  class  system  and  performed  degrading  tasks 
like  sweeping  and  working  with  leather;  all  Christians  and  Muslims  were  ritually  unclean  and  therefore 
tobe  avoided  if  at  all  possible.  '  The  caste  system  was  gradually  developed  as  Brahmins  sought  to 
divide  the  invading  Aryans  and  the  indigenous  population  into  a  large  number  of  distinctive  groups  or 
jad,  based  loosely  on  region  and  occupations,  and  each  internally  bound  by  rules  concerning  diet  and 
marriage.  2  Castes  were  regulated  by  local  committees  of  senior  members  who  could  both  formulate 
rules  and  judge  those  who  infringed  them.  Expulsion  was  the  dreaded  penalty  for  serious  breaches  of 
caste  rules.  A  person  who  was  ritually  polluted  would  lose  his  place  both  in  the  cosmic  order  (his  class) 
and  in  society  (his  caste).  Castes,  however,  were  not  immutable:  new  castes  appeared,  rules  changed 
and  membership  was  not  necessarily  exclusive.  In  his  Account  of  the  District  ofShahabadin  1809-10, 
Buchanan  observed  that  Bhumimars  (or  military  Brahmins),  like  Rajputs,  were  "not  scrupulous  in 
admitting  into  their  number  whatever  tribes  adopted  their  manners".  3 
'  Heathcote,  7he  Indian  Army,  p.  8  1. 
2  N.  K.  Dutt,  writing  in  the  1930s,  noted  there  were  more  than  3,000  castes  in  India,  some  "confined  to  a 
few  score  men",  while  others  claimed  "millions  of  members".  See  Dutt,  Origin  and  Growth  of  Caste  in 
India  (London,  193  1),  1,  pp.  34. 
3  Quoted  in  Kolff,  Naulair,  Rajput  andSepoy,  p.  185. 153 
Until  relatively  recent  times,  Indian  civil  society  did  not  take  caste  distinctions  that  seriously. 
According  to  the  historian  and  social  anthropologist  Susan  Bayly,  the  modem  concept  of  caste  in  India 
"has  been  engendered,  shaped  and  perpetuated  by  comparatively  recent  political  and  social 
developments".  Even  in  "parts  of  the  so-called  Hindu  heartland  of  Gangetic  upper  India,  "  wrote  Bayly, 
"the  institutions  and  beliefs  which  are  now  often  described  as  the  elements  of  'traditional'  caste  were 
only  just  taking  shape  as  recently  as  the  eighteenth  century".  4  By  the  1820s,  India  was  still  not  a 
homogenous  'caste  society'.  Bayly  noted: 
The  boundaries  between  individual  orders  or  classes  was  still  open  and  ambiguous  in  the  early  decades  of  British 
expansion;  the  language  of  caste  or  castelikc  relationships  still  allowed  for  the  great  man  who  could  reshape  or 
disregard  conventional  marriage  rules  and  dietary  codes,  and  for  the  thrusting  regional  clite  with  the  power  to 
proclaim  something  new  about  their  birth  and  moral  attributes.  This  openness  and  fluidity  were  much  less  apparent 
at  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century,  when  many  more  Indians  had  embraced  forms  of  caste  that  were  significantly 
more  formalised  than  those  of  their  recent  forebears.  5 
As  the  nineteenth  century  progressed,  caste  distinctions  became  increasingly  important  to  those  Indians 
with  "anxieties  about  the  preservation  of  status  and  economic  advantage".  Bayly  refers,  in  particular,  to 
the  "superior  landholders  who  found  themselves  clinging  to  inherited  lordships  in  India's  most  volatile 
agricultural  regions",  the  self-same  impoverished  gentry  that  Stokes  identified  as  the  dominant  force  in 
6  the  Bengal  Army.  Enhanced  caste  status  was  a  means  of  compensating  for  their  increasingly  humble 
standard  of  living.  It  is  important  to  remember,  however,  that  this  Rajput  and  Brahmin  "insistence  on 
the  radicial  differentiation  between  those  who  were  and  those  who  were  not  defined  as  high,  clean  and 
superior"  was  a  relatively  recent  phenomenon.  As  such,  caste  rules  were  never  as  rigid  as  they  might 
7  have  appeared  . 
'Susan  Bayly,  7he  New  Cambridge  History  of  India:  Vol,  IV.,  3-  Caste,  Society  andPofilicsinIndia 
f 
,  rom  the  Eighteenth  Century  to  the  Modenj  Age  (Cambridge,  1999),  p.  4. 
5  Ibid.,  p.  188. 
6  Ibid.,  pp.  190  and  197;  Stokes,  The  Peasant  Armed,  p.  5  1.  However  Bhadra  has  argued  that  rural 
rebels  in  1857  were  not  motivated  solely  by  economic  grievances.  'At  a  primary  level,  'he  wrote,  'a 
notion  of  community  organized  along  ethnic  settlements  and  an  aversion  to  the  encroachment  of  an 
alien  power  into  this  territorial  unit  determined  the  domain  of  rebel  authority.  '  See  Bhadra,  Gautam, 
'Four  Rebels  of  Eighteen-Fifty-Seven,  in  Ranajit  Guha  and  Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak  (eds.  ),  Selected 
Slibaltern  Studies  (Oxford,  1988),  pp.  142. 
7  Bayly,  7he  New  Cambridge  Histoty  of  India:  Vol,  IV-3,  p.  201. 154 
The  same  could  be  said  about  caste  consciousness  in  the  Bengal  Army.  According  to  the  sacred 
laws,  the  role  of  warrior  was  confined  to  the  kshatriya  class.  From  the  earliest  times,  however,  the 
Hindu  armies  of  India  were  composed  of  men  from  different  castes  and  even  classes.  The  Rajputs  of 
western  India,  whose  name  was  later  synonymous  with  kshatriya,  were  descendants  of  non-aryan 
invaders.  Brahmins  turned  to  soldiering  because  there  was  not  enough  employment  for  priests.  At  no 
time  was  there  a  caste  barrier  to  men  serving  as  soldiers.  All  this  was  to  change  in  the  late  eighteenth 
century  when  Warren  Hastings  and  his  successors  strove  towards  the  creation  of  a  high-caste  monopoly 
in  the  Bengal  Army  (see  Chapter  One).  "An  inevitable  ritual  complement  of  this  closed  shop  social 
strategy,  "  writes  Kolff,  "was  a  tendency  towards  brahminical  exclusiveness,  in  other  words,  towards  the 
doctrine  of  caste.  The  new  monomania  for  the  privileges  of  employment  soon  took  on  religious 
overtones  and  stands  in  sharp  contrast  ...  to  the  open  attitude  towards  adopting  and  recruitment  that  had 
been  typical  of  centuries  of  peasant  soldiering.  " 
Alavi  takes  this  argument  one  step  further  by  demonstrating  how,  "by  providing  a  forum  for  sorting 
out  the  social  tensions  hinging  around  the  ritual  purity  of  the  rural  high  caste,  the  army  formalized  these 
tensions  and  made  them  more  obvious  and  rigid".  But  for  the  Bengal  Army's  recruitment  policy,  says 
Alavi,  the  "evolution  of  high-caste  status  in  rural  north  India  would  have  progressed  differently".  Part 
of  the  process  of  achieving  this  high-caste  monopoly  was  the  promotion  of  the  sepoys'  religious,  dietary 
and  travel  preferences.  In  1779,  during  the  I't  Maratha  War,  Hastings  sent  reinforcements  from  Bengal 
to  Bombay  by  the  slower  overland  route  because  he  knew  that  a  sea  crossing  would  offend  the  religious 
feelings  of  the  high-caste  sepoys.  By  the  early  nineteenth  century,  a  complex  set  of  rules  governed  the 
Bengal  sepoys'  diet,  manner  of  preparation  and  mode  of  eating.  According  to  Alavi,  the  sepoys  began 
to  eat  food  "which  had  previously  been  associated  exclusively  with  high  caste  and  ritual  purity".  They 
were  therefore  able  "to  mark  out  their  high-caste  status  much  more  effectively  than  would  have  been 
possible  in  their  own  villages".  In  a  sense,  "the  Company  was  promoting  the  "sanskritization  of  the 
military.  "9  Buchanan  referred  to  the  creation  of  a  "modem"  doctrine  of  caste.  10 
The  diet  of  high-caste  sepoys  was  strictly  vegetarian.  It  included:  atta  (flour),  gram,  dal,  ghi  (clarified 
butter),  salt,  wheat,  sugar  and  some  vegetables.  They  were  not  supposed  to  consume  fish,  meat,  pulao 
(spiced  rice),  curry  or  alchohol.  Tubular  vegetables  like  potatoes,  aubergines,  radishes,  leeks  and 
8  Kolff,  Naukur,  Rajpul  and  Sepoy,  p.  186. 
9  A]  avi,  The  Sepoys  and  the  Company,  pp.  4  5,76. 
10  Quoted  in  Kolff,  Naulair,  Raiput  andsepoy,  p.  187. 155 
onions  were  also  avoided.  To  maintain  their  ritual  purity,  the  high-caste  sepoys  cooked  their  own  food, 
ate  alone  and  then  spread  fresh  cow-dung  on  their  place  of  repast  (as  laid  down  in  the  Shastras).  The 
type  of  food  available  at  the  permanent  station  bazars  and  temporary  camp  bazars  mirrored  these 
preferences.  As  did  the  type  of  food  provided  by  govenrment  for  overseas  expeditions,  beginning  with 
the  Sumatra  campaign  in  1789. 
The  Company  also  authorised  the  celebration  of  religious  festivals  in  cantonments,  and  encouraged 
European  officers  to  participate.  So  successful  were  the  latter's  attempts  to  absorb  the  culture  of  their 
men  that  their  names  were  often  introduced  into  the  Holi  festival  songs.  The  Ramlila  festival  was 
particularly  endorsed,  says  Alavi,  because  it  "provided  the  company  with  a  cultural  idiom  through  and 
by  which  British  authority  could  be  represented  in  India".  But  its  significance  went  further  than  this. 
In  medieval  times,  Ram's  defeat  of  the  giant  Ravana  had  been  represented  by  a  sword-bearing 
horseman;  but  during  the  Company  period,  artillery  was  used  to  depict  the  victory  of  good  over  evil. 
"The  form  of  celebration  therefore  changed  to  express  new  power  relations  and  create  a  new  tradition,  " 
writes  Alavi.  "Further,  the  Company,  by  making  the  sipahis  celebrate  Ramlila  independent  of  the 
patronage  of  any  priestly  figure,  created  a  superior  status  for  [the  British].  " 
This  attempt  to  separate  sepoys  from  the  influence  of  Brahmin  priests  was  deliberate:  Hindu  temples, 
for  example,  were  rarely  situated  in  military  cantonments.  Of  course  this  did  not  preclude  contact  with 
Brahmin  priests  outside  the  regiment.  But  even  here  the  "military  maintained  its  exclusive  high-caste 
status  independent  of  and  superior  to  that  of  the  Brahmin  patronage  networks"  by  exempting  the  sepoys 
from  certain  religious  obligations  such  as  pilgrim  dues  and  shrine  fees.  The  success  of  this  policy  to 
isolate  high-caste  sepoys  from  Hindu  society  can  be  gauged  by  the  use  of  Bengal  regiments  to  disperse 
crowds  of  Brahmins  protesting  against  cow  slaughter  in  the  Kumaon  district  in  1815,  and,  more 
importantly,  the  peaceful  response  to  the  banning  of  sali  (self-immolation  by  high-caste  widows)  in 
1829.11  In  the  latter  case,  Bentinck  sounded  out  no  less  than  49  experienced  officers  as  to  the  sepoys' 
likely  reaction  before  introducing  the  measure.  12  If  the  sepoys  did  not  object  to  infringements  in  Hindu 
customs,  it  was  argued,  they  could  be  relied  upon  to  put  down  any  form  of  civil  protest.  This  point  is 
important  because  it  suggests  that  sepoys  were  relatively  insulated  from  the  type  of  religious  issues  that 
affected  civil  society;  their  own  acts  of  disobedience,  it  follows,  were  much  more  likely  to  be  motivated 
by  'selfish'  professional  grievances. 
11  Alavi,  Yhe  Sepoys  and  the  Company,  pp.  79-90 156 
It  has,  of  course,  been  pointed  out  that  Bengal  sepoys  genuinely  resented  any  infringement  of  the 
ritual  rules  by  which  the  Company  had  redefined  their  status  and  identity.  The  mutinies  at  Barrackpore 
in  1825  and  1852  have  both  been  attributed  to  this  reason  (as  has,  to  a  certain  extent,  the  mutiny  of 
Madras  sepoys  at  Vellore  in  1806).  13  But  whether  the  instigators  really  were  acting  in  defence  of  their 
caste  and  religion,  or  were  simply  using  these  issues  as  a  rallying  call  to  achieve  other  ends,  is  open  to 
question.  The  Vellore  mutiny  took  place  after  Sir  John  Cradock,  the  recently-appointed  Commander- 
in-Chief,  had  ignored  the  advice  of  his  Army  Board  and  issued  controversial  new  dress  regulations, 
including  the  removal  of  beards,  caste  marks  and  ear-rings,  and  the  replacement  of  turbans  with  round 
caps  decorated  by  leather  cockades  (made  from,  it  was  said,  the  skin  of  cows  and  pigs).  The  typical 
explanation  for  the  mutiny  -  which  cost  the  lives  of  more  than  100  Europeans  and  350  sepoys  -  is  that 
Muslim  and  Hindu  sepoys  alike  were  responding  to  a  perceived  "attack  on  their  respective  religions".  14 
But  there  is  also  evidence  to  link  the  mutiny  to  a  plot  to  re-establish  the  sons  of  Tipu  Sultan,  who  were 
living  in  the  fort  of  Vellore,  as  the  rulers  of  Mysore.  15  And  there  were  other  parallels  with  the  mutiny 
of  1857.  According  to  Holmes,  the  sepoys  were  resentful  because  the  reorganisation  of  1796  had 
increased  the  number  of  European  officers  and  thereby  reduced  the  authority  of  native  officers;  it  had 
also  introduced  the  system  of  promotion  by  seniority  for  Europeans  and  natives  alike,  so  that 
commands  were  often  held  by  men  unfit  to  exercise  authority.  16 
If  the  defence  of  religion  and  caste  really  was  the  motive  for  mutiny,  why  did  the  disaffection  spread 
to  other  Madras  stations  after  the  withdrawal  of  the  obnoxious  dress  regulations?  It  is  true  that  Lord 
William  Bentinck,  Governor  of  Madras,  then  issued  a  proclamation  assuring  the  sepoys  that  the 
government  had  no  intention  of  intefering  with  their  religion.  But  the  Court  of  Directors  probably  got  it 
right  when  they  blamed  the  new  generation  of  commandings  officers  for  failing  to  earn  the  confidence 
of  their  men.  "If  the  reorganisation  of  1796  had  not  blasted  the  hopes  of  the  sepoys  and  deadened 
their  interest  in  their  profession,  "  concluded  Holmes,  "if  the  new  generation  of  English  officers  had 
treated  their  men  with  the  sympathy  which  their  predecessors  had  ever  shown",  the  danger  might  never 
have  arisen.  17 
12  Philips  (ed.  ),  Bentinck  Correspondence,  1,  p.  xxvii. 
11  Alavi,  Yhe  Sepoys  and  the  Company,  p.  91;  Barat,  7he  BengaINative  Infantly,  pp.  3034. 
14  Menezes,  'Race,  Caste,  Mutiny  and  Discipline,  in  Soldiers  of  the  Raj,  p.  104. 
"  Malleson  (ed.  ),  Indian  Mutiny,  I,  pp.  165-7. 
16  Holmes,  A  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  p.  5  1. 
17  Ibid.,  pp.  514. 157 
The  mutiny  at  Barrackpore  in  1825  was  likewise  the  result  of  mixed  motives.  It  was  sparked  by  an 
order  for  three  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  -  the  26",  47h  and  62nd  -  to  march  to  Chittagong  to 
reinforce  the  British  and  Madras  troops  fighting  in  Burma.  Having  reached  Barrackpore  near  Calcutta, 
however,  the  sepoys  of  the  47h  N.  I.  refused  to  proceed  any  further.  Alavi  cites  two  main  reasons:  the 
sepoys  objected  to  the  high  cost  of  bullock  transport  for  their  equipment  (including  their  individual 
cooking  and  drinking  vessels);  and  they  feared  that  if  they  did  not  go  by  land  they  would  be  forced  to 
travel  by  sea.  Their  ostensible  motive,  therefore,  was  the  protection  of  their  ritual  status.  's  They  may, 
on  the  other  hand,  have  been  using  the  defence  of  caste  as  an  excuse.  News  had  filtered  through  of  the 
defeat  of  British  troops  at  Ramu.  The  native  papers  were  full  of  stories  about  the  difficulty  of  Burma's 
terrain,  the  deadliness  of  its  climate  and  the  military  prowess  of  its  inhabitants.  Even  when  the  47th's 
colonel  offered  to  provide  bullock  transport  from  his  own  funds,  the  sepoys  upped  their  demands:  they 
would  not  proceed  by  sea,  and  they  would  not  march  unless  they  were  guaranteed  double  batta.  The 
showdown  came  to  a  climax  on  2  November  1825  when  a  parade  of  the  recalcitrant  sepoys  refused  to 
ground  their  arms  and  Sir  Edward  Paget,  the  inexperienced  Commander-in-Chief,  ordered  European 
troops  to  open  fire.  A  one-side  massacre  ensued.  It  had  been  caused,  in  Kaye's  opinion,  by  the  sepoys' 
eagerness  "to  find  a  pretext  for  refusing  to  march  on  such  hazardous  service".  But  Kaye  also  stressed 
the  damage  done  to  the  "discipline  and  efficiency  of  the  Indian  army"  by  the  reorganisation  of  1824 
which  had  split  each  two-battalion  regiment  into  two  separate  regiments  and,  in  particular,  the  division 
of  battalion  officers  betweeen  the  two  new  regiments,  so  that  a  great  many  "were  detached  from  the 
men  with  whom  they  had  been  associated  throughout  many  years  of  active  service".  19  Alackof 
empathy  between  officers  and  men  was  therefore  a  factor,  just  as  it  had  been  in  1806  and  would  be  in 
1857. 
The  1852  'mutiny'  was  much  less  serious.  Reinforcements  were  needed  to  fight  in  the  2  nd  Burma 
War  and  the  38h  N.  I.,  with  its  headquarters  at  Barrackpore,  was  the  most  conveniently  placed.  But 
because  it  was  not  a  general  service  regiment,  its  sepoys  were  asked  if  they  would  volunteer  for  service 
in  Rangoon.  The  initial  response,  from  the  bulk  of  the  regiment  on  duty  at  Fort  William,  was  that  the 
sepoys  "were  not  unwilling  to  go"  if  their  officers  accompanied  them.  20  But  the  first  sign  of 
disaffection  appeared  when  Burney,  the  commanding  officer,  ordered  his  company  commanders  to 
18  Alavi,  YheSepoysand  the  Compatiy,  p.  91. 
19Malleson(ed.  ),  Kaye  aildMallesolls  History  of  the  IndiallMutilly,  I,  pp.  1934. 
20  Quoted  in  Barat,  Yhe  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  p.  285. 158 
"assemble  their  men,  call  their  roll,  ask  each  man  to  volunteer,  &  if  he  declined  to  cause  him  to  state  the 
reason  why  he  declined'.  No.  I  Company  refused  to  comply  because,  Lord  Dalhousie  told  General 
Gomm,  "the  sepoys  looked  on  this  as  compulsion,  which  practically  it  was"  . 
21  Brigadier  Warren,  the 
station  commander,  cancelled  the  order  and  instructed  the  regiment  to  parade  before  him  the  following 
morning.  There  he  told  them  that  the  government  wished  to  send  them  to  Rangoon  by  sea;  but  if  they 
refused  to  volunteer,  they  would  be  marched  to  Arracan  to  relieve  the  67dN.  I.,  a  general  service  corps, 
which  would  take  their  place  in  Burma.  The  sepoys'response  was  that  they  were  "ready  to  move  in  any 
direction  by  land".  22  But  the  atmosphere  soured  when  some  of  the  native  officers  continued  to  try  to 
persuade  the  sepoys  to  volunteer  for  the  sea  journey.  It  was  later  claimed  that  Burney  told  the  men  they 
would  be  sent  to  Arracan  as  a  punishment  if  they  did  not  volunteer;  he  is  also  said  to  have  threatened 
them  with  the  loss  of  their  invalid  pensions.  Their  patience  finally  snapped  on  17  March  when, 
depressed  by  rumours  that  they  would  be  put  on  ships  by  force,  they  disobeyed  repeated  orders  to  return 
to  their  lines  before  finally  submitting. 
The  Court  of  Inquiry  put  most  of  the  blame  on  Burney  and  censured  his  attempt  to  pressurize  the  men 
by  asking  them  to  state  their  reasons  for  not  volunteering.  He  was  transferred  subsequently  to  another 
regiment  (the  32nd  N.  I.  which,  ironically,  was  one  ofjust  eight  regiments  disarmed  in  1857  but  later 
reincorporated  into  the  new  Bengal  Army).  Dalhousie  was  also  sympathetic  towards  the  sepoys.  "The 
men  refused  nothing  we  had  the  right  to  order  them  to  do,  "  he  informed  Gomm.  "Wemaycondemn 
their  poor  spirit,  but  we  have  no  right  to  term  them  insubordinate,  for  not  volunteering  to  go  on  board 
ship.  "  But  as  the  men  of  the  38h  were  still  in  a  ferment,  "as  they  suspected  Col.  Burney  of  some  dodge 
by  which  he  was  to  get  them  on  board  ship  when  half-way  (1),  as  they  could  not  go  at  this  season  by 
country  boats  to  Chittagong,  &  as  they  therefore  could  not  reach  Arracan  till  the  middle  of  June",  the 
military  authorities  "thought  it  better  to  get  rid  of  all  doubt,  difficulty,  and  Colonel  Burney  by  ordering 
23  the  38'h  to  Dacca"  which  was  much  closer.  It  was  also  a  notoriously  unhealthy  station  and  many 
sepoys  died  of  fever  and  other  illnesses  during  their  time  there. 
But  the  central  question  remains:  was  the  'mutiny'  of  the  3  8h  N.  I.  really  about  the  defence  of  caste? 
or  were  the  sepoys  simply  looking  for  an  excuse  to  avoid  the  unwelcome  prospect  of  fighting  in 
Burma?  Despite  Burney's  pressure  and  the  inevitable  rumours,  the  sepoys  were  never  actually  ordered 
21  Dalhousie  to  General  Gomm,  10  March  1852,  Dalhousie  Letters,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/Photo  Eur.  309. 
22  Quoted  in  Barat,  Yhe  BengaiNative  Itfiantry,  p.  286. 
23  Dalhousie  to  Gomm,  27  March  1852,  Dalhousie  Letters,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur.  /Photo  Eur.  309. 159 
to  embark  on  ships.  There  was,  moreover,  a  long  tradition  of  high-caste  Bengal  sepoys  volunteering  for 
action  outside  British  India:  in  1811,  seven  thousand  had  served  against  the  French  in  Mauritius  and 
Java;  more  recently,  the  38h  regiment  itself  had  fought  in  Afghanistan,  despite  the  dread  most  high- 
caste  sepoys  had  of  crossing  the  Indus  because,  in  the  words  of  Sitararn  (himself  a  volunteer),  "the  very 
act  means  loss  of  caste"  ;  24  and  during  the  mutiny,  three  disarmed  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  - 
the  47'h,  65'h  and  70'h  -  would  volunteer  for  service  in  China.  There  was  also  the  example  set  by  the 
Bombay  Army:  a  quarter  of  its  sepoys  were  high-caste  men  from  Hindustan,  yet  they  had  never 
objected  to  foreign  service  and,  in  1856-7,  would  cross  the  sea  to  fight  in  Persia  without  demur.  In 
theory,  all  three  presidency  armies  were  recruited  on  the  basis  that  their  sepoys  would  march  where 
they  were  directed,  "whether  within  or  beyond  the  Company's  territories".  25  But  the  various 
interpretations  of  this  rule  were  very  different,  as  Philip  Melvill  explained  to  a  Parliamentary  select 
committee  in  1852: 
In  Bengal,  except  for  general  service  regiments,  men  enlist  upon  the  understanding  that  they  are  not  sent  by  sea  for 
service  in  foreign  parts;  but  the  sepoys  of  the  Madras  and  Bombay  armies  enlist  upon  the  understanding  that  they 
will  go  wherever  they  are  sent.  At  the  same  time,  it  is  the  practice  at  Madras  to  apprise  the  scpoys  of  a  regiment 
ordered  on  foreign  service,  that  if  any  are  unwilling  to  follow  their  colours  their  places  will  be  supplied  in 
volunteers.  26 
Even  Bombay  sepoys  expected  to  be  consulted  before  serving  outside  their  presidency,  but  it  was 
purely  a  formality.  "They  have  never  objected  to  go  on  general  service,  to  go  abroad,  or  anywhere,  " 
Colonel  Leslie  told  the  Peel  Commission.  27  The  obvious  conclusion  is  that  caste  was  pandered  to  in 
Bengal  but  not  in  Bombay.  This,  itself,  was  the  consequence  of  the  deliberate  policy  to  create  an 
exclusively  high-caste  army  in  Bengal  (a  policy  that  only  began  to  be  reversed  after  the  mutiny  at 
Barrackpore  in  1825  had  shown  how  dangerous  caste  sensitivity,  however  contrived,  could  be).  One 
anecdote,  told  to  Sir  George  Malcolm  by  one  of  his  staff  officers,  perfectly  illustrates  the  different 
attitude  in  the  two  armies:  A  Brahmin  naik  was  asked  by  a  European  officer  why  he  had  left  his  former 
corps  in  the  Bengal  Army  on  the  promotion  of  a  low  caste  man,  but  was  now  serving  in  a  Bombay 
24  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  85. 
25  Bengal  Army  Regulations  1855,  OIOC,  LML/17/2/442,  p.  220. 
26  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1852-3,  )CML  p.  8. 160 
regiment  with  a  Jew  subedar,  a  Purwareejemadar  and  other  low  caste  men.  The  naik  replied: 
"Hindoostan  zat  ke  ghyrat,  Bombaypullun  ke  ghyral"  ("In  Hindustan  it  is  the  pride  of  caste,  in  Bombay 
that  of  the  corps").  Malcolm's  fear  that  pride  of  caste  was  becoming  more  prevalent  in  the  Bombay 
Army  was  the  reason  he  advised  Bentinck,  in  1830,  to  limit  the  number  of  Hindustani  recruits  to  no 
more  than  200  per  battalion  (see  Chapter  One) 
. 
28  This  never  came  to  pass,  though  the  overall  number 
of  Hindustanis  in  the  Bombay  Army  fell  slightly  from  just  over  50%  to  just  over  46%  (while  the 
number  of  high-caste  troops  remained  steady  at  around  25%).  Nevertheless,  except  in  the  few  native 
infantry  regiments  which  had  an  unusually  high  proportion  of  high-caste  men  -  such  as  the  2  nd 
, 
27tý  28th 
and  29h  -  professional  considerations  continued  to  outweigh  issues  of  caste. 
Major  John  Jacob  emphasized  this  crucial  difference  between  the  Bengal  and  Bombay  armies  in  an 
essay  published  in  1850.  So  much  attention  was  paid  to  caste  in  the  Bengal  Army,  he  wrote,  that  the 
sepoys  looked  upon  their  European  officers  not  as  superior  beings  but  as  bad  Hindus.  He  added: 
Instead  of  being  taught  to  pride  themselves  on  their  soldiership  and  discipline,  the  scpoys  are  trained  to  pride 
themselves  on  their  absurdities  of  caste,  and  think  that  their  power  and  value  are  best  shown  by  refusing  to  obey 
any  orders  which  they  please  to  say  do  not  accord  with  their  religious  prejudices.  It  is  a  grave  mistake  to  suppose 
that  religious  feelings  have  any  real  influence  on  these  occasions  ...  ;  but  it  is  certain  that  the  Bengal  scpoy  is  a 
stickler  for  his  imaginary  rights  ofcaste  for  the  sake  ofincreasedpower;  he  knows  that  by  crying  out  about  his 
caste,  he  keeps  power  in  his  hands,  saves  himself  from  many  of  the  hardships  of  the  service,  and  makes  his  officers 
afraid  of  him. 
As  proof  of  this,  Jacob  provided  a  comparison:  In  Bombay  a  low-caste  sepoy  could,  and  often  did,  rise 
to  the  rank  of  subedar  by  his  own  merit;  in  Bengal  such  a  man  would  not  even  be  admitted  to  the  ranks 
for  fear  of  contaminating  the  high-caste  sepoys.  Yet  in  the  Bombay  Army  "the  Brahmin  (father, 
brother,  or  son,  it  may  be,  of  him  of  Bengal)  stands  shoulder  to  shoulder  in  the  ranks  -  nay  sleeps  in  the 
same  tent  -  with  his  Purwaree  fellow-soldier,  and  dreams  not  of  any  objection  to  the  arrangement!  "  If 
this  anomaly  was  pointed  out  to  a  Bombay  Brahmin  sepoy,  as  it  sometimes  was  by  Bengal  officers,  the 
answer  would  always  be:  "What  do  I  care;  is  he  not  the  soldier  of  the  State?  1129 
27  Evidence  of  Col.  Leslie,  26  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  94. 
28  Malcolm,  Goveniment  ofIndia,  pp.  234n,  233-4. 
29  Pelly  (ed.  ),  Views  and  Opinions,  pp.  118-19. 161 
Douglas  Peers  has  argued  that  a  "growing  disenchantment  with  the  high-caste  prejudices  of  the 
Bengal  Army"  was  partly  responsible  for  the  clamour  to  reinstate  corporal  punishment  in  the  1840s.  He 
quotes  one  officer  as  saying  "The  sepoys  did  not  accept  the  abolition  as  a  boon  or  a  compliment;  on  the 
contrary,  they  merely  treated  it  as  a  tribute  to  their  own  strength,  wrung  from  the  fears  of  the 
government.  00  While  there  may  be  some  truth  in  this,  it  should  also  be  recalled  that  one  of  the  reasons 
why  Hardinge  recommended  the  resumption  of  flogging  was  because  he  considered  it  to  be  more 
acceptable  to  high-caste  sepoys  than  hard  labour  and  mandatory  dismissal.  And  whatever  their 
misgivings,  the  majority  of  Bengal  officers  continued  to  defer  to  caste  at  the  expense  of  discipline. 
How  else  can  we  explain  the  many  instances  of  Bengal  sepoys  being  allowed  to  avoid  manual  labour 
because  it  was  demeaning  to  their  caste?  After  the  battle  of  Chilianwalla,  for  example,  most  of  the 
entrenching  work  was  done  by  European  troops  because  Bengal  sepoys  declined  (and  were  allowed  to 
do  duty  as  a  covering  party  instead) 
.31 
At  the  siege  of  Multan,  so  General  Dundas  informed  the 
Bombay  government,  the  Bengal  sepoys  refused  to  work  in  the  trenches.  The  officer  commanding  the 
Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners  at  Multan  later  rejected  this  charge.  32  But  on  spurious  grounds.  For  as 
Colonel  Hill,  a  former  commandant  of  the  Bombay  Sappers  and  Miners,  told  the  Peel  Commission,  the 
Bengal  troops  did  indeed  "march  to  the  trenches  and  took  the  pickaxes  and  shovels  in  their  hands,  but 
they  did  not  work.  "  Hill  recalled  another  occasion  during  the  2nd  Sikh  War  when  the  divisional 
commander  ordered  him  to  enlist  Bengal  sepoys  for  working  parties.  Their  commanding  officer 
refiised  to  comply,  however,  on  the  ground  that  an  order  for  "Bengal  troops  to  work  on  fatigue  parties 
was  tantamount  to  ordering  them  to  mutiny  at  once".  In  the  Bombay  Army,  by  comparison,  Hill  had 
never  known  caste  to  inferfere  with  the  performance  of  duty.  He  related  how  one  of  his  high-caste 
sepoys,  a  Brahmin  from  Oudh,  had  been  in  hospital  when  the  corps  received  orders  to  march  to 
Bombay  for  embarkation  to  Persia  in  early  1857.  But  instead  of  staying  put,  the  Brahmin  discharged 
himself  and  marched  night  and  day  to  overtake  his  company  on  the  premise  that  he  "would  be  disgraced 
if  his  company  went  on  service  without  him".  33 
A  number  of  other  witnesses  testified  to  the  fact  that  only  in  Bengal  was  caste  allowed  to  interfere 
with  dUty.  34  Colonel  Leslie  recalled  how  unwilling  high-caste  Bengal  sappers  were  to  dig 
30  Peers,  'Sepoys,  Soliders  and  the  Lash',  JICH,  23:  2,1995,  p.  23  8. 
31  Thackwell,  Narrative  of  the  Second  Sikh  War,  p.  190. 
32  Evidence  of  Col.  Patrick  Grant,  14  March  1853,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1852-3,  XKVII,  pp.  127-8. 
33  Evidence  of  Col.  John  Hill,  26  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  pp.  95-6. 
34  They  included  Maj.  -Gen.  Steel,  John  Thomas  and  Sir  Charles  Trevelyan,  ibid.,  pp.  70-1,88,112, 162 
emplacements  during  the  I"  Afghan  War,  whereas  Madras  sappers  were  quite  the  opposite.  So 
frustrated  did  Leslie  become  that,  on  more  than  one  occasion,  he  ordered  his  troop  of  European  horse 
artillery  to  dismount  and  do  the  work  instead 
. 
35  Major-General  Steel  confirmed  that  caste  was  not 
pandered  to  in  the  Madras  Army:  on  receiving  a  petition  from  a  high-caste  sepoy  who  objected  to  the 
palanquin  marriage  of  a  lower  caste  havildar  in  cantonments,  the  Commander-in-Chief  ruled  that  the 
bride's  palanquin  was  not  to  be  interefered  with  -  and  that  was  the  end  of  the  matter.  "If  there  was  an 
act  committed  to  insult  or  disturb  a  Mahommedan,  a  man  of  high  or  low  caste,  or  of  no  caste  at  all,  " 
stated  Steel,  "we  should  deal  with  it  according  to  the  articles  of  war,  as  contrary  to  good  order  and 
military  discipline".  36  This  was  possible  because,  as  one  old  Madras  subedar  told  Captain  Hervey,  "We 
put  our  religion  into  our  knapsacks,  sir,  whenever  our  colours  are  unfurled,  or  where  duty  calls.  " 
Hervey  added: 
Not  being  over  particular,  therefore,  as  regards  the  due  observances  of  their  religion,  not  overburdened  with  tender 
consciences,  they  indulge  in  the  good  things  of  life  whenever  it  suits  their  convenience,  much  to  the  disgust  of 
those  high-castc  bigots  of  the  upper  provinces,  who  look  upon  the  natives  of  Southern  India,  and  more  particularly 
our  sepoys,  as  a  set  of  brute  beasts  not  worthy  to  exist.  Our  men  in  general  care  not  what  they  cat,  or  drink...  I 
have  myself  seen  Hindoos  and  Moslcms 
...  rolling  drunk  in  the  ditch;  their  castes  and  their  religion  are  matters  of 
secondary  importance.  37 
In  Bengal,  however,  caste  distinctions  could  even  override  military  rank.  One  Bombay  officer  recalled 
the  following  conversation  during  the  siege  of  Multan  between  a  high-caste  sepoy  and  a  lower  caste 
naik  of  the  Bengal  Army:  "We  have  left  our  lines:  I  intend  to  take  command,  you  go  into  the  ranks,  and 
you  will  obey  me.  "  According  to  one  of  the  officer's  subedars  (himself  a  high-caste  Hindu),  such  a 
proceeding  was  not  unusual  . 
38  Even  Major-General  Birch,  Military  Secretary  to  the  Government  of 
India,  could  not  "conceive  the  possibility  of  maintaining  discipline  in  a  corps  where  a  low-caste  non- 
commissioned  officer  will,  when  he  meets  off  duty  a  Brahman  sipahi,  crouch  down  to  him  with  his 
forehead  on  the  ground.  "  And  yet  he  had  seen  such  an  act  with  his  own  eyeS.  39 
"  Evidence  of  Col.  John  Leslie,  26  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  p.  94. 
36  Evidence  of  Maj.  -Gen.  R_  Alexander,  25  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  pp.  76-7. 
37  Allen  (ed.  ),  Soldier  of  the  Company,  p.  112. 
3'Evidence  of  Colonel  S.  Poole,  27  Aug  1858,  ibid.,  pp.  116-17. 
39  Quoted  in  Malleson  (ed.  ),  Kaye  andMallesons  History  of  the  IndianMuliny,  1,  p.  243n. 163 
Kaye  recorded  the  typical  Bengal  response  to  the  criticism  of  Bombay  and  Madras  officers:  "that 
high-caste  Hindustanis  enlisting  into  the  Bombay  or  Madras  Armies  were,  to  a  great  extent,  cut  off 
from  the  brotherhood,  that  they  were  greatly  outnumbered  in  their  several  regiments,  that  it  was 
convenient  to  conform  to  the  custom  of  the  country,  and  that  what  he  did  in  a  foreign  country  amongst 
strangers  was  little  known  at  home".  40  There  is  something  in  this.  But  even  Bengal  sepoys  were 
prepared  to  disregard  caste  rules  when  it  suited  them.  This  much  became  clear  to  John  Lang,  a  British 
lawyer,  when  he  fell  in  with  a  company  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  escorting  treasure  from  Mainpuri  to 
Agra  in  the  early  1850s.  In  the  course  of  a  long  conversation  with  Lieutenant  Sixtie,  the  company 
commander,  he  discovered  that  it  had  become  commonplace  for  high-caste  sepoys  to  ask  permission  to 
carry  the  remains  of  popular  officers  to  the  grave,  though  it  was  technically  an  infringement  of  their 
caste  rules.  Sixtie  commented: 
So  much  for  caste,  if  it  can  begot  over  by  an  understanding  amongst  themselves  I  Castel  More  than  four-fifths  of 
what  they  talk  about  it  pure  nonsence  and  falsehood,  as  any  straightfoward  native  will  confidentially  confess  to 
you.  I  doWt  mean  to  say  that  some  Hindoos  arc  not  very  strict.  Many,  indeed,  are  so.  But  I  mean  to  say  that  a  very 
small  proportion  live  in  accordance  with  the  Shastcrs  [sic],  and  that  when  they  cry  out,  "if  we  do  so  and  so  we  shall 
lose  our  caste,  "  it  is  nothing  more  than  a  rotten  pretext  for  escaping  some  duty,  or  for  refusing  to  obey  a  distasteful 
order. 
The  truth  of  Sixtie's  words  was  brought  home  to  Lang  the  following  day  when  he  witnessed  a  sick 
Brahmin  sepoy  drink  a  mixture  of  brandy  and  water  from  his  officer's  silver  tumbler.  On  being 
lighheartedly  accused  of  having  lost  his  caste,  the  sepoy  replied: 
The  Sahib  logue  [Europeans]  believe  everything  that  the  natives  tell  them  about  caste,  and  the  consequence  is  they 
believe  a  great  many  falsehoods...  There  is  no  mention  of  brandy  in  the  Shasters,  Sahib...  But,  supposing  that  it 
were  forbidden;  do  not  men  of  every  religion  frequently  and  continually  depart  from  the  tenets  thereof,  in  minor 
things,  or  construe  them  according  to  their  own  inclination  or  convenience,  or  make  them  sort  of  bundobust 
(agreement)  with  their  consciences?  Indeed,  if  we  did  not  make  this  bundobust,  what  Hindoo  or  Mussulman  would 
come  in  contact  at  all  with  one  another,  or  with  Christians,  and  certainly  we,  the  natives  of  India,  would  not  serve 
as  soldiers...  We  should  be  in  continual  dread  of  having  our  bodies  contaminated  and  our  souls  placed  beyond  the 
reach  of  redemption  -  and  who  would  submit  to  that  for  so  many  rupees  a  month?  Who  can  say  what  animal 
40  Ibid.,  p.  243. 164 
supplies  the  skin  which  is  used  for  our  chacos  and  accoutrements?  The  cow,  or  the  pig?  The  Mussulmans,  when 
we  laugh  together  about  it,  say  the  cow.  We  protest  that  it  is  pigskin. 
The  sepoy  also  told  the  tale  of  Pertab  Singh,  an  emissary  of  the  Rani  of  Lahore,  who  tried  to  encourage 
the  Bengal  regiments  at  Barrackpore  to  rise  in  1848  on  the  ground  that  the  leather  on  their  shakos  was 
insulting  to  both  Hindus  and  Muslims.  He  was  listened  to  as  long  as  his  money  lasted,  and  then  handed 
41 
over  to  the  authorities. 
Sir  Henry  Lawrence  made  the  same  point  about  the  adaptability  of  religious  and  caste  rules  in  1856. 
"A  cap,  a  beard,  a  moustache,  a  strap,  all  in  their  time  have  given  offence,  "  he  wrote.  "All  oil  the 
pretence  of  religion.  But  by  a  little  management,  by  leading  instead  of  drawing,  almost  anything  may 
be  done.  The  man  who  would  not  touch  leather  a  few  years  ago,  is  now,  in  the  words  of  a  fine  old 
subedar,  "up  to  the  chin  in  it.  "  This  was  because  leather  cap-straps  had  been  provided  free,  whereas 
cloth  straps  cost  between  one  and  two  annas.  Lawrence  concluded:  "Tact  and  management,  not 
Brahminism  in  officers  are  wanted.  eiQ  No  officer  exemplified  better  the  qualities  Lawrence  was 
referring  to  than  John  Jacob.  In  September  1854,  after  a  particularly  raucous  celebration  of  the  Muslim 
festival  of  Mohurram  by  his  men,  Jacob  banned  all  "noisy  processions"  and  "disorderly 
displays  ...  under  pretence  of  religion".  Though  mostly  Muslim  his  men  complied  with  the  order.  Three 
years  later,  with  the  same  festival  approaching,  the  disaffected  members  of  the  &  Bengal  I.  C.  tried  to 
use  Jacob's  prohibition  to  induce  the  Muslim  troopers  of  the  Sind  Irregular  Horse  to  rise.  The  response 
from  a  senior  native  officer  was  that  "it  is  the  order  and  must  be  obeyed".  And  it  was.  Jacob's 
biographer  observes  that  this  order  became  "deservedly  famous,  as  a  practical  and  conclusive  proof  of 
the  truth  of  his  doctrine  that  under  a  proper  system  of  discipline  the  Indian  soldier  would  cheerfully  lay 
aside  the  prejudices  of  caste  or  religion  when  his  commanding  officer  ... 
declared  that  this  was 
to  43 
necessary  . 
The  only  branch  of  the  Bengal  Army  that  operated  a  similar  system  of  discipline  was  the  Punjab 
Irregular  Force.  Colonel  Wilde  told  the  Peel  Commission  that  his  men  would  have  been  "severely 
punished"  if  they  had  used  caste  or  religion  as  a  pretence  to  avoid  duty.  That  did  not  mean  that  the 
officers  were  insensitive  to  religious  prejudices:  they  would  not  ask  their  Muslim  soldiers  to  drink  from 
a  pigskin  water-bag,  for  example;  and  if  such  a  mistake  was  made,  they  would  quickly  rectify  it.  But 
41  John  Lang,  Wanderings  in  India:  and  other  Sketches  ofLife  in  Hindostan  (London,  1859),  pp.  140-7. 
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where  military  duty  was  concerned,  caste  issues  were  not  allowed  to  interfere.  So  when  Wilde's 
regiment  was  ordered  to  dig  the  entire  foundations  of  a  fort  at  Bahadoor  Khail,  everyone  took  part, 
including  the  Brahmins.  44 
In  the  regular  Bengal  Army,  on  the  other  hand,  so-called  caste  rules  were  accorded  far  too  much 
respect.  So  much  so,  noted  a  Madras  correspodent  to  the  United  Service  Magazine  in  1853,  that  "the 
Sepoy,  seeing  himself  the  object  of  so  much  care  and  solicitude,  does  not  evince  that  feeling  of 
reverence  and  respect  that  he  did  in  days  'lang  syne"'.  It  was,  the  author  added,  only  natural  for  the 
sepoy  to  take  advantage  of  the  fact  that  his  officer  hesitated  every  time  he  ordered  him  to  undertake  a 
duty  that  might  transgress  his  caste.  Four  years  later,  with  the  mutiny  underway,  the  editor  of  the  same 
magazine  listed  the  various  reasons  that  had  been  put  forward  to  explain  why  the  regular  Bengal  Army 
was  so  indisciplined.  It  is  argued,  he  wrote,  "that  caste,  and  what  it  forbids,  and  the  danger  attending 
any  attempt  to  control  or  weaken  its  despotism,  have  been  grossly  exaggerated  and  greatly  overrated, 
which,  being  only  too  apparent  to  the  apprehension  of  the  native,  has  suggested  to  him  the  the 
advantage  of  keeping  up  the  delusion,  and  gratuitously  furnished  him  with  a  ...  pretext  under  the  cloak 
of  which  he  can  further  his  own  ends".  45 
One  senior  Madras  officer,  in  his  evidence  to  the  Peel  Commission,  blamed  the  mutiny  of  the  Bengal 
Army  on  the  "way  in  which  caste  was  pampered  and  got  the  upper  hand  of  discipline  and 
subordination".  46  Even  a  former  Bengal  colonel  was  prepared  to  admit  that  he  and  his  fellow  officers 
took  more  notice  of  caste  than  their  counterparts  in  the  other  presidencies,  and  that  the  excuse  of  caste 
was  to  a  great  extent  an  absurdity.  "The  men,  "  he  added,  "would  bejust  as  willing  to  take  our  service, 
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without  any  reference  to  caste,  as  the  Madras  and  Bombay  troops  do. 
The  evidence  of  this  chapter  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  Bengal  sepoys  did  not  treat  ritual  rules  as 
seriously  as  most  historians  have  supposed.  This  is  not  to  say  that  they  would  not  have  died  in  defence 
of  their  caste  and  religion  -  but  rather  that  what  constituted  a  genuine  threat  to  both  has  often  been 
misunderstood.  Kolff  has  shown  that  caste  exclusiveness  was  absent  from  the  long  tradition  of  peasant 
soldiering  in  north  India  until  Warren  Hastings  favoured  high-caste  recruits  for  the  Bengal  Army  in  the 
late  eighteenth  century.  Thereafter  the  British  positively  encouraged  the  observance  of  caste  rules  that 
43  Lambrick,  Jacob  ofJacobabad,  pp.  201-2,334. 
44  Evidence  of  Lt.  -Col.  Alfred  Wilde,  26  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  92. 
45  United  Service  Magazine,  August  1858  and  July  1857,  pp.  604  and  318-19. 
46  Evidence  of  Maj.  -Gen.  Robert  Alexander,  25  Aug  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  80. 
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were  even  stricter  than  those  that  applied  to  civilians.  The  intention  was  to  create  an  61ite  force  that  was 
separate  from  peasant  society.  Only  then  could  the  native  army  be  trusted  to  enforce  government  laws 
that  infringed  upon  religious  and  social  customs.  The  success  of  this  policy  would  seem  to  support  the 
argument  that  Bengal  sepoys  cared  more  about  professional  grievances  than  infringements  of  Hindu 
custom  such  as  the  abolition  of  sati. 
For  the  Bengal  Army's  doctrine  of  caste  was  never  as  inflexible  as  it  appeared:  partly  because  it  was 
distinctive  to  the  army  and  therefore  not  necessarily  enforceable  by  the  village  caste  committees;  and 
partly  because  caste  rules  in  civil  society  did  not  assume  their  modem  exclusiveness  until  the  first  half 
of  the  nineteenth  century.  "Until  well  into  the  colonial  period,  "  wrote  Susan  Bayly,  "much  of  the 
subcontinent  was  still  populated  by  people  for  whom  the  formal  distinctions  of  caste  were  of  only 
limited  importance  as  a  source  of  corporate  and  individual  lifestyles.  "48  This  was  not,  of  course,  the 
impression  gained  by  the  sepoys'European  officers  who  did  everything  in  their  power  to  avoid  giving 
offence  to  caste  or  religion.  It  was  only  natural  that  the  sepoys  would  take  advantage.  In  his  1858 
minute  on  the  reconstruction  of  the  Bengal  Army,  Major-General  Mansfield  wrote  that  he  had  long 
been  convinced  that  "the  surly  conduct  of  the  sepoys  when  called  on  to  do  what  did  not  exactly  suit 
their  fancy"  would  lead  sooner  or  later  to  a  confrontation.  He  added: 
The  subserviency  of  the  officers  generally  to  the  feeling  of  high  caste,  which  gave  them  handsome  and  intelligent 
men,  was,  I  believe,  appreciated  in  all  its  strength  by  the  sepoys,  who  actually  played  with  the  fears  of  their 
Braluninized  coloncls,  and  insisted,  on  many  instances,  on  the  observance  of  certain  customs,  even  in  the  presence 
of  an  enemy,  to  which  we  know  they  are  perfectly  indifferent  under  really  intelligent  and  energetic  command. 
Thus  was  the  gcrin  of  resistance  to  authority  and  discipline  fostered,  and  it  but  too  often  happened  that 
commanding  officers  openly  admitted  the  presence  of  a  power  superior  to  their  own  discipline,  succumbed  to  it 
themselves,  and  induced  superior  authority  to  give  countenance  to  it  also.  " 
Mansfield  was  right.  Bengal  sepoys  were  only  too  happy  to  use  caste  as  an  excuse  to  avoid  unpleasant 
duties:  from  digging  to  foreign  service.  Yet  there  are  plenty  of  examples  of  Bengal  sepoys  being 
persuaded  both  to  dig  (as  at  Arracan  during  the  I  st  Burma  War)  and  to  serve  overseas.  High-caste 
sepoys,  as  we  have  seen,  were  quite  prepared  to  disregard  caste  rules  when  it  suited  them.  In  this 
48  B  ayly,  Ae  New  Cambridge  HistorY  of  Indfa.  -  IV.  3,  p.  3. 
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context,  the  General  Service  Enlistment  Order  of  1856  (see  Chapter  one)  was  unpopular  not  because  it 
threatened  a  loss  of  caste  per  se,  but  because  it  seemed  to  represent  yet  another  nail  in  the  coffin  of  the 
high-caste  'brotherhood'  which  dominated  the  Bengal  Army.  On  8  November  1856,  Canning  informed 
the  President  of  the  Board  of  Control  that  he  had  no  reason  to  fear  that  caste  feelings  would  be  excited 
by  the  new  enlistment  regulation  because  it  would  only  apply  to  new  recruits,  and  because  the  number 
of  high-caste  sepoys  who  were  happy  to  join  a  general  service  army  like  Bombay  proved  that  they  did 
"not  on  first  entering  the  service  hold  very  closely  to  caste  privileges".  "  If  caste  really  had  been  under 
threat,  RaJput  and  Brahmin  recruits  would  have  dried  up  afler  the  publication  of  the  order,  yet 
according  to  Canning  that  did  not  happen.  51 
Caste  could  also  be  used  as  a  smokescreen  for  other  grievances.  The  mutinies  at  Madras  in  1806  and 
Barrackpore  in  1825  are  said  to  have  been  motivated  by  a  defence  of  caste  and  religion.  Yet  in  both 
cases  other  factors  were  arguably  more  important,  such  as  a  lack  of  empathy  between  the  sepoys  and 
their  European  officers  and  (in  the  case  of  1806)  a  desire  to  re-establish  a  traditional  ruler  as  an 
alternative  employer.  It  is  surely  no  coincidence  that  similar  grievances  contributed  to  the  1857 
mutiny.  Moreover  the  Bengal  tradition  of  using  caste  as  an  means  to  achieve  other  ends  did  not  cease 
with  the  suppression  of  the  Indian  mutiny.  In  1917,  for  example,  120  members  of  the  3rd  Brahmans 
mutinied  when  group  messing  was  introduced  during  the  Mesopotamian  campaign.  "The  authorities 
suspected  that  the  main  concern  of  the  mutineers  was  not  to  preserve  their  caste,  "  wrote  Omissi,  "but  to 
exploit  the  system  of  individual  messing  to  avoid  frontline  service.  (The  food  which  was  introduced 
was  in  line  with  Brahmin  practice,  and  was  later  freely  eaten  by  the  regiment  y52 
50  Canning  to  Vernon  Smith,  8  Nov  1856,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS.  Eur.  /F231/4. 
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Chapter  Six  -  Mutiny:  The  Cartridge  Question 
It  is  almost  impossible  to  identify  with  any  degree  of  certainty  the  exact  reason  why  almost  three- 
quarters  of  the  regular  Bengal  Army  chose  to  mutiny,  or  partially  mutiny,  in  1857.1  Most  historians 
have  pinpointed  the  fear  of  an  enforced  conversion  to  Christianity  as  the  primary  motive.  They  cite  a 
series  of  recent  laws  and  trends  that  appeared  to  undermine  traditional  customs  and  beliefs  -  such  as  the 
legalization  of  widows'  marriages,  the  establishment  of  group  messing  in  jails,  the  passing  of  the 
General  Service  Enlistment  Order,  and  the  upsurge  of  missionary  activity  -  and  argue  that  the 
introduction  of  Enfield  cartridges  greased  with  cow  and  pig  fat  was  the  last  straw.  But  a  detailed  study 
of  the  so-called  'cartridge  question'  can  lead  to  a  quite  different  conclusion. 
All  the  East  India  Company's  weapons  were  ordered  direct  from  British  manufacturers  by  its  Military 
Store  Department  in  London.  These  arms  were  similar  to  those  supplied  to  the  British  Army  by  the 
Board  of  Ordnance,  thus  enabling  both  Company  and  Royal  troops  in  India  to  use  the  same 
ammunition.  In  1840,  in  line  with  the  British  Army,  the  Company  switched  from  flintlock  to 
percussion  small-arms  (the  muzzle-loading  muskets  retained  the  same'Brown  Bess'design  that  had 
been  in  use  since  the  eighteenth  century,  but  with  their  flints  replaced  by  percussion  caps).  The  first 
Company  troops  to  use  percussion  arms  in  action  were  sepoys  of  the  2d  Madras  N.  I.  at  the  storming  of 
Chin-kiang  Fu  in  China  in  July  1842.  Over  the  next  decade  or  so,  nearly  460,000  percussion  muskets, 
carbines  and  pistols  were  despatched  to  India.  But  the  procurement  of  these  smooth-bore  firearms 
ceased  in  June  1851  when  the  British  government  decided  to  equip  its  troops  with  the  revolutionary 
2 
Mini6  rifle. 
Rifles  had  been  used  by  the  British  and  East  India  Company  armies  for  skirmishing  and  sniping  since 
the  early  nineteenth  century.  But  their  accuracy  had  been  more  than  offset  by  a  slow  rate  of  loading,  a 
seemingly  inevitable  consequence  of  the  need  for  the  ball  or  bullet  to  have  a  loose  fit  during  loading 
and  a  tight  fit  in  the  rifling  grooves  on  being  fired.  This  conundrum  was  solved  in  the  1840s  by  two 
French  officers:  the  first,  Delvigne,  developed  an  elongated  bullet  with  a  hollow  base  which  expanded 
1  Seven  out  of  10  Bengal  Light  Cavalry  regiments  and  54  out  of  74  Bengal  Native  Infantry  regiments 
mutinied  or  partially  mutinied  in  1857.  These  figures  do  not  include  the  many  other  regiments  that 
displayed  a  mutinous  disposition  before  they  were  disarmed. 
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when  fired;  Captain  Mini6  improved  the  design  by  adding  a  cup  in  the  cavity  to  assist  uniform 
expansion.  Though  both  men  wanted  the  concept  to  be  called  the'Delvigne-Mini6',  if  came  to  be 
known  by  the  latter's  name  alone.  The  first  such  weapon  chosen  by  the  Board  of  Ordnance  for  the 
British  Army  was  the  Pattern  1851  Rifled  Musket,  otherwise  known  as  the  Mini6  rifle.  But  it  was  never 
generally  issued  because  the  British  government's  'Committee  on  Small  Arms'  decided  in  1852  that  the 
Mini6's.  702  bore  was  too  large.  The  Pattern  1853  Rifled  Musket,  or  Enfield  rifle,  with  a.  577  bore  was 
eventually  chosen  instead.  3 
Though  the  East  India  Company  was  promised  30,000  new  Enfield  rifles  by  the  Board  of  Ordnance  in 
1854,  it  did  not  receive  any  for  two  years.  This  was  partly  because  the  government  factory  at  Enfield 
was  neither  large  nor  modem  enough  to  meet  demand;  and  partly  because  Britain's  entry  into  the 
Crimean  War  in  1854  meant  that  Lord  Raglan's  expeditionary  force  was  given  priority.  The  war  also 
enabled  the  British  government  to  comer  the  small-arms  market  and  extinguish  unwelcome  competition 
by  forcing  the  Court  of  Directors  in  March  1856  to  cede  control  of  its  arms  procurement  to  the  new 
War  Department  (which  had  replaced  the  Board  of  Ordnance  in  February  1855).  4  The  first 
consignment  of  1,500  Enfield  rifles  finally  reached  the  Bengal  Presidency  in  the  spring  of  1856.  They 
were  ear-marked  for  the  Bengal  Army,  but  the  Indian  government  agreed  to  assign  them  to  H.  M.  60,  h 
Rifles  on  the  ground  that  their  existing  rifles  were  "unservicable  and  should  be  replaced  immediately".  5 
By  the  outbreak  of  mutiny  in  1857,  the  Bengal  Presidency  had  received  just  over  12,000  Enfields.  But 
the  only  regiment  in  possession  of  these  weapons  was  H.  M.  60,  h  Rifles  (it  had  received  1,040).  The 
remainder  were  in  the  arsenals  at  Fort  William  (4,395),  Allahabad  (3,000),  Ferozepore  (3,000),  Delhi 
(4  1),  the  Artillery  Depot  of  Instruction  at  Meerut  (525)  and  the  musketry  depots  at  Dum-Durn 
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(Damdamah),  Sialkot  and  Ambala. 
It  was  not  the  rifles  themselves,  however,  but  their  ammunition  that  was  to  prove  so  controversial. 
Cartridges  for  most  muzzle-loading  percussion  firearms  of  this  period  took  the  form  of  a  tube  of  paper 
that  contained  a  ball  (lead  tin  alloy)  and  enough  powder  for  a  single  shot.  The  approved  method  of 
loading  such  a  cartridge  was  to  bite  the  top  off  to  allow  the  powder  to  be  poured  down  the  barrel.  The 
3  Ibid.,  pp.  119-23. 
4  Ibid.,  pp.  12344. 
1  Col.  A.  Abbott  to  Col.  R.  J.  H.  Birch,  7  April  1856  and  Birch  to  Abbott,  25  April  1856,  India  Military 
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rest  of  the  cartridge,  including  the  ball,  would  then  be  forced  down  the  barrel  with  the  ramrod.  This 
type  of  ammunition  was  used  by  both  the  existing  percussion  musket  and  the  Enfield  rifle,  But  the 
crucial  difference  between  the  two  was  that  the  Enfield  rifle's  grooved  bore  required  the  bottom  two- 
7  thirds  of  its  cartridge  to  be  greased  to  facilitate  loading.  Another  rifle  -  the  two-grooved  Brunswick 
model  -  had  been  used  by  the  60th  Rifles  and  rifle  companies  in  some  Bengal  Native  Infantry  regiments 
since  the  early  1840s.  Its  ammunition  consisted  of  a  powder  cartridge  and  a  separate  ball  covered  with 
a  'patch'  of  fine  cloth  smeared  with  beeswax  and  coconut  Oil,  and  was  therefore  considered  to  be 
inoffensive  to  both  Hindus  and  Muslims.  This  was  not  the  case  with  the  substance  used  to  grease  the 
new  Enfield  cartridges. 
In  1853,  when  the  first  Enfield  cartridges  were  sent  to  India  to  test  their  reaction  to  the  climate, 
General  Gomm  warned  the  Secretary  to  the  Military  Board  that  "unless  it  be  known  that  the  grease 
employed  in  these  cartridges  is  not  of  a  nature  to  offend  or  interfere  with  the  prejudices  of  caste,  it  will 
be  expedient  not  to  issue  them  for  test  to  Native  corps".  As  it  happened,  the  grease  contained  an 
element  of  tallow  (animal  fat)  which  may  well  have  come  from  either  cows  or  pigs.  But  the  Military 
Board  chose  to  ignore  Gomm's  counsel  and  the  ammunition  was  tested  over  a  period  of  some  months 
by  being  carried  in  the  pouches  of  sepoy  guards  at  Fort  William,  Cawnpore  and  Rangoon.  No  objection 
to  these  cartridges  was  raised  either  by  the  sepoys  themselves  or  by  the  committees  of  European 
officers  set  up  to  report  on  them.  8  The  tests  confirmed  that  the  grease  could  stand  up  to  the  Indian 
climate  and  the  consignment  was  returned  to  England  in  1855.  A  year  later,  following  hard  on  the  heels 
of  the  first  batch  of  Enfield  rifles  was  a  shipment  of  greased  cartridges  and  bullet  moulds.  9  Thereafter 
the  Bengal  Army's  Ordnance  Department  began  to  manufacture  its  own  cartridges  at  its  Fort  William, 
Meerut  and  Dum-Dum  arsenals.  The  grease  used  for  the  rifle  patch  -a  mixture  of  wax  and  oil  -  was 
discounted  because  its  lubricating  properties  disappeared  when  cartridges  were  bundled.  Instead  the 
same  combination  preferred  by  the  Royal  Woolwich  Arsenal  -  five  parts  tallow,  five  parts  stearine  and 
6  Col.  Chester  to  Col.  Abbott,  29  April  1857,  India  Military  Consultations,  OIOC,  P/47/18,  No.  81  of  19 
June  1857. 
7  Lewis  Winant,  Early  Percussion  Firearms.,  A  History  of  the  Early  Percussion  Firearms  Ignition  (New 
york,  1959),  p.  255-6. 
'  Malleson  (ed.  ),  Kaye  andMalleson's  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  1,  pp.  3  79-80. 
9  Birch  to  Abbott,  7  Nov  1856,  India  Military  Consultations,  OIOC,  P/46/55,  No.  24  of  7  Nov  1856. 171 
one  part  wax  -  was  used.  10  But  the  department  made  the  fatal,  and  unforgiveable,  error  of  not 
specifying  what  type  of  tallow  was  to  be  used.  " 
The  60th  Rifles  received  their  fiill  complement  of  1,040  Enfield  rifles  on  I  January  1857.12  At  around 
the  same  time,  Bengal  Native  Infantry  regiments  began  to  send  detachments  of  seven  men  (one 
European  officer,  one  native  officer  and  five  non-commissioned  officers  and  sepoys)  for  instruction  in 
the  care  and  handling  of  the  new  weapon  at  the  Musketry  Depots  at  Dum-Dum  near  Calcutta,  Ambala 
in  the  Cis-Sutlej  States  and  Sialkot  in  the  Punjab.  13  But  not  a  greased  cartridge  had  been  issued,  nor  a 
practice  shot  fired,  by  the  time  a  rumour  began  to  circulate  among  the  sepoys  at  the  Dum-Dum  depot  in 
late  January  that  the  grease  for  the  new  cartridge  was  offensive  to  both  Hindus  and  Muslims,  and  that 
this  was  part  of  a  systematic  plot  by  government  to  convert  all  Indians  to  Christianity.  The  origin  of 
the  rumour  was  a  conversation  between  a  high-caste  sepoy  of  the  2nd  N.  I.  and  a  low  caste  khalasi  (or 
labourer)  from  the  Dum-Dum  magazine.  According  to  a  report  by  Captain  Wright,  commandant  of  the 
Rifle  Instruction  Depot,  the  sepoy  had  rejected  the  khalasi's  request  to  drink  from  his  Iota  because  he 
did  not  know  his  caste,  to  which  the  khalasi  replied:  "You  will  soon  lose  your  caste,  as  ere  long  you 
will  have  to  bite  cartridges  covered  with  the  fat  of  pigs  and  COWS.  it  14 
Wright's  report  was  submitted  to  the  station  authorities  on  23  January  1857  by  Major  Bontein, 
commanding  the  Musketry  Depot,  who  also  gave  details  of  a  parade  held  the  evening  before  at  which 
two-thirds  of  the  native  portion  of  the  depot  (including  all  the  native  officers)  had  stated  their  objection 
to  the  grease  applied  to  the  new  cartridges  and  a  request  for  wax  and  oil  to  be  used  instead.  Both  letters 
were  then  forwarded  to  Major-General  J.  B.  Hearsey,  commanding  the  Presidency  Division,  who  sent 
them  on  to  Colonel  Birch,  the  Military  Secretary  to  the  Government  of  India,  with  the  comment  that  the 
khalasils  claim  was  "no  doubt  totally  groundless",  but  so  "suspiciously  disposed"  were  the  sepoys  that 
the  only  remedy  was  to  allow  them  to  grease  the  cartridges  themselves  with  materials  from  the  bazar.  15 
The  Government  of  India,  ever  conscious  of  religious  issues,  was  swift  to  react:  on  27  January,  having 
10  Evidence  of  Lt.  M.  E.  Currie,  Commissary  of  Ordnance,  23  March  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857,  XKX,  p. 
261;  Memorandum  by  J.  G.  Bonner,  Inspector-General  of  Stores,  23  March  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857, 
XXX,  p.  4. 
"  Mall  eson  (ed.  ),  Kaye  andMalleson's  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  1,  pp.  38  0-  1. 
12  J.  A.  B.  Palmer,  7he  Mutiny  Outbreak  atMeerut  in  1857  (Cambridge,  1966),  p.  14. 
13  Birch  to  Sir  John  Lawrence,  5  Feb  1857,  India  Military  Consultations,  OIOC,  P/47/5,  No.  51  of  6  Feb 
1857. 
14  Capt.  J.  A.  Wright  to  the  Adjutant  of  the  Rifle  Instruction  Depot,  22  Jan  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State 
Papers,  I,  p.  3. 
15  Maj.  J.  Bontein  to  the  Station  Staff  Officer,  23  Jan  1857  and  Hearsey  to  Maj.  W.  A.  J.  Mayhew,  24  Jan 
1857,  ibid.,  pp.  1-3. 172 
consulted  Colonel  Abbott  (Inspector-General  of  Ordnance),  Birch  ordered  that  all  cartridges  at  the 
Depots  of  Instruction  (including  the  Artillery  depot  at  Meerut)  were  to  be  issued  free  from  grease  and 
that  the  sepoys  were  to  be  allowed  "to  apply,  with  their  own  hands,  whatever  mixture  for  the  purpose 
they  may  prefer".  Abbott,  however,  was  quick  to  inform  Colonel  Chester,  the  Adjutant-General,  who 
was  up  country  with  the  Commander-in-Chief,  General  Anson,  that  such  a  solution  would  "answer  well 
enough  for  practice,  but  would  be  impracticable  on  service"  because  balled  cartridges  needed  to  be 
greased  before  they  were  bundled.  He  therefore  suggested  the  replacement  of  balled  cartridges  with 
balls  covered  with  grease  patches  and  powder-only  cartridges.  16 
Abbott  also  anticipated  the  government  by  making  inquiries  as  to  the  exact  composition  of  the 
cartridge  grease.  On  29  January,  he  reported  to  Colonel  Birch  that,  in  line  with  the  instructions 
received  from  the  Court  of  Directors,  "a  mixture  of  tallow  and  bees'wax"  had  been  used  and  that  "no 
extraordinary  precaution"  appeared  to  have  been  taken  "to  insure  [sic]  the  absence  of  any  objectionable 
fat".  Ina  separate  letter  that  day,  Abbott  informed  Birch  that  strict  orders  would  be  given  for  the 
exclusive  use  of  sheep  or  goats'  fat  if  it  was  decided  that  some  form  of  tallow  was  necessary.  17  It  has 
never  been  proven  beyond  doubt  that  the  original  grease  for  the  Enfield  cartridge  contained  beef  or  pork 
fat.  But  the  circumstantial  evidence  is  compelling.  In  a  letter  to  the  President  of  the  Board  of  Control 
of  7  February,  Canning  himself  stated  that  the  grease  grievance  had  "turned  out  to  be  well  founded".  is 
In  March,  the  officer  in  charge  of  the  Fort  William  arsenal  testified  that  no  one  had  bothered  to  check 
what  type  of  animal  fat  was  used.  At  the  same  tribunal,  Abbott  admitted  that  the  tallow  may  well  "have 
contained  the  fat  of  cows  or  other  animals".  19 
At  this  stage,  therefore,  the  Dum-Dum  sepoys  appear  to  have  had  a  genuine  grievance  -  though  not 
one  or  them  had  been,  or  ever  would  be,  issued  with  a  greased  cartridge.  Even  more  perplexing  is  the 
claim  by  Major  Bontein  that  no  greased  cartridges  were  ever  made  at  the  Dum-Dum  magazine  because 
its  operatives  were  still  learning  the  complicated  process  of  manufacture  when  the  rumour  began.  Nor 
were  any  greased  cartridges  ever  sent  from  the  Fort  William  arsenal,  where  they  were  being  made,  to 
16  Birch  to  Maj.  Mayhew,  27  Jan  1857,  Birch  to  Col.  C.  Chester,  27  Jan  1857  (Telegraphic),  Abbott  to 
Chester,  28  Jan  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857,  XXX,  pp.  3740. 
17  Abbott  to  Birch,  29  Jan  1857  (two  separate  letters),  ibid.,  pp.  40-1. 
18  Canning  to  Vernon  Smith,  7  Feb  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F231/4. 
"  Evidence  of  Lt.  Currie  and  Col.  A.  Abbott,  23  March  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857,  XXX,  p.  261. 173 
the  Dum-Dum  depot 
. 
20  How,  then,  did  the  Dum-Dum  khalasi  discover  the  truth  about  the  cartridge 
grease?  We  can  only  speculate. 
What  we  do  know  is  that  the  government  moved  swiftly  to  correct  its  earlier  error  by  halting  the 
production  of  greased  cartridges  and  authorizing  the  sepoys  to  apply  their  own  grease.  No  sooner  had 
this  concession  been  announced,  however,  than  sepoys  from  the  four  regiments  of  Bengal  Native 
Infantry  at  Barrackpore,  the  great  military  station  16  miles  north  of  Calcutta  (and  about  30  miles  from 
Dum-Dum),  were  voicing  their  fears  that  the  paper  encasing  the  new  cartridges  also  contained 
objectionable  fat.  These  suspicions  first  arose  when  ungreased  Enfield  cartridges  and  the  paper  used 
for  making  them  were  shown  to  a  parade  of  the  2  nd  N.  I.  at  Barrackpore  on  4  February  (similar  fears 
were  also  expressed  during  a  separate  parade  of  the  34thN.  I.  ).  At  a  subsequent  court  of  inqury,  held 
four  days  later,  witness  after  witness  stated  his  belief  that  the  paper  was  objectionable  to  his  caste.  One 
said  that  the  rumour  began  with  khalasis  from  the  Fort  William  arsenal;  others  referred  to  bazar  gossip 
and  a  "general  report  in  the  cantonment".  Two  witnesses,  a  sepoy  and  the  havildar-major  (native 
sergeant-major),  claimed  to  have  experimented  with  the  paper:  the  former  said  that  it  made  a  fizzing 
noise  when  burnt  "and  smelt  as  if  there  was  grease  in  it";  the  latter  that  it  would  not  dissolve  in  oil  and 
that  this  had  convinced  him  there  was  no  grease  in  it.  But  despite  this,  the  havildar-major  would  not 
bite  off  the  end  of  an  ungreased  cartridge  because  "the  other  men  would  object  to  it".  21  This  objection 
to  the  cartridge  paper  was  groundless:  it  contained  no  grease  and  certainly  no  tallow.  Suspicions  had 
arisen  partly  because  the  English  manufactured  paper  was  slightly  thicker  than  that  used  to  make 
musket  cartridges.  22  But  the  lack  of  a  genuine  reason  prompts  the  speculation  that  some  guiding  hand  - 
within  or  without  the  regiments  -  was  trying  to  keep  the  cartridge  controversy  alive  by  switching 
attention  from  the  grease  (which  was  no  longer  an  issue)  to  the  paper.  Canning  suspected  such  a 
conspiracy  and  told  Vernon  Smith  that  there  was  a  mutinous  spirit  in  the  2nd  N.  I.,  or  at  least  part  of  it, 
which  had  "not  been  roused  by  the  cartridges  alone  if  at  all  it 
. 
23 
The  first  serious  outbreak  of  open  mutiny  took  place  at  Berhampore,  110  miles  north  of  Calcutta, 
during  the  night  of  26/27  February.  The  previous  afternoon,  the  men  of  the  19th  N.  I.  had  refused  to 
receive  their  copper  caps  for  firing  exercise  on  the  morning  of  27  February  because  they  suspected  that 
the  paper  for  the  blank  practice  cartridges  contained  objectionable  grease.  These  cartridges,  it  should 
20  Evidence  of  Maj.  Bontein,  18  March  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857,  XXX'  p.  259. 
21  Proceedings  of  a  Special  Court  of  Inquiry,  6  Feb  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  1,  pp.  7-13, 
22  Evidence  of  Maj.  Bontein  and  Lt.  Currie,  18  March  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857,  )OK  pp.  259-60. 174 
be  stressed,  were  for  their  old  muskets  -  not  the  new  Enfield  -  and  were  the  same  type  that  had  been 
issued  to  the  army  for  many  years.  They  had,  moreover,  been  made  up  in  the  regimental  magazine  the 
previous  year  by  the  sepoys  of  the  7h  N.  I..  Lieutenant-Colonel  Mitchell  reminded  the  native  officers  of 
these  facts  and  warned  them  that  any  sepoy  who  refused  to  accept  the  blank  cartridges  at  the  morning 
parade  would  be  court-martialled.  At  around  IIp.  m.,  however,  the  sepoys  broke  into  their  bells-of- 
arms  and  seized  their  muskets.  Mitchell  responded  by  ordering  a  detachment  of  the  I  1'h  I.  C.  and  some 
European  artillery  to  cover  the  mutinous  sepoys  while  he  went  to  speak  to  them.  Four  hours  later,  after 
much  negotiation,  Mitchel  I  finally  agreed  to  the  native  officers'  suggestion  to  withdraw  the  cavalry  and 
guns.  The  men  then  lodged  their  weapons  and  returned  to  their  lines.  24 
During  the  subsequent  Court  of  Inquiry,  the  native  officers,  non-commissioned  officers  and  sepoys 
of  the  19'h  N.  I.  sent  a  petition  to  General  Hearsey  to  explain  their  behaviour.  They  stated  that  the 
rumour  about  the  new  cartridges  containing  objectionable  fat  had  been  in  circulation  for  "two  months 
and  more",  and  that  they  were  very  much  afraid  for  their  religion.  Their  minds  had  been  temporarily 
put  at  ease  by  Colonel  Mitchel  I's  announcement  that  grease  for  the  new  cartridges  would  be  made  up  in 
front  of  the  sepoys  by  the  company  pay-havildars.  But  their  fears  returned  when  they  inspected  the 
blank  cartridges  at  their  bells-of-arms  on  the  afternoon  of  26  February.  "We  perceived  them  to  be  of 
two  kinds,  "  they  wrote,  "and  one  sort  appeared  to  be  different  from  that  formerly  served  out.  Hence  we 
doubted  whether  these  might  not  be  the  cartridges  which  had  arrived  from  Calcutta,  as  we  had  made 
none  ourselves,  and  were  convined  that  they  were  greased.  "  It  was  for  this  reason,  they  claimed,  that 
they  refused  to  accept  the  firing  caps.  Colonel  Mitchell  had  angrily  responded  by  threatening  to  take 
the  regiment  to  Burma,  where  they  would  all  die  of  hardship,  if  they  did  not  accept  the  cartridges.  This 
outburst  had  convinced  them  that  the  cartridges  were  greased.  They  had  seized  their  arms  in  fear  of 
their  lives  amidst  shouts  that  they  were  about  to  be  attacked  by  Europeans,  the  cavalry  and  the  guns.  25 
The  sepoys'  objections,  therefore,  had  switched  from  the  grease  on  the  Enfield  cartridge,  to  the  paper 
used  for  the  Enfield  cartridge,  and  finally  to  the  paper  on  the  old  musket  cartridge.  The  reference  to 
two  different  kinds  of  blank  cartridge  is  explained  by  the  fact  that,  since  the  mid-1850s,  some  of  the 
paper  used  for  musket  ammunition  had  been  produced  by  the  Serampore  mills  near  Calcutta.  Its  paper 
23  Canning  to  Vernon  Smith,  22  Feb  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F231/4. 
24  Lt.  -Col.  W.  St.  L.  Mitchell  to  Major  A-H.  Ross,  27  Feb  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  I,  p.  41. 
25  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  1,  pp.  45-7. 175 
was  of  a  slightly  darker  shade  than  the  familiar  English  product  of  John  Dickinson  &  C0.26  Yet  it 
contained  no  grease,  nor  was  grease  ever  applied  to  cartridges  for  smooth-bore  muskets.  There  is, 
therefore,  no  rational  explanation  for  the  behaviour  of  the  19th  N.  I.  on  the  night  of  26  February  beyond 
a  complete  breakdown  of  trust  between  the  sepoys  and  their  European  officers.  Colonel  Mitchell  had 
assured  them  that  the  cartridges  were  of  the  old  type  and  contained  no  grease,  and  yet  they  preferred  to 
believe  the  wild  rumour  that  the  Indian  government  was  planning  their  forcible  conversion  to 
Christianity.  It  is  highly  probable  that  certain  members  of  the  regiment  were  playing  upon  the  fears  of 
their  comrades  to  incite  mutiny.  These  ringleaders  were  almost  certainly  behind  the  false  reports  that 
the  blank  cartridge  paper  contained  grease  and  that  the  regiment  was  about  to  be  attacked  during  the 
night  of  26/27  February. 
By  mid-March,  the  disaffection  had  spread  to  the  Musketry  Depot  at  Ambala  where  detachments 
from  41  Bengal  Native  Infantry  regiments  were  being  instructed  in  the  use  of  the  new  Enfield  rifle.  On 
the  morning  of  16  March,  as  all  the  native  detachments  were  being  paraded  for  drill,  Lieutenant 
Martineau,  Instructor  of  Musketry,  called  aside  the  native  officers  to  express  his  surprize  that  the  men 
were  still  discussing  whether  or  not  to  the  use  Enfield  cartridges  despite  his  assurance  that  they  could 
apply  their  own  grease.  At  which  point  a  native  officer  from  the  71t  N.  I.  stepped  forward  and  stated 
that  the  men  at  the  depot  were  against  using  any  of  the  new  cartridges  until  they  had  ascertained  that 
their  doing  so  was  "not  unacceptable  to  their  comrades  in  their  respective  corps".  For  they  feared  being 
taunted  with  loss  of  caste  on  return  to  their  regiments.  That  this  was  not  the  generally  held  opinion, 
however,  is  proved  by  the  interjection  of  a  jemadar  from  the  36h  N.  I.  who  claimed  that  the  previous 
speaker  knew  "perfectly  well  that  many  of  the  detachments  here  entertain  no  such  feelings".  The 
Jemadar  added: 
I  will  fire  when  I  am  told,  &I  know  many  others  will  do  the  same.  I  have  sufficient  confidence  in Government  & 
my  officers  to  know  that  no  improper  order  will  be  given  to  us,  &  to  demur  using  cartridges  merely  because  they 
are  of  a  different  form,  or  made  of  different  paper,  is  absurd,  in  fact  there  is  no  question  of  caste  in  the  matter,  &  he 
who  refuses  to  obey  proper  orders,  or  who  cavels  about  doing  so  on  the  pretext  of  religion,  is  guilty  of  mutinous 
and  insubordinate  conduct. 
26  David  Harding,  'Arming  the  East  India  Company's  Forces',  Soldiers  of  the  Raj,  p.  145. 176 
According  to  Martineau,  the  jemadar's  sentiments  were  backed  up  throughout  by  the  native  officers  of 
27 
the  10h  and  22nd  N.  I.,  while  others  loudly  denounced  the  views  of  the  first  speaker.  Here  then  is 
evidence  that  not  all  native  soldiers  were  sufficiently  disillusioned  with  either  their  European  officers  or 
the  government  to  believe,  or  even  claim  to  believe,  that  the  cartridge  question  was  still  a  legitimate 
issue.  Those  who  continued  to  do  so  were,  in  this  native  officer's  opinion,  using  religion  as  a  pretext. 
Nevertheless,  the  fear  of  social  ostracisation  was  not  without  foundation.  On  19  March,  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  General  the  Hon.  George  Anson,  arrived  in  Ambala  on  a  tour  of  inspection  with 
his  escorting  regiment,  the  36th  N.  I.  But  when  a  havildar  and  a  naik  from  the  regiment,  part  of  the 
detachment  doing  duty  at  the  Musketry  Depot,  went  to  the  camp  to  greet  their  comrades  they  were 
refused  entry  to  the  tents  and  taunted  by  one  subedar  with  having  become  Christians.  Martineau  was 
asked  to  obtain  some  redress  not  only  by  the  two  aggrieved  N.  C.  Os.,  but  also  by  the  native  officers  at 
the  depot  who  "regarded  the  insult  as  intended  for  all  who  as  good  soldiers  were  obeying  the  orders  of 
Government  by  using  the  new  Enfield  rifle"  . 
28  He  therefore  conducted  his  own  inquiry  among  the 
depot's  detachments  and  discovered,  so  he  told  the  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  the  existence  of  a 
rumour  that  the  Enfield  cartridge  had  been  purposely  greased  with  beef  and  pork  fat  "with  the  express 
object  of  destroying  caste",  and  that  the  weapon  itself  was  "nothing  more  or  less  than  a  Government 
missionary  to  convert  the  whole  Army  to  Christianity".  That  "so  absurd  a  rumour  should  meet  with 
ready  credence"  was  proof  that  the  feeling  of  native  troops  was  anything  but  sound.  Yet  it  was 
"generally  credited",  he  added,  and  punchayets  had  been  formed  in  all  Bengal  corps  from  Calcutta  to 
Peshawur,  determined  to  regard  as  outcastes  any  men  who  used  the  new  cartridges.  29 
On  23  March,  having  been  informed  of  the  above  developments,  General  Anson  addressed  a  parade 
of  the  native  officers  at  the  depot.  Through  the  medium  of  an  interpreter,  he  told  them  that  the 
rumoured  intention  of  the  government  to  interfere  with  their  caste  and  religion,  or  to  coerce  them  or  the 
people  of  the  country  in  general  to  do  anything  which  would  involve  loss  of  caste,  was  "utterly 
groundless  and  false",  and  that  he  looked  to  them  to  satisfy  those  under  their  authority  on  this  point.  30 
The  response  of  the  native  officers,  through  the  medium  of  Lieutenant  Martineau,  was  that  they  knew 
the  rumour  to  be  false,  but  it  was  "universally  credited,  not  only  in  their  regiments,  but  in  their  villages 
27  Capt.  E.  M.  Martineau  to  Sir  John  Kaye,  20  Oct  1864,  Kaye  Mutiny  Papers,  OIOC,  H725,  pp.  1023-4. 
28  Ibid.,  pp.  1027-8. 
29  Lt.  Martineau  to  Capt.  S.  Becher,  20  March  1857,  Martineau  Letters,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/C571. 
30  Becher  to  Col.  Birch,  25  March  1857,  India  Military  Consultations,  OIOC,  P147/1  1,  No.  335  of  3 
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&  their  homes".  They  would  not  disobey  an  order  to  fire,  but  they  wanted  the  Commander-in-Chief  to 
understand  the  social  consequences  to  themselves,  namely  loss  of  caste.  Martineau  himself  could  not 
offer  any  definitive  explanation,  yet  he  was  disposed  to  regard  the  greased  cartridge  "more  as  the 
medium  than  the  original  cause  of  this  wide  spread  feeling  of  distrust  that  is  spreading  dissatisfaction  to 
our  Rule".  31  Part  of  his  reason  for  believing  this,  he  later  testified,  was  because  only  I-Endu  sepoys 
appeared  to  be  genuinely  worried  by  the  cartridge  question;  the  Muslim  sepoys,  on  the  other  hand, 
simply  "laughed  at  it".  32 
Anson  was  of  a  similar  conviction.  "The'Cartridge'  question  is  more  a  pretext,  than  reality,  "  he 
informed  Lord  Elphinstone  on  29  March,  adding:  "The  sepoys  have  been  pampered  &  given  way  to,  & 
have 
...  grown  insolent  beyond  bearing.  03  Yet  he  accepted  that  the  native  officers  at  Ambala  genuinely 
feared  social  ostracism,  and  so  ordered  the  deferment  of  actual  target  practice  at  the  three  musketry 
depots  until  the  government  had  voiced  its  opinion.  34 
The  Supreme  Government  had  meanwhile  come  to  another  decision.  On  27  March,  Canning's 
general  order  announced  the  forthcoming  disbandment  of  the  19d'N.  I.  for  "open  and  defiant  mutiny".  it 
also  took  the  opportunity  to  assure  the  native  army  that  it  had  ever  been  "the  unvarying  rule  of  the 
Government  of  India  to  treat  the  religious  feelings  of  all  its  servants,  of  every  creed,  with  careful 
respect",  and  that  had  the  sepoys  of  the  19'h  N.  I.  "confided  in  their  Government,  and  believed  their 
commanding  officer,  instead  of  crediting  the  idle  stories  with  which  false  and  evil-minded  men  have 
deceived  them,  their  religious  scruples  would  still  have  remained  inviolate" 
. 
35  The  19'h  N.  I.  was  duly 
disbanded  at  Barrackpore  on  31  March,  in  the  presence  of  the  garrison's  four  regiments  of  native 
infantry,  the  Governor-General's  Body-Guard  and  five  companies  of  H.  M.  84,  h  Foot  sent  up  from 
Calcutta  and  Chinsurah  respectively. 
Two  days  earlier,  Barrackpore  witnessed  the  first  outbreak  of  mutinous  violence  when  Sepoy  Mungul 
Pandy  of  the  34"'  N.  I.,  armed  with  a  musket  and  sword,  tried  to  murder  the  European  sergeant-major, 
Hewson,  and  the  adjutant,  Lieutenant  Baugh.  Both  received  severe  sword  cuts  before  Pandy, 
confronted  by  General  Hearsey  and  his  staff,  turned  his  gun  upon  himself.  What  was  particularly 
shocking  about  this  incident  was  the  fact  that  upwards  of  400  sepoys  watched  Pandy's  unprovoked 
31  Martineau  to  Becher,  23  March  1857,  Martineau  Letters,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/C571. 
32  Examination  of  Captain  Martineau,  23  Feb  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVH1,  p.  210. 
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34  Becher  to  Col.  Birch,  25  March  1857,  India  Military  Consultations,  OIOC,  P/47/1  1,  No.  335  of  3 
April  1857. 178 
attack  without  intervening.  Furthermore,  the  Jemadar  of  the  Quarter  Guard  ignored  repeated  orders  to 
disarm  Pandy,  and  there  is  even  evidence  to  suggest  that  some  members  of  the  Guard  assisted  in  the 
attack  upon  the  two  Europeans  (Hewson,  for  example,  recalled  being  felled  from  behind  by  blows  from 
a  sepoy's  musket).  That  Hewson  and  Baugh  survived  was  mainly  due  to  the  intervention  of  Sepoy 
Shaik  Pultoo,  the  only  native  to  offer  assistance,  who  was  badly  wounded  in  the  process.  36 
Pandy's  intention  is  unclear,  though  it  would  appear  to  have  been  a  failed  attempt  to  incite  the  whole 
regiment  to  mutiny.  "Come  out,  you  Mainchutes  [sister-violaters],  the  Europeans  are  here,  "  he  is  said 
to  have  shouted  on  emerging  from  his  hut.  "From  biting  these  cartridges  we  shall  become  infidels.  Get 
ready,  turn  out  all  OfYOU.  07  A  separate  statement  by  the  same  witness  has  Pandy  warning  the  men  that 
the  "guns  and  Europeans  had  arrived  for  the  purpose  of  slaughtering  them".  38  Hewson  recalled  him 
saying:  "Nikul  ao,  pultun;  nikul  ao  hamara  sath  (Come  out,  men;  come  out  and  join  me  -  You  sent  me 
out  here,  why  don't  you  follow  me).  09  Pandy  himself  admitted  that  he  had  recently  been  taking  Mang 
(an  infusion  of  Indian  hemp)  and  opium,  and  was  not  aware  of  what  he  was  doing  at  the  time  of  the 
attack  . 
40  It  seems  likely,  therefore,  that  an  intoxicated  Pandy  acted  prematurely  before  his  co- 
conspirators  were  ready.  Certainly  his  false  references  to  the  approach  of  Europeans  and  the  loss  of 
religion  were  repeated  in  many  other  mutinies,  and  they  had  clearly  been  decided  upon  as  the  best  way 
to  win  over  waverers.  But  in  the  case  of  the  34th  N.  I.,  there  had  been  no  specific  dispute  over  the  issue 
of  cartridges  (though  the  men  had  expressed  their  suspicions  about  the  paper  for  the  new  Enfield 
cartridge),  and  the  ground  was  not  yet  prepared  for  fiill-blown  mutiny. 
It  was  later  suggested  that  the  evangelism  of  the  34th's  commanding  officer,  Colonel  Wheler,  was 
largely  to  blame  for  the  bad  feeling  in  the  regiment.  Wheler  himself  admitted  that  he  had  been  in  the 
habit  of  speaking  to  "natives  of  all  classes,  sepoys  and  others"  on  the  subject  of  Christianity  "in  the 
highways,  cities,  bazars  and  villages",  though  "not  in  the  lines  and  regimental  bazars".  41  He  had,  he 
said,  "often  addressed"  sepoys  of  his  own  and  other  regiments  in  the  stations  where  he  had  been 
quartered  with  the  aim  of  converting  them  to  Christianity.  42  Such  an  officer,  Canning  told  the  President 
"  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  1,  pp.  94-7. 
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38  Examination  of  Havildar  Shaik  Pultoo,  9  April  1857,  ibid.,  pp.  129-30. 
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of  the  Board  of  Control,  was  "not  fit  to  command  a  regiment".  13  But  other  opinion  was  divided.  An 
anonymous  letter  to  the  Rriend  ofIndia  asked,  with  reference  to  a  report  that  Wheler  was  about  to  be 
removed  from  his  command,  "by  what  law  a  man  who  lives  as  a  Christian,  and  peaceably  endeavours  to 
induce  others  to  be  Christians  like  him,  is  made  an  offender".  44  Yhe  Bengal  Hurharu  responded  with 
the  comment  that  the  "least  likely  way  of  making  Christians  of  the  Natives  in  this  country,  is  to  get 
turned  out  of  it  ourselves"  . 
45  Lieutenant  Martineau  later  testified  that  he  had  never  heard  any  sepoys  at 
Ambala  speak  complainingly  of  the  efforts  of  Wheler  and  missionaries  in  general  to  convert  natives  to 
Christianity  and  did  not  think  "they  cared  one  bit  about  it".  46  Anson  did  not  believe  the  disaffection  of 
the  Bengal  Army  could  be  "traced  to  the  preaching  of  Commanding  officers"  because  Wheler  was  an 
isolated  case.  47  Yhe  Bengal  Hurhani  also  had  "no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  prevalence  of  disaffection 
and  insubordination  in  the  Bengal  Army  had  been  caused  by  the  proceedings  of  proselytizing  officers". 
Yet,  it  added,  what  was  "more  likely  to  cause  general  disaffecton  in  an  army  of  illiterate  natives  than 
the  suspicion  of  a  design  against  their  national  faith",  what  "more  likely  to  excite  such  a  suspicion  than 
the  spectacle  of  a  military  Commander 
...  teaching  and  preaching  a  foreign  religion".  In  other  words, 
the  actions  of  Wheler  and  men  like  him  were  grist  to  the  mill  of  those  who  wished  "to  win  away  the 
allegiance  of  the  sepoys  from  Government  ii 
. 
48 
In  civil  society  as  a  whole,  many  Indians  had  become  increasingly  wary  of  the  government's  attempts 
at  anglicization  during  the  previous  40  years.  In  1813,  as  part  of  the  20-year  renewal  of  the  East  India 
Company's  Charter,  two  decisions  were  taken  which  were  to  have  far-reaching  consequences  for  Indian 
language  and  culture:  the  Indian  government  was  committed  to  spending  L10,000  a  year  on  education; 
and  the  long-standing  ban  on  Christian  missionaries  was  removed.  As  a  result  of  the  first  initiative, 
Anglicizers  and  Orientalists  began  a  fierce  debate  as  to  what  kind  of  education  -  English  or  classical 
Indian  -  should  be  funded 
. 
49  The  question  was  finally  settled  in  1835  when  Thomas  Babington 
Macaulay,  law  member  to  the  new  Legislative  Council  of  India,  penned  his  notorious  Minute  on 
Education  which  recommended  raising  up  an  English-educated  middle-class  "who  may  be  interpreters 
between  us  and  the  millions  whom  we  govern  -a  class  of  persons  Indian  in  colour  and  blood,  but 
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English  in  tastes,  in  opinions,  in  morals,  and  in  intellect".  50  Already  a  new  anglicized  61ite  in  Calcutta 
had  begun  "to  create  institutions  to  serve  its  own  interests".  These  were  largely  educational 
establishments  that  taught  English  language,  literature  and  western  sciences,  and  included  the  Hindu 
College  (1816),  the  Calcutta  School  Society  (1818),  the  Sanskrit  College  (1824)  and  the  Oriental 
Seminary  (1829).  They  were  supplemented  by  missionary  schools  that  generally  taught  Indians  of  all 
religions  and  castes  for  free,  notably  Dr  Duff  s  Free  Church  Mission  in  Calcutta.  But  even  those 
Calcutta  61ites  who  accepted  the  necessity  of  learning  English  were  split  between  conservatives  who 
wanted  to  limit  the  incorporation  of  foreign  culture  within  Hindu  society  (such  as  the  members  of  the 
Hindu  Dharma  Sabha)  and  "cultural  radicals  who  rejected  Hindu  social  norms  in  favour  of  English 
culture  and  secular  rationalism  imported  from  Europe"  (led  by  the  brilliant  young  Eurasian,  Henry 
Derozio,  who  supported  the  abolition  of  sad  in  1829,  just  two  years  before  his  untimely  death  at  the  age 
of  22).  51  The  extent  to  which  these  cultural  developments  affected  rural  communities  and  military 
cantonments,  however,  is  open  to  question.  The  abolition  of  sad,  for  example,  caused  hardly  a  ripple 
among  the  native  troops. 
The  activity  of  Christian  missionaries,  however,  was  potentially  more  problematical.  With  the  ending 
of  the  ban  on  their  activity  in  1813,  missionaries  of  all  denominations  made  rapid  inroads  into 
Company  territory.  At  first  they  were  required  to  possess  an  official  licence;  but  this  stipulation  was 
dropped  when  the  Company's  Charter  was  renewed  for  a  further  20  years  in  1833.  By  then,  moderate 
evangelicals  were  receiving  the  enthusiastic  support  of  both  Lord  William  Bentinck,  the  Governor- 
52 
General  (1828-35),  and  Daniel  Wilson,  the  Bishop  of  Calcutta  (1832-58).  In  1834,  the  American 
Presbyterian  Mission  established  its  headquarters  at  Ludhiana  in  the  Cis-Sutlej  States  (then  part  of  the 
Punjab).  A  year  later  the  Mission  acquired  a  printing  press  and  began  to  publish  tracts,  translations  of 
the  scriptures  and  dictionaries  in  Punjabi,  Urdu,  Persian,  Hindi  and  Kashmiri.  After  the  annexation  of 
the  Punjab  in  1849,  a  number  of  new  missions  sprang  up.  A  similar  process  took  place  at  Agra  where 
the  Anglican  Church  Missionary  Society  set  up  a  mission,  orphanage  and  printing  press  in  1838.  By 
1846  the  major  missionary  societies  had  an  annual  budget  of  1425,000,  nearly  half  of  which  was  spent 
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by  Anglicans  and  Methodists.  The  campaign  of  proselytism  in  the  North-Western  Provinces,  in 
particular,  provoked  a  stream  of  pamphlets,  books,  journals  and  newspapers  in  defence  of  the  Hindu 
and  Muslim  religions  from  native-owned  presses  in  Agra,  Delhi  and  Meerut.  But  despite  the  Christian 
zeal  of  a  number  of  governors-general  -  including  Lord  Canning  who  made  donations  to  the  Calcutta 
Bible  Society,  the  Serampore  College  (established  by  Baptist  missionaries)  and  the  Free  Church 
Mission  -  the  actual  number  of  conversions  to  Christianity  in  the  Bengal  Presidency  prior  to  the  mutiny 
was  relatively  insignificant:  the  Anglican  Church  Missionary  Society,  for  example,  had  just  19,000 
church  attendants  throughout  India  by  the  1840s,  most  of  them  outside  Bengal;  in  the  Punjab,  where  the 
American  Presbyterian  Mission  was  active,  the  total  number  of  converts  was  fewer  than  4,000  by  the 
1880s.  In  the  Madras  Presidency,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Tinnevelly  district  recorded  nearly  40,000 
Christian  converts  by  1850,  with  a  further  20,000  in  southern  Travancore  (though  the  process  of 
conversion  was  actually  begun  by  Jesuits  in  the  17th  Century).  They  were  chiefly  Untouchables  who 
had  little  social  status  to  lose.  Respectable  Hindus  in  southern  India  responded  in  the  mid-1840s  by 
forming  two  organizations:  the  Vibuthi  Sangam  (Sacred  Ash  Society),  a  shadowy  group  dedicated  to 
ending  Christian  conversions;  and  the  Madras-based  Sadu  Veda  Siddhanta  Sabha  (Society  for 
Spreading  the  Philosophy  of  the  Four  Vedas),  which  sought  the  same  end  by  legal  means.  Both 
societies  were  probably  behind  the  spate  of  attacks  on  Christian  villages  that  were  commonplace  in  the 
late  1840s  and  1850s.  If  anything,  therefore,  the  antagonism  towards  missionaries  was  much  higher  in 
the  Madras  Presidency  than  in  Bengal.  But  Hindus  across  India  -  especially  those  of  the  higher  castes  - 
were  undoubtedly  alarmed  by  the  Company's  amendment  of  Hindu  law:  first,  in  1850,  to  allow 
Christian  converts  the  right  of  inheritance;  and  second,  in  1856,  to  legalize  the  second  marriage  of 
13 
Hindu  widows  (and  thereby  legitimize  their  subsequent  offspring). 
Perhaps  of  more  relevance  to  the  disaffection  of  the  &h  and  34dregiments  than  issues  of  caste  and 
religion,  however,  was  the  fact  that  both  were  commanded  by  relatively  unfamiliar  officers.  Mitchell 
had  been  with  his  regiment  forjust  18  months.  Wheler  a  few  years  longer,  though  he  had  only  returned 
to  take  command  of  the  34th  in  1856  after  an  absence  of  seven  years.  Wheler  had  also  been  in 
temporary  command  of  the  original  34h  N.  I.  when  it  was  disbanded  in  1844  for  refusing  to  serve  in 
Sind  without  extra  benefits.  It  may  be  assumed,  therefore,  that  he  was  not  particularly  popular. 
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Furthermore  it  is  surely  no  coincidence  that  both  regiments  were  stationed  in  Lucknow,  the  capital  of 
Oudh,  when  that  kingdom  was  forcibly  annexed  by  the  East  India  Company  in  February  1856  on  the 
ground  of  misgovernance.  Many  of  their  sepoys  came  from  that  province  (as  did  a  large  proportion  of 
sepoys  in  the  Bengal  Army  as  a  whole).  Not  only  was  the  annexation  a  blow  to  their  national  pride,  but 
it  also  brought  an  end  to  the  privilege  enjoyed  by  all  Company  soldiers  from  Oudh  of  being  able  to 
prosecute  their  legal  cases  and  petitions  through  the  British  Resident.  So  abused  had  this  privilege 
become  -  with  some  sepoys  receiving  up  to  10  months  leave  for  the  sole  purpose  of  prosecuting  their 
claims  -  that  in  1853  the  maximum  leave  was  stipulated  as  that  which  "would  enable  the  applicant  to 
travel  to  Lucknow,  remain  there  for  10  days,  and  then  return  (unless  the  Resident  certified  that  the 
man's  continued  presence  was  necessary)ti.  54  Yet  the  privilege  remained  until  annexation  and  there  is 
no  doubt  that  its  loss  -  and  with  it  the  prestige  of  serving  the  Company  -  was  keenly  felt.  In  a  letter  to 
Canning  of  I  May  1857,  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  mentioned  that  he  had  received  a  number  of  letters 
attributing  the  "present  bad  feeling  not  to  the  cartridge  or  any  specific  question,  but  to  a  pretty  general 
dissatisfaction  at  many  recent  acts  of  Government  which  have  been  skilfully  played  upon  by 
incendiaries".  Lawrence  gave  the  example  of  an  Oudh  sowar  in  the  Bombay  cavalry  who  was  asked  if 
he  liked  annexation.  "No,  "  the  sowar  replied.  "I  used  to  be  a  great  man  when  I  went  home;  the  best  in 
the  village  rose  as  I  approached;  now  the  lowest  puff  their  pipes  in  my  face.  "55  Therewereother 
occasions  when  the  annexation  of  Oudh  was  cited  as  a  grievance.  Lieutenant  De  Kantzow  of  the  9th 
N.  I.  noted  that  some  of  his  younger  sepoys,  who  had  seen  the  annexation  of  Oudh  with  their  own  eyes 
(including  the  auctioning  of  the  King's  property),  referred  to  their  country  as  having  been  "snatched".  56 
Martineau  recalled  that  dissatisfaction  with  the  annexation  of  Oudh  was  "occasionally  alluded  to"  by 
sepoys  at  the  Musketry  Depot  at  Ambala.  57  And  during  the  mutiny  itself,  Captain  Thomson  of  the  53d 
N.  I.,  one  of  only  four  men  to  survive  the  Cawnpore  massacres,  was  informed  by  mutinous  sepoys  that 
"the  Company's  rai  would  cease"  because  of  the  annexation  of  Oudh  alone.  58 
The  upshot  of  the  aborted  rising  of  the  34h  N.  I.  was  that  Mungul  Pandy  and  the  Jemadar  of  the 
Guard,  Issuree  Pandy,  were  hanged  for  mutiny  on  8  and  21  April  respectively.  With  just  10  exceptions 
54  Col.  Sleeman  to  C.  Allen,  14  Oct  1852,  India  Military  Consultations,  OIOC,  P/43/61,  No.  375  of  5 
Nov  1852;  G.  O.  G.  G.,  16  Feb  1853,  Abstract  of  General  Orders  from  1848  to  1853,  OIOC, 
LJMIU17/2/437. 
55  Anderson  and  Subedar  (eds.  ),  Yhe  Last  Days  of  the  Company,  1,  p.  I  10. 
56  Kantzow  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/Photo/Eur  86,  vol.  1,  p.  5. 
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-  three  native  officers,  three  N.  C.  O.  s  and  three  sepoys  -  the  remainder  of  the  seven  companies  present  at 
Barrackpore  when  the  incident  took  place  (the  other  three  companies  were  on  detached  duty  at 
Chittagong)  were  found  guilty  of  passive  mutiny  and  disbanded  by  order  of  the  Governor-General  on  6 
May.  59  The  reaction  of  the  native  newspaper,  The  Hindoo  Patriot,  to  the  outbreak  of  disaffection  in  the 
Bengal  Army  was  to  indicate  a  cause  far  deeper  than  the  cartridge  question.  "Months  before  a  single 
cartridge  was  greased  with  beef-swet  or  hogslard,  "  it  commented  on  2  April,  "we  endeavoured  to  draw 
public  attention  to  the  unsatisfactory  state  of  feeling  in  the  sepoy  army...  There  is  no  want  of 
distinctness  or  prominence  in  the  symptoms  which  have  already  appeared  to  wam  us  against  the 
existence  of  a  powder  mine  in  the  ranks  of  the  native  soldiery  that  wants  but  the  slightest  spark  to  set  in 
motion  gigantic  elements  of  destruction.  10 
Also  in  early  April,  on  the  advice  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hogge  (the  Director  of  the  Artillery  School 
of  Instruction  at  Meerut)  and  Major  Bontein,  the  government  attempted  to  remove  any  remaining 
objection  to  the  new  cartridges  by  altering  the  firing  drill  for  both  rifles  and  muskets.  61  Instead  of 
tearing  the  top  of  the  cartridge  with  their  teeth,  sepoys  would  now  do  so  with  their  left  hand.  6'  With 
this  and  the  other  main  concession  in  place  (that  of  allowing  sepoys  to  apply  their  own  grease),  Canning 
authorized  the  musketry  depots  to  commence  firing  practice.  Any  further  postponement,  he  observed, 
would  be  viewed  by  the  sepoys'  comrades  in  their  regiments  as  a  victory;  the  government  would  be 
seen  to  have  "admitted  the  justice  of  the  objection  or  at  least  as  having  doubts  upon  it,  and  the  prejudice 
63 
would  take  deeper  root  than  ever"  . 
The  first  live  firing  at  the  Ambala  musketry  depot  -  using  Enfield  cartridges  greased  by  the  sepoys 
with  a  composition  ofghi  and  beeswax  -  took  place  on  17  April.  The  native  troops  at  the  depot  had 
warned  Martineau  that  it  would  lead  to  an  outbreak  in  the  station  -  which  was  garrisoned  by  the  4th 
L.  C.,  5h  and  60dN.  I..,  H.  M.  9h  Lancers  and  two  troops  of  European  Bengal  horse  artillery  -  and  the 
increased  frequency  of  arson  attacks  seemed  to  confirm  thiS.  64  As  early  as  26  March  an  attempt  was 
made  to  bum  down  the  hut  of  the  native  officer  in  the  36th  N.  I.  who  had  been  the  first  to  declare  his 
59  G.  O.  G.  G.,  4  May  1857  and  Maj.  -Gen.  Hearsey  to  Col.  Birch,  6  May  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State 
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willingness  to  fire  the  new  cartridge.  The  fires  resumed  on  13  April,  when  the  authorities  at  Ambala 
received  orders  to  commence  firing  practice,  and  continued  on  into  May.  The  targets  included  the 
depot  hospital,  a  barrack  in  the  European  lines,  an  empty  bungalow,  a  European  officer's  stables,  and 
huts  belonging  to  two  high-caste  native  officers  and  a  havildar  from  the  50'N.  I.  who  were  attached  to 
the  depot  (and  who,  according  to  their  C.  O.,  had  "fired  the  new  cartridges  without  demur"  and 
repeatedly  assured  him  that  there  was  "nothing  objectionable  in  them").  65  That  no  one  would  identify 
the  incendiaries  despite  the  offer  of  a  large  reward  was,  Martineau  was  told,  "a  certain  sign  of  general 
,  66  dissatisfaction  and  some  impending  outbreak'.  But  not  all  native  regiments  were  outraged  by  the 
news  from  Ambala.  When  the  detachments  from  the  Cawnpore  regiments  returned  from  Ambala, 
noted  Captain  Thomson,  "they  were  amicably  received,  and  allowed  to  cat  with  their  own  caste, 
although  they  had  been  using  the  Enfield  rifle  and  the  suspected  cartridges".  One  Muslim  sepoy  from 
Thomson's  53d  N.  I.  even  "brought  with  him  specimens  of  the  cartridges,  to  assure  his  comrades  that  no 
animal  fat  had  been  employed  in  their  construction".  67  This  docile  reaction  is  confirmed  by  Jhokun,  the 
servant  of  Colonel  Williams  of  the  50"  N.  I.,  another  of  the  Cawnpore  units.  "The  cartridge  question 
used  to  be  talked  about,  "  claimed  Jhokun,  "but  it  did  not  engross  much  attention.  The  53rd  and  56th  N.  I. 
showed  great  lukewarmness  until  the  mutiny  actually  broke  out.  "  This  was  probably  because  the 
instigators  of  the  eventual  mutiny  at  Cawnpore  were  from  the  other  two  regiments:  the  2d  L.  C.  and  the 
l"N.  1.68  The  cartridge  question,  therefore,  was  only  of  interest  to  those  who  wished  to  foment  mutiny. 
At  the  Dum-Dum  depot  live  firing  commenced  on  23  April  without  incident.  Major  Bontein  told  the 
Assistant  Adjutant-General  of  the  Presidency  Division  that  his  orders  had  been  "obeyed  as  a  matter  of 
course",  which  was  only  to  have  been  expected  after  the  "alteration  in  the  method  of  loading  and 
greasing  the  cartridges".  69  One  of  the  first  to  step  forward  and  declare  his  willingness  to  fire  the  new 
cartridge  was  Subedar  Bholah  Upadhya,  a  Brahmin  from  the  17  th  N.  I.  Ms  loyalty  was  rewarded  when 
his  commanding  officer,  Major  Burroughs,  recommended  him  for  the  vacant  subedar-majorship  in  the 
regiment  though  he  was  only  the  second  senior  subedar.  The  subedar  who  was  passed  over,  Bhoondu 
15  Capt.  E.  W.  E.  Howard  to  G.  C.  Barnes,  4  May  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857,  )00ý  p.  443;  Return  by  Maj.  F. 
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Sing  (an  Ahir),  would  later  lead  the  regiment  in  mutiny  at  Azimgarh  on  3  June,  70  Before  that  event 
took  place,  the  men  frequently  voiced  their  suspicions  about  the  new  cartridges.  Unable  to  understand 
their  objections  in  the  light  of  the  government's  concessions  over  greasing  and  loading,  Burroughs 
sought  an  answer  from  his  shrewdest  and  most  intelligent  havildar,  Juggernath  Tewarry.  While 
refusing  to  enter  into  specifics,  Tewarry  pointed  out  that  it  was  the  object  of  all  smart  sepoys  to  get  into 
their  regiment's  rifle  company  (if  it  had  one),  and  once  there  to  use  patches  greased  in  the  government 
magazines.  "We  do  not  know  what  that  grease  is  made  of,  "  added  Tewarry,  "but  did  you  ever  hear  any 
sepoy  objecting  to  it?  "  Then  why,  said  Burroughs,  was  an  objection  made  know?  Tewarry  replied: 
"From  villainy.  "  But  would  say  no  more.  71 
it  is  difficult  to  pinpoint  the  exact  day  on  which  firing  practice  began  at  the  Sialkot  depot.  But  we  do 
know  that  on  26  April,  the  day  after  an  "uneasy  feeling  about  the  Enfield  rifle  and  cartridge  showed 
itself',  Lieutenant-Colonel  Darwall  of  the  57h  N.  I.  at  Ferozepore  "caused  a  native  letter  to  be  written  to 
the  detached  party  at  the  Sialkot  depot,  to  assure  them  that  no  greased  cartridges  were  in  the  regimental 
magazine,  or  would  be  used".  The  letter  was  also  readout  to  the  regiment.  "The  men  were  satisfied,  " 
noted  Darwall,  "and  nothing  further  occurred"  until  286  men  deserted  when  the  regiment  was  disarmed 
on  14  May.  72  At  Sialkot,  meanwhile,  the  sepoys  were  firing  the  Enfields  without  a  murmur.  After  a 
visit  to  the  depot  in  early  May,  Sir  John  Lawrence  informed  Canning  that  the  sepoys  were  "highly 
pleased  with  the  new  musket,  and  quite  ready  to  adopt  it",  not  least  because  they  realized  the  advantage 
it  would  give  them  in  mountain  warfare  on  the  North-West  Frontier.  73 
Within  a  week  the  mutiny  proper  had  began  at  Meerut.  The  ostensible  cause,  as  it  had  been  at 
Berhampore  in  February,  was  a  refusal  to  accept  blank  cartridges  for  firing  practice.  The  soldiers  in 
question  were  90  skirmishers  of  the  3rd  L.  C.,  made  up  of  the  15  men  in  each  troop  to  whom  carbines 
were  issued,  and  described  by  one  officer  as  "more  or  less  picked  men,  and  quite  the  61ite  of  the 
regiment".  74  On  23  May,  these  skirmishers  were  ordered  to  attend  a  parade  the  following  morning  to 
practise  the  new  firing  drill  whereby  the  cartridge  was  tom  rather  than  bitten.  That  evening,  five  of  the 
six  troop  commanders  were  warned  by  their  men  that  the  skirmishers  would  not  fire  the  cartridges  for 
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fear  of  getting  a  bad  name.  One  of  these  officers  informed  the  adjutant  (for  transmission  to  the  C.  O., 
Colonel  Carmichael-Smyth)  that  the  men  had  said  "if  they  fire  any  kind  of  cartridge  at  present  they  lay 
themselves  open  to  the  imputation  from  their  comrades  and  other  regiments  of  having  fired  the 
objectionable  ones".  75  In  other  words  they  did  not  care  whether  the  cartridges  they  were  being  asked  to 
fire  were  unobjectionable  or  not;  their  concern  was  to  escape  social  ostracization.  The  warnings  were 
genuine.  At  the  following  day's  parade,  85  out  of  the  90  skirmishers  refused  to  accept  the  three  blank 
cartridges  they  were  offered,  despite  Carmichael-Smyth's  assurance  that  they  were  not  greased  and 
were  the  same  as  they  had  been  using  all  season.  According  to  the  colonel,  none  of  those  who  refused 
gave  any  reason  for  doing  so  "beyond  that  they  would  get  a  bad  name;  not  one  of  them  urged  any 
scruple  of  religion;  they  all  said  they  would  take  these  cartridges  if  the  others  did.  06  They  numbered 
48  Muslims  and  37  Hindus.  Of  the  five  non-commissioned  officers  who  took  the  cartridges,  three  were 
Muslims  and  two  Hindus. 
At  the  subsequent  court  of  inquiry,  both  the  native  quartermaster-havildar  and  the  former  acting 
quartermaster  havildar  testified  that  the  blank  cartridges  involved  had  been  been  manufactured  in  the 
regimental  magazine  the  previous  year.  They  also  confirmed  that  the  paper  was  the  same  as  that  in  use 
for  many  years,  and  that  there  was  nothing  in  the  material  of  the  cartridges  or  the  manner  in  which  they 
had  been  made  up  that  would  be  objectionable  to  either  a  Hindu  or  a  Muslim.  The  former  acting 
quartermaster-havildar,  one  of  the  five  men  to  accept  the  cartridges,  had  even  supervised  their 
production.  '  So,  too,  had  Bhuggun,  the  Regimental  Tindal,  who  had  been  making  similar  cartridges  in 
the  regiment  for  over  33  years.  "Till  now,  "  he  stated,  "I  never  heard  any  objection  of  any  kind  against 
them,  and  even  now  I  cannot  understand  what  point  in  particular  is  objected  to.  08 
Apart  from  Carmichael-Smith,  the  only  other  witnesses  to  give  evidence  to  the  court  of  inquiry  were 
the  senior  Muslim  and  Hindu  sowars  from  each  troop,  none  of  whom  was  involved  in  the  parade. 
Asked  in  turn  whether  they  were  aware  of  anything  objectionable  in  the  material  of  the  cartridges,  most 
admitted  that  they  knew  of  nothing  and  that  the  cartridges  seemed  to  be  of  the  type  always  used.  And 
yet,  many  added,  there  was  a  general  rumour  or  suspicion  that  there  was  something  wrong  with  them. 
Only  the  senior  Muslim  sowar  in  the  &  Troop  was  prepared  to  elaborate:  "They  apparently  look  like 
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old  ones,  but  they  may,  for  aught  I  know,  have  pig's  fat  rubbed  over  them.  to  79  The  court,  made  up  of 
seven  native  officers  from  the  two  regiments  then  at  Meerut  (three  from  the  Yd  L.  C.  and  four  from  the 
2e  N.  I.  ),  so  concluded  that  that  there  was  "no  adequate  cause"  for  the  disobedience  the  previous  day 
beyond  a  vague  rumour  that  the  cartridges  contained  a  suspicious  material.  They,  however,  were 
unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  there  was  "nothing  whatever  objectionable  in  the  cartridges"  and  that 
they  could  be  received  and  used  as  before  without  affecting  the  religious  scruple  of  either  a  Hindu  or  a 
Muslim.  Any  claim  to  the  contrary  was  "false".  8t 
In  the  opinion  of  Major  G.  W. Williams,  who  later  conducted  an  extensive  investigation  into  the 
outbreak  at  Meerut,  those  cartridges  served  out  to  the  troopers  could  not  have  been  confused  with  the 
new  Enfield  cartridge.  "Though  we  can  fairly  allow  for  suspicion  to  have  entered  the  minds  of  some,  " 
he  added,  "yet  this  fact  is  significant  of  a  hostile  feeling  against  Government,  and  a  determination  to 
make  the  worst  of  the  matter,  by  extending  the  prejudice  originally  incited  by 
...  the  Enfield  cartridges, 
to  those  of  the  same  kind  as  has  been  used  by  them  for  generations  past  . 
"82 
As  a  result  of  the  court's  findings,  Anson  agreed  with  the  recommendation  by  the  Judge  Advocate- 
General,  Colonel  Young,  that  the  85  skirmishers  should  be  charged  with  collective  disobedience  before 
a  general  court-martial.  83  But  before  the  trial  could  be  convened,  two  similar  episodes  occurred.  First, 
on  27  April,  a  squad  of  native  artillery  recruits  at  Meerut  refused  to  accept  blank  cartridges  for  carbine 
drill.  They  were  paid  up  and  discharged  from  the  service  forthwith.  84  Five  days  later,  at  Lucknow,  the 
71h  Oudh  I.  I.  (a  local  corps  under  British  command)  also  refused  cartridges  for  musketry  practice, 
alleging  they  were  greased.  The  officer  involved  is  said  to  have  ordered  them  to  bite  the  cartridges 
because  he  had  not  received  the  revised  instructions  for  loading  drill.  Nevertheless  "it  was  a  foolish 
and  groundless  objection,  "  noted  Lieutenant  Bonham  of  the  Oudh  Artillery,  "for  the  cartridges  were  the 
same  as  those  always  in  use  with  the  regiment,  and  being  of  the  ordinary  kind,  for  use  with  the  old 
smooth-bore  musket,  they  had  not,  of  course,  been  greased.  All  this  was  fully  explained  by  the  officer 
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in  charge  of  the  parade,  but  the  men  still  remained  obdurate,  ""'  The  following  day,  3  May,  it  was 
discovered  that  men  from  the  7th  were  inciting  another  native  regiment  at  Lucknow  to  mutiny. 
Thereupon  the  Chief  Commissioner  of  Oudh,  Sir  Henry  Lawrence,  ordered  the  disarmament  of  the  7h 
and  during  this  operation  a  number  of  sepoys  panicked  and  deserted.  Lawrence's  inclination  was  to 
disband  the  remaining  sepoys  and  re-enlist  those  whose  innocence  could  be  proved.  8s  Canning 
disagreed,  pointing  out  that  only  the  guilty  ones  should  be  discharged.  87  In  the  event,  Lawrence  effed 
on  the  side  of  caution  by  dismissing  only  fifteen  sepoys  and  all  the  native  officers  bar  two;  the  others 
were  forgiven,  though  as  a  precaution  only  200  were  rearmed.  88  But  Canning's  fellow  Supreme 
Council  members  held  very  different  opinions  as  to  the  motive  for  the  7h's  disobedience.  Major- 
General  Low  and  J.  P.  Grant  thought  that  most  of  the  regiment  refused  to  bite  the  cartridges  because 
they  genuinely  feared  a  loss  of  caste;  whereas  Joseph  Dorin  regarded  the  biting  of  the  cartridge  as  an 
"excuse  for  mutiny"  on  the  ground  that  "no  new  rifles  or  greased  cartridges"  had  been  issued  to  the 
7  th  89 
The  court-martial  of  the  85  men  of  the  P  L.  C.  took  place  over  the  three  days  of  6,7  and  8  May.  The 
court  comprised  15  native  officers:  four  from  the  II  th  N.  I.  (which  had  arrived  in  Meerut  at  the  end  of 
April),  two  from  the  Yd  Light  Cavalry,  one  from  the  20  th  N.  I.,  one  from  the  Artillery  and  five  from 
Native  infantry  regiments  stationed  in  nearby  Delhi  (one  from  the  74h  and  two  each  from  the  3e  and 
54'h).  Havildar  Matadeen,  the  senior  rank  of  the  accused,  tried  to  excuse  his  action  by  claiming  that  the 
night  before  the  parade  Brijmohun  Sing,  the  Havildar-Major's  orderly,  had  boasted  that  he  had  fired  off 
two  of  the  new  greased  cartridges.  It  was  therefore  a  fear  of  losing  their  caste  that  had  caused  him  and 
the  other  men  to  disobey  orders  the  following  day.  90  This  accusation  is  highly  suspect.  Brijmohun  had 
in  fact  fired  off  two  old  blank  carbine  cartridges  using  the  new  loading  drill  in  the  presence  of  his 
colonel.  Why,  then,  would  he  lie  to  his  comrades?  Palmer  has  suggested  a  desire  to  create  mischief" 
Certainly  Brijmohun,  a  low-caste  Hindu  who  was  considered  to  be  Carmichael-Smyth's  pet,  was 
unpopular  in  the  regiment  and  his  hut  was  duly  burnt  down  during  the  night  of  23  April.  But 
presumably  that  was  because  he  had  admitted  to  firing  any  cartridge,  rather  than  a  greased  cartridge 
83  Col.  John  Bonham,  Oude  in  1857.  Some  memories  of  the  Itidian  Mutiny  (London,  1928),  pp.  20-  1. 
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which  did  not  exist.  The  truth  is  that  there  was  no  real  justification  for  refusing  the  cartridges  on  24 
April  beyond  a  general  determination  to  stick  together  in  defiance  of  legitimate  authority.  Some  may 
have  swallowed  the  canard  that  their  religion  and  caste  really  were  in  danger;  others  dared  not  step  out 
of  line.  But  most  were  probably  being  manipulated  by  a  hard-core  of  conspirators  who  had  other  ends 
in  sight:  not  least  the  replacement  of  the  East  India  Company  with  a  more  amenable  employer.  This 
conspiracy  theory  will  be  explored  in  detail  in  the  next  chapter.  For  Lieutenant  Mackenzie  of  the  3rd 
L.  C.  was  surely  right  when  he  noted  that  word  had  been  "passed  throughout  the  Bengal  native  army  to 
make  the  cartridge  question  the  test  as  to  which  was  stronger  -  the  native  soldier  or  the  Government  92 
By  a  majority  verdict  of  14  to  one,  all  85  defendants  were  found  guilty  and  sentenced  to  10  years 
imprisonment  with  hard  labour.  The  court  recommended  favourable  consideration  on  the  ground  of 
good  character  and  the  fact  that  the  men  had  been  misled  by  rumours.  But  the  reviewing  officer, 
Major-General  Hewitt,  thought  that  the  latter  circumstance  aggravated  rather  than  mitigated  the  crime. 
He  therefore  confirmed  the  majority  of  the  sentences,  while  halving  those  of  the  II  men  who  had 
served  less  than  five  years  on  the  basis  that  they  were  young  and  had  been  led  astray  by  their  seniors.  93 
The  verdict  of  the  court  was  read  out  to  the  prisoners  on  Saturday,  9  May,  at  a  morning  parade  attended 
by  the  whole  Meerut  garrison:  the  Yd  L.  C.,  the  I  Ph  and  20th  N.  I.,  H.  M.  60th  Rifles,  H.  M.  6th  Dragoon 
Guards  (Carabiniers),  a  troop  of  European  horse  artillery  and  battery  of  European  foot  artillery.  The 
prisoners  were  then  stripped  of  their  uniforms  and  shackled  in  irons.  During  the  hour  or  so  it  took  to 
complete  the  shackling,  some  men  cried  out  "bey  kussor  (without  fault)"  and  threw  their  boots  away  in 
disgust;  others  called  upon  their  comrades  for  assistance  while  also  castigating  their  colonel,  the  native 
officers  who  had  composed  the  court-martial  and  the  government.  But  however  tempted  they  may  have 
been,  the  watching  natives  troops  did  nothing,  not  least  because  they  were  being  covered  by  the  guns  of 
the  European  soldiers.  With  the  shackling  complete,  the  prisoners  were  marched  to  the  jail  in  Meerut 
and  there  handed  over  to  the  civil  authorities.  94 
It  has  often  been  claimed  that  the  bloody  rising  at  Meerut  the  following  day  -  the  start  of  the  mutiny 
proper  -  was  motivated  by  a  desire  to  free  these  prisoners.  But  Palmer  has  shown  beyond  doubt  that  the 
native  infantry,  rather  than  the  cavalry,  were  the  first  to  rise,  and  that  the  plot  to  mutiny  had  been 
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maturing  for  at  least  a  fortnight.  The  rescue  of  the  prisoners,  therefore,  was  a  "last  minute  addition  to 
the  plan".  95  The  evidence  for  a  more  general  plot  encompassing  regiments  in  Delhi  and  elsewhere  will 
be  considered  in  the  next  chapter.  Suffice  it  to  say  that  the  cartridge  question,  even  in  its  most  watered 
down  form  as  seen  at  Meerut,  was  a  perfect  vehicle  for  conspirators  to  turn  the  rank  and  file  sepoys 
against  British  rule.  "Some  scoundrel  has  seized  upon  the  cartridge  question  as  an  opportunity  to  unite 
both  creeds",  wrote  the  veterinary  surgeon  of  the  P  L.  C.  on  9  May,  the  day  before  his  death  at  the 
hands  of  mutineers.  96 
A  particularly  convincing  argument  for  the  cartridge  question  to  be  seen  as  a  pretext  to  mutiny  was 
put  forward  by  Major  Marriott,  the  prosecutor,  at  the  trial  of  the  King  of  Delhi  in  March  1858.  "That 
neither  Mussulman  nor  Hindu  had  any  honest  objection  to  the  use  of  any  of  the  cartridges  at  Meerut  or 
Delhi,  "  declared  Marriott,  "is  sufficiently  proved  by  the  eagerness  with  which  they  sought  possession  of 
them,  and  the  alacrity  with  which  they  used  them,  when  their  aim  and  object  was  the  murder  of  their 
European  officers.  "  Marriott  also  mentioned  the  fact  that  not  one  of  the  numerous  petitions  that  had 
been  sent  to  the'restored'King  of  Delhi  by  mutineers  during  the  summer  of  1857  made  any  reference  to 
the  cartridge  question,  though  they  contained  a  host  of  other  trivial  grievances.  Yet  whenever  the 
mutineers'words  were  "uttered  with  a  prospect  of  reaching  European  ears,  greased  cartridges  are 
always  brought  forward".  Lastly  Marriott  made  the  point  that  Muslims  had  no  caste  nor  had  they  ever 
claimed  a  loss  of  religion  by  touching  pork;  many  Muslim  servants  of  Europeans,  he  said,  handled  pork 
daily.  And  to  back  this  up  he  reminded  the  court  of  Martineau's  claim  that  the  Muslim  sepoys  at 
Ambala  had  laughed  at  the  cartridge  question.  "We  thus  perceive,  "  he  concluded,  "that  these  men 
initiated  open  mutiny  without  one  pretext  for  so  doing...  They  had  not  even  the  extenuation  of  a 
pretended  grievance;  yet  they  at  once  leagued  themselves  in  rebellion  against  us,  and  induced  the 
Hindus  to  join  them,  by  speciously  exciting  them  on  that  most  vulnerable  of  points,  the  fear  of  being 
forcibly  deprived  of  their  caste.  "  97  Marriott's  additional  evidence  for  this  was  Mrs  Aldwell's  claim  to 
have  been  told  by  Hindu  sepoys,  after  the  battle  of  Hindun  on  30  May  1857,  that  they  greatly  regretted 
what  they  had  done,  "reproached  the  Mahomedans  for  having  decieved  them  on  pretence  of  their 
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religion,  and  seemed  to  doubt  greatly  whether  the  English  Government  had  really  had  any  intention  of 
interfering  with  their  caste".  98 
Marriott  was  trying  to  prove  that  the  King  of  Delhi  was  at  the  centre  of  a  Muslim  conspiracy  to 
overthrow  British  rule.  He  was  not  the  only  one  to  blame  the  Muslims.  In  mid-May,  shortly  after  the 
disarmament  of  native  troops  at  Lahore,  Donald  MacLeod,  the  Judicial  Commissioner  for  the  Punjab, 
told  Bartle  Frere  that  the  cartridges  had  been  used  to  "seduce  the  credulous,  weak  &  superstitious  of 
either  class",  and  that  he  believed  the  intrigues  to  be  of  Muslim  origin.  99  A  month  later,  Canning's 
private  secretary  confided  to  the  Governor  of  Ceylon  that  the  "rebellion  is  now  pretty  well  understood 
to  be  a  Mahomedan  one  -  and  the  Cartridge  question  to  have  been  only  a  pretext  to  unite  the  Hindoos 
withthem".  100  It  is  probably  incorrect  to  blame  the  mutiny  on  the  Muslims  alone.  Whatisnotin  doubt 
is  that  a  sizeable  number  of  sepoy  conspirators  -  Hindu  and  Muslim  alike  -  were  prepared  to  use  the 
cartridge  question  to  unite  opposition  to  British  rule,  not  because  they  genuinely  feared  for  their  caste 
and  religion,  but  because  they  believed  they  would  be  better  off  in  the  service  of  a  native  government. 
Major-General  Hearsey  made  just  this  point  in  his  evidence  to  the  Peel  Commission,  describing  the 
mutiny  as  a  "general  movement  among  the  soldier  class  of  Hindoostan"  to  "throw  off  the  dominion  of  a 
foreign  race,  and  then  to  sell  their  services  to  the  highest  native  bidder".  101  Hearsey  had  no  doubt  been 
influenced  by  a  letter  from  an  officer  of  the  7&  N.  I.  reporting  a  comment  made  to  him  by  a  Muslim 
sepoy  that  "when  first  the  report  was  spread  about,  it  was  generally  believed  by  the  men,  but  that 
subsequently  it  had  been  a  well  understood  thing  that  the  cartridge  question  was  merely  raised  for  the 
sake  of  exciting  the  men,  with  a  view  of  getting  the  whole  army  to  mutiny  and  thereby  upset  the 
English  Government;  that  they  argued,  that  as  we  were  turned  out  of  Cabool  [Kabul  in  1842]  and  had 
never  returned  to  that  place,  so,  if  once  we  were  entirely  turned  out  of  India,  our  rule  would  cease  and 
we  should  never  return".  102 
Many  other  officers  and  officials  were  similarly  unconvinced  that  the  cartridge  question  -  or  religion 
in  general  -  was  a  genuine  cause  of  mutiny.  "It  was  all  a  sham  about  the  cartridges,  "  wrote  a  Bengal 
Artillery  officer  at  the  siege  of  Delhi,  "for  they  are  now  firing  them  against  us.  "  103  Another  Bengal 
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officer  on  detached  duty  from  his  regiment  described  the  cartridge  question  in  July  1857  as  a  "mere 
farce",  adding:  "The  mutiny  is  a  well  organised  and  pre-concerted  plan  for  the  extermination  of  the 
hated  English  from  India.  "  104  According  to  Hervey  Greathed,  the  senior  civilian  at  Delhi  during  the 
siege,  sepoy  deserters  invariably  cited  the  cartridge  question  as  the  cause  of  disaffection.  But  Greathed 
considered  the  real  cause  to  be  the  growth  of  a  "consciousness  of  power"  in  the  army  "which  could 
"only  be  exercised  by  mutiny".  105  William  Muir,  the  intelligence  chief  at  Agra  to  whom  these  views 
were  divulged,  was  of  a  similar  opinion: 
The  fact  is  [he  informed  the  Secretary  to  the  Home  Department  on  19  August  1857]  that  the  sepoys  had  long  been 
puffed  up  with  conceit  that  the  Imperial  fabric  rested  on  their  shoulders  alone:  they  had  constructed  it;  they 
maintained  it.  This  filled  them  with  an  arrogant  and  independent  feeling,  which  led  to  the  constant  feeling  of 
grievance  when  they  were  not  petted  and  humourcd  in  everything.  Here  were  the  elements  of  disaffection  and 
mutiny.  The  cartridge  was  used  by  the  bad  designing  men  of  each  regiment  to  inflame  the  otherwise  contented 
soldiery,  and  when  distrust  was  once  infused  our  most  solemn  disavowals  of  intercferencz  with  caste  were 
disbelicvcd.  '06 
In  a  memorandum  for  the  Supreme  Council  in  1858,  Sir  John  Lawrence  characterized  the  cartridge 
question  as  simply  the  spark  that  ignited  a  combustible  mass.  What  had  made  the  mass  combustible,  he 
declared,  was  the  fact  that  the  sepoy  army  had  become  too  powerful.  The  sepoys  were  aware  that  most 
of  the  key  installations  in  the  country  -  the  fortresses,  magazines  and  treasuries  -  were  largely  under 
their  control.  They  imagined  they  could  overthrow  the  British  government  at  will,  and  replace  it  with 
one  of  their  own.  It  was  this  sense  of  their  own  power,  said  Lawrence,  that  had  induced  them  to 
revolt.  107 
But  arguably  the  most  perspicacious  comment  on  the  cartridge  question  and  the  causes  of  the  mutiny 
was  provided  by  Christopher  McGuinness,  a  lowly  sergeant  in  the  Bengal  Army's  Public  Works 
Department,  in  a  letter  to  his  brother-in-law.  He  wrote: 
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For  some  years  past  the  Bengal  Scpoy  has  been  changing  the  tone  of  his  conduct.  He  was  in  former  years  a  humble 
man.  He  became  a  pet  in  all  cases  where  his  caste  could  be  brought  forward.  He  was  allowed  every  indulgence. 
His  commanding  officer  became  a  mere  cyphcr,  without  the  power  to  either  punish  or  promote;  his  officers  instead 
of  studying  regimental  duties  were  seldom  present  with  their  corps,  in  fact  each  eagerly  sought  staff  employment 
from  it...  The  result  of  such  mis-rcgulations  soon  became  apparent.  The  sepoy  became  sclf-conceited,  impertinent, 
careless,  a  grumbler...  From  recent  information  we  are  led  to  suppose  that  an  excuse  for  a  general  uprising  of 
sepoys  in  open  mutiny  was  long  wanted,  and  an  unfortunate  affair  of  cartridges  being  made  at  home  for  our 
improved  rifle,  gave  the  first  spark  to  die  flame.  log 
There  is,  of  course,  much  evidence  that  appears  to  support  the  theory  that  sepoys  were  motivated  by 
nothing  more  than  a  desire  to  preserve  their  caste  and  religion.  Some  of  it  is  provided  by  European 
officers.  At  the  height  of  the  cartridge  question,  for  example,  Lieutenant  De  Kantzow  of  the  9h  N.  I. 
was  asked  by  some  of  his  Oudh  sepoys  why,  having  already  endured  the  loss  of  their  country,  they 
could  be  expected  to  stand  by  and  see  their  caste  "contaminated  also"?  109  Having  spoken  to  the  native 
officers  of  the  4"'  N.  I.  in  May  1857,  Captain  Taylor  was  convinced  that  they  genuinely  believed  the 
cartridges  were  a  "trick  injurious  to  their  religion".  110  Captain  Sneyd  of  the  28h  N.  I.,  in  a  letter  to  his 
mother  of  27  May,  noted  that  the  majority  of  the  sepoys  liked  their  officers  but  were  "suspicious  of  the 
Government  about  their  refigion".  111 
Other  evidence  comes  from  native  sources.  According  to  Ghulam  Abbas,  during  a  stormy  interview 
with  the  King  of  Delhi  in  the  Red  Fort  on  II  May,  the  native  officers  of  the  3  rd  L.  C.  justified  the  mutiny 
at  Meerut  on  the  ground  that  they  had  been  "required  to  bite  cartridges"  greased  with  beef  and  pork 
f  t.  112 
a  This  lie  was  then  repeated  in  the  Delhi  Proclamation,  issued  by  the  rebels  between  II  and  15 
May  1857,  which  stated  that  the  Governor-General  had  served  out  "cartridges  made  up  with  swine  and 
beef  fat"  to  "deprive  the  army  of  their  religion".  '  13  A  similar  attempt  to  justify  the  rebellion  on  the 
ground  of  religion  was  made  by  Nana  Sahib's  proclamation  of  6  July.  114 
Tapti  Roy  is  convinced  that  such  evidence  proves  the  mutiny-rebellion  was  religiously  motivated. 
"Let  us  listen 
...  to  what  the  soldiers  said  after  they  had  mutinied,  "  she  writes.  "Without  exception,  they 
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answered  in  the  idiom  of  religion.  Not  only  are  there  official  reports  on  sepoy  actions  but  also  letters 
and  proclamations  written  by  the  rebels  themselves  in  which  they  declare  their  reasons  for  turning 
against  their  masters...  The  widely  shared  opinion  among  the  British  officers  that  the'soldiery  had  a 
hard  religious  panic'was  substantially  corroborated  by  the  language  used  in  the  written  addresses  sent 
out  to  mobilize  men  in  the  cause  of  religion.  Here  the  uprising  was  described  not  so  much  as  a  struggle 
for  political  ends  as  an  imperative,  a  sacred  duty,  for  upholding  religion  which  stood  threatened  by  the 
British  rule.  "  115 
Much  of  what  Roy  says  is  true.  Many  officers,  sepoys  and  rebels  did  talk  in  the  idiom  of  religion. 
The  real  question  is  why?  The  officers  were  simply  repeating  the  accusations  made  by  their  own 
troops.  They  may  even  have  wanted  to  believe  that  religion  was  the  primary  grievance  because  the 
alternative  -  deeper-lying  professional  grievances  -  would  have  reflected  badly  on  them  and  the  service 
in  general.  Some  of  the  sepoys  (perhaps  even  the  majority)  may  well  have  considered  their  caste  and 
religion  to  be  in  danger,  however  irrational  this  belief  became  in  relation  to  the  cartridge  question  itself 
But  that  in  itself  shows  a  complete  breakdown  of  trust  between  them  and  their  European  officers,  an 
intra-service  issue  that  was  many  years  in  gestation.  For  these  sepoys  the  defence  of  religion  may  have 
provided  a  personal  justiflcation  for  mutinying  that  professional  grievances  could  not.  Lastly  there 
were  the  conspirators  (both  within  and  without  the  Bengal  Army)  and  the  rebel  leaders  who  jumped  on 
the  band-waggon.  These  men  were  bound  to  set  up  a  cry  of  "religion  in  danger"  as  the  only  way  to 
unite  both  Muslims  and  Hindus  against  their  British  overlords.  Their  aspirations  were  the  real  driving 
force  behind  mutiny.  Ahsanullah  Khan,  the  King  of  Delhi's  personal  physician,  who  had  much  contact 
with  the  leading  mutineers,  wrote  later: 
Although  the  issue  of  the  now  cartridges  was  the  ostensible  cause  of  the  mutiny,  it  was  not  in  reality  so.  Some 
individuals  of  the  native  army  had  long  before  been  adverse  to  and  dissatisfied  with  the  British  Government.  They 
considered  that  they  were  treated  with  severity,  and  eagerly  siezcd  the  opportunity  of  the  issue  of  new  cartridges  as 
affording  a  good  pretext  for  their  defection.  The  wily  and  intriguing  among  them  made  it  the  fulcrum  of  their 
designs  to  excite  the  whole  army  against  their  rulers,  and,  mixing  therewith  a  religious  element,  alienated  the  minds 
of  the  troops  from  the  Government...  [Had]  the  new  cartridges  not  been  issued,  they  would  have  made  some  other 
III  Roy,  Yhe  Politics  of  a  Popular  Uprising,  p.  5  1. 195 
pretext  to  mutiny,  because  if  they  had  been  actuated  by  religious  motives  alone,  they  would  have  given  up  service; 
and  if  they  wished  to  serve,  they  would  not  have  mutinicd.  116 
116  Supplementary  Evidence  of  Hakim  Ahsanullah  Khan,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIH,  p.  267. 196 
Chapter  Seven  -  Mutiny:  The  Conspiracy 
Some  historians  have  acknowledged  the  existence  of  a  widespread  conspiracy  within  the  Bengal  Army 
in  1857,1  others  the  possibility  that  external  agencies  were  also  involved.  2  Yet  they  still  identify  the 
defence  of  caste  and  religion  as  the  key  to  the  mutiny.  But  if,  as  this  chapter  will  demonstrate, 
disaffected  elements  of  the  Bengal  Army  were  in  contact  with  each  other  and  with  disgruntled  civilians 
both  before  and  during  the  cartridge  question,  there  is  every  likelihood  that  the  conspirators'  aims  were 
far  more  ambitious. 
A  comparison  between  the  mutinies  in  the  Bengal  Army  in  1849/50  and  1857  is  particularly 
instructive.  In  the  former  case,  it  will  be  recalled,  Napier  received  information  that  as  many  as  24 
native  infantry  regiments  (a  third  of  the  total)  were  tainted  with  a  "mutinous  spirit"  and  that  they  were 
in  communication  with  each  other.  Napier  commented: 
In  all  mutinies,  some  men  more  daring  than  others  are  allowed  to  take  the  lead  while  the  more  wary  prepare  to 
profit  when  the  time  suits;  a  few  men  in  a  few  corps,  a  few  corps  in  any  army  begin;  if  successful  they  arejoined 
by  their  more  calculating,  and  by  their  more  timid  comrades...  To  what  extent  [the  conspiracy]  was  secretly  carried 
is  unknown;  but  the  four  sepoys  condemned  [in  the  32d  N.  I.  at  Wazirabad]  went  from  company  to  company 
administering  unlawful  oaths  to  insist  on  higher  pay  from  a  Government  of  a  different  religion,  and  a  different 
raccl  Many  regiments  were  of  the  same  mind,  and  it  may  be  assumed  that  each  had,  at  least,  four  agitators 
similarly  employed.  3 
There  is  good  reason  to  suspect  the  existence  of  similar  small  cabals  in  each  regiment  of  the  Bengal 
Native  Infantry  and  Cavalry  in  1857.  During  his  12  years  as  adjutant  of  the  17"'  N.  I.,  Major  Burroughs 
established  a  "thorough  system  of  espionage"  which  enabled  him  to  know  exactly  what  was  going  on. 
But  when  he  tried  to  re-establish  this  system  on  returning  to  the  regiment  as  commanding  officer  in 
early  1857  (after  a  two  year  detachment  as  commandant  of  the  Bhagulpur  Hill  Rangers),  he  found  "no 
1S  ee  Holmes,  A  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  p.  5  65;  Majumdar,  Yhe  Sepoy  Mutiny,  p.  218;  Palmer, 
y7le  Mutiny  Outbreak  atMeerut,  pp.  130-3;  and  Stokes,  Yhe  Peasant  Armed,  pp.  50-1. 
'2  See  Malleson  (ed.  ),  Kaye  andMallesons  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  I,  p.  256. 
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one  willing  or  possessing  sufficient  courage"  to  give  him  any  information.  This,  and  other 
circumstances,  caused  him  to  conclude  that  "the  plot  for  revolt,  was  not  recent,  although  probably 
known  to  a  select  few  only  in  each  Regiment".  4 
One  of  the  senior  civilian  conspirators  was  almost  certainly  Dhondu  Pant  (better  known  as  Nana 
Sahib),  the  adopted  son  of  BaJi  Rao  If,  the  last  Peshwa  of  the  Maratha  Confederacy.  Defeated  by  the 
British  in  the  Yd  Maratha  War  of  1817-18,  the  Peshwa  had  exchanged  his  power  base  in  western  India 
for  a  Company  pension  of  800,000  rupees  and  exile  in  Bithur,  12  miles  north  of  Cawnpore.  When  he 
died  in  185  1,  Nana  Sahib  inherited  his  Bithur  estate  and  a  huge  personal  fortune  of  25  million  rupees. 
But  Lord  Dalhousie  -  in  a  decision  that  contradicted  the  Hindu  practice  of  allowing  adopted  heirs  to 
succeed  their  royal  fathers  -  would  not  allow  the  Nana  to  assume  the  title  of  Peshwa,  nor  would  he  pay 
him  all  or  even  a  part  of  BaJi  Rao's  pension.  5  The  Nana  was  not  even  permitted  to  use  the  Peshwa's 
honorific  title  of  maharaja.  The  Nana  appealed  against  these  decisions  -  without  success  -  to  both  the 
Governor-General  and  the  Court  of  Directors  in  London.  In  the  latter  instance,  the  petition  was  carried 
in  person  by  his  confidential  agent,  a  young  Muslim  named  Azimullah  Khan.  During  his  return 
journey,  Azimullah  leamt  of  the  failure  of  the  British  assault  on  Sebastopol  of  18  June  1855.  He 
therefore  made  a  detour  to  the  Crimea  to  judge  the  course  of  the  war  for  himself.  According  to  the 
celebrated  Times  correspondent,  W.  H.  Russell  (who  met  him  there),  he  discovered  a  British  Army  in  a 
"state  of  some  depression"  and  formed  "a  very  unfavourable  opinion  of  its  morale  and  physique  in 
comparison  with  that  of  the  French".  6  Back  in  India  at  this  time,  the  native  bazaars  of  the  great 
military  stations  were  buzzing  with  the  news  that  Britain  had  suffered  a  catastrophic  reverse  in  the 
Crimea.  "[The]  news  was  always  fabricated  to  show  that  the  Sirkar  was  usually  defeated,  and  that  the 
Russians  had  destroyed  all  the  English  soldiers  and  sunk  all  their  warships,  "  recalled  Sitaram  Pandy  of 
the  63d  N.  I.  "This  idea  was  fostered  by  interested  parties  with  the  result  that  when  the  Mutiny  broke 
out,  most  Indians  believed  that  the  Sirkar  had  no  other  troops  than  those  which  were  already  in  India. 
The  sepoys'  belief  in  British  invincibility  had  been  shattered  first  by  the  ignominious  retreat  from  Kabul 
4  Lt.  -Col.  Burroughs  to  Capt.  I.  H.  Chamberlain,  Jan  1860,  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom 
Stniggle,  I,  p.  347. 
5  The  same  principle  underpinned  Dalhousie's  infamous  Doctrine  of  Lapse,  whereby  states  were 
forfeited  to  the  paramount  power  (the  East  India  Company)  in  the  event  of  there  being  no  natural  heirs. 
The  doctrine  was  used  to  justify,  among  others,  the  annexation  of  Satara  in  1848,  and  Nagpur  and 
Jhansi  in  1854 
6  W.  H.  Russell,  My  Diary  hi  India  (London,  1859),  1,  pp.  167-8. 
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in  1842.  The  reverses  of  the  Sikhs  wars  and  the  Crimean  War  were  seen  as  further  proof  that  British 
military  power  was  in  irreversible  decline.  In  other  words,  the  time  was  right  for  a  change  of  employer. 
After  returning  to  India,  says  Russell,  Azimullah  accompanied  the  Nana  to  Lucknow,  where  they 
remained  some  time,  and  subseqently  the  "worthy  couple,  on  the  pretence  of  a  pilgrimage  to  the  hills  -a 
Hindoo  and  a  Mussulman  joined  in  a  holy  excursion  -  visited  the  Military  stations  all  along  the  main 
trunk  road,  and  went  as  far  as  [Ambala)".  8 
Corroboration  of  the  Nana's  scheming  is  provided  by  a  native  emissary  called  Sitaram  Bawa.  In  a 
statement  given  to  the  Judicial  Commissoner  of  Mysore  in  January  1858,  Sitaram  claimed  that  Nana 
began  suggesting  rebellion  to  native  princes  -  including  the  rulers  and  former  rulers  of  Gwalior,  Assam, 
Jaipur,  Jodhpur,  Jammu,  Baroda,  Hyderabad,  Kolapore,  Satara  and  Indore  -  as  early  as  the  autumn  of 
1855.  At  first  nobody  replied  to  his  letters.  But  afler  the  annexation  of  Oudh,  the  "answers  began  to 
pour  in"  from  both  Hindus  and  Muslims.  Among  the  Nana's  first  adherents,  said  Sitaram,  was  Maun 
Singh,  the  biggest  talukdar  (landowner)  in  the  Faizabad  district  of  Oudh,  who  lost  all  but  three  of  his 
villages  in  the  revenue  settlement  of  1856.  Other  dispossessed  talukdars  then  joined  the  conspiracy,  as 
did  the  "Soukars"  of  Lucknow  and  Golab  Singh,  the  Maharajah  of  Jammu  and  Kashmir.  An  agreement 
was  also  made  with  the  King  of  Delhi.  The  financial  assistance  provided  by  many  of  these  influential 
plotters  was  used  to  seduce  serving  sepoys  and  disbanded  members  of  the  King  of  Oudh's  army  alike. 
"The  military  classes  were  enticed  by  a  promise  of  restoring  the  old  times  of  licence,  "  commented 
Sitaram,  "and  they  all  prefer  that  to  a  regular  form  of  Government.  "9 
Kaye,  for  one,  was  convinced  by  this  and  other  evidence.  "There  is  nothing  in  my  mind  more  clearly 
substantiated,  "  he  wrote,  "than  the  complicity  of  the  Nana  Sahib  in  wide-spread  intrigues  before  the 
outbreak  of  the  mutiny.  The  concurrent  testimony  of  witnesses  examined  in  parts  of  the  country  widely 
distant  from  each  other  takes  this  story  altogether  out  of  the  regions  of  the  conjectural.  "  Kaye 
particularly  refers  to  machinations  between  the  Nana  and  the  family  of  the  late  Raja  of  Satara  whose 
south  Maratha  state  had'lapsed'to  the  Bombay  Presidency  in  1848.  He  also  links  Nana's  plot  to  the 
attempt  by  adherents  of  the  King  of  Oudh  to  tamper  with  the  troops  in  the  Presidency  Division  in  early 
1857.10  Kaye,  it  should  be  mentioned,  was  an  officer  in  the  Bengal  Artillery  (183241)  before 
becoming  a  journalist  (he  founded  the  Calcutta  Review  in  1844)  and  finally  a  member  of  the  East  India 
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Company's  Home  Service  (1856-74).  His  willingness  to  believe  in  an  external  conspiracy  theory  may 
have  been  an  unconscious  attempt  to  protect  the  reputation  of  the  Bengal  Army  and  its  officers.  He 
had,  on  the  other  hand,  published  many  of  Henry  Lawrence's  articles  criticizing  the  army  and  was  well 
aware  of  its  shortfalls. 
Russell's  claim  that  Nana  Sahib  and  Azimullah  both  visited  military  stations  as  far  as  Ambala  is  not 
quite  accurate.  Kaye  believed  that  the  Nana,  who  rarely  ventured  beyond  the  limits  of  Bithur,  made 
threejoumeys  in  the  early  months  of  1857:  to  Kalpi,  Delhi  and  finally  to  Lucknow.  "  But  Azimulla 
did  travel  to  Ambala.  Lieutenant  Martineau  bumped  into  him  at  the  Dak  bungalow  in  January  1857, 
shortly  after  taking  up  his  appointment  as  instructor  of  the  Musketry  Depot.  Martineau  had  first  made 
Azimullah's  aquaintance  the  previous  October  on  the  journey  from  Suez  to  Aden,  and  had  been  struck 
by  the  bitterness  with  which  he  spoke  of  Lord  Dalhousie's  recent  annexation  of  Nagpur.  On  meeting 
him  again  at  Ambala,  Martineau  gained  the  impression  that  he  was  on  a  "tour  of  inspection  to  feel  the 
temper  of  the  Mahratta,  Rajpoot,  &  Seik  Chiefs  on  his  route  from  Bombay  to  enable  him  to  report 
progress  to  his  master".  12  Further  evidence  linking  the  Nana  and  Azimullah  to  the  eventual  outbreak  of 
mutiny  at  Cawnpore  in  June  1857  will  be  considered  in  Chapter  Eight, 
The  first  definite  indication  of  a  conspiracy  to  mutiny  within  the  Bengal  Army  was  given  on  26 
January  1857  when,  according  to  Jemadar  Durriow  Sing,  the  subedar-major  and  other  senior  native 
officers  of  the  34"'  N.  I.  made  an  abortive  attempt  to  capture  key  installations  in  Calcutta  with  the 
assistance  of  three  companies  of  the  regiment  en  route  to  Chittagong  in  east  Bengal.  All  four  regiments 
at  Barrackpore  were  implicated  in  the  plot  by  Sing,  as  were  the  Calcutta  Native  Militia  and  certain 
retainers  of  Wajid  Ali,  ex-King  of  Oudh,  who  had  been  living  in  exile  at  Garderfs  Reach  in  Calcutta 
since  his  deposition  in  early  1856.  The  sepoys'reward  was  to  have  been  an  increase  in  pay  from  seven 
to  10  rupees  amonth.  The  plan  was  abandoned,  said  Sing,  partly  because  he  sent  two  of  his  sepoys  to 
warn  the  authorities  to  be  on  the  alert,  and  partly  because  the  guard  on  the  Lieutenant-Govemor's 
residence  at  Alipore,  commanded  by  Subedar-Major  Ram  Lail,  the  chief  conspirator,  was  relieved  by 
Europeans  on  the  morning  of  the  26th.  But  this  did  not  prevent  Ram  Lail  from  trying  to  incite  Sing's 
10  Mal  I  eson  (ed.  ),  Kaye  andMallesons  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  L  p.  425. 
11  bid.,  p.  423. 
12  Capt.  E.  M.  Martineau  to  Sir  John  Kaye,  20  Oct  1864,  Kaye  Mutiny  Papers,  OIOC,  H725,  pp.  469-70. 200 
Treasury  guard  to  mutiny  by  saying  he  would  not  serve  any  longer  because  of  the  objectionable 
cartridges.  13 
Three  important  observations  can  be  made  about  Sing's  evidence:  first,  that  the  chief  conspirators 
were  all  senior  figures  in  the  regiment  (Sing  identified  by  name  the  subedar-major,  two  subedars,  one 
jemadar,  the  drill  havildar  and  the  regimental  munshi),  though  overall  they  were  a  relatively  small 
group  and  had  yet  to  convince  enough  of  their  colleagues  that  mutiny  was  in  their  interests;  second,  that 
the  timing  of  the  conspiracy,  just  four  days  after  the  supposed  origin  of  the  cartridge  controversy  at  the 
Dum-Dum  depot,  could  mean  that  the  plot  to  overthrow  the  British  government  had  been  in  existence 
for  longer  than  the  rumour  about  the  cartridges  (which  must  have  been  seen  as  a  godsend);  third,  that 
the  supposed  aim  of  the  conspirators  was  to  replace  the  British  with  a  native  ruler  who  would  increase 
their  pay  (in  other  words,  their  motive  was  partly  financial). 
The  existence  of  a  wider  plot  to  mutiny  is  confirmed  by  other  evidence.  On  28  January,  General 
Hearscy  reported  to  government  the  simultaneous  burning  of  European  property  at  Barrackpore  and  the 
railhead  of  Raniganj,  where  separate  wings  of  the  2nd  N.  I.  were  stationed.  14  It  was  later  alleged  by 
Mainodin  Hassan  Khan,  one  of  the  leading  rebels  at  Delhi  during  the  mutiny  (and  therefore  in  a 
position  to  know),  that  the  burning  of  the  Raniganj  telegraph  office  was  a  preconcerted  signal  that 
would  be  communicated  along  the  line  from  Calcutta  to  Punjab,  and  that  those  in  the  know  would 
respond  with  similar  acts.  Mainodin  also  claimed  that  the  origin  of  the  mutiny  was  not  religious  but 
political,  namely  the  annexation  of  Oudh.  It  was,  therefore,  no  coincidence  that  two  of  the  three  native 
infantry  regiments  stationed  in  Lucknow  at  that  time  -  the  19  th  and  34  th  Regiments  (the  other  was  the 
17'h)  -  were  at  the  centre  of  the  conspiracy.  Mainodin  explained: 
Both  these  regiments  were  full  of  bitterness 
...  and  from  them  letters  were  written  to  other  Purbcah  regiments.  The 
34'  took  the  lead.  These  letters  reminded  every  regiment  of  the  ancient  dynasties  of  Hindustan;  pointed  out  that 
the  annexation  of  Oudc  had  been  followed  by  the  disbandment  of  the  Oude  army,  for  the  second  time  since  the 
connection  of  the  English  with  Oudc;  and  showed  that  their  place  was  being  filled  by  the  enlistment  of  Punjabis 
and  Sikhs,  and  the  formation  of  a  Punjab  army.  The  very  bread  had  been  torn  out  of  the  mouths  of  men  who  knew 
no  other  profession  than  that  of  the  sword.  The  letters  went  on  to  say  that  further  annexations  might  be  cxpected, 
with  little  or  no  use  for  the  native  army.  Thus  was  it  pressed  upon  the  Scpoys  that  they  must  rebel  to  reseat  the 
13  Evidence  of  Jemadar  Darriow  Sing,  17  April  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  1,  pp.  156-60. 
14  Hearsey  to  Major  W.  A.  J.  Mayhew,  28  Jan  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  1,  pp.  4-5. 201 
ancient  kings  on  their  thrones,  and  drive  the  trespassers  away.  The  welfare  of  the  soldier  caste  required  this;  the 
honour  of  their  chiefs  was  at  stake.  15 
Sitaram  Pandy  of  the  63d  N.  I.  was  also  convinced  that  the  "seizing  of  Oudh  filled  the  minds  of  the 
sepoys  with  distrust  and  led  them  to  plot  against  the  Government".  He  added:  "Agents  of  the  Nawab 
[King]  of  Oudh  and  also  of  the  King  of  Delhi  were  sent  all  over  India  to  discover  the  temper  of  the 
army.  They  worked  upon  the  feelings  of  the  sepoys,  telling  them  how  treacherously  the  foreigners  had 
behaved  towards  their  king.  They  invented  ten  thousand  lies  and  promises  to  persuade  the  soldiers  to 
06 
mutiny  and  turn  against  their  masters... 
The  involvement  in  this  plot  of  Wajid  Ali,  the  Muslim  ex-King  of  Oudh,  or  at  least  members  of  his 
entourage,  is  highly  possible.  Major  Burroughs  discovered  after  the  mutiny  of  his  regiment  -  the  17d- 
in  June  1857  that  it,  the  19'h  and  the  34h  had  all  offered  their  services  to  the  King  of  Oudh  at  the  time  of 
annexation  in  early  1856.17  The  link  between  the  Barrackpore  conspirators  and  Wajid  Ali  is  further 
established  by  the  correspondence  of  an  unnamed  jemadar  of  the  34th  N.  I.  in  which  he  refers  to 
members  of  his  regiment  and  the  Vd  N.  I.  "joining"  or  "siding  with"  the  King  of  Oudh.  Sir  John  Kaye, 
who  read  these  letters  in  their  original  form,  was  convinced  that  the  sepoys  at  Barrackpore  "were 
induced  to  believe  that,  if  they  broke  away  from  the  English  harness,  they  would  obtain  more  lucrative 
service  under  the  restored  kingship  of  Oudh".  18 
From  the  start  senior  figures  in  the  Bengal  Presidency  suspected  outside  interference.  In  his  letter  to 
the  Deputy  Adjutant-General  of  28  January,  Major-General  Hearsey  blamed  "Brahmins  or  agents  of  the 
religious  Hindu  party  in  Calcutta  (I  believe  it  is  called  the  Dhurma  Subha)"  for  the  rumour  that  the 
cartridges  were  part  of  a  government  plot  to  convert  natives  to  Christianity.  19  By  late  February, 
Canning  told  Vernon  Smith,  he  had  switched  his  suspicions  to  the  "King  of  Oude's  people  at  Garden 
Reach".  Canning  himself  was  not  entirely  convinced.  "I  cannot  say  that  his  evidence  is  very 
conclusive,  "  he  added,  "but  if  there  has  been  any  attempt  to  seduce  them  with  a  view  to  embarrassing 
the  Government  it  is  much  more  likely  to  have  come  from  the  Oude  courtiers  than  the  Brahmins  as  was 
first  suspected.  "'0  Within  a  month  Canning's  belief  in  a  conspiracy  had  hardened.  HetoldVernon 
'5  Charles  T.  Metcalfe  (trans.  ),  Two  Native  Narratives  of  the  Mutiny  in  Delhi  (London,  1898),  pp.  3  7-9. 
16  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  16  1. 
17  Burroughs  to  Chamberlain,  Jan  1860,  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Rreedom  Struggle,  1,  p.  342. 
18  Malleson  (ed.  ),  Kaye  andMallesons  History  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  1,  p.  42  1. 
'9  Hearsey  to  Major  W.  A.  J.  Mayhew,  28  Jan  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  1,  pp.  4-5. 
20  Canning  to  Vernon  Smith,  7  February  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS.  Eur/F231/4. 202 
Smith  that  while  many  sepoys,  even  the  majority,  were  sincere  in  their  alarm  for  their  religion,  these 
fears  had  been  put  into  their  heads  by  civilians,  though  once  such  feelings  had  taken  root  they  were 
"disseminated  from  one  corps  to  another  without  aid  from  without".  He  was  convinced  that  the  prime 
movers  had  no  ostensible  connection  with  the  army,  though  whether  they  were  "political  malcontents 
such  as  the  King  of  Oude's  followers  or  religious  alarmists"  he  could  not  say.  But  despite  the  emphasis 
on  religion,  he  added,  the  "moving  purpose  may  be  purely  political"  and  there  were  some  small 
incidents"  to  point  the  finger  at  the  "Oude  herd".  2  1  Hearsey,  a  fluent  I-Iindi  speaker  who  had  Eurasian 
sons  and  who  prided  himself  on  his  close  relations  with  his  native  troops,  was  of  a  similar  opinion. 
"Rajah  Maun  Sing  and  other  [senior  advisers]  of  the  ex-King  of  Oude,  "  he  informed  government  on  5 
April,  "have  been  bribing  some  evil-minded  &  traiterous  Hindoos  of  the  19'h  and  34h  N.  I.  to  seize  the 
first  opportunity  to  incite  disturbance.  This  cartridge  business  came  opportunely  for  them  &  they 
seized  it  even  before  the  cartridges  were  made  for  distribution...  In  short,  the  sepoys  have  never  even 
seen  a  greased  Car1ridge.  "22 
At  Barrackpore,  meanwhile,  the  conspirators  were  struggling  to  win  over  enough  of  their  fellow 
soldiers.  During  the  evening  of  5  February,  the  same  Jemadar  Durriow  Sing  of  the  34h  who  had  helped 
to  foil  the  plot  to  seize  Calcutta  was  forcibly  taken  by  two  sepoys  to  the  parade  ground  where  he  found 
a  large  gathering  of  about  300  soldiers  from  all  four  regiments,  their  faces  covered  with  masks.  Having 
asked  Sing  to  join  them,  they  explained  that  they  were  willing  to  die  for  their  religion  and  that,  if  they 
could  make  an  arrangement  that  evening,  they  would  plunder  the  station  and  kill  all  the  Europeans  the 
following  night.  Sing  responded  by  advising  the  men  to  disperse  and  warning  them  that  they  would 
"not  get  such  good  masters  in  future".  But  he  did  not  inform  his  superiors  until  10  February,  when  he 
gave  a  sworn  deposition  in  the  presence  of  his  company  commander,  adjutant,  commanding  officer  and 
station  commander  (Brigadier  Grant).  The  only  voice  he  could  recognize,  he  told  them,  was  that  of 
Mookta  Persaud,  the  drill  havildar  who  was  part  of  the  earlier  plot  to  seize  Calcutta.  23 
Sing's  version  of  events  is  backed  up  by  Ramshahai  Lalla,  a  low-caste  (Kait)  sepoy  in  the  same 
regiment.  He  told  the  authorities  that  he  had  been  aware  of  the  secret  assembly  on  5  February  but  did 
not  attend  it.  The  following  day,  however,  he  discovered  that  a  second  meeting  had  been  arranged  for 
that  evening  at  which  delegates  from  each  of  the  four  regiments  at  Barrackpore  would  take  an  oath  and 
11  Canning  to  Vernon  Smith,  23  March  1857,  ibid. 
22  Hearsey  to  Col.  Birch,  5  April  1857,  Mutiny  Papers,  BL,  Add.  MSS  41489,  f  78.  The  italics  are 
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decide  on  their  future  course  of  action.  Lalla  then  waited  until  early  evening  before  taking  this 
intelligence  to  his  company  commander,  Lieutenant  Allen,  with  whom  he  was  on  particularly  good 
terms.  He  told  Allen  that  the  men  were  "apprehensive  of  being  forced  to  give  up  their  caste  and  be 
made  Christians"  and  that  they  had  determined  to  rise  up  against  their  officers  before  proceeding  to 
Calcutta.  They  had  decided  to  act  before  it  was  too  late,  said  Sing,  because  rumours  had  already 
reached  them  that  a  European  regiment  and  artillery was  on  its  way  from  Dinapore  to  assist  in  carrying 
out  the  measures  of  government.  Men  of  other  regiments  were  to  be  asked  to  cooperate  with  their 
comrades  in  Barrackpore,  he  added,  as  it  was  an  affair  which  concerned  them  all  equally.  But  despite 
Lalla's  suggestion  that  he  should  proceed  to  the  meeting  place  (a  large  tree  near  the  station  magazine) 
between  eight  and  nine  p.  m.  to  see  for  himself,  Allen  chose  to  inform  his  superiors.  When  he  did 
finally  reach  the  assembly  point,  it  was  afler  nine  and  the  place  was  deserted.  Lalla  was  convinced  that 
the  conspirators  cancelled  the  meeting  because  they  suspected  the  authorities  were  on  to  them.  24 
In  a  letter  to  government  of  II  February,  Major-General  Hearsey  likened  the  disaffection  at 
Barrackpore  to  a  "mine  ready  for  explosion".  The  minds  of  the  sepoys,  he  added,  had  "been  misled  by 
some  designing  scoundrels  who  have  managed  to  make  them  believe  that  their  refigiousprejudices, 
their  caste,  is  to  be  interfered  with  by  Government".  25  That  some  of  these  scoundrels  were  probably 
soldiers  themselves  does  not  seem  to  have  occurred  to  Hearsey  at  this  juncture.  These  ringleaders  were 
almost  certainly  behind  the  move  to  spread  the  net  of  disaffection.  On  12  February,  for  example,  the 
native  doctor  of  the  43rd  N.  I.  told  his  commanding  officer  that  he  had  overheard  a  sepoy  of  2  nd  N.  I.  tell 
a  comrade  that  a  cossid  (hand-delivered  message)  had  been  sent  to  the  19th  N.  I.  at  Berhampore  and  to 
the  regiments  at  Dinapore  (the  7h,  e  and  40'h  N.  I.  ),  "informing  them  that  ten  or  twelve  of  us  have 
raised  a  disturbance,  and  we  want  you  to  support  USvo.  26  The  mutinous  behaviour  of  the  19'h  N.  I.  during 
the  night  of  26  February,  therefore,  needs  to  be  seen  in  the  context  of  this  mutinous  correspondence.  It 
is  surely  no  coincidence  that  a  havildar's  guard  from  the  34d'  N.  I.,  escorting  a  party  of  European 
invalids,  arrived  at  Berhampore  the  day  before  the  mutiny.  27  On  II  March,  Canning  told  Vernon  Smith 
that  there  was  much  evidence  to  show  that  the  men  of  the  19'h  N.  I.  had  been  "seduced  from  without", 
23  Deposition  of  Jemadar  Durriow  Sing,  10  Feb  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  I,  pp.  20-2. 
24  Examination  of  Sepoy  Ramsahai  Lalla,  II  Feb  1857,  ibid.,  pp.  22-4;  Statement  by  Lt.  A.  S.  Allen,  8 
Feb  1857,  ibid.,  pp.  17-18. 
25  Hearsey  to  Col.  Birch,  II  Feb  1857,  ibid.,  p.  24. 
26  Statement  by  Major  H.  W.  Matthews,  12  Feb  1857,  ibid.,  pp.  29-3  0. 
27  Lt.  -Col.  Mitchell  to  Major  Ross,  27  Feb  1857,  ibid.,  p.  41. 204 
particularly  the  sending  of  emissaries  from  Barrackpore  and  the  arrival  of  the  guard  of  the  34th.  28  But 
the  clincher  came  after  the  regiment  had  been  disbanded  on  31  March.  In  two  petitions  to  Major- 
General  Hearsey,  the  "faithful"  officers  and  men  of  the  15h  claimed  that  the  regiment  had  been  led 
astray  by  the  "advice  of  some  wicked  men".  The  names  of  the  instigators,  they  added,  were  only 
known  to  their  enemies  who  were  young  sepoys  and  therefore  "independent  of  the  Honourable 
Company's  service".  Those  thought  to  be  faithfiil  had  not  been  let  in  on  the  plot.  They  were  prepared 
to  say,  however,  that  the  guard  of  the  34h  was  the  cause  of  the  mutiny.  29 
Given  that  the  disbanded  men  of  the  19'h  were  trying  to  secure  a  reversal  of  the  government's 
punishment,  there  is  every  reason  not  to  accept  these  two  petitions  at  face  value.  It  is  extremely 
unlikely  that  the  "loyal"  officers  and  sepoys  would  not  have  known  the  identity  of  at  least  some  of  the 
ringleaders.  Their  decision  not  to  hand  them  over,  therefore,  is  probably  an  indication  that  a  sizeable 
proportion  of  the  regiment  was  disaffected.  Certainly  there  is  evidence  that,  having  dispersed,  the 
disbanded  men  of  the  19'h  incited  other  regiments  to  mutiny.  In  May,  for  example,  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  17dN.  I.  prohibited  the  admittance  of  strangers  into  the  regimental  lines  in  an  attempt  to 
prevent  fraternization  between  his  sepoys  and  those  former  members  of  the  I  SP  who  lived  in  the 
vicinity  (the  two  regiments  had  forged  close  links  during  their  time  at  Lucknow).  But  contact  was 
made,  nonetheless,  and  the  17  th  mutinied  soon  after.  30  So  who  were  these  disaffected  men?  One  clue 
was  provided  by  a  conversation  between  the  regimental  doctor  and  a  group  of  disbanded  Muslim 
sepoys.  Asked  the  real  reason  behind  the  mutiny,  the  Muslims  replied  that  the  Hindus  in  the  regiment 
"had  threatened  them  with  instant  death"  if  they  told  the  authorities,  yet  they  promised  to  disclose  the 
"true  cause"  of  the  supposed  cartridge  outbreak  after  the  Hindus  had  dispersed  to  their  homes 
.31 
This 
promise  was  never  kept,  but  we  can  surmise  that  the  Muslims  were  referring  particularly  to  the  majority 
high-caste  Hindus.  We  can  also  surmise  that  the  "true  cause"  was  not  a  genuine  fear  for  religion  but  a 
general  dissatisfaction  with  the  service  of  the  British  raj:  partly  because  of  the  annexation  of  Oudh, 
from  where  many  of  them  hailed;  partly  because  of  the  change  in  recruitment  policy  which  was 
beginning  to  undermine  the  high-caste  monopoly;  and  partly  because  of  a  number  of  professional 
grievances  such  as  low  pay  and  poor  career  prospects. 
28  Canning  to  Vernon  Smith,  II  March  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F231/4. 
29  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  L  pp.  1034. 
30  Return  by  Major  F.  W. Burroughs,  4  June  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  WEIL  pp.  25. 
31  Hearsey  to  Col.  Birch,  4  April  1857,  Mutiny  Papers,  BL,  Add.  MSS  41489,  f  73. 205 
March  saw  further  attempts  by  BarTackpore  troops  to  incite  a  rising.  First,  on  5  March,  a  jemadar  of 
the  7&  N.  I.,  which  had  only  arrived  in  January,  held  an  illegal  meeting  in  his  hut  at  which  he 
encouraged  the  men  of  his  company  to  refuse  to  bite  the  new  cartridges  and  to  take  part  in  a  prospective 
mutiny.  Five  days  later,  two  sepoys  of  the  2!  0  N.  I.  tried  and  failed  to  induce  the  subedar  in  command  of 
the  Mint  Guard  at  Calcutta  to  march  his  men  into  Fort  William  as  part  of  a  wider  mutinous  venture.  All 
three  were  found  guilty  of  mutiny  by  native  general  courts-martial  (mainly  on  the  strength  of  evidence 
provided  by  their  fellow  soldiers):  the  two  sepoys  were  given  14  years'  imprisonment  with  hard  labour; 
the  jemadar  got  away  with  dismissal.  Anson,  believing  this  latter  punishment  to  be  insufficient,  asked 
the  court  to  reconsider,  but  it  would  not  budge.  32  The  court's  recalcitrance  is  revealing  not  only  because 
it  implies  a  wider  sympathy  towards  the  jemadaes  illegal  action,  but  also  because  it  emphasizes  the 
court's  lack  of  respect  for  their  Commander-in-Chief  (not  to  mention  the  latter's  inability  to  insist  upon 
a  more  suitable  punishment). 
In  late  March,  the  Barrackpore  conspirators  made  contact  with  the  63d  N.  I.,  part  of  a  field  force  that 
was  stationed  in  the  unsettled  Sonthal  region  of  west  Bengal.  The  only  tangible  consequence  was  a 
temporary  refusal  by  14  sepoys  in  three  companies  of  the  63d  to  take  annual  leave  until  the  regiments  at 
Barrackpore  had  taken  theirs.  33  Colonel  Burney,  commanding  the  field  force,  traced  this  intransigence 
to  the  recent  arrival  of  two  sepoys  from  Barrackpore,  travelling  incognito  by  train  and  bearing  cossids.  34 
The  first  doubts  about  the  new  cartridges,  however,  had  been  raised  by  the  detachment  of  the  63rd  N.  I. 
at  the  Dum-Dum  depot.  "The  men  from  our  regiment  wrote  to  others  in  the  regiment  telling  them  of 
[the  objectionable  grease  rumour],  "  recalled  Jemadar  Sitaram  Pandy,  "and  there  was  soon  excitement  in 
every  regiment.  Some  men  pointed  out  that  in  forty  years'  service  nothing  had  ever  been  done  by  the 
Sirkar  [Indian  government]  to  insult  their  religion,  but 
... 
the  sepoys'  minds  had  been  inflamed  by  the 
seizure  of  Oudh.  Interested  parties  were  quick  to  point  out  that  the  great  aim  of  the  English  was  to  turn 
us  all  into  Christians,  and  they  had  therefore  introduced  the  cartridge  in  order  to  bring  this  about  ... 
05 
But  the  majority  of  the  63d  would  not  be  won  over  by  the  blandishments  of  the  conspirators  and, 
though  later  disarmed  at  Berhampore,  the  corps  became  one  of  only  II  native  infantry  regiments  to  be 
reincorporated  as  a  body  into  the  post-mutiny  Bengal  Army. 
32  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857,  XXX,  pp.  109-24,257-94. 
33  Two  of  them  were  the  61ite  light  and  grenadier  companies.  in  many  of  the  mutinies  of  1857,  the  most 
disaffected  soldiers  were  from  these  companies.  This  is  possibly  because  they  contained  the  tallest  and 
smartest  soldiers,  and  therefore  a  large  proportion  of  high-caste  sepoys. 
34  Col.  Burney  to  Major  Ross,  29  March  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857,  )DCX,  p.  104 206 
Also  included  in  that  number  were  the  43d  and  7&  N.  I.  Of  the  four  Barrackpore  regiments,  only  the 
43  rd  was  not  directly  implicated  in  the  plotting.  During  March,  in  an  attempt  to  keep  his  regiment 
separate  from  its  disaffected  counterparts,  the  subedar-major  of  the  43d  rejected  an  invitation  to  dine 
36  1, 
with  the  2nd  N.  L.  The  native  officers  and  men  of  the  70'  N.  I.  would  later  attempt  to  prove  their 
loyalty  by  offering  to  serve  against  the  mutineers  (this  offer  was  not  accepted,  though  they  were 
subsequently  sent  overseas  to  fight  in  the  2nd  China  War).  It  was  a  Muslim  sepoy  of  the  7&,  it  will  be 
recalled,  who  informed  one  of  his  officers  that  the  cartridge  question  was  merely  a  pretext  to  mutiny. 
The  sole  black  mark  against  the  70th  was  the  agitation  of  the  disaffected  jemadar,  and  he  was  promptly 
handed  over  to  the  authorities  by  men  of  his  own  regiment.  So  why  were  the  43d  and  7&  regiments  so 
impervious  to  the  blandishments  of  the  conspirators?  With  regard  to  the  43  rd 
,  the  presence  of  a  much- 
respected  commanding  officer,  Major  Matthews,  should  not  be  underestimated.  Matthews  had  joined 
the  regiment  in  1824  and  been  present  for  most  of  the  next  33  years  (the  main  exception  being  four  and 
a  half  years  on  detachment  to  the  Assam  Sebundy  Corps),  seeing  action  on  the  Bhutan  frontier,  in  the 
I'  Afghan  War,  the  Gwalior  campaign  and  the  I"  Sikh  War.  Colonel  Kennedy  of  the  701h  ,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  served  most  of  his  30  year  career  in  the  25th  N.  I.  and  Commissariat  Department.  Only  in 
1856  was  he  appointed  to  command  the  7&  Regiment.  37  He  was,  therefore,  virtually  a  stranger  to  his 
sepoys,  though  his  experience  as  a  Commissariat  officer,  having  to  speak  the  vernacular  and  dealing 
with  natives  of  all  classes,  may  have  compensated  to  some  extent. 
The  only  other  evidence  we  have  of  contact  between  the  Barrackpore  conspirators  and  other  native 
troops  at  this  time  is  a  claim  by  Colonel  Sherer,  the  commanding  officer  of  the  73d  N.  I.,  that  a  sepoy 
from  his  two  companies  at  Dacca  was  sent  to  Barrackpore  in  March  to  find  out  what  was  going  on. 
When  those  two  companies  rejoined  regimental  headquarters  at  Jalpigori  in  June,  they  contained  a 
number  of  disaffected  men  who  spread  a  falsehood  that  Europeans  were  on  their  way  to  disarm  the 
corps.  This  nearly  provoked  a  mutiny,  with  almost  all  the  grenadier  company  and  many  from  other 
companies  sleeping  with  their  loaded  muskets.  But  Sherer  managed  to  regain  control  by  winning  over 
the  dominant  Oudh  and  Bhojpore  factions:  the  former  group  by  promoting  an  influential  Oudh  naik  to 
jemadar;  and  the  latter  by  appointing  a  popular  Bhojpore  man  to  the  vacant  havildar-majorship.  These 
two  men  subsequently  arrested  two  havildars;  and  nine  sepoys  who  were  plotting  to  murder  their 
35  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  162. 
36  Maj.  H.  W.  Matthews  to  Brig.  Grant,  March  1857,  Mutiny  Papers,  BL,  Add.  MSS  41489,  f  19. 
37  Service  Records  of  the  officers  of  the  East  India  Company  Army,  Hodson  Index,  NAM, 207 
officers.  The  only  mutiny  involving  the  regiment  took  place  in  November  as  a  consequence  of  an 
attempt  to  disarm  the  two  new  companies  on  duty  at  Dacca.  38  Sherer,  it  should  be  added,  had  only  been 
in  command  of  the  regiment  since  January.  But  like  Kennedy  he  was  a  good  linguist  who  had  spent 
much  of  his  service  on  detached  duties  (latterly  in  the  Stud  Department).  He  had  also  become  a  soldier 
at  the  relatively  late  age  of  21  -  Kennedy  was  22  -  having  begun  a  degree  at  Oxford 
. 
39  I-Egh-flyers  with 
staff  experience,  like  Sherer  and  Kennedy,  probably  made  more  effective  colonels  than  regimental 
officers  who  were  no  longer  with  their  original  corps  (Mitchell  and  Wheler)  and  even  some  of  those 
who  were  (Carmichael-Smyth  of  the  3rd  L.  C.  ). 
In  the  light  of  all  the  evidence  placing  the  34h  at  the  very  centre  of  the  conspiracy  to  overturn  British 
rule,  the  reaction  of  the  regiment  to  Mungul  Pandy's  bungled  attempt  to  incite  mutiny  on  29  March 
begins  to  make  sense.  But  why  did  Pandy's  action  not  result  in  full-blown  mutiny?  The  answer 
probably  lies  in  the  ringleaders'  realization  that  the  time  was  not  right:  partly  because  not  enough 
members  of  the  other  Barrackpore  regiments,  particularly  the  43d  and  7&,  had  been  won  over  to  the 
cause  of  mutiny;  and  partly  because  the  34h  itself  was  not  of  one  opinion.  As  with  the  Výh  N.  I.,  the 
main  pro-mutiny  faction  was  probably  dominated  by  high-caste  Hindus  (who  comprised  53%  of  the 
regiment).  This  might  explain  why,  during  the  drama  of  29  March,  one  sepoy  told  Colonel  Wheeler 
that  no  one  would  use  force  against  Mungul  Pandy  because  he  was  a  Brahmin.  40  Captain  Drury 
confirmed  this  impression  when  he  told  the  Court  of  Inquiry  that  he  was  convinced  the  Quarter  Guard 
would  have  refused  any  order  to  shoot  Pandy  on  account  of  their  "sulky  and  reluctant  manner",  their 
"natural  disinclination  to  kill  a  man  of  his  caste",  and  their  fear  of  the  bad  "opinion  of  their  comrades  in 
the  lines  as  it  was  impossible  to  say,  there  being  a  large  proportion  of  Brahmins  in  the  regiment,  who 
approved  of  what  he  was  doing  and  who  did  not"  . 
41  Two  Sikh  members  of  the  Quarter  Guard  later 
claimed  that  their  Brahmin  jemadar,  Issuree  Pandy,  ordered  them  not  to  intervene.  42  Stokes  has  argued 
that  the  relatively  high  proportion  of  Sikhs  in  the  regiment  (around  7%)  affected  its  unity  of  action  on 
this  occasion  . 
43  But  that  was  surely  down  to  the  unwillingness  of  the  other  high-caste  sepoys  to  commit 
themselves.  The  significance  of  the  Sikhs,  on  the  other  hand,  is  that  they  were  too  few  in  number  to 
38  Col.  G.  M.  Sherer  to  Major  Ross,  28  Feb  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIII,  pp.  14-15 
39  Service  Records,  Hodson  Index,  NAM. 
40  Evidence  of  Lt.  -Col.  S.  G.  Wheler,  30  March  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  14  pp.  147-8. 
41  Evidence  of  Capt.  Drury,  ibid.,  p.  150. 
42  Ensign  F.  E.  A.  Charnier  to  Capt.  Drury,  7  April  1857,  ibid.,  p.  1523 
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support  their  European  superiors.  Captain  Drury,  who  did  not  believe  they  were  mixed  up  in  the 
disturbances,  said  they  were  unwilling  to  come  forward  on  the  20  because  they  were  in  such  a 
minority.  44  However  Sikhs  were  not  always  a  calming  influence.  The  Ludhiana  regiment  of  irregular 
Sikh  infantry  mutinied  at  Benares  on  4  June,  and  Sikhs  played  a  leading  part  in  the  mutiny  of  the  two 
wings  of  the  12'h  N.  I.  at  Jhansi  and  Nowgong  on  6  and  10  June  respectively.  45 
With  the  failure  of  Mungul  Pandy's  attempt  to  provoke  the  3e  N.  I.  to  mutiny  on  29  March  (and  the 
subsequent  disbandment  of  the  regiment  on  6  May),  the  focal  point  of  disaffection  moved  from  the 
Presidency  Division  to  the  more  isolated  stations  up  country.  One  of  the  means  by  which  ill-feeling 
spread  throughout  the  Bengal  Army  was  the  fraternization  of  detachments  at  the  musketry  depots.  In 
mid-March,  it  will  be  recalled,  Lieutenant  Martineau  was  told  by  sepoys  at  the  Ambala  depot  that  all 
Bengal  regiments  contained  cabals  determined  to  brand  those  who  used  the  new  cartridges  as  outcastes. 
These  secret  committees  had  one  aim:  to  convince  their  comrades  that  the  cartridge  question  was  part  of 
a  wider  government  conspiracy  to  deprive  them  of  their  religion  and  caste.  In  case  they  were  doubted, 
a  number  of  other  rumours  were  spread  to  reinforce  this  belief. 
In  early  March,  for  example,  a  sepoy  at  Ambala  showed  Martineau  a  letter  from  his  brother  in  the  I' 
N.  I.  at  Cawnpore  warning  him  about  contaminated  flour.  A  couple  of  days  later,  after  the  sepoy  had 
shown  the  letter  to  his  comrades,  he  explained  its  significance  to  Martineau.  The  rumour  was  that  flour 
retailed  from  government  depots  had  been  deliberately  mixed  with  the  ground  bones  of  cows  and  pigs 
to  deprive  the  the  natives  of  their  religion.  "I  was  excesssively  startled,  "  recalled  Martineau,  "and  saw 
at  once  that  some  brain  of  more  than  ordinary  cunning  had  succeeded  in  combining  for  the  time  being 
the  parties  of  both  Hindus  and  Mahomedans  against  us.  "46  According  to  W.  H.  Carey,  resident  in  India 
at  the  time,  the  rumour  originated  on  8  March  when  a  merchant,  hoping  to  clear  his  stock  before  other 
supplies  arrived,  sold  a  large  quantity  of  flour  at  an  unusually  low  price  in  the  market  at  Cawnpore. 
Carey  identified  a  sepoy  who  bought  some  of  the  flour  as  the  man  responsible  for  spreading  the  "evil 
report"  that  it  had  been  mixed  with  bullock  and  pig!  s  bones  at  the  Canal  Departmenes  mills  at 
Evidence  of  Capt.  Drury,  30  March  1857,  ibid.,  p.  151. 
Gov.  -Gen.  to  the  Court  of  Directors,  19  June  1857,  P.  P.,  11C.,  1857-8,  XLIV,  p.  425;  Deposition  of 
Francis  Reilly,  5&6  July,  Mutiny  Papers,  BL,  Add.  MSS  41996,  f.  97;  Capt.  Scot  to  Mrs  Ryves,  12 
July  1857,  Scot  Papers,  OlOC,  MSS  Eur/C324. 
46  Captain  E.  M.  Martineau  to  Sir  John  Kaye,  20  Oct  1864,  Kaye  Mutiny  Papers,  OIOC,  H725,  p.  1023. 209 
Cawnpore.  47  The  fact  that  the  mills  were  run  by  native  contractors  with  whom  the  owners  of  the  grain 
made  their  own  arrangements  was  either  not  known  or  deliberately  concealed  . 
48  The  cartridge  question 
had  been  so  skilfully  handled  by  the  conspirators  that  many  of  their  fellow  soldiers  were  willing  to 
believe  the  government  was  capable  ofjust  about  anything.  In  the  coming  months  more  than  one 
officer  would  hear  his  men  repeat  the  contaminated  flour  rumour  as  if  it  were  fact.  It  was  taken  so 
seriously  by  the  sepoys  of  the  I&  Oudh  I.  I.  that,  in  early  June,  they  insisted  on  emptying  carts  of  flour  - 
which  had  been  procured  for  them  by  the  native  mayor  -  into  the  river  . 
49  They  and  other  troops  at 
Sitapur  mutinied  the  following  day. 
The  bone  dust  rumour  was  predated  by  the  mysterious  arrival  of  chapatties  in  the  North-West 
Provinces.  They  first  appeared  in  the  Agra  Division  in  January  and  quickly  spread  north  to  the  frontier 
of  the  Punjab,  east  to  Oudh  and  south-east  to  Allahabad.  The  recipients  of  these  flat  unleavened  cakes 
were  chaukidars  (village  watchmen)  who  were  told  to  bake  five  more  and  deliver  them  to  their 
counterparts  in  the  five  nearest  villages.  In  this  way  the  chapatties  spread,  in  geometrical  ratio,  at  a  rate 
of  up  to  a  hundred  miles  a  night.  The  origin  and  purpose  of  these  chapatties  has  never  been 
satisfactorily  established,  though  contemporary  speculation  was  rife.  Sir  Syed  Ahmed  Khan  pointed 
out  that,  with  cholera  prevalent  at  the  time,  some  people  regarded  the  chapatties  as  a  talisman  to  ward 
off  the  disease.  50  But  most  interpretations  were  not  so  benign.  The  native  newspapers  at  Delhi  thought 
their  appearance  was  "an  invitation  to  the  whole  country  to  unite  for  some  secret  object  afterwards  to  be 
disclosed".  "  Mainodin  Hassan  Khan,  then  the  thanadar  (chief  officer)  of  a  police  station  just  outside 
Delhi,  told  the  local  magistrate  that  he  regarded  the  chapatties  as  "significant  of  some  greater 
disturbance,  that  would  follow  immediately".  Before  the  downfall  of  Maratha  power,  Mainodin 
explained,  a  sprig  of  millet  and  a  morsel  of  bread  had  been  passed  from  village  to  village  to  signify  a 
forthcoming  upheaval.  52  The  British  spy  Jat  Mail,  a  resident  of  Delhi,  claimed  that  some  people 
regarded  the  chapatties  as  a  warning  of  some  impending  calamity,  others  that  their  purpose  was  to  warn 
against  the  government's  plot  to  force  Christianity  upon  the  people,  and  still  others  that  they  were  being 
circulated  by  government  to  intimate  to  the  people  of  Hindustan  that  they  would  all  be  compelled  to  eat 
47  W.  H.  Carey,  The  Mahomedan  Rebellion  (Rurki,  1857),  pp.  27-8. 
48  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Struggle,  1,  p.  396. 
49  ibid.,  IL  p.  22. 
50  Sir  Syed  Ahmad  Khan,  An  &W  on  the  Causes  ofthe  Indian  Revolt  (Calcutta,  1860),  Capt.  W.  N. 
Lees  (trans.  ),  p.  3. 
51  Examination  of  Chuni,  9  Feb  1858,  P.  P.,  RC.,  1859,  X'M  p.  195. 
52  Metcalfe  (trans.  ),  Two  Native  Narratives,  pp.  39-4  1. 210 
the  same  food  as  Christians.  53  One  food  and  one  faith.  This  last  view,  according  to  Martineau,  was 
prevalent  among  "the  sepoys  of  every  regiment  that  furnished  a  detachment  to  the  depot  at  Ambala".  54 
At  the  time  the  British  did  not  attach  particular  importance  to  the  appearance  of  the  chapatties.  "Is  it 
treason  orjest?  "  asked  the  pro-government  Friend  ofIndia  on  5  March.  "Is  thereto  bean  'explosion  of 
feeling'  or  only  of  laughter?  "  Captain  Thomson  of  the  53rd  N.  I.  noted  that  "various  speculations  were 
made  by  Europeans  as  to  the  import  of  this  extreme  activity",  but  it  was  invariably  dismissed  as  native 
superstition.  "  The  exceptions,  according  to  the  Collector  of  Mathura,  were  those  "few  who 
remembered  that  a  similar  distribution  of  cakes  had  been  made  in  Madras  towards  the  end  of  the  last 
century,  and  had  been  followed  by  the  mutiny  of  Vellore".  56  Only  in  retrospect  were  the  chapatties 
generally  regarded  as  the  harbingers  of  mutiny.  In  his  narrative  of  the  outbreak  at  Agra,  the 
commissioner  stated  that  he  had  reason  to  believe  the  appearance  of  the  chapattis  "had  some  bearing 
upon  the  Hindoo  prophecy  limiting  British  rule  to  a  centenary  of  years",  and  that  sepoys  of  the  34th  N.  I. 
were  involved  in  some  way.  57  Lieutenant  Mackenzie  of  the  P  L.  C.  was  in  no  doubt  that  they  were  "in 
some  way  a  signal,  understood  by  the  sepoys,  of  warning  to  be  in  readiness  for  coming  events".  58  The 
commissioner  of  Agra's  reference  to  the  3e  N.  I.  is  the  only  tenuous  link  between  the  military 
conspirators  and  the  chapatties.  Yet  the  appearance  of  the  cakes  in  January  1857,  at  the  outset  of  the 
cartridge  question,  suggests  a  possible  connection.  If  the  intention  was  to  unsettle  the  minds  of  sepoys 
and  civilians  alike,  and  make  them  more  receptive  to  wild  rumour,  then  it  certainly  succeeded.  59 
53  Examination  of  Jat  Mall,  3  Feb  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIII,  p.  184. 
54  Examination  of  Capt.  Martineau,  23  Feb  1858,  ibid.,  p.  210. 
55  Thomson,  Me  Story  of  Cawnpore,  p.  24. 
5'  Mark  Thornhill,  Me  Personal  Adventures  and  Erperiences  ofa  Magistrate  during  the  Rise, 
Progress,  and  Suppression  of  the  Indian  Mutiny  (L  ondon,  18  8  4),  p.  2. 
57  Narra  ti  ve  of  E  ve  n  is  at  lending  th  eouI  break  of  Dist  ur  ban  c  es  and  the  R  estora  tion  of  Au  th  ori  ty  in  the 
Agra  Division  in  1857-58  (Calcutta,  188  1),  p.  4. 
51  Mackenzie,  'The  Outbreak  at  Meerut',  Yhe  Sepoy  Mutiny,  pp.  216-17. 
59  RanaJit  Guha  has  argued  thatthere  is  no  way  of  knowing  whether  or  not  the  chapati  had  anything  to 
do  with  the  uprisings  of  1857'.  He  added:  'Yet  the  attempt  on  the  part  of  some  bureaucrats  and  scholars 
to  decipher  it  after  the  event  and  the  size  of  the  literature  this  has  inspired  are  a  measure  of  the  urge  for 
an  understanding  of  insurgency  in  terms  of  the  processes  of  its  transmission.  At  a  certain  level  this  urge 
expressed  itself  in  the  search  for  a  prime  cause  and  helped  by  an  obvious  predilection,  spawned  a 
conspiracy  theory.  It  was  then  easy  to  read  into  this  hitherto  inexplicable  relay  a  meaning  appropriate 
to  that  theory  and  brand  it,  in  retrospect,  as  the  signal  of  the  troubles  just  experienced.  '  (Ranaj  it  Guha, 
Elementary  Aspects  ofPeasant  Insurgency  (Delhi,  1983,  p.  240).  Guha  has  a  point.  But  his  argument 
does  not  preclude  the  possibility  that  disaffected  soldiers  and/or  civilians  may  have  initiated  the 
spreading  of  the  chapatties  with  no  specific  'message'  in  mind.  They  would  not  have  wanted  them  to  be 
understood  by  the  peasant  communities  who  received  them.  Their  intention  was  rather  to  create  a 
general  climate  of  fear  and  suspicion  in  which  rebellion  cold  flourish.  'If  the  transmission  of  these 211 
The  next  obvious  example  of  conspiracy  took  place  at  Lucknow  on  3  May,  the  day  after  the  7  th  Oudh 
I.  I.  had  refused  the  blank  cartridges,  when  two  sepoys  from  that  regiment  sent  a  note  to  the  48th  N.  I. 
saying  they  had  acted  for  the  faith  and  awaited  the  48h's  orders.  It  can  probably  be  deduced  from  this 
that  ringleaders  from  at  least  two  native  regiments  at  Lucknow  (and  probably  more)  had  agreed  in 
advance  that  they  would  act  when  the  cartridge  question  came  to  a  head.  Unfortunately  the  messenger 
delivered  the  note  to  an  old  subedar  -  almost  certainly  not  the  intended  recipient  -  who  handed  it  over  to 
his  European  superiors.  The  two  sepoys  were  arrested,  the  regiment  disarmed  and  the  plot  to  mutiny 
not  reactivated  until  the  end  of  the  month.  60 
On  the  same  day  at  Nowgong  in  Central  India,  where  a  portion  of  the  120'N.  I.,  14'h  I.  C.  and  4/9th 
Foot  Artillery  (F.  A.  )  were  stationed,  Dr  Thomas  Mawe  informed  his  sister  of  his  belief  that  the  various 
fires  since  24  April  had  been  coordinated  by  a  small  group  of  conspirators.  Mawe  added  that  a  sepoy 
on  leave  from  his  regiment  at  Benares  (the  37h  N.  I.  )  had  recently  attempted  to  incite  a  local  raja  to  rise 
against  the  government;  but  the  raja  had  handed  him  and  his  seditious  documents  over  to  the  British 
resident  . 
61  The  Joint  Magistrate  of  the  Ambala  cantonment  was  convinced  that  the  spate  of  fires  at  his 
and  other  stations  was  evidence  of  a  conspiracy  embracing  the  whole  Bengal  Army.  Not  all  sepoys 
were  directly  involved,  he  told  the  Commissioner  of  the  Cis-Sutlej  States,  but  a  majority  were 
supportive  to  the  extent  that  "no  single  man  dared  come  forward  to  expose  it".  62 
And  so  to  the  outbreak  at  Meerut  on  10  May  1857.  Sen  concluded  that  it  was  not  pre-meditated.  63 
But  the  evidence  to  the  contrary  is  highly  persuasive.  We  know,  for  example,  that  the  refilsal  by 
skirmishers  of  the  P  L.  C.  to  accept  blank  cartridges  on  23  April  was  planned  in  advance.  According  to 
depositions  taken  from  three  Hindu  members  of  the  regiment  by  Major  G.  W.  Williams,  the  first  act  of 
"open  and  decided  mutiny"  took  place  during  the  evening  of  22  April  when  two  Muslim  naiks,  Pir Ali 
and  Kudrat  Ali,  convinced  their  comrades  that  the  cartridges  for  firing  practice  the  next  day  had  been 
prepared  with  beef  and  pork  fat,  the  men  then  swore  on  the  Ganges  and  the  Koran  (depending  upon 
cakes  was  only  intended  to  create  a  mysterious  uneasiness,,  wrote  one  British  magistrate,  'that  object 
was  gained.  '(Sherer,  Daily  Life  during  the  Indian  Mutiny,  pp.  7-8). 
60  Lawrence  to  Canning,  3  May  1857,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  II,  p.  8. 
61  Mawe  to  his  sister,  3  May  1857,  Mawe  Letters,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/C324. 
62  Capt.  E.  W.  E.  Howard  to  G.  C.  Barnes,  4  May  1857,  P.  P.  H.  C.,  1857,  )OCX,  p.  444. 
63  Sen,  Eighteen  Fifty-Seven,  p.  402. 212 
their  religion)  that  they  would  reffise  the  cartridges  until  the  whole  Bengal  Army  had  accepted  them.  64 
The  two  Alis  were  clearly  the  ringleaders.  Their  arrest  with  83  other  skirmishers  the  following  day  is 
possibly  the  reason  why  the  Yd  L.  C.  did  not  play  a  leading  part  in  the  rising  on  10  May. 
That  role  was  taken  on  by  the  ringleaders  of  the  20'h  N.  I.  -  the  I  Ph  N.  I.  had  only  arrived  at  Meerut  in 
late  April  -  who  began  by  concerting  their  actions  with  the  three  native  infantry  regiments  at  Delhi,  30 
miles  to  the  south-east.  But  the  plot  may  also  have  involved  Bahadur  Shah  111,  the  82-year-old  King  of 
Delhi  who  had  succeeded  to  the  throne  of  the  great  Moghul  emperors  in  1837.  The  title  had  not 
conferred  any  real  authority  since  the  fall  of  Delhi  to  the  British  in  1803  (and  long  before  that  date  the 
Moghuls  had  been  eclipsed  by  the  Maratha  Confederacy  as  the  dominant  power  in  north  and  central 
India).  A  Company  pensioner  whose  temporal  power  did  not  extend  beyond  the  walls  of  the  Royal 
palace  (also  known  as  the  Red  Fort),  the  King  was  nevertheless  a  symbol  of  ancient  legitimacy  to  many 
Hindus  and  Muslims  alike.  Moreover  his  relations  with  the  British  had  been  deteriorating  since  Lord 
Ellenborough  had  discontinued  the  practice  whereby  Govemors-General  presented  him  with  nazirs 
(ceremonial  gifts)  three  times  a  year.  He  had  particularly  resented  the  government's  refilsal  to 
recognize  as  heir  his  youngest  and  favourite  son,  Mirza  Jawan  Bakht,  after  the  death  of  the  heir- 
apparent,  Prince  Dara  Bukht,  in  1849.  Instead  the  government  nominated  Bahadur  Shah's  eldest 
surviving  son,  Mirza  Fakir-ud-din,  on  condition  that  he  vacated  the  Red  Fort  on  becoming  King.  65  In 
1854,  according  to  his  secretary  Mukund  Lal,  Bahadur  Shah  allowed  some  infantry  soldiers  at  Delhi  to 
become  his  disciples  and  from  this  day  "a  sort  of  understanding  was  established  between  the  army  and 
the  King".  66  His  hakim  (personal  physician)  and  adviser,  Ahsanullah  Khan,  said  his  actual  intrigues 
began  a  year  later  when  he  sent  his  nephew  with  a  letter  to  the  Shah  of  Persia,  requesting  assistance 
against  the  British  "in  the  shape  of  money  and  troops".  Despite  subsequent  letters,  Ahsanullah  was  not 
aware  of  any  reply,  though  during  the  Persian  War  (1856-7)  the  King  told  him  that  "he  had  strong 
hopes  of  receiving  aid  from  Persia  in  the  shape  of  money  and  troops".  67  According  to  an  intinerant 
mendicant  who  had  good  contacts  in  the  palace,  these  hopes  were  fostered  by  Hasan  Askari,  a  religious 
adviser  to  the  King,  who  told  him  that  he  had  had  a  divine  revelation  that  the  dominion  of  Persia  would 
extend  over  the  whole  of  Hindustan,  and  "that  the  splendour  of  the  sovereignty  of  Delhi  will  again 
64  Major  G.  W.  Williams'  memorandum  of  15  Nov  1857,  Rivzi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Struggle, 
v,  pp.  10-11;  Palmer,  Yhe  Mutiny  Outbreak  atMeerut,  p.  60. 
65  Supplementary  evidence  of  Ahsanullah  Khan,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVHI,  p.  264;  Malleson  (ed.  ),  Indian 
Mutiny,  Ii,  pp.  10-25. 
66  Examination  of  Mukund  Lal 
,  12  Feb  1857,  ibid.,  p.  206. 213 
revive"  . 
68  Delhi  Muslims  in  general  (including  sepoys)  were  excited  by  the  possibility  that  Persian 
troops  might  invade  India  to  eject  the  British,  said  one  native  news-writer.  The  anticipation  was 
heightened  further  by  the  anti-British  sentiment  of  the  leading  native  journal,  the  Sadik-ul-Akhhar 
('Authentic  News),  copies  of  which  were  delivered  to  the  Royal  palace  . 
69  Ahsanullah  claimed  that  the 
Royal  princes,  in  particular,  attached  great  importance  to  the  journal's  false  reports  that  the  British  were 
being  defeated  by  the  Persians,  and  that  they  may  have  communicated  its  contents  to  the  King.  70  But 
Ahsanullah  could  not  confirm  that  Bahadur  Shah  had  been  in  contact  with  Bengal  troops  during  the 
cartridge  question,  though  the  King  undoubtedly  "believed  that  his  own  prosperity  would  go  hand  in 
71 
hand  with  the  ruin  of  British  power".  Mukund  Lal  has  claimed,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  Royal 
palace  received  intelligence  that  the  troops  at  Meerut  were  going  to  mutiny  a  full  20  days  before  they 
actually  did.  Four  days  before  the  outbreak  at  Delhi  (I  I  May),  he  added,  the  King's  personal  attendants 
were  predicting  that  the  army  would  soon  revolt  and  "come  to  the  palace,  when  the  government  of  the 
King  would  be  re-established".  72 
Other  hints  that  the  insurrection  at  Meerut  and  Delhi  was  planned  in  advance  were  provided  by  Sir 
Theophilus  Metcalfe,  the  Joint  Magistrate  at  Delhi,  who  later  testified  that  an  anonymous  petition  was 
presented  to  the  magistrate  in  late  April  1857,  stating  that  the  Cashmere  Gate  would  soon  be  wrested 
from  British  control.  "This  gate  being  our  chief  stronghold  in  the  city,  and  main  connection  with  the 
cantonments  of  Delhi,  "  commented  Metcalfe,  "it  would  naturally  be  the  first  point  seized  in  any  attempt 
at  insurrection  in  the  city,  and  it  was  the  only  gate  at  which  there  was  ever  a  military  guard.  "  The  guard 
duly  mutinied  on  II  May  and  the  gate  was  secured  by  the  rebels.  At  around  the  same  time  in  April, 
said  Metcalfe,  a  member  of  the  King's  Bodyguard  "secretly  urged  a  ressaldar  of  the  14'h  I.  C.  to  leave 
our  service,  and  to  take  service  with  the  King,  telling  him,  as  an  inducement  to  do  so,  that  before  the  hot 
weather  was  over,  the  Russians  would  have  come  to  India,  and  the  Government  of  the  English  be  at  an 
end".  Metcalfe  had  been  given  this  information  by  the  ressaldar  himself  -a  Eurasian  named  Everett  - 
who  also  told  him  that,  about  six  months  earlier,  the  King  had  sent  an  emissary  to  Russia.  '  There  was 
also  a  curious  conversation  that  took  place  at  the  beginning  of  May  between  Captain  Tytler  of  the  38h 
67  Supplementary  evidence  of  Ahsanullah  Khan,  ibid.,  pp.  265-6. 
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N.  I.  and  one  of  his  old  servants  who  was  going  to  visit  his  family.  When  Tytler  said  he  hoped  he  would 
return,  the  man  replied,  "Yes,  sir,  provided  your  hearth  is  still  in  existence".  Tytler  inferred  from  this 
that  the  man  had  forewarning  of  some  type  of  disturbance.  74 
But  the  key  evidence  linking  the  outbreaks  at  Meerut  and  Delhi  was  provided  by  Jat  Mall,  the  British 
spy.  A  few  days  before  the  mutiny,  he  claimed  to  have  learned  from  sepoys  on  duty  at  the  palace  that 
"it  had  been  arranged  in  case  greased  cartridges  were  pressed  upon  them,  that  the  Meerut  troops  were  to 
come  here  [to  Delhi],  where  they  would  be  joined  by  the  Delhi  troops,  and  it  was  said  that  the  compact 
had  been  arranged  through  some  native  officers,  who  went  over  on  court-martial  duty  to  Meerut".  75 
Five  of  the  15  native  officers  who  sat  in  judgement  on  the  85  skirmishers  of  the  P  L.  C.  from  6  to  8 
May,  it  will  be  recalled,  were  from  the  three  native  infantry  regiments  at  Delhi:  one  from  the  74h  and 
two  each  from  the  38  th  and  540.  Sceptics  may  argue  that  the  harsh  sentence  passed  on  the  skirmishers 
contradicts  the  theory  that  the  native  officers  from  Delhi  were  part  of  a  plot  to  mutiny.  A  lesser 
sentence  or  an  acquittal,  however,  would  simply  have  aroused  the  suspicions  of  the  British.  In  any 
case,  the  outbreak  would  provide  an  ideal  opportunity  to  rescue  the  prisoners. 
Ahsanullah  Khan  went  even  further  than  Jat  Mall  by  revealing  that  men  of  the  38dN.  I.  had  told  him 
that  "they  had  leagued  with  the  troops  at  Meerut"  before  the  mutiny,  and  that  the  latter  had 
"corresponded  with  the  troops  in  all  other  places,  so  that  from  every  cantonment  troops  would  arrive  at 
Delhi".  Even  after  the  outbreak,  said  Ahsunulla,  "letters  were  received  at  Delhi  from  which  it  was 
evident  that  [sepoys  all  over  India]  had  beforehand  made  common  cause  among  themselves".  For  their 
part  the  mutinous  officers  at  Delhi  wrote  -  and  got  the  King  to  write  -  to  many  regiments,  inviting  them 
to  join  them.  A  typical  appeal,  according  to  Ahsunulla,  was  as  follows:  "So  many  of  us  have  come  in 
here;  do  you  also,  according  to  your  promise,  come  over  quic  y?  '  76 
Sen  has  argued  that  there  was  not  even  a  conspiracy  to  mutiny  among  the  regiments  at  Meerut.  He 
cites  evidence  that  purports  to  show  that  the  mutiny  began  after  a  cooles  boy  from  H.  M.  6&  Rifles 
started  a  rumour  in  the  Sudder  Bazar  that  Europeans  troops  were  coming  to  disarm  the  natives.  77  The 
rumour  was  believed,  according  to  General  Hewitt,  because  the  6e  Rifles  were  parading  for  evening 
73  Examination  of  Sir  Theophilus  Metcalfe,  8  Feb  1858,  ibid.,  pp.  190-1. 
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church  service.  78  But  Palmer  rejected  this  version  of  events  on  the  grounds  that  the  story  of  the  cook 
boy  was  hearsay  and  the  church  parade  was  not  due  to  take  place  until  6.30  p.  m,  a  ftill  hour  and  a  half 
after  the  rumour  began.  He  suspects  that  sepoys  from  the  2&  N.  I.  were  responsible  for  the  rumour. 
Certainly  the  uproar  began  first  in  their  lines  before  spreading  to  those  of  the  11"'  N.  I.  and  3rd  L.  C.  79 
The  2&'s  leading  role  may  also  be  connected  to  the  appearance  of  a  mysterious  Hindufakir  (religious 
mendicant)  at  Meerut  about  a  month  before  the  mutiny.  According  to  one  havildar,  he  arrived  on  an 
elephant  and  was  accompanied  by  a  native  carriage,  horses  and  about  10  followers.  He  is  said  to  have 
stayed  a  number  of  days  in  the  lines  of  the  2&  N.  I.  before  being  ordered  out  of  the  station  by  the 
magistrate,  Johnstone.  During  his  subsequent  investigation,  Major  G.  W.  Williams  discovered  that,  prior 
to  arriving  at  Meerut,  thefakir  had  been  seen  at  the  musketry  depot  at  Ambala,  but  despite  these 
"suspicious  facts"  nothing  of  a  seditious  nature  was  ever  proved  against  him.  "O 
Palmer  also  points  to  two  important  facts  which  contradict  Sen's  claim  that  the  outbreak  was  not 
premeditated:  the  warning  given  during  the  evening  of  9  May  by  a  native  officer  of  the  3  rd  L.  C.  to  his 
troop  commander,  Lieutenant  Gough,  that  the  native  infantry  would  mutiny  the  following  day  and  the 
cavalry  would  follow  their  lead;  81  and  the  deliberate  cutting  of  the  telegraph  line  between  Meerut  and 
Delhi  before  4  p.  m.  on  the  10  May.  82  There  is  also  evidence  that,  at  2  p.  m.,  a  Kashmiri  prostitute 
named  Sophie  was  told  by  a  sepoy  in  the  Sudder  Baza  that  the  native  troops  would  mutiny  that  day.  3 
The  speed  with  which  native  civilians  -  particularly  Muslim  butchers  from  the  bazar  -joined  in  the 
mayhem  and  murder  would  seem  to  imply  that  even  they  were  forewarned. 
At  Delhi,  Captain  Tytler  noted  that  a  carriage  containing  sepoys  from  Meerut  arrived  in  his  regiment's 
lines  at  3  p.  rn  on  10  May.  84  His  wife  concluded  that  they  were  "emissaries  sent  over  from  Meerut  to 
warn  the  soldiers  to  be  prepared  for  the  next  day's  proceedings".  85  Jat  Mall  confirmed  the  arrival  of 
letters  at  the  palace  that  day  "bringing  intelligence  that  82  [sic]  soldiers  had  been  imprisoned,  and  that  a 
serious  disturbance  was  to  take  place  in  consequence".  As  a  result  of  this,  the  sepoys  guarding  the 
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palace  made  no  secret  of  their  belief  that,  after  mutinying,  the  troops  at  Meerut  would  come  to  Delhi.  86 
The  conclusion  drawn  by  Captain  Marriott,  the  prosecutor  at  the  trial  of  the  King  of  Delhi,  was  that  the 
outbreak  at  Meerut  did  not  occur  on  9  May  -  the  day  the  skirmishers  were  put  in  irons  -  because  the 
conspirators  needed  time  to  warn  the  Delhi  regiments.  Even  the  hour  of  mutiny  (5  p.  m.  )  was  evidence 
of  "cunning  and  craft"  in  that  the  native  lines  were  two  miles  from  their  European  equivalent.  The 
conspirators  would  have  calculated  on  the  lapse  of  at  least  one  and  a  half  hours  before  the  Europeans 
could  have  made  an  appearance.  By  which  time  it  would  have  been  dark,  said  Marriott,  and  the 
mutineers  long  gone  -  which  is  exactly  what  happened.  87 
The  disagreement  between  the  mutineers  as  to  their  eventual  destination  is  sometimes  cited  as  proof 
that  the  risings  at  Meerut  and  Delhi  were  not  coordinated.  According  to  Munshi  Mohanlal  -  who 
overheard  a  conversation  between  a  sowar  of  the  P  L.  C.  and  a  sepoy  in  Delhi  -  the  main  body  of 
mutineers  stopped  a  few  miles  outside  Meerut  to  decide  on  a  course  of  action.  The  majority  wanted  to 
head  for  either  Rohilkhand  to  the  north-east  or  Agra  to  the  south.  This  fact,  however,  is  entirely 
consistent  with  the  theory  that  only  a  small  number  of  sepoys  and  sowars  were  part  of  the  conspiracy  to 
mutiny  at  Meerut.  It  was  almost  certainly  these  men  who  persuaded  the  majority  that  any  march 
without  artillery  would  be  fatal.  Delhi  was  a  much  more  attractive  proposition,  they  argued,  because  it 
was  void  of  European  troops  and  would  be  easy  to  capture,  It  also  contained  a  large  magazine  and  the 
King  of  Delhi,  round  whom  more  rebel  troops  could  rally.  The  pro-Delhi  speakers  have  never  been 
identified.  But  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  they  were  the  self-same  conspirators  who  had  already 
been  in  contact  with  the  Delhi  troops.  Sir  John  Lawrence,  who  was  aware  of  Mohanlal's  evidence,  later 
wrote:  "It  is  very  possible,  indeed  probable,  that  the  native  soldiers  [at)  Delhi  were  so  far  in  the  scheme 
that  they  had  engaged  to  stand  by  their  comrades  at  Meerut.  Suck  indeed,  was  the  case  all  over  the 
Bengal  Presidcncy.  "88 
The  behaviour  of  the  troops  at  Delhi  during  the  morning  of  II  May  certainly  supports  Lawrence's 
theory.  Even  before  the  vanguard  of  the  Meerut  mutineers  -  sowars  of  the  3  rd  L.  C.  -  entered  the  walled 
city  of  Delhi  at  around  7.30  a.  m.,  the  local  garrison  was  showing  signs  of  disaffection.  At  an  early 
morning  parade  to  hear  the  general  order  announcing  the  execution  of  Jemadar  Issuree  Pandy  of  the  301 
N.  I.,  the  three  Delhi  regiments  gave  vent  to  their  disapproval.  The  3e,  for  example,  "hissed  and 
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shuffled  their  feet"  as  the  order  was  read  out  in  the  vernacular,  "showing  by  their  actions  their  sympathy 
with  the  executed  sepoy".  89  When  the  news  of  the  mutineers'  arrival  reached  the  military  cantonments  - 
on  a  ridge  to  the  north  of  the  city  -  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ripley  was  ordered  to  march  his  regiment,  the 
540'N.  I.,  down  to  the  Cashmere  Gate  to  quell  the  disturbance.  Confronted  there  by  sowars  of  the  3`1 
L.  C.,  Ripley  ordered  his  men  to  open  fire.  But  to  a  man  they  refused  and  the  mutinous  troopers  were 
able  to  cut  down  Ripley  and  a  number  of  his  officers  without  hindrance.  90  Ripley  had  only  been 
transferred  to  the  54th  from  the  I"  Bengal  European  Fusiliers  a  year  earlier,  and  his  experience  of  native 
troops  was  extremely  limited.  91 
Captains  Tytler  and  Gardiner,  meanwhile,  had  been  instructed  to  take  their  companies  of  the  38h  N.  I. 
to  a  house  on  the  ridge  above  the  new  powder  magazine  in  case  the  mutineers  decided  to  advance.  As 
the  cartridges  and  caps  were  being  handed  out,  Tytler  noticed  that  many  of  the  men  seized  more  than 
they  were  entitled  to,  but  he  was  in  too  much  of  a  hurry  to  do  anything  about  it.  Having  arrived  at  the 
house,  Tytler  sent  out  pickets  and  ordered  the  rest  of  the  men  to  shelter  from  the  sun  inside.  But  with 
fires  visible  in  the  city,  the  sepoys  began  to  gather  in  little  groups  outside  and  Tytler  had  to  order  them 
in  again.  That  afternoon,  on  entering  one  of  the  rooms,  Tytler  came  across  a  sepoy  telling  the  rest  of 
the  men  that  "every  power  of  government  existed  their  [sic]  allotted  time,  and  that  it  was  nothing 
extraordinary  that  that  of  the  English  had  come  to  an  end".  Before  he  could  arrest  the  man,  the  main 
magazine  in  the  city  exploded  and  the  men  of  the  two  companies  grabbed  their  arms  and  set  off  for  the 
city,  shouting  "Pillhivi  Raj  Ki  Jail  (Victory  to  the  Sovereign  of  the  World)".  Tytler  later  expressed  his 
conviction  that  his  men  had  been  expecting  a  disturbance  before  it  actually  broke  out.  92 
The  King  of  Delhi  is  often  said  to  have  been  surprized  by  the  arrival  of  the  mutineers  on  II  May. 
This  is  the  impression  given  by  the  evidence  of  his  confidential  advisor,  Ghulam  Abbas,  at  the  King's 
trial  in  1858.  But  then  Ghulam,  who  was  acting  as  the  King's  attorney,  was  trying  to  depict  Bahadur 
Shah  as  an  unwilling  figurehead  of  the  rebellion.  When  the  sowars  of  the  P  L.  C.  first  appeared 
beneath  the  walls  of  the  Royal  palace,  said  Ghulam,  the  King  immediately  informed  Captain  Douglas, 
the  Commandant  of  the  Palace  Guard.  Soon  after  the  King  complied  with  a  request  by  Simon  Fraser, 
the  Commissioner,  to  provide  guns  and  infantry  to  protect  Douglas's  apartments  in  the  palace's  Lahore 
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Gate  and  to  send  palanquins  to  collect  two  European  ladies  who  were  staying  there.  But  they  arrived 
too  late  and  all  the  Europeans  were  massacred.  Then,  as  sowars  from  Meerut,  accompanied  by  two 
companies  of  native  infantry  on  guard  at  the  palace,  marched  into  the  Diwan-i-Khas  (Hall  of  Private 
Audience)  and  told  the  King  that  they  had  mutinied  because  they  had  been  "required  to  bite  cartridges" 
greased  with  beef  and  pork  fat,  and  had  therefore  come  to  Delhi  to  claim  his  protection,  he  is  said  to 
have  replied:  "I  did  not  call  for  you;  you  have  acted  very  wickedly.  "  At  which  point  another  200 
Meerut  mutineers  (this  time  infantry)  arrived  to  tell  the  King  that  "unless  you  join  us,  we  are  all  dead 
men,  and  we  must  in  that  case  just  do  what  we  can  for  ourselves".  Whereupon  the  King  sat  down  and 
"the  soldiery,  officers  and  all,  came  forward  one  by  one,  bowed  their  heads  before  him,  asking  him  to 
place  his  hand  on  them",  which  he  did.  93 
Despite  Ghulam's  partiality  as  a  witness,  it  is  possible  that  the  King  -  however  disaffected  -  was  not 
personally  aware  of  the  plot  to  mutiny  at  Meerut  and  Delhi.  But  some  senior  palace  figures 
undoubtedly  were.  How  else  can  we  explain  the  involvement  of  the  King's  armed  retainers  in  the 
murder  of  Fraser,  Douglas  and  other  Europeans  in  the  Red  Fort  even  before  Bahadur  Shah  had  given 
his  blessing  to  the  mutineers  in  the  Hall  of  Private  Audience?  94  Or  the  despatch  of  a  detachment  of  the 
palace  guard  to  the  city  magazine  between  10  and  IIa.  m.  -  ostensibly  under  orders  from  the  King  -  to 
relieve  the  regular  guard  of  the  38th  N.  I.  and  to  escort  all  the  European  employees  of  the  Ordnance 
Department  to  the  Red  Fort.  When  the  handful  of  Europeans  refused  to  open  the  gates,  the  King's 
guards  brought  scaling  ladders  for  sepoys  of  the  I  Ph  and  20'h  N.  I.  to  use  in  an  attack  which  lasted  more 
than  three  hours.  It  prompted  the  whole  native  establishment  of  the  magazine  to  switch  sides  and  was 
coordinated,  according  to  Lieutenant  Forrest  (one  of  only  three  survivors),  by  a  son  and  grandson  of  the 
King.  The  siege  was  finally  brought  to  a  conclusion  at  3.30  p.  m.  when  the  European  defenders  blew 
up  the  magazine.  95 
In  retrospect,  Forrest  was  convinced  that  the  magazine's  native  employees  were  expecting  an  uprising. 
For  several  days  prior  to  the  outbreak,  he  told  the  King's  trial,  the  employees  had  been  "insolent  and 
overbearing",  particularly  the  Muslims.  On  II  May  itself,  the  senior  natives  and  workmen  had  arrived 
for  work  in  smarter  clothes  than  normal.  It  was  only  after  reaching  the  safety  of  Meerut,  however,  that 
he  heard  a  second-hand  account  that  someone  in  the  magazine  at  Delhi  had  been  sending  circulars  to  all 
92  Examination  of  Capt.  R.  Tytler,  13  Feb  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIIL  p.  209. 
9'  Examination  of  Ghulam  Abbas,  29  Jan  1858,  ibid.,  p.  136-7 
94  Examination  of  Jat  Mal,  3  Feb  1858,  ibid.,  p.  18  1. 219 
the  native  regiments  to  the  effect  that  the  cartridges  prepared  in  the  magazine  had  been  smeared  with  a 
objectionable  fat,  and  that  they  were  not  to  believe  their  European  officers  when  they  denied  it.  Forrest 
suspected  Karim  Baksh,  the  head  of  the  native  establishment,  "an  intelligent  man  and  also  a  good 
scholar,  capable  of  writing  Persian  well".  So  suspicious  was  Baksh's  conduct  during  the  attack  on  the 
magazine  that  the  Commissary  of  Ordnance,  Lieutenant  Willoughby,  ordered  Forrest  to  remove  him 
from  the  gate  and  shoot  him  if  he  returned  to  it.  He  was  later  hanged  "for  his  treacherous  conduct  on 
that  occasion".  '6  If  the  story  about  Baksh  and  the  circulars  is  true,  it  confirms  both  the  involvement  of 
magazine  employees  in  the  plot  to  mutiny  and  the  theory  that  the  cartridge  question  was  being  used  as  a 
pretext  to  incite  mutiny.  For  no  one  knew  better  than  Karim  Baksh  that  Enfield  cartridges  were  never 
manufactured  at  the  Delhi  arsenal.  The  greased  variety  were  only  ever  made  at  the  Fort  William  and 
Meerut  arsenals,  and  not  anywhere  in  India  after  January  1857. 
An  interesting  codicil  to  the  outbreak  at  Meerut  and  Delhi  occurred  in  Ambala.  During  the  morning 
of  10  May,  a  sepoy  from  the  Grenadier  Company  of  the  60'h  N.  I.  was  arrested  for  demanding  to  be 
taken  by  the  orderly  havildar  to  his  company  commander  to  complain  about  the  introduction  of  the  new 
cartridge.  No  sooner  had  news  of  his  confinement  spread  than  200  members  of  his  regiment  assembled 
in  undress  at  the  quarter-guard,  demanding  to  be  placed  alongside  the  prisoner.  They  only  agreed  to 
disperse  when  their  C.  O.,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Drought,  promised  a  thorough  inquiry.  Not  long  after,  in 
a  curious  echo  of  events  at  Meerut,  a  cry  went  up  in  the  60th  lines  and  the  musketry  depot  lines  "that  the 
lancers  and  artillery  were  coming  down  to  cut  up  the  native  infantry  regiments".  At  which  point  men 
from  every  company  broke  into  their  bells-of-arms  and  grabbed  muskets  and  ammunition.  Once  again 
the  commanding  officer's  personal  intervention  calmed  the  situation  and  the  men  eventually  agreed  to 
return  their  weaponS.  97  Drought,  it  will  be  recalled,  had  only  returned  to  the  60th  in  January  after 
nearly  three  years  on  furlough.  But  prior  to  that  he  had  served  with  the  regiment  for  almost  30 
unbroken  years,  seeing  action  at  the  siege  and  capture  of  Bharatpur  and  during  the  latter  stages  of  the  I't 
Afghan  War.  98  He  was  a  familiar  and  experienced  officer  whose  influence  may  well  have  prevented  an 
outbreak  at  Ambala. 
95  Examination  of  Capt.  Forrest,  5  and  6  Feb  1858,  ibid.,  pp.  186-7. 
96  Examination  of  Capt.  Forrest,  6  Feb  1858,  ibid.,  p.  188. 
9"  Brevet  Lt.  -Col.  R.  Drought  to  Major  Ewart,  A.  A.  G.  Sirhind  Div.,  23  March  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859, 
XVIII,  p.  61. 
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Having  read  the  proceedings  of  the  subsequent  court  of  inquiry,  which  probably  sat  on  II  May, 
Drought  ordered  the  release  of  the  prisoner  on  the  ground  that  he  was  a  "mere  tool,  and  that  the  whole 
tumult  on  the  I&_  was  a  preconcerted  plot"  in  which  the  "credulity  of  the  men,  on  the  score  of  caste" 
had  been  "worked  upon  by  traitors  to  the  State".  According  to  Private  Potiphar  of  H.  M.  's  9h  Lancers, 
the  conspiracy  had  even  spread  to  their  syces  (native  grooms).  Coordinated  by  a  senior  syce  known  as 
a  jemadar,  the  plan  was  to  hamstring  the  lancers'  horses  so  they  would  not  be  able  to  act  against  the 
mutinous  sepoys.  But  the  plot  was  given  away  by  a  low-caste  syce  and  the  jemadar  was  arrested  on  10 
May.  Among  his  papers,  wrote  Potiphar,  "letters  were  found  which  proved  that  he  had  been  holding 
correspondence  with  many  of  the  regiments  who  afterwards  mutined".  He  was  tried,  found  guilty  and 
hanged.  The  otherjemadars  were  discharged.  99 
Drought  was  later  accused  by  Sir  Henry  Barnard,  commanding  the  Sirhind  Division,  of  covering  up 
the  mutinous  acts  of  his  men  and  superseded  in  command  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Seaton  (formerly  of 
the  35h  N.  I.  ),  but  not  before  fresh  attempts  were  made  to  provoke  the  regiment  to  mutiny.  At  sunset  on 
12  May,  the  officer  of  the  day  was  warned  by  the  native  officer  commanding  the  quarter-guard  that  the 
sepoys  intended  to  rise  at  10  p.  m.  and  murder  all  their  officers.  Nothing  occurred  that  night,  but  the 
following  evening  "some  evil-diposed  person"  again  started  a  panic  in  the  lines  of  the  61Yh  by  spreading 
a  report  that  the  European  troops  were  on  their  way.  For  the  third  time  Drought  managed  to  defuse  the 
situation,  this  time  by  allowing  each  company  to  furnish  a  picket  of  10  men  under  a  European  officer. 
The  next  day  -  the  last  of  Drought's  independent  command  -  fragments  of  anonymous  letters  in  the 
"Persian  and  Nagtee  character"  were  found  on  the  60%  parade  ground.  On  the  morning  of  10  June,  the 
day  the  regiment  finally  mutinied  at  Rohtak  near  Delhi,  a  number  of  men  received  similar  letters 
written  in  Persian.  Drought  is  convinced  that  these  letters  precipitated  the  mutiny.  100 
This  sequence  of  events  concerning  the  60th  N.  I.  is  revealing  in  a  number  of  ways.  The  attempted 
rising  on  the  I  Oh,  for  example,  bears  an  uncanny  resemblance  to  the  simultaneous  outbreak  at  Meerut  in 
that  both  were  the  result  of  a  conspiracy  to  take  advantage  of  the  cartridge  question,  and  both  were  set 
off  by  the  same  lie  that  European  troops  were  approaching.  Also  the  decision  to  incite  the  first  up- 
country  mutinies  in  stations  that  contained  a  sizeable  European  garrison  may  have  been  deliberate: 
partly  because  the  presence  of  European  troops  made  it  easier  to  promote  a  climate  of  fear  and  panic; 
and  partly  because  the  Europeans  would  be  harder  to  catch  off  guard  once  the  uprising  had  begun.  This 
99  T/S  Account  of  Mutiny,  Potiphar  Papers,  NAM,  7201-45-2,  pp.  5-6. 221 
is  how  it  proved  in  the  Punjab,  where  the  majority  of  European  troops  were  stationed,  and  where  the 
authorities  took  pre-emptive  action  to  disarm  a  number  of  disaffected  regiments  in  the  fortnight  or  so 
after  the  outbreak  at  Meerut.  The  only  circumstantial  evidence  that  links  the  events  at  Meerut  and 
Ambala,  however,  is  Major  Williams'claim  that  the  mysteriousfaqir  had  recently  been  present  in  both 
stations. 
So  why  did  the  rising  at  Ambala  not  develop  into  the  full-blown  mutiny  that  was  witnessed  at 
Meerut?  One  possible  answer  is  that  the  5h,  the  other  native  regiment  at  Ambala,  was  not  sufficiently 
disaffected  to  be  included  in  the  plot.  But  we  know  from  Major  Maitland,  the  commanding  officer  of 
the  5',  that  his  regiment  contained  a  cabal  that  was  fiercely  opposed  to  the  new  cartridges.  Gimlette  is 
convinced  that  the  5th  was  in  on  the  plot  to  mutiny  on  10  May,  and  its  sepoys  also  broke  into  their  bells- 
of-arms,  though  Maitland  makes  no  mention  of  this  in  his  official  report.  He  does  state,  however,  that 
the  51h  displayed  so  mutinous  a  disposition  at  Ambala  on  18  May  that  it  was  broken  up  into  small 
detachments.  "'  This  failed  to  remove  the  bad  feeling  and  two  companies  subsequently  mutinied,  two 
were  disbanded  and  the  rest  were  disarmed.  In  other  words,  the  5h  did  contain  enough  disgruntled 
sepoys  to  make  it  a  willing  participant  in  the  attempted  mutiny  of  10  May.  Could  it  be,  then,  that  the 
conspirators  in  the  5th  N.  I.  were  waiting  to  follow  the  6&  N.  I.  's  lead,  just  as  the  I  I'h  N.  I.  and  Yd  L.  C. 
responded  to  the  2&  N.  Vs  promptings  at  Meerut?  If  so,  then  the  reason  why  the  sepoys  of  the  60'  N.  I. 
would  not  cross  the  Rubicon  by  killing  Europeans  -  as  the  2e  N.  I.  did  -  may  explain  why  the  rising 
failed  at  Ambala  and  succeeded  at  Meerut.  And  the  answer  to  that  question  may  lie  in  the  identity  of 
the  respective  commanding  officers.  Drought,  as  already  stated,  was  a  familiar  figure  in  his  regiment. 
Maitland,  on  the  other  hand,  only  joined  the  50'N.  I.  as  a  captain  in  1842  and  spent  most  of  the  next  15 
years  on  detachment  to  the  Gwalior  Contingent.  102  If  the  5h  had  taken  the  lead  on  10  May,  the  outcome 
may  well  have  been  different. 
At  Meerut,  the  experienced  colonel  of  the  20'h  N.  I.  was  absent  on  10  May  (possibly  on  sick  leave), 
and  a  relatively  junior  officer,  Captain  Taylor,  was  in  temporary  command.  103  Though  Taylor  had 
served  with  the  regiment  for  18  years,  seeing  action  in  the  I"  Afghan  War  and  against  the  Afiidi 
"0  Drought  to  Ewart,  23  March  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIII,  pp.  61-2. 
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tribesmen  in  1853,  he  may  not  have  commanded  the  same  respect  as  a  more  senior  officer.  It  is 
probably  no  coincidence  that  the  other  two  native  infantry  regiments  in  the  temporary  command  of 
captains  -  the  28  th  and  29h  -  both  mutinied  in  1857.  The  least  disaffected  regiment  at  Meerut  the  I  Ith 
N.  I.,  was  commanded  by  a  colonel,  Finnis,  who  had  only  joined  the  regiment  in  June  1856.  But  like 
Kennedy  of  the  7&  and  Sherer  of  the  73  rd,  Finnis  had  extra-regimental  experience  (with  the  Public 
Works  Department)  which  may  have  stood  him  in  good  stead.  104  He  was  killed  on  10  May  by  sepoys 
of  the  20'h  N.  I.,  as  was  Captain  Macdonald,  one  of  their  own  officers.  105  The  remaining  native  regiment 
at  Meerut  -  the  3d  L.  C.  -  was  commanded  by  Colonel  Carmichael-Smyth  who,  though  experienced,  was 
not  popular  with  his  men.  Referring  to  the  skirmishers'  refusal  to  accept  blank  cartridges  on  24  April, 
Comet  MacNabb  noted  that  the  men  "hate  Smyth"  and  "if  almost  any  other  officer  had  gone  down  they 
would  have  fired  them  off'.  MacNabb  added  that  the  adjutant,  Lieutenant  Clarke,  was  "always  severe 
tothemen".  106  Clarke  was  just  22  and  had  only  been  with  the  regiment  for  four  years  (three  months  as 
adjutant).  This  combination  of  an  unpopular  commanding  officer  and  a  young,  inexperienced  and 
overbearing  adjutant  made  it  much  less  likely  that  the  majority  of  the  P  L.  C.  would  remain  loyal  in 
1857. 
After  the  suppression  of  the  mutiny,  James  Cracroft  Wilson,  the  former  Judge  of  Moradabad,  was 
appointed  a  Special  Commissioner  to  punish  guilty  and  reward  deserving  natives.  The  evidence  he 
collected,  he  said,  was  proof  that  "Sunday,  31"  of  May,  1857,  was  the  day  fixed  for  mutiny  to 
commence  throughout  the  Bengal  Army;  that  there  were  committees  of  about  three  members  in  each 
regiment,  which  conducted  the  duties  of  the  mutiny;  that  the  sepoys,  as  a  body,  knew  nothing  of  the 
plans  arranged;  and  that  the  only  compact  entered  into  by  regiments,  as  a  body,  was,  that  their  particular 
regiments  would  do  as  the  other  regiments  did".  107 
However  Major  G.  W.  Williams,  Cracroft  Wilson!  s  fellow  Special  Commissioner,  did  not  agree.  it 
was  only  afler  the  outbreak  at  Meerut,  he  wrote,  that  "corps  after  corps  caught  the  infection,  excited  and 
encouraged  by  the  uncontradicted  boast  of  the  extermination  of  all  Europeans,  and  the  overthrow  of  the 
British  rule"  by  the  native  troops  at  Meerut  and  Delhi.  Even  when  the  boast  proved  hollow,  they  were 
"still  lured  on  by  the  glowing  accounts  of  unbounded  wealth  obtained  from  the  plunder  of  Europeans 
104  Service  Records,  Hodson  Index,  NAM. 
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and  Government  treasuries,  and  the  honors  and  promotions  expected  from  a  rebel  King".  Many  also 
believed  the  rumours,  "kept  alive  by  evil  and  designing  men",  that  their  religion  was  in  danger.  If  any 
such  plot  for  a  general  mutiny  had  existed,  Williams  concluded,  the  Meerut  troops  "were  indeed  rash 
and  insane  to  mar  the  whole".  108 
The  truth  probably  lies  midway  between  these  two  theories.  Cracroft  Wilson  omitted  to  specify  the 
evidence  from  which  he  drew  his  conclusion.  But  his  point  about  secret  committees  coordinating  the 
uprising  is  supported  by  much  of  the  documentation  already  cited  in  this  chapter.  For  security  reasons 
alone,  those  made  party  to  such  a  plot  would  necessarily  have  been  few  in  number.  Williams,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  surely  right  in  his  assessment  of  the  motives  that  drove  many  sepoys  to  mutiny.  If  the 
two  theories  are  combined,  we  are  left  with  a  loose  network  of  conspirators  who  were  prepared  to  incite 
mutiny  as  and  when  the  occasion  presented  itself.  Their  success  would  depend  upon  a  number  of 
variables:  the  closeness  of  the  relationship  between  the  native  troops  and  their  European  officers 
(particularly  the  commanding  officer);  the  presence  of  other  European  troops;  the  proximity  to 
unguarded  treasure  and  other  regiments  that  had  already  mutinied;  and,  of  course,  the  number  of  sepoys 
prepared  to  believe  (or  appear  to  believe)  that  their  religion  and  caste  were  in  danger.  Given  that  most 
soldiers  were  in  the  dark,  however,  the  conspirators  would  not  have  been  foolish  enough  to  imagine  that 
they  could  coordinate  a  general  mutiny  on  a  single  day. 
But  to  understand  why  the  cartridge  question  was  manipulated  to  provide  a  pretext  for  mutiny,  we 
need  to  identify  the  aspirations  of  the  army  ringleaders  themselves.  They  were,  by  definition, 
ambitious  men.  They  were  drawn  from  a  complete  cross-section  of  army  ranks  -  including  native 
officers  who  were  close  to  receiving  their  pensions  and  therefore  had  the  most  to  lose  -  and  were 
probably  united  by  a  shared  exasperation  with  the  limitations  of  Company  service.  Their  pre-mutiny 
links  to  the  courts  of  disaffected  princes  like  the  ex-King  of  Oudh  and  the  King  of  Delhi  are  surely 
indicative  of  an  aim  that  was  both  political  and  professional:  the  replacement  of  their  British  employers 
with  a  native  government  that  would  provide  greater  career  opportunities  and  increased  pay. 
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Chapter  Eight  -  Mutiny:  The  Pattern  of  Rebellion 
Much  can  be  learned  about  the  nature  of  1857  by  studying  the  pattern  of  mutiny  after  the  outbreak  at 
Meerut.  How,  when  and  where  did  the  various  regiments  revolt?  What  proportion  of  their  numbers 
became  active  mutineers,  remained  loyal  or  returned  to  their  homes?  Who  were  the  chief  instigators 
and  did  they  take  command  of  the  mutinous  regiments?  Did  the  mutineers  retain  their  regimental 
discipline  or  become  a  disorganised  rabble?  What  were  the  mutineers  hoping  to  achieve?  In  an  attempt 
to  answer  these  questions,  this  chapter  will  first  chart  the  spread  of  mutiny  to  its  high  point  in  June 
before  moving  on  to  specific  themes.  The  narrative  section  will  consider,  in  particular,  the  possible  link 
between  a  commanding  officer's  record  of  service  and  the  willingness  of  his  regiment  to  mutiny. 
if  the  post-Meerut  mutinies  were  solely  about  "contagion",  as  Mukherjee  has  suggested,  '  then  a 
gradual  spread  outwards  from  Delhi  would  be  expected.  To  some  extent  this  happened.  But  the 
disarmament  of  regiments  about  to  mutiny  also  needs  to  be  taken  into  account.  In  May,  most  of  these 
incidents  took  place  in  the  Punjab,  hundreds  of  miles  from  Delhi,  where  the  majority  of  European 
troops  were  stationed.  2  They  provide  ftirther  evidence  of  a  widespread  conspiracy  and  indicate  a  desire 
to  strike  before  the  Europeans  could  recover  from  the  shock  of  Meerut  and  Delhi  by  securing  key 
strategic  points  such  as  Lahore  Fort,  the  Ferozepore  magazine  and  the  Attock  Ferry. 
Thanks  to  the  actions  of  two  young  telegraph  signallers  at  Delhi,  fragmentary  news  of  the  outbreak 
reached  Ambala  on  II  May.  3  From  there  it  was  flashed  to  Lahore,  the  capital  of  the  Punjab,  and  on  to 
the  main  stations  in  the  province.  A  rider  was  also  sent  to  inform  General  Anson,  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  who  was  at  Simla  in  the  hills.  Brigadier  Corbett,  commanding  at  Lahore,  received  the  telegram 
from  Ambala  on  the  morning  of  12  May.  Around  the  same  time,  the  cantonment  Joint  Magistrate 
passed  on  information  from  his  spies  that  the  four  native  regiments  at  Lahore  -  the  10h,  26th  and  49th 
1  Mukherjee,  Awadh  in  Revolt,  p.  65. 
2  In  1852  the  Indian  garrison  included  29  Queen's  regiments.  This  total  was  reduced  by  three  during  the 
Crimean  War,  with  only  one  added  by  the  outbreak  of  the  mutiny.  There  were,  therefore,  27  Queen's 
regiments  (4  cavalry  and  23  infantry)  assigned  to  India  in  May  1857:  18  to  Bengal,  5  to  Bombay  and  4 
to  Madras.  Each  presidency  had,  in  addition,  three  regiments  of  Company  European  infantry.  But 
three  of  Bombay's  European  regiments  were  serving  in  Persia,  while  two  of  Bengal's  and  one  of 
Madras's  were  stationed  in  Burma.  As  a  result,  the  Bengal  presidency  had  only  19  European  regiments 
(2  of  H.  Ms  cavalry,  14  of  H.  M.  's  infantry  and  3  of  Company  infantry)  located  within  its  territory:  12  of 
whom  were  in  the  Punjab  and  the  neighbouring  Cis-Sutlej  region. 225 
N.  I.  and  the  8t"  L.  C.  -  intended  to  mutiny  and  seize  the  fort  on  15  May  when  the  monthly  relief  took 
place  and  1,100  armed  soldiers  would  have  been  present.  Corbett  decided  to  take  no  chances  and 
4 
disarm  all  four  corps.  He  was  supported  by  Robert  Montgomery,  the  Judicial  Commissioner  of  the 
Punjab,  who  was  the  senior  civil  officer  present  in  Lahore.  5  Policed  by  H.  M.  8lt  Foot  two  troops  of 
Bengal  European  horse  artillery  and  four  companies  of  Bengal  European  foot  artillery  without  cannon, 
the  disarmament  parade  passed  without  incident  on  the  morning  of  13  May.  The  disaffection  of  the 
Lahore  brigade,  however,  was  not  in  doubt.  On  14  May,  a  plot  by  the  disarmed  regiments  to  secure  the 
Ferozepore  magazine,  45  miles  to  the  south,  was  also  foiled  by  intelligence  from  spies,  though  a 
number  did  desert.  Finally,  on  30  July,  the  majority  of  the  2eN.  I.  mutinied,  butchering  their  C.  O., 
Major  Spencer,  the  European  quartermaster-sergeant,  and  a  subedar  and  havildar-major  who  tried  to 
intervene.  The  other  regiments  are  also  said  to  have  intended  rising  at  the  signal  of  the  midday  gun,  but 
the  plan  was  disrupted  by  Spencer's  murder.  Of  the  600  sepoys  who  fled  the  cantonments  at  Man  Mir, 
500  were  subsequently  drowned,  killed  fighting  mounted  police  and  villagers,  or  executed.  They  were 
mainly  Oudh  men  who  had  earlier  been  separated  from  140  of  their  comrades,  Bhojpore  Brahmins  from 
Behar  province,  because  the  latter  were  thought  to  be  more  loyal.  The  same  segregation  had  been 
applied  to  the  other  two  native  infantry  regiments.  In  the  event,  the  Bhojpore  men  were  not  involved  in 
6 
the  conspiracy  and  survived. 
With  Lieutenant-Colonel  Evans  on  sick  leave,  Spencer  was  in  temporary  command  in  the  summer  of 
1857.  Apart  from  a  brief  spell  as  cantonment  magistrate  in  the  early  1850s,  he  had  served  with  the  26th 
for  all  of  his  28-year  career,  seeing  action  in  the  I"  Afghan  and  I"  Sikh  Wars  (the  regiment  so 
distinguished  itself  during  the  former  campaign  that  it  was  made  into  an  61ite  light  infantry  corpS).  7  IES 
murder,  therefore,  is  particularly  puzzling.  He  may  have  been  unpopular  (like  Carmichael-Smyth),  or 
he  may  simply  have  been  in  the  wrong  place  at  the  wrong  time. 
The  existence  of  a  plot  for  combined  action  between  the  native  regiments  at  Lahore  and  Ferozepore, 
the  largest  arsenal  in  upper  India,  is  implied  by  the  behaviour  of  45'h  and  57'h  N.  I.  at  the  latter  station  on 
13  and  14  May.  On  the  13th,  as  the  57th  N.  I.  was  being  replaced  as  the  magazine  guard  by  H.  M.  61" 
3  P.  V.  Luke,  Uow  the  Electric  Telegraph  Saved  India',  Vibart,  Yhe  Sepoy  Mutiny,  pp.  250-67. 
4  Statement  by  Brig.  S.  Corbett,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIII,  p.  48. 
5  Sir  John  Lawrence,  the  Chief  Commissioner,  was  en  route  to  join  his  family  in  the  Murree  hills  and 
had  reached  Rawalpindi  when  he  received  news  of  the  outbreak. 
6  Statement  by  Brig.  S.  Corbett,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIU,  p.  48;  Off.  Sec.  to  the  Chief  Comm.  of  the 
Punjab  to  the  Sec.  to  the  Govt.  of  India,  3  Aug  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857-8,  XLIV,  pp.  303-4. 
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Foot,  the  majority  of  the  45h's  sepoys  -  led  by  the  grenadiers  -  mutinied  and  burnt  much  of  the 
cantonment.  The  following  day,  as  the  remnants  of  the  45h  N.  I.  and  the  whole  of  the  57h  N.  I.  were 
being  disarmed,  almost  300  of  the  latter  corps  fled.  8  The  I&  L.  C.,  the  other  native  corps  at  Ferozepore, 
is  said  to  have  behaved  well  at  this  time,  even  helping  to  capture  some  of  the  mutineers.  It  was 
disarmed  as  a  precaution  on  10  July  but  resented  having  its  horses  requisitioned  for  the  Delhi  Field 
Force.  Two  hundred  sowars  finally  mutinied  on  19  August,  killing  their  veterinary  surgeon  and  two 
European  gunners  in  the  process.  9  Members  of  all  three  regiments  joined  the  rebels  at  Delhi.  10 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Liptrap  had  only  been  in  command  of  the  45  th 
.  the  most  disaffected  regiment  at 
Ferozepore,  since  1856.  Most  of  his  service  had  been  with  the  42nd  N.  I.  with  whom  he  had  seen  action 
in  the  I"  Burma  War,  the  I"  Afghan  War  and  the  Sonthal  Revolt  of  1855.  He  was,  at  61,  the 
oldest  regimental  commander  in  the  Bengal  Army.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Darvall  of  the  570'N.  I.,  on  the 
other  hand,  was  50  and  had  served  with  the  regiment  for  most  of  his  career.  Major  MacDonell,  the  48- 
year-old  commander  of  the  I&  L.  C.,  boasted  a  similar  record  -  including  active  service  in  the  Vt 
Afghan  War,  the  Gwalior  campaign  and  the  Vd  Sikh  War  -  and  it  may  have  been  due  to  his  influence 
that  the  regiment  did  not  mutiny  on  13  May. 
The  next  rising  was,  once  again,  at  Meerut.  After  the  initital  mutiny,  six  companies  of  Bengal 
Sappers  &  Miners  were  ordered  down  from  their  headquarters  at  Rurki  to  stiffen  the  force  that  was 
planning  to  march  on  Delhi.  On  16  May,  despite  the  presence  of  so  many  European  troops,  four 
companies  mutinied,  killing  their  commandant,  Captain  Fraser,  and  the  havildar-major.  The  ostensible 
cause  was  Fraser's  insistence  that  their  ammunition  be  kept  under  lock  and  key.  Pursued  by  Carabiniers 
and  horse  artillery,  56  sappers  were  killed  and  280  escaped.  The  other  two  companies,  on  duty  at  the 
time,  were  disarmed  but  continued  to  work.  Two  days  later,  the  two  companies  left  behind  at  Rurki 
also  mutinied.  " 
On  20  May,  four  companies  of  the  9h  N.  I.  rose  at  the  small  town  of  Aligarh,  between  Delhi  and  Agra. 
According  to  one  European  witness,  the  news  of  the  mutinies  at  Delhi  and  Meerut  had  caused  an 
"immense  sensation"  in  the  area  and  during  the  night  of  17  May  a  vacant  European  bungalow  was  burnt 
8  Return  of  45  th  N.  I.,  3  March  1858  and  Return  of  the  57h  N.  I.  by  Lt.  Col.  Darwall,  3  March  1858,  P.  P., 
H.  C.,  XVIIL  pp.  49-50. 
9  D.  F.  MacLeod  to  B.  Frere,  15  May  1857,  Elphinstone  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F87/Box  6B/8/1; 
Gimlette,  A  Postscript  to  the  Records  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  pp.  69-70. 
"  Off.  Sec.  to  the  Chief  Comm.  of  the  Punjab  to  the  Sec.  to  the  Govt.  of  India,  27  Aug  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C., 
1857-8,  XLIV,  p.  307. 227 
to  the  ground.  Two  days  later,  four  sepoys  of  the  96'were  attending  a  wedding  at  a  village  near  Aligarh 
when  they  heard  a  local  Brahmin  zemindar  (landholder)  boast  that  he  was  responsible  for  the  attack  and 
that  worse  was  in  store.  They  reported  this  and  a  trap  was  laid.  The  following  day,  as  the  zemindar 
was  in  the  process  of  telling  a  native  N.  C.  O.  that  he  would  provide  two  thousand  men  to  assist  in 
murdering  the  Europeans  and  plundering  the  treasury  if  the  regiment  could  be  induced  to  mutiny,  he 
was  arrested  by  sepoys  hidden  nearby.  A  native  court-martial  found  him  guilty  of  rebellion  and  his 
execution  was  fixed  for  that  evening.  But  during  the  parade  to  witness  his  hanging,  one  sepoy  incited 
the  others  to  mutiny  with  the  words:  "Behold  a  martyr  to  our  religion.  "  12  The  military  and  civil 
officers,  however,  were  allowed  to  escape  with  their  lives.  It  may  be  significant  that  the  9'b's  temporary 
commanding  officer,  48-year-old  Major  Eld,  had  spent  much  of  his  career  on  detached  duties  in  Assam 
and  Manipur,  though  he  had  been  present  for  most  of  the  previous  seven  years.  13  As  the  news  of  the 
Aligarh  rising  spread  through  the  Agra  region,  the  other  detachments  of  the  9th  N.  I.  rose  in  sympathy. 
Only  a  week  earlier,  however,  members  of  the  two  companies  at  Etawah  killed  four  and  captured  two 
mutineers  from  the  Yd  L.  C.  who  were  trying  to  resist  arrest.  14  Such  contradictory  behaviour  was 
repeated  all  over  India  and  suggests  an  ongoing  power  struggle  in  most  regiments  between  the 
disaffected  and  those  who  preferred  to  remain  true  to  their  salt.  Even  a  portion  -  between  60  and  70  -  of 
those  most  violent  of  mutineers,  the  Yd  L.  C.,  had  stayed  loyal  on  10  May. 
Meanwhile,  sepoys  at  Peshawur  in  the  North-West  Frontier  Province  were  plotting  a  mutiny.  On  18 
May,  conspirators  in  the  5  I't  N.  I.  sent  a  letter  to  the  respective  headquarters  of  the  64th  N.  I.  and  Kelat-i- 
Ghilzie  Regiment  (a  corps  of  irregular  infantry)  at  nearby  Fort  Shubkudr  in  the  Khyber  Pass.  It  stated 
that  it  came  from  the  whole  Peshawur  cantonment  and  informed  the  two  regiments  that  cartridges 
would  havetobebittenon22May.  "Obrotherl"  it  continued.  "The  religion  ofHindoos  and 
Mahommedansisallone.  Therefore  all  you  soldiers  should  know  this.  Here  all  the  sepoys  are  atthe 
biding  of  the  Jemadar,  Soobadar,  Buhadoor,  and  Havildar  Major.  All  are  discontented  with  this 
"Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  I,  pp.  253-4,256-7;  Gimlette,  A  Postscript  to  the  Records  of  the  Indian 
Mutiny,  pp.  28-9. 
12  Yhe  BengalHurkaru  andIndia  Gazette,  12  March  1858;  Return  by  Major  Percy  Eld,  91h  N.  I.,  P.  P., 
H.  C.,  XVIIL  p.  53;  Kantzow  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/Photo.  Eur.  86,  vol.  1,  p.  10. 
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14  Narrative  by  Allan  Hume,  Magistrate  at  Etawah,  18  Nov  1858,  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom 
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business,  whether  small  or  great.  What  more  need  be  written?  Do  as  you  think  best.  "  A  postscript  in  a 
different  hand  urged  the  regiments  to  march  into  Peshawur  on  the  21'.  15 
The  bearer  of  the  letter,  a  Brahmin  priest,  handed  it  to  a  sepoy  of  the  64  th  N.  I.  He  probably  gave  it  to 
his  subedar-major  (to  whom  it  was  principally  addressed)  and  it  was  eventually  turned  over  to  the 
commanding  officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Garrett.  Herbert  Edwardes,  the  Commissioner  of  Peshawur, 
was  particularly  surprised  by  this  act  of  loyalty  because  the  seizure  of  other  mutinous  correspondence 
between  Muslim  "bigots"  at  Patna  and  a  naik  and  sepoys  of  the  64h  N.  I.  had  convinced  him  that  the 
regiment  was  disaffected.  These  letters  had  also  alluded  to  a  lengthy  correspondence  between  the  same 
native  soldiers  and  "Hindoostanee  fanatics  in  Swat  and  Sitana".  The  letter  from  the  51'tN.  I.  was  given 
up  by  the  64h  N.  I.  not  because  the  latter  was  innocent,  Edwardes  concluded,  but  because  it  would  have 
been  impossible  for  its  three  detachments  "to  collect  and  act  together  without  the  co-operation  of  the 
Kelat-i-Ghilzie  Regiment  which  was  similar  placed  in  the  same  outposts".  The  latter  regiment,  wrote 
Edwardes,  had  probably  made  it  clear  it  would  not  cooperate  and  so  the  64h  had  given  up  the  letter  to 
"gain  a  name  of  loyalty  for  themselves".  The  other  possibility,  of  course,  is  that  the  letter  was  handed 
to  members  of  the  regiment  who  were  neither  part  of  the  conspiracy  nor  sufficiently  disaffected  to  keep 
it  secret.  Edwardes  believed  that  the  letter  proved  "beyond  a  doubt  that  whatever  moved  the 
Mahommedans,  the  Hindoos  were  moved  by  the  cartridges".  16  He  is  right  in  the  sense  that  the  ma  ority  j 
were  being  manipulated  by  the  minority.  For  the  conspirators  at  Peshawur  knew  only  too  well  that 
cartridges  would  not  have  to  be  "bitten"  on  22  May;  17  for  the  rising  to  succeed,  however,  a  religious 
cause  that  embraced  both  faiths  was  essential. 
As  a  result  of  this  letter  (and  the  other  intercepted  correspondence),  most  of  the  native  corps  in  and 
around  Peshawur  -  the  24'h,  27thl  5  1"  and  64th  N.  I.  and  50'L.  C.  -  were  disarmed  on  22  May.  The 
exception  was  the  21r"  N.  I.  which  Brigadier  Cotton,  the  acting  divisional  commander,  believed  to  be 
loyal.  It  repaid  his  faith  by  becoming  one  of  only  two  traditionally-recruited  regiments  of  Bengal 
Native  Infantry  to  retain  its  arms  throughout  the  mutiny.  The  other  corps,  the  3  1"  N.  I.,  was  not  wholly 
beyond  reproach  in  that  one  of  its  detached  companies  mutinied  in  June.  Both  regiments  were 
commanded  by  familiar  and  relatively  young  offlicers:  Major  Milne  was  45  and,  other  than  a  spell  in  the 
15  An  Intercepted  Letter  from  Peshawur  (translation  by  Herbert  Edwardes,  30  May  1857),  NAK  5504- 
63. 
16  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Siniggle,  L  pp.  3534. 
17  Since  the  introduction  of  the  new  firing  drill  in  early  April  1857,  all  cartridges  had  been  tom  with  the 
hand  rather  than  bitten.  (See  p.  182). 229 
Commissariat  Department,  had  spent  most  of  his  career  with  the  21";  Major  Hampton,  one  year  older, 
had  been  with  the  regiment  for  27  years  and  seen  action  in  five  campaigns.  Even  more  important, 
perhaps,  was  the  fact  that  -  as  mentioned  in  Chapter  Three  -  both  had  native  family  ties:  Milne  was 
married  to  a  Eurasian;  Hampton  had  two  Eurasian  daughters.  's 
A  few  days  afler  the  disarmament  at  Peshawur,  when  it  became  clear  that  their  treasonable 
correspondence  had  been  intercepted,  the  subedar-major  and  250  men  of  the  51t  N.  I.  fled  into  the 
mountains.  Many  were  returned  by  Pathan  tribesmen,  including  the  subedar-major  who  was  hanged  on 
29  May.  But  the  plotting  continued  and  on  28  August,  as  their  lines  were  being  searched  for  arms,  the 
men  of  the  5  I't  rose,  killed  and  wounded  more  than  50  members  of  H.  M.  701b  Foot  and  headed  for  the 
surrounding  jungle.  More  than  700  were  recaptured  and  summarily  executed.  But  they  were  not  alone 
in  their  plans  to  rise.  Arms  and  ammunition,  recorded  General  Cotton,  were  found  concealed  in  the 
roofs  and  walls  of  every  one  of  the  disarmed  regiments.  19  But  only  one  actually  mutinied  -  the  51"N.  I. 
-  and  its  commander,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cooper,  had  been  with  it  forjust  a  year.  Garrett  of  the  64h 
N.  I.  -  the  next  most  disaffected  regiment  -  had  known  his  men  for  barely  18  months,  The  other 
commanding  officers  -  Lieutenant-Colonel  Harington  of  the  5h  L.  C.,  Major  Shakespear  of  the  24th  N.  I. 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Plumbe  of  the  27"'  N.  I.  -  had  spent  most  of  their  careers  with  their  corps.  20 
This  may  have  prevented  the  conspirators  in  their  regiments  from  gaining  enough  adherents  to  risk  an 
armed  rising. 
one  mutiny  which  did  occur  in  the  Peshawur  district  in  May  involved  the  55,  h  N.  I.  A  detachment  of 
the  regiment  was  based  at  Nowshera,  south-east  of  Peshawur,  with  a  sub-unit  guarding  the  Indus 
crossing  at  Attock.  On  21  May,  as  the  guard  was  being  replaced  by  men  from  the  5  th  Punjab  I.  I.,  it 
loaded  its  weapons  and  marched  off  to  Nowshera  where  it  was  apprehended  by  Major  Verner  and 
sowars  of  the  10th  I.  C.  But  when  the  rest  of  the  detachment  heard  about  the  arrests,  they  mutinied,  fired 
on  the  sowars  and  released  their  comrades.  Verner  ordered  his  men  to  oppose  the  mutineers  but  they 
refused.  Next  day  the  detachment  of  the  55h  N.  I.  crossed  the  Kabul  river  and  headed  north  to  rejoin  the 
main  body  of  the  regiment  in  the  fort  at  Hoti  Murdan.  On  the  night  of  24/25  May,  with  most  of  the 
regiment  up  in  arms  and  the  European  officers  under  house  arrest,  the  commanding  officer,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Spottiswoode,  shot  himself  in  despair.  Meanwhile  a  column  of  European  troops  had  been 
18  Service  Records,  Hodson  Index,  NAM. 
19  Rogers  Papers,  NAM,  7310-57;  Gimlette,  A  Postscript  to  the  Records  of  the  IndianMufiny,  pp,  163- 
5;  Return  by  Maj.  -Gen.  S.  Cotton,  19  April  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVM,  pp.  50-1. 230 
despatched  from  Peshawur.  As  it  approached  the  fort  at  daybreak  on  the  25  th 
.  the  mutineers  fled 
towards  the  Swat  hills  with  as  much  treasure  and  ammunition  as  they  could  carry.  Only  a  handful 
survived,  including  some  Hindu  sepoys  who  -  ironically  given  their  alleged  reason  for  rebelling  -  were 
forced  to  convert  to  Islam  by  Kohistan  tribesmen.  One  hundred  and  forty-three  native  officers,  N.  C.  O.  s 
and  sepoys  stayed  with  their  officers  on  25  May:  the  eight  Sikhs  among  them  joined  the  newly-raised 
16'h  Punjab  I.  I.;  the  remaining  soldiers  were  posted  to  the  51"N.  I.  and  shared  its  fate 
. 
21  S  pottiswoode, 
it  should  be  added,  was  a  former  adjutant  of  the  21"  N.  I.  and  had  been  with  the  55dforjust  two  years.  22 
For  its  failure  to  act  against  the  sepoys  of  the  55h  N.  I.  at  Nowshera  and  after  they  fled  from  Hoti 
Mardan  on  25  May,  the  I&  I.  C.  came  under  considerable  suspicion.  These  doubts  were  confirmed  in 
June  when  the  civil  authorities  discovered  a  "treasonable  correspondence  between  the  regiment  and  the 
King  of  Delhi,  the  Chief  of  Swat  country  and  the  inhabitants  of  the  City  of  Peshawar".  On  26  June,  the 
two  wings  of  the  regiment  were  disbanded  simultaneously  at  Nowshera  and  Peshawur.  23  Just  over  two 
months  later,  however,  a  ressaidar  and  50  sowars  of  the  10th  I.  C.  arrived  in  Delhi  and  offered  their 
services  to  Bahadur  Shah.  The  ressaldar  also  proposed  calling  in  the  rest  of  the  regiment  from  their 
homes  in  the  surrounding  area,  though  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  did.  His  motive,  he  declared,  was  to 
defend  the  faith  and  protect  the  King's  throne.  But  the  question  of  money  was  also  raised,  albeit 
obliquely,  when  the  ressaldar  mentioned  that  he  and  his  men  had  been  forced  to  abandon  all  their 
property,  money  and  arrears  of  pay.  24  Their  genuine  aims,  therefore,  were  probably  twofold:  to  see  the 
restoration  of  the  Mughal  empire  and  to  join  a  service  which  offered  higher  pay  and  greater  career 
opportunities  than  the  British.  Given  their  alleged  correspondence  with  Bahadur  Shah,  they  had  surely 
seen  a  copy  of  the  proclamation  issued  in  his  name  shortly  after  the  mutiny  at  Delhi,  promising  double 
pay  to  all  Company  soldiers  who  murdered  their  officers  and  transferred  their  allegiance  to  hiM.  25 
Their  commanding  officer,  Major  Vemer,  had  been  with  the  I  oth  I.  C.  -  and  its  predecessor,  the 
Cavalry  of  the  Bundelkhand  Legion  -  since  1840,  longer  than  any  other  commandant  of  irregular 
cavalry.  During  that  time  he  and  his  men  had  served  in  three  campaigns,  including  the  Vt  Sikh  War. 
At  first  sight,  therefore,  it  is  surprising  that  that  such  a  familiar  officer  was  not  able  to  stem  the  spread 
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of  disaffection  in  his  regiment.  On  the  other  hand,  it  may  have  been  his  influence  that  prevented  his 
sowars  from  openly  siding  with  the  55dN.  I.  in  May  1857. 
Nasirabad  in  Rajputana,  300  miles  to  the  south-west  of  Delhi,  was  the  scene  of  the  next  mutiny.  The 
garrison  was  made  up  of  the  15'h  and  30'h  N.  I.,  a  battery  of  native  foot  artillery  and  the  I't  Bombay 
Lancers.  On  18  May,  the  commanding  officer  of  the  15"'  N.  I.  received  information  from  two  sources 
that  some  of  his  sepoys  were  holding  secret  meetings  at  night.  He  therefore  gave  orders  that  the  men 
were  not  to  leave  their  lines  after  roll-call.  As  an  additional  precaution,  a  cavalry  guard  was  placed 
over  the  guns  at  night.  But  in  the  afternoon  of  28  May,  twenty-one  of  the  "worst  characters"  of  the  15th 
N.  I.,  who  had  secreted  their  arms  in  their  huts,  managed  to  take  possession  of  the  guns  before  the 
arrival  of  the  night  picket.  26  The  artillerymen  simply  stood  and  watched,  though  a  few  protected  the 
lives  of  their  officers.  27  The  remaining  troops  were  assembled  and  ordered  to  recover  the  guns.  The 
Bombay  Lancers,  considered  the  most  loyal,  made  a  show  of  obeying  but  veered  away  at  the  last 
moment,  and  thereby  caused  the  death  of  two  of  their  unsupported  European  officers.  In  the  opinion  of 
Lieutenant  Pierce  of  the  30'h  N.  I.,  the  Bombay  troopers  "sympathized"  with  the  mutineers  and  had  "no 
th 
intention  of  making  any  effort  to  retake  the  guns".  28  Nor  did  the  men  of  the  15  N.  I.  who,  led  by  the 
light  company,  began  to  steal  over  to  join  their  mutinous  comrades.  In  a  final  effort  to  save  the 
Colours,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Shuldharn  ordered  the  grenadier  company  to  follow  him  towards  the 
cavalry.  As  some  attempted  to  obey,  they  were  mobbed  by  the  rest  who  opened  fire  on  their  fleeing 
officers.  The  30'h  N.  I.,  meanwhile,  was  standing  firm  but  they  would  not  attack  the  mutineers.  At 
dusk,  the  native  officers  received  a  note  from  the  subedar  of  the  15'h  N.  I.  to  the  effect  that  unless  they 
joined  the  mutineers  by  8  p.  m.  they  would  be  fired  upon.  To  prevent  further  bloodshed,  they  advised 
their  European  officers  to  quit  the  station.  As  the  station  commander,  the  cavalry  and  the  officers  of  the 
151  N.  I.  had  already  left  for  Beawur,  35  miles  to  the  south-west,  they  reluctantly  agreed.  They  were 
accompanied  by  four  native  officers  and  nine  other  ranks.  The  following  morning,  the  subedar-major 
and  another  2-300  sepoys  detached  themselves  from  the  mutineers  and  began  to  march  on  Beawur.  But 
many  were  dissuaded  by  men  in  the  employ  of  a  notorious  dacoit  (who  had  been  in  communication 
25  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Siniggle,  1,  pp.  438-9 
26  Lt.  Col.  J.  R.  Shuldharn  to  the  Adjt.  -Gen.,  7  March  1858,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIII,  p.  55 
27  Timbrell  Narrative,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/C201. 
28  Lt.  T.  Pierce  to  his  parents,  27  July  1857,  Pierce  Letters,  BL,  Add.  MSS  42500,  vol.  3,  f.  33. 232 
with  a  disaffected  jemadar),  and  others  lost  heart  when  they  heard  the  false  rumour  that  all  their  officers 
had  been  killed.  Only  the  subedar-major  and  56  others  made  it  to  Beawur  where  they  were  disarmed.  "' 
The  ringleaders  of  the  mutiny  were  undoubtedly  men  of  the  15'h  N.  I.  They  had  only  recently  arrived 
from  Meerut  where  the  I  10N.  I.  had  taken  their  place.  It  is  fair  to  assume,  therefore,  that  they  were  part 
of  the  conspiracy  to  mutiny  at  their  previous  station.  They  arrived,  in  the  words  of  one  officer  of  the 
30th  N.  I.,  "ready  primed  for  revolt,  and  it  has  only  been  delayed  on  account  of  the  great  difficulty  they 
30 
experienced  in  seducing  our  regiment  to  join  them".  Part  of  this  difficulty  may  have  been  due  to  the 
identity  of  the  30'h  N.  Vs  commanding  officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Campbell,  who  had  joined  the 
regiment  as  an  ensign  and  served  with  it  in  the  V  Afghan  and  2nd  Sikh  Wars,  receiving  wounds  at  both 
Saudulpur  and  Chilianwala.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Shuldam,  on  the  other  hand,  had  been  with  the  15'h  for 
less  than  three  years.  31 
The  day  after  the  mutiny  at  Nasirabad,  a  detachment  of  the  4ýh  I.  C.  and  the  headquarters  of  the 
Hurrianah  Light  Infantry  rose  at  Hansi,  90  miles  to  the  north-west  of  Delhi.  The  timing  was  partly 
determined  by  financial  considerations  in  that  the  latter  corps  broke  out  shortly  after  the  men  had 
received  their  monthly  pay.  That  thejoint  mutiny  was  planned  is  proven  by  the  fact  that  Captain 
Stafford,  the  Hurrianah  U.  's  commanding  officer,  was  given  advance  warning  by  two  brothers,  a 
jemadar  and  the  drill-havildar.  32  In  a  knock-on  effect,  detachments  of  both  regiments  mutinied  at  neaby 
Sirsa  a  day  ortwo  later.  The  headquarters  of  the  0I.  C.  had  left  Hansi  on  20  May  to  join  the 
Commander-in-Chief  s  force  of  European  and  loyal  native  troops  assembling  at  Kumaul,  south  of 
Ambala,  with  the  intention  of  retaking  Delhi.  Its  94  men  did  good  service  under  Captain  Hall  and, 
despite  being  disarmed  and  dismounted  in  August  as  a  precaution,  two  were  promoted  for  gallant 
conduct  and  one  received  the  Order  of  Merit,  Yd  Class,  for  saving  the  life  of  Brigadier  Hope  Grant.  " 
Hall,  it  should  be  mentioned,  had  served  in  the  regiment  since  1850.  Captain  Stafford  had  been  with 
the  Hurrianah  L.  I.  for  even  longer  -  12  years  -  and  this  length  of  service  may  have  saved  his  life,  though 
it  could  not  prevent  his  regiment  from  mutinying.  34 
Anson  died  of  cholera  on  27  May  and  Major-General  Sir  Henry  Barnard,  commanding  the  Sirhind 
Division,  took  control  of  the  troops  converging  on  Delhi.  Major-General  Thomas  Reed  of  the 
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Peshawur  Division,  now  the  senior  Queen's  officer  in  Bengal,  was  named  temporary  Commander-in- 
Chief  (pending  the  arrival  of  Sir  Patrick  Grant  from  Madras).  On  the  day  of  Anson's  death,  Brigadier 
Wilson  left  Meerut  with  a  mixed  force  of  1,000  Europeans  and,  on  30  May,  defeated  3,000  rebels  at 
Ghazi-ud-din-nagar  on  the  Hindun  river,  10  miles  east  of  Delhi.  Wilson  gained  a  second  -  mainly 
artillery  -  victory  the  following  day.  On  7  June,  the  two  European-led  forces  linked  hands  at  Alipur,  10 
miles  north  of  Delhi.  A  day  later,  the  combined  force  of  5,500  men  -  henceforth  known  as  the  Delhi 
Field  Force  -  won  a  hard  fought  battle  at  Badli-ki-Serai,  six  miles  from  the  city,  before  occupying  the 
site  of  the  former  cantonment  on  a  ridge  to  the  north-west  . 
The  three-month  siege  of  Delhi  had  begun, 
though  the  increasingly  outnumbered  Europeans  were  more  properly  besieged  than  besiegers. 
Meanwhile  a  small  mutiny  had  taken  place  at  Mathura,  30  miles  north-west  of  Agra.  According  to 
the  magistrate  Mark  Thornhill,  the  district  became  disturbed  after  the  arrival  of  the  news  from  Delhi 
and  the  details  of  the  King's  proclamation.  This  manifested  itself  chiefly  in  attacks  on  banias 
(moneylenders)  and  the  ejection  of  new  zemindars  by  their  predecessors.  But  on  30  May,  as  460,000 
rupees  were  about  to  be  despatched  to  Agra  Fort,  the  treasury  guard  (a  company  of  the  67h  N.  I.  and  its 
replacement,  a  company  of  the  4e  N.  I.  )  attacked  their  officers  -  murdering  one  -  before  setting  off  for 
Delhi  with  the  money.  35  News  of  the  outbreak  reached  Agra  that  night  and  the  headquarters  of  the  4&h 
and  67th  N.  I.  were  disarmed  the  following  morning  (though  some  sepoys  still  made  their  way  to  Delhi 
without  arms).  Both  commanding  officers  were  relatively  unfamiliar  to  their  troops:  Colonel  Haldane, 
60,  had  been  with  the  44'h  N.  I.  forjust  two  years;  Lieutenant-Colonel  Cotton,  48,  had  only  returned  to 
the  67h  in  1856  after  13  years  with  the  Judge  Advocate's  Department.  The  mutineers  arrived  in  Delhi 
on  5  June  and  promptly  handed  most  if  not  all  of  the  treasure  over  to  King's  rebel  government.  36  By 
supplying  the  rebels  with  military  and  financial  support,  they  were  hoping  to  secure  their  own  long- 
term  employment  prospects.  Their  chief  motive,  therefore,  was  essentially  professional. 
Lucknow  was  the  next  garrison  to  rise.  On  30  May,  a  sepoy  of  the  13  th  N.  I.  -  who  had  earlier  been 
rewarded  by  Sir  Henry  Lawrence,  the  Chief  Commissioner,  for  assisting  in  the  capture  of  a  spy  -  told 
one  of  his  European  officers  that  a  mutiny  would  commence  at  9  p.  m.  in  the  lines  of  the  71"  N.  I.,  at  the 
Muriaon  cantonments  three  miles  north  of  the  city.  The  message  was  passed  to  the  Chief 
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Commissioner,  but  such  warnings  were  commonplace  and  no  specific  action  was  taken.  37  According 
to  an  Oudh  artillery  officer,  treasonable  correspondence  between  the  48th  N.  I.  and  relatives  of  the  ex- 
King  of  Oudh  had  recently  been  intercepted 
. 
38  The  troops  were  known  to  be  disaffected  and  the 
greater  part  of  H.  M.  32d  Regiment  and  a  battery  of  European  foot  artillery  had  already  been  moved  to 
the  native  cantonments  as  a  precaution.  At  the  appointed  time,  however,  members  of  all  three  infantry 
regiments  mutinied  and  murdered  a  number  of  their  officers.  Prevented  from  marching  towards  the  city 
by  the  presence  of  European  troops,  the  mutineers  moved  off  in  the  direction  of  the  nearby  cavalry  lines 
at  Mudkipur  where  they  were  joined  by  at  least  30  members  of  the  7h  L.  C.  More  followed  on  31  May 
as  the  remaining  cavalry  at  Lucknow  -  about  ISO  sabres  -  took  part  in  the  successful  operation  to  eject 
the  mutineers  from  Mudkipur.  A  few  native  officers  and  70  or  so  sepoys  remained  faithful  and  did 
good  work  rounding  up  stray  mutineers.  Among  them  was  the  71-year-old  subedar-major,  who  told  his 
commanding  officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Master,  that  he  was  aware  of  the  conspiracy  to  mutiny,  but 
could  not  say  anything  for  fear  of  his  life 
. 
39  It  may  be  significant  that  Master  had  only  returned  to  the 
regiment  in  October  1855  after  eight  years  with  the  I  Vh  I.  C. 
Of  the  three  regular  Bengal  Native  Infantry  regiments,  around  700  remained  loyal,  most  of  them  from 
the  13"'  and  48th  N.  I.,  though  a  number  of  the  latter  were  distrusted  and  subsequently  disarmed.  40  The 
loyalty  of  the  greater  part  of  the  13th  was  probably  down  to  Major  Bru6re,  their  commanding  officer, 
who  had  served  with  the  regiment  for  25  years.  When  he  was  killed  defending  the  Residency  on  4 
September,  his  surviving  men  were  genuinely  grief-stricken;  as  a  sign  of  respect  they  attended  his 
funeral,  and  some  were  even  prepared  to  ignore  caste  concerns  by  carrying  his  body  to  the  grave.  " 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Palmer  of  the  48h  was  also  a  familiar  figure,  having  joined  the  regiment  as  an 
ensign  in  1826.  Despite  the  occasional  absence  on  staff  duty,  he  had  seen  plenty  of  action  with  the  48d, 
notably  at  Mudki  and  Ferozeshah  during  the  I"  Sikh  War.  Palmer's  influence  may  have  prevented 
almost  half  his  regiment  from  joining  the  mutineers  on  30  May.  He  later  commanded  the  Regiment  of 
Lucknow,  formed  around  the  faithful  remmants  of  the  l3tý  48  1h  and  71  1  N.  I.  The  latter  regiment  had 
the  smallest  number  of  loyal  sepoys  -  about  100  -  and  is  generally  considered  to  have  been  the  most 
disaffected.  It  comes  as  no  surprise,  therefore,  to  learn  that  the  71"'s  commanding  officer,  Colonel 
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Halford,  had  only  served  with  it  for  18  months.  He  also  happened  to  be  60,  the  second  eldest 
regimental  C.  O.  in  the  Bengal  Army;  Bru4e,  by  contrast,  was  44  and  Palmer  49.42 
The  mutiny  at  Lucknow  was  followed  by  a  civil  uprising  in  which  green  banners  -  the  standard  of  the 
prophet  Mohammed  -  were  raised  and  one  European  clerk  was  murdered.  Though  easily  suppressed  by 
the  city  police,  evidence  soon  came  to  light  of  "an  extensive  conspiracy  in  the  city  and  in  the 
cantonments".  A  former  lahsildar  (native  revenue  collector)  pointed  the  finger  at  Shurruff-ud  Dowlah, 
a  senior  figure  in  the  court  of  the  ex-King,  Wajid  Ali  Shah,  and  a  prime  minister  to  two  of  Wajid's 
predecessors.  He  was  arrested  (albeit  temporarily),  as  were  two  of  his  siblings,  the  brother  of  the  ex- 
King  (Mustapha  Ali  Khan),  the  Raja  of  Tulsipur  and  two  members  of  the  Delhi  royal  family.  Shurruff 
would  later  become  a  prominent  member  of  the  rebel  government  in  Oudh.  A  more  summaryjustice 
was  meted  out  to  22  conspirators,  said  to  have  been  sent  from  Benares  and  elsewhere  to  corrupt  the 
troops,  who  were  shot  after  a  drumhead  court-martial.  43  But  with  all  the  European  troops  concentrated 
in  Lucknow,  the  remaining  15,000  or  so  native  troops  in  Oudh  -  including  irregulars  -  had  no  one  to 
police  them  and  over  the  next  fortnight  they  mutinied  almost  to  a  man.  Lawrence  was  convinced  the 
mutinies  had  been  planned  in  conjunction  with  disaffected  civilians.  "Everything  had  been  conducted 
with  the  utmost  regularity,  "  he  informed  Canning,  with  specific  reference  to  the  uprising  at  Faizabad  on 
8  June,  "the  Native  civil  officers  taking  prominent  places;  and  the  King  of  Delhi  had  been  proclaimed. 
In  all  quarters  we  hear  of  similar  method  and  regularity...  Yhis  quiet  method  bespeaks  some  leading 
injhience.  04 
Meanwhile,  Rohilkhand,  the  province  to  the  north-east  of  Delhi,  had  also  risen  in  rebellion.  On 
Sunday  31  May,  mutinies  took  place  in  Bareilly,  the  capital,  and  Shahjahanpur,  one  of  the  bigger 
towns.  Two  days  before  the  outbreak  at  Bareilly,  Khan  Bahadur  Khan,  the  descendant  of  the  last 
Muslim  ruler  of  the  province,  was  visited  by  members  of  the  native  garrison:  the  18d'  and  68h  N.  L,  the 
8'  I.  C.  and  a  battery  of  native  foot  artillery.  The  exact  details  of  the  conversation  are  not  known,  but  the 
following  day  Khan  told  the  Commissioner  that  the  regiments  would  certainly  mutiny.  "  Also  on  30 
May,  Colonel  Troup  of  the  68th  N.  I.  discovered  that  the  artillery  pay  havildar  had  addressed  a  letter  to 
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both  native  infantry  regiments,  "urging  them  by  the  most  sacred  oaths  to  rise  and  murder  their  European 
officers,  stating  that  such  had  been  done  at  all  the  other  stations,  and  that  if  they  would  not  do  so,  the 
46  Hindoos  were  to  consider  that  they  had  eaten  beef  and  the  Mussulman's  pork"  . 
Of  the  two  infantry 
regiments,  the  68h  N.  I.  is  said  to  have  been  the  most  disaffected.  Along  with  the  artillerymen,  its 
sepoys  were  at  the  forefront  of  the  mutiny  on  31  May,  hunting  down  and  murdering  one  officer  and  the 
quartermaster-sergeant.  The  men  of  the  18dN.  I.,  on  the  other  hand,  hesitated  for  some  time  and  only 
turned  when  they  were  threatened  by  the  golundazze.  Even  then  they  concealed  their  officers  and 
allowed  them  to  escape  (though  five  were  subsequently  murdered  by  rebellious  villagers).  The  most 
prominent  traitor  in  the  8h  I.  C.  was  Mahomed  Shafi,  the  senior  ressaldar,  who  is  said  to  have  had  an 
understanding  with  Khan  Bahadur  Khan  (who,  on  31  May,  declared  himself  the  ruler  of  Rohilkhand  on 
behalf  of  the  King  of  Delhi).  But  even  Shafi  could  not  convince  his  men  to  murder  their  European 
officers  who  were  allowed  to  escape  to  Naini  Tal,  accompanied  by  12  native  officers  and  II  sowars.  " 
The  level  of  disaffection  in  a  corps  can  once  again  be  correlated  to  the  identity  of  its  commanding 
officer.  Troup,  for  example,  had  served  just  two  years  with  the  68'h,  -  whereas  Major  Pearson  of  the  181 
had  been  with  the  same  regiment  for  the  whole  of  his  27-year  career.  The  commandant  of  the  8dI.  C., 
Lieutenant  Mackenzie,  was  also  relatively  familiar,  having  joined  as  the  adjutant  in  1849.48 
A  spate  of  mutinies  took  place  in  early  June  in  garrisons  as  far  apart  as  Moradabad  in  Rohilkhand, 
Benares  on  the  lower  Ganges,  Nimach  in  central  India,  Cawnpore  in  the  Doab,  Jhansi  in  Bundelkhand 
and  Jullundur  in  the  Punjab  (see  Appendix  2).  When  news  of  the  Delhi  outbreak  reached  the  holy  city 
of  Benares  on  12  May,  it  made  the  large  "ruffian  population"  -  many  of  whom  openly  carried  arms  - 
even  more  volatile  than  usual.  Fearing  a  civil  uprising,  both  the  commissioner  and  local  brigadier 
suggested  evacuating  the  troops  to  the  nearby  stronghold  at  Chumar.  But  this  was  vetoed  by  Judge 
Gubbins  and  the  magistrate,  Francis  Lind,  on  the  ground  that  it  would  put  in  jeopardy  the  road,  river 
and  telegraph  communications  between  Calcutta  and  upper  India.  49  The  garrison  at  that  stage  was 
composed  of  the  37'  N.  I.,  the  Ludhiana  Regiment  of  Sikhs,  a  wing  of  the  13'b  I.  C.  and  half  of  battery  of 
European  artillery.  Colonel  Gordon  was  convinced  his  Sikhs  would  remain  loyal  but  had  "misgivings" 
about  the  37h.  As  for  the  irregular  cavalry,  they  had  let  it  be  known  that  they  would  be  passively 
faithful,  but  "could  not  be  trusted  to  charge  or  fire  upon  mutineers  on  the  cartridge  question".  Lind 
46  Troup  to  the  D.  A.  G.,  10  June  1857,  ibid.,  pp.  190-1. 
47  Gimlette,  A  Postscript  to  the  Records  of  the  IndianMutiny,  pp.  114,184,196. 
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took  this  to  mean  they  were  at  heart  as  mutinous  as  the  sepoys.  Discontent  increased  with  the 
circulation  of  rumours  that  the  government  was  planning  to  issue  bread  containing  pig  and  cow  bones  at 
a  below  market  price.  50  On  27  May,  a  trooper  of  the  1P  I.  C.  tried  to  incite  the  Sikhs  to  mutiny;  but  he 
was  promptly  handed  over  to  the  authorities  by  a  Sikh  havildar  who  was  rewarded  with  promotion  to 
jemadar.  51  Around  the  same  time,  a  respected  subedar  in  the  37tb  N.  I.  informed  his  commanding 
officer,  Spottiswoode,  that  he  had  nothing  to  fear  from  the  regiment  in  general,  even  though  it 
contained  some  bad  men  who  might  try  to  intimidate  the  well-disposed  into  mutinying.  52 
Matters  came  to  a  head,  nevertheless,  in  early  June  when  the  outlying  stations  were  ordered  to  send  in 
their  treasure  for  safekeeping.  This  was  the  signal  for  the  17dN.  I.  to  mutiny  at  Azimgarh,  50  miles  to 
the  north,  on  3  June.  The  news  reached  Benares  the  following  morning.  By  now  the  garrison  had  been 
reinforced  by  150  men  of  H.  M.  I  Oh  Foot  (from  Dinapore  in  Bihar)  and  60  members  of  the  I"  Madras 
European  Fusiliers,  rushed  across  the  Bay  of  Bengal  and  on  from  Calcutta  by  bullock  transport.  Present 
with  the  vanguard  of  the  I"  M.  E.  F.  was  its  commanding  officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  James  Neill.  It 
was  Neill  who  persuaded  the  local  commander,  Brigadier  Ponsonby,  to  carry  out  an  immediate 
disarmament  of  the  37h  N.  1.53  At  the  hastily-arranged  afternoon  parade,  the  Europeans  and  Sikhs  were 
still  not  in  position  when  Spottiswoode  ordered  his  men,  by  companies,  to  lodge  their  muskets  in  their 
bells-of-arms.  He  had  got  as  far  as  No.  6  Company  -  and  was  convinced  that  the  regiment  contained  a 
majority  of  loyal  sepoys  -  when  two  or  three  voices  called  out,  "Our  officers  are  deceiving  us,  they 
want  us  to  give  up  our  arms,  that  the  Europeans  who  are  coming  up  may  shoot  us  down  P.  Tocalinthe 
men,  Spottiswoode  galloped  away  to  prevent  the  advancing  Europeans  from  coming  any  closer.  But  no 
sooner  had  he  returned  than  shots  rang  out  from  the  direction  of  No.  2  Company  (fired,  in  the  first 
instance,  by  the  pay  havildar),  causing  the  men  to  rush  towards  the  bells-of-arms  to  rearm  themselves.  54 
In  the  confusion  of  the  gun  battle  that  followed,  sowars  of  the  13  th  I.  C.  are  said  to  have  shot  in  the 
direction  of  the  Sikhs,  who  faced  about  and  returned  fire.  One  Sikh  attempted  to  murder  Colonel 
Gordon,  but  a  faithful  havildar  intervened,  receiving  the  bullet  in  his  arm,  Assuming  the  Sikhs  had 
mutinied,  the  European  gunners  opened  fire  on  them,  causing  the  whole  regiment  to  scatter.  The 
mutineers  at  once  fled  the  station.  But  elements  from  all  three  native  regiments  remained  loyal, 
49  Memorandum  of  the  Services  of  Francis  M.  Lind,  Lind  Papers,  NAK  5106-1-36,  pp.  1-4. 
50  Francis  Lind's  diary  entry  for  19  May  1857,  Lind  Papers,  NAM,  5  105-70-2,  p.  62. 
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including  more  than  200  Sikhs  (some  of  whom  formed  the  treasury  guard)  and  14  members  of  the  37  th 
N.  I.  guarding  the  paymaster's  compound.  Lieutenant  Glasse,  the  adjutant  of  the  Sikhs,  thought  that  the 
fidelity  of  the  treasury  guard,  in  particular,  was  proof  that  the  regiment  had  "no  design  ofjoining  the 
plans  of  the  mutineers".  But  he  was  also  prepared  to  concede  that  "a  certain  number  out  of  such  a  body, 
comprising,  as  it  did,  several  Poorbeahs  in  the  superior  ranks,  must  have  cherished  a  mutinous  spirit". 
In  a  similar  vein,  some  of  the  loyal  sepoys  of  the  37h  N.  I.  told  Spottiswoode  that  the  "majority  of  the 
men  were  entirely  ignorant  of  the  intentions  of  the  turbulent  characters"  and  that  more  would  have 
remained  loyal  if  they  had  not  been  shot  at  indiscriminately.  As  proof  of  this,  the  company  on  detached 
duty  at  Chunar  stayed  loyal  even  after  hearing  of  the  mutiny  at  Benares.  The  detachment  of  two 
companies  of  Sikhs  at  Jounpore,  on  the  other  hand,  rose  up  and  murdered  their  European  officer  when 
they  received  the  news.  55 
The  mutiny  at  Benares  is  a  perfect  example  of  how  an  evil-disposed  minority  was  able  to  manipulate 
the  majority  by  playing  on  their  fears  and  credulity.  The  cry  that  Europeans  were  coming  to  do  them 
harm  was  repeated  in  too  many  other  mutinies  where  it  was  palpably  false  to  be  considered  a  genuine, 
spur  of  the  moment  warning.  It  had  probably  been  agreed  by  conspirators  beforehand  as  the  best  way 
to  win  over  waverers.  But  the  fact  that  so  many  were  won  over  by  such  unlikely  claims  is  yet  more 
evidence  of  a  breakdown  of  trust  between  European  officers  and  their  native  troops.  The  confidence  of 
the  37"'  N.  I.  in  their  commanding  officer,  for  example,  cannot  have  been  helped  by  his  absence  for  20 
56 
of  the  previous  22  years  on  furlough  and  detached  duty  with  the  Stud  Department. 
The  rising  of  the  troops  at  Cawnpore  on  4-5  June  contains  yet  more  evidence  of  a  conspiracy  between 
disaffected  soldiers  and  disgruntled  civilians.  Having  returned  from  his  suspicious  tour  of  military 
stations  (including  Delhi  and  Ambala),  Azimullah  Khan  accompanied  Nana  Sahib  on  a  visit  to  Luckow 
in  April  1857.  Among  the  civil  officials  who  received  them  was  Martin  Gubbins,  the  Financial 
Commissioner  of  Oudh.  He  found  the  Nana  "arrogant  and  presuming",  and  became  suspicious  when 
the  Nana  departed  suddenly  for  Cawnpore  on  "urgent  business".  Sir  Henry  Lawrence  shared  Gubbins' 
suspicions  and  authorized  him  to  warn  Sir  Henry  Wheeler,  commanding  at  Cawnpore,  that  the  Nana 
was  not  to  be  trusted.  The  warning  was  obviously  ignored  because,  on  22  May,  at  Wheelees  request, 
Nana  Sahib  arrived  at  Cawnpore  with  two  guns  and  300  horse  to  guard  the  treasury  and  maintain 
54  Lt.  Col.  A.  C.  Spottiswoode  to  Brig.  J.  Christie,  II  March  1858,  ibid.,  p.  29. 
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order.  57  The  only  European  troops  stationed  at  Cawnpore  were  15  invalids  from  H.  M.  3Vd  Foot  and  a 
company  of  foot  artillery.  By  early  June  they  had  been  joined  by  55  fit  members  of  H.  M.  32  nd  Foot 
(sent  over  from  Lucknow),  70  soldiers  of  H.  M.  84h  Foot  and  15  Madras  Fusiliers  (the  first 
reinforcements  to  arrive  from  Calcutta).  But  they  were  heavily  outnumbered  by  the  native  garrison 
which  consisted  of  the  2nd  L.  C.,  the  I",  53d  and  56"'  N.  I.,  and  two  companies  of  native  foot  artillery. 
By  the  time  Nana  Sahib  arrived  at  Cawnpore,  the  troops  were  already  on  the  verge  of  mutinying. 
According  to  a  sowar  of  the  2rd  L.  C.  who  remained  faithful,  the  arrival  of  the  news  from  Meerut 
prompted  sepoys  and  sowars  alike  to  discuss  an  outbreak.  58  On  20  May,  a  fire  in  the  lines  of  the  I'  N.  I. 
was  interpreted  by  Europeans  as  the  "probable  signal  for  revolt",  but  the  presence  of  the  I's  European 
officers  and  the  arrival  of  the  European  artillery  deterred  an  outbreak.  59  That  night  the  2nd  L.  C.  also 
showed  signs  of  disaffection,  excited  by  a  message  from  a  sepoy  of  the  5e  N.  I.  that  the  Europeans 
were  on  their  way  to  destroy  them.  60  It  too  came  to  nothing.  Two  days  later,  some  of  the  I"  N.  I.  were 
"overheard  wildly  talking  of  mutiny  &  murder,  and  made  a  proposal  to  destroy  their  officers".  61 
Around  the  same  time,  a  detachment  of  the  2  nd  L.  C.  on  treasure  escort  duty  at  Fatehpur  were  heard 
talking  "openly  of  offering  their  services  to  the  New  Government  [at  Delhi]  to 
. 
62 
After  22  May  -  according  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  Williams,  who  took  42  depositions  in  the  course  of 
his  investigation  into  the  outbreak  at  Cawnpore  -  the  corruption  of  the  native  troops  was  conducted  by 
two  of  the  Nana's  sowars,  Rahim  Khan  and  Muddut  Ali.  But  the  Vd  L.  C.,  in  particular,  were  "already 
ripe  for  mutiny"  and  needed  "little  persuasion".  On  I  June,  wrote  Williams,  six  of  their  ringleaders  - 
Subedar  Teeka  Singh,  Havildar-Major  Gopal  Singh  and  four  sowars  -  had  a  secret  meeting  with  the 
Nana,  his  brother,  Bala  Rao,  and  Azimullah  that  lasted  two  hours.  It  reached  the  ears  of  the  magistrate, 
Charles  Hillersdon,  nonetheless,  and  when  he  asked  the  Nana  to  account  for  it,  he  received  the  reply 
63 
that  it  had  been  held  to  ensure  the  troops  remained  "firm  and  loyal".  Yet  on  2  June  one  of  the  sowars 
present  at  the  meeting,  Shumsh-ud-din  Khan,  is  said  to  have  told  the  prostitute  Asisun  that  the  Peshwa's 
reign  would  commence  in  a  day  or  two  and  he  would  be  in  a  position  to  fill  her  room  with  gold 
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mohurs.  64  The  following  day,  according  to  a  prominent  Cawnpore  citizen,  the  Nana  and  his  advisers 
held  another  secret  consultation  with  the  subedars  of  the  cavalry  and  infantry  regiments.  65  He  is 
probably  referring  to  subedars  from  the  I"  N.  I.  and  2d  L.  C.,  the  two  regiments  that  mutinied  during  the 
evening  of  4  June.  The  other  two  infantry  regiments  -  the  53'd  and  56h  N.  I.  -  and  the  two  companies  of 
foot  artillery  did  not  break  out  until  the  following  morning.  They  had  been  abandoned  by  their 
European  officers,  who  had  been  ordered  into  Wheelees  hastily-constructed  entrenchment  for  their  own 
safety,  and  by  their  native  officers,  whom  Wheeler  had  asked  to  report  on  the  temper  of  their  men. 
According  to  a  sepoy  of  the  53"1  N.  I.,  the  mutiny  began  when  the  light  company  of  the  53  rd  and  the 
grenadier  company  of  the  56th  "concocted  a  plot  for  the  seizure  of  the  regimental  colours  and  treasure". 
But  most  of  the  men  were  not  disposed  to  join  them  until  Wheeler,  believing  both  regiments  had 
already  turned,  ordered  his  artillery  to  open  fire  on  the  native  lines.  66  Lieutenant-Colonel  Williams 
noted  that  the  53  d  N.  I.  appeared  to  have  been  the  "least  tainted"  and  that  many  of  those  who  deserted 
and  joined  their  mutinous  comrades  "did  so  from  fear  of  being  implicated  in  the  consequences  of 
revolt".  By  far  the  largest  number  of  faithful  sepoys  were  from  the  53'd:  10  native  officers,  15  N.  C.  O.  s 
and  22  sepoyS.  67  One  of  the  officers,  Jemadar  Shaikh  Ali,  later  insisted  that  Nana  Sahib  "was  the  man 
68 
who  corrupted  the  troops  at  Cawnpore:  first  the  2d  Cavalry  and  Id  N.  I.  and  then  the  rest  went". 
According  to  Williams'  memorandum,  a  sowar  from  the  Vd  L.  C.  and  a  subedar  of  the  I"  N.  I.  visited 
Nana  Sahib  on  the  morning  of  5  June  and  gave  him  the  option  of  a  kingdom  if  he  joined  with  them  or 
death  if  he  sided  with  the  British.  He  is  said  to  have  replied:  "What  have  I  to  do  with  the  British.  I  am 
with  you.  "  Having  sworn  to  be  their  chief,  he  instructed  the  mutineers  to  carry  the  government  treasure 
to  the  nearby  village  of  Kullianpore,  where  he  would  join  them  for  the  march  to  Delhi.  The  Nana  then 
consulted  his  advisors  as  to  whether  this  was  the  best  course  of  action.  Azimullah  "pointed  out  the 
folly  of  proceeding  to  Delhi,  where  their  individual  power  and  influence  would  necessarily  cease".  He 
recommended  instead  the  Nana  "recalling  the  mutineers,  taking  possession  of  Cawnpore,  and  extending 
his  authority  as  far  as  he  could  to  the  eastward;  adding  that  he  was  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the 
resources  of  the  British,  that  the  number  of  Europeans  in  India  was  scarce  one-fourth  that  of  the  Native 
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army,  and  that  the  latter  having  mutinied,  the  former  were  powerless".  69  Thus  began  the  three-week 
siege  of  Wheeler's  entrenchment  that  was  to  end  in  the  death  of  all  but  a  handful  of  its  European 
garrison. 
At  Cawnpore,  as  with  so  many  earlier  mutinies,  there  seems  to  be  some  correlation  between  a 
regiment's  level  of  disaffection  and  the  relative  familitary  of  its  commanding  officer.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Ewart  of  the  I"  N.  I.,  for  example,  had  known  his  men  for  only  two  years.  Much  of  his 
previous  service  had  been  in  the  judge  advocate's  department.  That  he  was  considered  to  be  something 
of  a  martinet  is  proven  by  the  way  his  former  sepoys  carried  out  a  mock  parade  before  murdering  him 
as  he  was  being  carried  from  the  shattered  entrenchment  on  27  June.  70  Colonel  Stephen  Williams  had 
spent  even  less  time  with  the  56'h  N.  I.,  the  next  most  disaffected  infantry  regiment,  though  he  was  more 
regimentally  experienced  and  had  seen  more  active  service  than  Ewart.  Major  Hillersdon,  however, 
had  served  all  his  20-year  career  with  the  53'd  N.  I.,  generally  considered  to  be  the  least  disaffected 
regiment  at  Cawnpore.  The  cavalry  regiment  -  the  2nd  L.  C.  -  is  the  exception  to  the  rule,  just  as  it  was 
at  Meerut.  It  was  being  temporarily  commanded  by  Major  Vibart  who,  like  Hillersdon,  had  begun  his 
service  with  the  same  regiment.  However  the  original  corps  had  been  disbanded  for  cowardice  in  the 
face  of  the  enemy  in  1840  during  the  I't  Afghan  War.  The  regiment  that  mutinied  in  1857,  therefore, 
had  only  been  in  existence  for  15  years.  Originally  designated  the  I  Ph  L.  C.,  it  was  accorded  the  honour 
of  being  renamed  the  2nd  L.  C.  after  illustrious  service  at  the  Battle  of  Multan  in  1848.  Vibart  had 
gained  particular  renown  during  this  action  by  cutting  down  a  Sikh  standard-bearer  and  capturing  a 
regimental  standard.  The  fact  that  his  former  sowars  helped  to  carry  his  possessions  during  the  ill-fated 
march  to  the  boats  at  Sad  Chowra  Ghat  on  27  June  indicates  that  he  was  not  personally  unpopular.  Yet 
he  was  unable  to  prevent  his  regiment  from  mutinying.  71 
Nana  Sahib's  involvement  in  the  Cawnpore  outbreak  is  significant  for  a  number  of  reasons.  In  the  first 
place,  his  pre-mutiny  machinations  indicate  the  existence  of  a  plot  for  a  rebellion  by  both  civilians  and 
sepoys  that  pre-dated  the  cartridge  question  by  almost  a  year.  Sitaram  Bawa's  claim  that  the  conspiracy 
only  got  off  the  ground  after  the  annexation  of  Oudh  is  entirely  consistent  with  the  fact  that  two  of  the 
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regiments  then  stationed  at  Lucknow  -  the  19th  and  34th  N.  I.  -  were  at  the  forefront  of  the  disaffection 
in  1857  . 
72  In  this  context,  the  cartridge  controversy  was  a  heaven-sent  opportunity  for  the  conspirators 
to  unite  Hindu  and  Muslim  sepoys  against  their  European  masters.  It  may  be  no  coincidence  that  the 
rumour  about  bone  dust  being  added  to  flour  originated  at  Cawnpore  (see  Chapter  Seven).  Then  there 
is  Sitararn  Bawa's  point  that  the  "military  classes"  were  enticed  by  the  promise  that  the  old  days  of 
licence  would  be  restored.  73  This  is  important  because  it  identifies  plunder  as  a  motive  for  mutiny.  By 
1856,  with  most  of  India  under  the  heel  of  the  British,  the  opportunity  for  native  soldiers  to  supplement 
their  relatively  meagre  pay  with  plunder  had  all  but  vanished.  Only  the  replacement  of  the  British  with 
native  rulers  would  bring  back  this  cycle  of  war  and  rapine.  Lastly  the  mutineers'offer  of  a  kingdom  or 
death  to  Nana  Sahib  confirms  that  they  were  the  real  power  behind  the  rebel  movement  Oust  as  they 
were  at  Delhi).  Yet  only  a  handful  of  mutineers  tried  to  set  themselves  up  as  rulers  in  their  own  right: 
possibly  because  they  realized  that  only  legitimate  princes  had  a  chance  of  gaining  enough  grass-roots 
support  to  defeat  the  British;  and  possibly  because  their  chief  aim  had  always  been  to  attach  themselves 
to  a  viable  employer. 
Of  the  six  ruling  princes  named  by  Sitaram  Bawa  as  party  to  the  Nana's  conspiracy  -  the  Nizarn  of 
Hyderabad,  Maharaja  Holkar  of  Indore,  Maharaja  Scindia  of  Gwalior,  and  the  Maharajas  of  Jaipur, 
Jodhpur  and  Jammu  -  not  one  openly  rebelled  during  the  Indian  mutiny.  But  that  was  probably  because 
they  had  the  most  to  lose.  The  British  certainly  suspected  more  than  one  of  them  of  disloyalty  and 
came  to  the  conclusion  that  they  were  waiting  to  see  how  events  unfolded  before  they  committed 
themselves.  These  suspicions  were  partly  founded  upon  the  inability  or  unwillingness  of  these  princes 
to  prevent  their  own  troops  from  mutinying.  Most  of  the  European-officered  Gwalior  Contingent 
mutinied  in  the  first  two  weeks  of  June  1857,  as  did  a  cavalry  regiment  of  the  Hyderabad  Contingent. 
Two  of  Holkar's  native-controlled  regiments  rose  and  attacked  the  British  Residency  at  Indore  on  I 
July,  and  the  whole  of  the  Joudhpur  Legion  turned  against  its  officers  in  late  August  (see  Appendices  2 
and  3  for  details).  Referring  to  the  first  three  of  these  mutinies  in  a  letter  of  23  July,  the  Governor  of 
Madras  wrote:  "Holkar's  and  Scindiah's  conduct  appears  questionable,  at  all  events  they  appear  to  have 
been  shaken  for  a  short  time  but  subsequently  to  have  recovered  themselves  &  remained  staunch...  The 
'  Statement  of  Sitarain  Bawa  to  H.  B.  Devereux,  28  Jan  1858,  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom 
Struggle,  1,  pp.  372-6. 
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Nizam  [of  Hyderabad]  appears  true  at  present  but  from  all  I  can  learn  he  is  a  wretched  weak  creature 
who  will  certainly  go  wrong  if  his  present  Minister,  Salar  Gang,  should  not  be  got  rid  of.  "74 
The  mutinies  at  Gwalior  and  Scindia's  reaction  are  particularly  revealing.  In  late  May,  Scindia  told 
the  British  political  agent,  Major  Macpherson,  that  the  worst  affected  of  his  contingent  (most  of  whom 
werepurbias  from  Bengal)  had  been  holding  "nightly  meetings  for  administering  pledges"  and  been 
"boasting  of  the  destruction  of  the  English  power  and  of  all  Christians"  since  the  arrival  of  news  from 
Meerut.  Furthermore  "emissaries  and  letters  from  Delhi,  Calcutta,  and  other  centres  of  the  revolt"  had 
been  circulating  in  Gwalior.  Six  of  the  former  had  been  arrested  and  discharged  as  deserters  from 
Bengal  regiments,  said  Macpherson,  but  nothing  more  serious  could  be  proved  against  them.  Scindia's 
own  inquiries  as  to  the  cause  of  the  revolt  had  revealed  a  "general  hostility  to  our  rule"  with  the 
"cartridge  question  being  declared  to  be  merely  its  pretext".  Macpherson  added: 
Scindia  and  the  Dewan  [chief  minister]  ...  said  most  confidently  that,  as  no  reigning  prince  of  influence  had  joined 
the  revolt,  and  as  its  leaders  at  Dclhi  were  plainly  unequal  to  their  great  enterprise,  but  especially  as  Benarcs,  Gya 
(Gays),  and  the  other  ccntrcs  of  Hindu  opinion,  to  which  all  had  looked,  had  abstained  from  sanctioning  any 
religious  pretext  alleged  for  it,  when  DcIhi  should  be  crushed,  the  belief  in  our  ascendancy  would  at  once  return, 
and  the  revolt  be  arrested.  75 
This  may  explain  why  Scindia  never  sided  with  his  mutinous  troops,  despite  severe  pressure  for  him  to 
do  so  after  Macpherson  and  the  other  European  survivors  left  Gwalior  for  Agra  on  17  June.  "I  may 
observe,  "  wrote  Macpherson,  "that  had  Scindia,  in  this  the  dark  hour  of  the  stonn,  supported  by  the 
Dewan  alone  with  the  two  chiefs  of  his  troops,  yielded  to  the  pressure  of  the  opinions  and  temptations 
which  impelled  him  to  strike  against  us,  the  character  of  the  revolt  had  been  entirely  changed...  But  he 
believed  in  our  final  triumph,  and  that  it  was  his  true  policy  to  strain  his  power  to  contribute  to  it.  "  For 
four  months,  the  troops  "menaced,  beseeched,  dictated,  wheedled,  and  insulted  Scindia.  by  turns".  He, 
in  turn,  used  every  stratagem  available  to  keep  them  at  Gwalior  until  the  British  had  concentrated 
enough  forces  to  retake  Delhi.  Then,  said,  Macpherson,  he  "despatched  them  to  rout  by  our  arms".  76 
"  Lord  Harris  to  Robert  Vernon  Smith,  23  July  1857,  Lyveden  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F23  1/5. 
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Struggle,  IH,  pp.  166-189 
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According  to  Ahsanullah  Khan,  the  mutinous  troops  at  Delhi  persuaded  the  King  to  send  shukkas 
(messages)  to  a  number  of  princes  -  including  the  Maharajas  of  Gwalior,  Jodhpur,  Jaipur  and  Jammu  - 
"calling  upon  them  to  come  over  with  their  troops  and  munitions  of  war".  But  none  of  the  above  four 
replied  because  they  had  "no  inclination  to  side  with  the  King".  77  However  Scindia  might  have  been 
hedging  his  bets.  In  a  letter  attributed  to  him  of  18  November  1857,  he  congratulated  the  rebel  Nawab 
of  Banda  for  having  reclaimed  his  former  domain.  "You  have  beaten  and  driven  out  the  English,  "  he 
wrote.  "This  is  good  news  to  me.  Tell  me of  whoever  comes  to  fight  with  you  and  I  will  give  you 
assistance  with  my  army...  I  hear  that  the  Rewa  Raja  has  allowed  the  English  to  stay  with  him.  At  this 
I  am  much  displeased...  I  have  published  your  name  from  this  to  Delhi.  u78  Such  behaviour  was 
certainly  in  line  with  Maratha  diplomatic  tradition:  during  the  2nd  Maratha  War  the  Peshwa,  Baji  Rao, 
was  an  official  ally  of  the  Company  but  kept  in  regular  contact  with  its  enemies,  the  Maharajas  of 
Gwalior  and  NagpUr.  79 
Former  rulers  -  such  as  the  Nawabs  of  Farruckabad  and  Banda,  the  Raja  of  Assam,  and  the  families  of 
the  late  Rajas  of  Kolhapur,  Satara  and  Jhansi  -  had  less  to  lose  and  were  more  willing  to  risk  rebellion. 
The  young  Raja  of  Assam,  for  example,  was  arrested  and  sent  out  of  his  province  in  September  1857 
after  being  implicated  in  a  plot  to  incite  the  I"  Assam  Light  Infantry  to  mutiny.  80  The  extent  to  which 
the  Rani  was  complicit  in  the  outbreak  at  Jhansi,  on  the  other  hand,  is  much  disputed.  D.  V.  Tahmankar, 
her  best  known  biographer,  is  convinced  that  her  "agents  moved  about  freely  and  kept  her  informed  of 
the  preparations  which  were  being  made  for  a  rising".  When  Nana  Sahib,  her  former  playmate,  arrived 
in  nearby  Kalpi  in  early  1857,  writes  Tahmankar,  "he  was  met  by  the  Ranee's  men,  though  the  British 
officials  at  Jhansi  knew  nothing  of  his  visit".  81  By  late  May,  the  deputy  superintendent  at  Jhansi  is  said 
to  have  obtained  "private  information 
...  that  the  Ranee  and  the  troops  were  one  and  that  some  treachery 
,,  82 
was  intended  .A 
few  days  later,  the  officer  commanding  at  Nowgong  received  letters  from  both  the 
Jhansi  superintendent  and  his  deputy,  informing  him  that  they  had  learned  from  separate  sources  that 
Lakshman  Rao,  one  of  the  Rani's  servants,  "was  doing  his  best  to  induce  the  men  of  the  12ýh  [N.  I.  ]  to 
77  Supplementary  Evidence  of  Hakim  Ahsanullah  Khan,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIII,  p.  274. 
78  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Siniggle,  IV,  pp.  626-7. 
79  Dirk  H.  A.  Kolff,  'The  End  of  anAncien  Rigime:  Colonial  War  in  India  1798-18181,  J.  A.  de  Moor  and 
H.  L.  Wesseling  (eds.  ),  Imperialism  and  War:  Essays  on  Colonial  Wars  in  Asia  andAfrica  (Leiden, 
1989),  pp.  25-6. 
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mutiny",  though  it  was  "not  known  whether  the  Ranee  authorized  these  proceedings".  83  Sepoy  Aman 
Khan  later  claimed  that  the  mutiny  on  5/6  June  was  sparked  by  the  receipt  of  a  letter  from  Delhi  stating 
that  the  Jhansi  troops  would  be  regarded  as  "outcastes"  and  men  who  "had  lost  their  faith"  unless  they 
joined  the  rebellion.  According  to  Khan,  "the  insurgents  previous  to  the  mutiny  did  not  consult  the 
Ranee".  84  But  Khan  may  not  have  been  privy  to  the  conspiracy.  As  for  the  other  former  rulers,  it  is 
surely  no  coincidence  that  by  far  the  most  serious  mutiny  in  the  Bombay  Army  was  perpetrated  by 
sepoys  of  the  27th  N.  I.  at  Kolhapur.  The  Nawab  of  Farrukhabad,  on  the  other  hand,  appears  to  have 
taken  no  part  in  any  pre-mutiny  plotting  and  only  agreed  to  set  himself  up  as  subordinate  ruler  to  the 
King  of  Delhi  when  mutineers  threatened  to  kill  him  if  he  did  not.  85 
Other  influential  rebels  included  large  landholders  who  had  had  their  estates  broken  up  by  revenue 
settlements  of  the  Company.  The  most  notable  was  Raja  Kunwar  Singh  of  Jagdishpur  in  Bihar,  the 
recruiting  heartland  of  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry.  S.  B.  Chaudhuri  is  not  entirely  convinced  that 
Kunwar  Singh  incited  the  three  regiments  at  Dinapore  -  the  7th,  8h  and  401,  N.  I.  -  to  mutiny  on  25  July 
1857.86  Yet  the  circumstantial  evidence  is  compelling:  the  three  regiments  made  straight  for  Jagdishpur 
and  put  themselves  under  the  Raja's  command;  they  were  joined,  three  weeks  later,  by  the  mutinous  5h 
I.  C.  from  Bhagaipur.  Another  disgruntled  landholder  was  the  Raja  of  Mainpuri  who  had  forfeited  149 
of  his  200  villages  as  a  result  of  the  British  land  settlement.  He  was  indirectly  implicated  in  the  rising 
of  the  I  Oh  N.  I.  at  Fatehgarh  on  18  June  in  that  a  letter  from  the  Raja's  uncle,  exhorting  the  sepoys  of  the 
loth  to  mutiny,  was  intercepted  two  weeks  earlier.  87  The  Raja  himself  later  petitioned  the  King  of  Delhi 
for  troops,  but  the  mutinous  officers  insisted  that  none  could  be  sent  until  the  British  had  been  driven 
from  the  ridge.  " 
Within  six  weeks  of  the  outbreak  at  Meerut,  nearly  half  the  native  corps  in  the  regular  Bengal  Army 
had  mutinied,  partially  mutinied  or  been  disbanded.  They  included:  4  out  of  10  Bengal  Light  Cavalry 
regiments;  39  out  of  74  Bengal  Native  Infantry  regiments;  6  out  of  18  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry 
regiments;  7  out  of  18  companies  of  Bengal  Foot  Artillery;  I  out  of  4  troops  of  Bengal  Horse  Artillery; 
:3  Capt.  P.  Scot  to  the  D.  A.  G.,  28  July  1857,  P.  P.,  1857-8,  XLIV,  p.  183. 
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and  6  out  of  12  companies  of  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners.  They  had  been  joined  in  rebellion  by  three 
local  corps,  the  whole  of  the  Oudh  Irregular  Force  (3  cavalry  regiments,  10  infantry  regiments,  4 
companies  of  foot  artillery,  2  battalions  of  military  police),  the  Malwa  Contingent,  the  Bharatpur 
Legion,  and  most  of  the  Gwalior  Contingent  (I  out  of  2  cavalry  regiments,  6  out  of  7  infantry  regiments 
and  3  out  of  4  companies  of  foot  artillery).  A  further  three  Bengal  Light  Cavalry  regiments,  13  Bengal 
Native  Infantry  regiments,  three  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  regiments,  seven  companies  of  Bengal  Foot 
Artillery,  two  troops  of  Bengal  Horse  Artillery  and  two  companies  of  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners  had 
also  been  disarmed  by  this  time.  The  uprisings  reached  their  peak  during  the  week  of  3-10  June  when 
mutinies  took  place  in  15  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry,  three  regiments  of  Bengal  Light 
Cavalry,  four  regiments  of  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry,  five  companies  of  Bengal  Foot  Artillery,  one 
company  of  Bengal  Horse  Artillery,  one  Gwalior  infantry  regiment,  one  local  regiment  and  most  of  the 
Oudh  Irregular  Force.  89  The  fact  that  the  mutinies  began  in  May  and  peaked  in  June,  the  height  of  the 
hot  season,  was  almost  certainly  deliberate.  European  troops  were  at  a  disadvantage  in  hot  weather  and 
many  were  stationed  in  the  hills.  90 
In  the  majority  of  cases  -  as  if  in  confirmation  of  Ahsanullah's  claim  that  it  was  agreed  by  the 
conspirators  beforehand  -  the  mutinous  regiments  headed  for  Delhi.  By  mid-August  -  according  to  one 
British  spy  -  the  rebel  army  at  Delhi  was  composed  of  20  and  a  half  regiments  of  infantry  and  three  and 
a  half  regiments  of  cavalry,  giving  a  grand  total  of  17,975  mutineers  and  33  guns.  91  But  not  all  the 
rebel  troops  made  it  to  Delhi.  Some,  notably  in  the  Punjab,  were  intercepted  and  destroyed  en  route.  9' 
Others  coalesced  around  alternative  rebel  authorities:  such  as  Nana  Sahib  who  was  proclaimed  the  new 
Peshwa  at  Bithur  on  I  July;  Biijis  Qadir,  the  younger  son  of  WaJid  Ali,  who  was  crowned  King  of 
Oudh  at  Lucknow  on  5  July;  Raja  Koer  Singh  of  Jugdishpur  in  Bihar;  and  the  Nawabs  of  Banda  and 
Farruckhabad.  In  each  case,  however,  the  mutinous  troops  were  anxious  to  set  up  some  form  of 
alternative  government  to  the  British. 
This  determination  to  transfer  their  allegiance  to  a  native  employer  was  motivated  by  considerations 
that  were  both  political  and  professional  in  nature:  political  in  the  sense  that  they  were  seeking  to 
replace  their  colonial  overlords  with  traditional  native  rulers;  professional  in  that  many  of  them, 
"  Supplementary  Evidence  of  Hakim  Ahsanullah  Khan,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIII,  p.  276. 
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particularly  the  conspirators,  hoped  that  service  under  these  new  employers  would  be  more  rewarding 
than  it  had  become  under  the  British.  They  were,  as  Kolff  has  put  it,  simply  exercising  their  rights 
under  the  terms  of  the  traditional  military  labour  market.  "To  take  leave  of  a  master,  whose  'salt  one 
had  eaten',  "  writes  Kolff,  "did  neither  amount  to  a  breach  of  faith  nor  to  the  end  of  a  relationship.  "  He 
gives  the  example  of  a  battalion  of  Bombay  sepoys  which,  having  arrived  in  Poona  in  July  1805  one 
thousand  strong,  had  less  than  400  men  six  months  later.  93  By  1857,  however,  the  East  India  Company 
had  so  successfully  dominated  the  military  labour  market  that  it  was  no  longer  possible  for  sepoys  to 
pick  and  choose  their  employer  with  impunity.  The  only  way  to  create  an  alternative  was  to  destroy 
British  power.  In  this  sense  it  was  all  or  nothing  which  may  explain  why,  according  to  Ahsanullah,  the 
mutineers  decided  in  advance  "to  kill  all  Europeans  including  women  and  children,  in  every 
cantonment". 
9'  Such  atrocities  would  tar  whole  regiments  with  the  same  mutinous  brush  and  help  to 
ensure  that  the  less  enthusiastic  sepoys  joined  the  rebellion  because  they  no  longer  had  anything  to  lose. 
"There  were  some  who  remained  faithful,  "  wrote  Sitararn  Pandy,  "and  there  were  still  more  whose  fate 
it  was  to  be  in  a  regiment  that  mutinied.  These  had  no  desire  to  rebel  against  the  Sirkar,  but  feared  that 
no  allowance  would  be  made  for  them  when  so  many  others  had  gone  wrong.  This  was  well 
understood  by  those  who  instigated  the  mutiny.  Their  first  object  was  to  implicate  an  entire  regiment  so 
that  everyone  had  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  them.  "95 
The  argument  that  the  ringleaders  were  seeking  to  replace  one  employer  with  another  is  supported  by 
the  way  in  which  many  mutinous  corps  retained  their  command  structure  and  cohesiveness.  Stokes 
observed  that  the  "problem  of  re-establishing  discipline  and  internal  order  within  a  unit"  could  be 
"formidable",  partly  because  the  mutinous  faction  was  usually  "composed  of  men  from  the  ranks".  This 
was  true  in  a  number  of  cases,  notably  the  mutinies  of  the  P  L.  C.  at  Meerut,  the  6h  N.  I.  at  Allahabad, 
the  ffh  N.  I.  at  Nowgong  and  Jhansi,  the  28"'  N.  I.  at  Shafijahanpur,  the  32nd  N.  I.  (two  companies)  at 
Deogurh,  the  37h  N.  I.  at  Benares,  the  53  d  and  56h  N.  I.  at  Cawnpore,  the  7lt  at  Lucknow,  and 
Scindia's  Contingent  at  Gwalior.  But  in  many  more  instances,  native  officers  took  an  active  part  in  the 
plotting  and  perpetration  of  mutiny.  These  ringleaders  include:  the  subedar-majors  of  the  1',  34h,  41'4, 
5  I'd,  69h  N.  I;  subedars  in  the  2nd  and  4h  L.  C.,  5h,  IOh,  ffh,  15ý  17'11P  2&,  22nd,  34ýh,  42nd,  50h,  52ýd  and 
92  The  mutineers  from  Sialkot  -  the  4e  N.  I.  and  a  wing  of  the  9th  L.  C.  -  were  destroyed  almost  to  a  man 
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72nd  N.  I.,  5/7h  and  6/8h  F.  A.,  Oh,  7h  and  10th  Oudh  I.  I.,  P  and  7th  Gwalior  Infantry,  Mhairwarrah 
Battalion  and  2d  Punjab  I.  C.;  ressaldars  in  the  4h,  8h,  9g,  1&,  12'h,  14th  and  15th  I.  C.,  2nd  Oudh  I.  C.  and 
Nagpore  I.  C;  and  jemadars  in  the  5tý  32"d,  33rd  3411',  501h  and  7&  N.  I.,  and  I't  Hyderabad  Cavalry. 
Many  of  these  native  officers  were  working  hand  in  glove  with  other  non-commissioned  and  sepoy 
conspirators.  But  no  sooner  had  a  regiment  mutinied  than  its  remaining  native  officers  tended  either  to 
take,  or  to  be  given,  control.  Lal  Khan,  a  Muslim  subedar  of  the  3  rd  L.  C.,  is  said  to  have  been  elected 
generalissimo  of  the  Meerut  brigade  with  Bulcho  Singh,  a  Hindu  subedar  from  the  20'h  N.  I.,  as  his 
second-in-command. 
96  They  may  have  been  the  same  two  subedars  who,  according  to  the  courtier 
Munshi  Jiwan  Lal,  "formally  tendered  the  services  of  the  [mutinous]  troops  to  the  King"  on  II  May.  A 
day  later,  the  "whole  body  of  native  officers"  of  the  Meerut  regiments  presented  nazzars  (tribute 
money)  to  the  King  and  "described  themselves  as  faithful  soldiers  awaiting  his  orders".  But  they  were 
the  real  power  in  Delhi,  as  was  proven  by  the  Kingýs  acquiescence  to  their  demand  that  he  should 
proceed  through  the  streets  on  an  elephant  to  "allay  the  fears  of  the  citizens  and  order  the  people  to 
resume  their  ordinary  occupationS'e.  97  The  political  influence  of  native  officers  was  also  evident  in 
Lucknow  where  they  only  agreed  to  the  coronation  of  Biijis  Qadir  as  King  of  Oudh  on  the  following 
conditions:  orders  from  Delhi  were  to  override  any  other  authority;  the  King's  wazir  (chief  minister) 
was  to  be  selected  by  the  army;  officers  were  not  to  be  appointed  to  the  mutinous  regiments  without  the 
consent  of  the  army;  double  pay  was  to  be  issued  from  the  date  of  their  leaving  the  English  service;  and 
98 
no  one  was  to  interfere  with  the  "treatment  and  disposal  of  those  who  were  friends  to  the  English". 
The  native  officers  were  demanding  not  just  financial  reward,  but  professional  autonomy  and  a  say  in 
the  political  process  as  well. 
Some  native  officers  even  set  themselves  up  as  defacto  rulers.  Shortly  after  the  mutiny  of  two 
companies  of  the  560'N.  I.  at  Hamirpur  on  14  June,  their  senior  subedar,  Ali  Bux,  proclaimed  the  rule  of 
the  Mughal  dynasty  with  himself  as  the  King  of  Delhi's  agent.  Three  days  later,  Bux  ordered  the 
execution  of  the  magistrate,  Lloyd,  and  another  European  official.  99  In  the  Fatehgarh  district,  Subedar 
Thakur  Pandy  of  the  41'  N.  I.  assumed  administrative  control  of  the  eastern  division,  while  two  other 
subedars  "formed  a  kind  of  Appellate  Court  and  appear  to  have  been  invested  with  the  same  powers  as 
96  United  Service  Magazine,  August  1857,  p.  475. 
97  Metcalfe  (trans.  ),  Tivo  Native  Narratives,  pp.  83-6. 
9'  Statement  of  Mir  WaJid  Ali,  8  July  1859,  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Struggle,  111,  p.  85. 
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the  Lieutenant-Governor  of  the  N.  W.  P.  had  under  the  British  rule".  100  All  three  were  under  the  nominal 
authority  of  the  reluctant  Nawab  of  Farrukhabad. 
But  most  native  officers  were  content  to  monopolize  the  command  structure  of  mutinous  regiments, 
brigades  and  even  armies.  Following  the  mutiny  at  Nimach,  for  example,  Subedar  Shaikh  Riadut  Ali  of 
the  I"  L.  C.  was  appointed  brigadier.  He  "issued  orders  in  the  name  of  the  King  of  Delhi,  "  wrote 
Gimlette,  "and  promoted  subedars  and  jemadars  to  be  colonels  and  majors".  Subedar  Gurres  Ram  of 
the  72nd  N.  I.  was  given  command  of  his  regiment,  and  a  jemadar  in  the  I't  L.  C.  was  made  the  brigade 
major.  Even  after  the  defeat  of  the  Nimach  Brigade  at  Najafgarh  in  late  August,  a  portion  of  the  72nd 
N.  I.  kept  together  under  the  command  of  another  subedar,  Hira  Singh,  who  was  promoted  to  the  rank  of 
colonel.  101  At  Cawnporc,  Subedar  Tika  Singh  of  the  2"d  L.  C.,  the  senior  conspirator,  was  given  the  rank 
of  general  and  command  of  the  rebel  cavalry,  while  the  subedar-major  of  the  I"  N.  I.  controlled  the 
inf  ntry. 
102 
a  The  S&  N.  I.  was  initially  led  by  its  havildar-major;  but  he  was  replaced  by  a  subedar  after 
the  I"  N.  I.  had  "established  it  as  a  rule  that  men  who  joined  from  Furlough  should  get  their  places  and 
103  promotion".  Ajemadar  commanded  the  53d  N.  I.,  probably  because  no  subedar  was  available. 
Colonel  Lennox  of  the  22d  N.  I.  named  Subedar  Dulip  Singh  of  his  own  regiment  and  the  ressaldar  of 
the  troop  of  15'h  I.  C.  as  the  chief  instigators  of  the  mutiny  at  Fyzabad.  104  Gimlette  added:  "The  Subedar 
Major  of  the  22nd  ...  assumed  command  of  the  station  ...  and  ordinary  routine  was  carried  on.  Subedars 
became  Majors  and  Captains.  Jemadars  became  Lieutenants,  and  all  with  these  ranks  annexed  the 
horse,  carriages  and  property  of  their  predecessors.  "  105  Even  at  Jhansi,  where  the  chief  conspirators 
were  identified  as  four  sepoys,  the  rebel  leaders  were  native  officers:  Ressaldar  Faiz  Ali  of  the  14th  I.  C. 
and  Subedar  Lal  Bahadur  of  the  12'h  N.  I.  Ali  was  allegedly  responsible  for  the  infamous  massacre  of 
57  Christian  men,  women  and  children  on  8  June.  106 
The  native  officer  to  achieve  the  greatest  prominence  during  the  mutiny  was  Subedar  Bakht  Khan  of 
6'h/8'h  Foot  Artillery  which  mutinied  at  Bareilly  on  31  May.  One  of  the  chief  conspirators,  Bakht  Khan 
was  in  command  when  the  Bareilly  mutineers  -  augemented  by  the  28h  and  29h  N.  I.  from  Shahjahanpur 
100  Ibid.,  Nos.  U  8,119  and  120. 
101  Gimlette,  A  Postscript  to  the  Records  of  the  IndianMutiny,  pp.  36,187-9. 
102  Statement  of  Sowar  Jahangir  Khan,  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Struggle,  IV,  pp.  501-2; 
Gimlette,  A  Postscript  to  the  Records  of  the  Indian  Mutiny,  p.  72. 
103  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Struggle,  IV,  p.  669;  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  II,  Introd.,  p. 
159. 
104  Statement  by  Col.  W.  G.  Lennox,  I  Aug  1857,  Faizabad  Mutiny,  NAM,  5204-73. 
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and  Moradabad  respectively  -  arrived  in  Delhi  on  2  July.  At  a  subsequent  audience  with  the  King, 
Bakht  Khan  said  that  he  had  come  with  400,000  rupees  and  that  his  men  had  been  given  six  month's 
pay  in  advance.  He  added  that  he  did  not  require  any  financial  assistance  and  would  pay  the  balance  of 
his  money  into  the  King's  treasury  if  the  rebels  were  victorious.  He  also  promised  to  impose  discipline 
if  he  was  made  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  rebel  army  and  the  King  agreed.  Bakht  Khan  replaced  four 
ineffectual  royal  princes  -  Mirza  Mogul,  Mirza  Kizr  Sultan,  Mirza  Abu  Bakr  and  Mirza  Abdulla  -  at  the 
head  of  the  rebel  army,  though  Mirza  Mogul,  the  King's  eldest  surviving  son,  stayed  on  as  his  Adjutant- 
General.  But  Bakht  Khan's  own  tenure  failed  to  dislodge  the  Europeans  from  the  Delhi  ridge  and,  on 
23  August,  after  accusations  that  he  had  been  negotiating  with  the  enemy,  he  was  replaced  in  supreme 
command  by  a  12-man  committee  (six  nominated  by  the  King  and  six  by  the  rebel  officers).  107 
Native  officers  were  not  always  ascendant  in  rebel  regiments.  According  to  Major  Macpherson, 
Subedar-Major  Amanut  Ali  of  the  V  Infantry,  Gwalior  Contingent,  was  promoted  to  "general"  by  the 
rebels  at  Gwalior,  "but  the  most  violent  sepoys  in  fact  commanded".  He  added:  "These  troops  spent 
their  whole  time  in  council,  punchayels,  courts,  and  deputations;  and  the  Maharajah  [Scindia]  was 
compelled  to  receive  daily 
...  one  of  the  latter,  composed  of  officers  from  every  corps  with  privates 
delegated  to  watch  them.  .. 
008  This  power-sharing  arrangement  was  similar  to  thepunchayet  system 
which  had  held  sway  in  the  Khalsa  (Sikh  army)  prior  to  the  I"  Sikh  War  (not  to  mention  the  military 
committees  which  had  dominated  the  parliamentary  army  after  the  English  Civil  War),  and  probably 
explains  why  Scindia  found  it  so  easy  to  play  one  faction  of  the  Gwalior  Contingent  off  against  another. 
occasionally  other  ranks  assumed  positions  of  authority.  After  the  mutiny  at  Allahabad  on  6  June,  the 
200  or  so  members  of  the  6th  N.  I.  who  made  for  Cawnpore  were  commanded  by  a  jemadar,  but  with  a 
sepoyas  his  acting  havildar-major.  109  When  Jemadar  SitaramPandy,  on  leave  from  the  6PNI,  was 
taken  prisoner  in  Oudh  by  a  band  of  mutineers,  he  noted  that  the  "leader  of  this  party  was  a  sepoy, 
although  there  were  two  mibedars  with  it".  110  Also,  according  to  the  offical  record  of  notable  rebels, 
Juggut  Singh  of  the  52"d  N.  I.  "became  a  leader  of  the  rebels  and  was  killed  in  May  1858  with  13  of  his 
followers".  III 
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Overall,  however,  former  native  officers  dominated  the  military  hierarchy  of  rebel  regiments:  partly 
because  so  many  of  them  had  taken  an  active  part  in  the  pre-mutiny  plotting;  but  mainly  because  most 
mutineers  realized  that  adherence  to  military  rank  was  the  best  and  fairest  way  to  maintain  regimental 
cohesion  and  discipline.  The  willingness  with  which  many  sepoy  conspirators  were  prepared  to  submit 
to  the  post-mutiny  authority  of  their  military  superiors  is  surely  proof  that  professional  considerations 
were  paramount.  The  sensitivity  of  the  rank  and  file  towards  service  issues  like  seniority,  for  example, 
was  much  in  evidence.  In  late  August,  the  native  officers  of  the  3rd  N.  I.  petitioned  the  King  of  Delhi  on 
behalf  of  the  regiment's  other  ranks  (N.  C.  O.  s  and  sepoys)  who  objected  to  the  fact  that  latecomers  to  the 
Royal  service  had  recently  been  placed  on  the  same  general  list  of  seniority  that  applied  to  those  who 
had  been  fighting  all  summer.  Formerly,  said  the  petition,  these  late  arrivals  bad  been  "kept  on  as 
supernumeraries,  in  the  grades  in  which  they  had  formerly  served".  112 
Interestingly  enough,  a  rough  estimate  of  the  number  of  Bengal  Native  Infantrymen  who  either 
mutinied,  were  disarmed  and  disbanded,  or  remained  loyal,  indicates  that  native  officers  were  over 
represented  in  the  latter  category.  113  This  is  not  surprising,  given  their  age  and  proximity  to  a  Company 
pension.  More  remarkable  is  the  significant  proportion  of  native  officers  involved  in  the  planning  and 
execution  of  mutiny,  and  the  conduct  of  military  operations  thereafter.  Prior  to  the  mutiny,  Napier  and 
Lawrence  highlighted  the  inadequacy  of  career  prospects  for  native  officers  and  the  danger  of  thwarting 
legitimate  ambition.  Both  were  ignored,  but  the  accuracy  of  their  predictions  seems  to  have  been 
proven  by  the  significant  role  played  by  native  officers  during  the  mutiny.  According  to  Major  O'Brien 
of  the  60'  Oudh  I.  I.,  a  "large  body"  of  the  native  officers  of  his  regiment,  the  22nd  N.  I.  and  the  15'h  I.  C. 
were  "active  instigators  of  the  mutiny"  at  Faizabad  on  8  June.  He  added:  "The  prizes  they  hope  to  gain 
by  being  put  in  the  position  the  European  officers  formerly  held,  &  having  perhaps  from  one  to  four 
hundred  rupees  pay  per  mensum,  being  in  my  opinion  one  of  their  chief  inducements  to  side  with  the 
rebels.  "  114 
Long-term  financial  reward  and  regimental  cohesion  went  hand  in  hand.  The  mutineers  could  hardly 
expect  to  be  employed  as  a  body  by  the  restored  native  rulers  unless  they  retained  their  discipline. 
112  Petition  of  the  commissioned  officers  of  the  3d  N.  I.,  26  Aug  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIU,  p.  170. 
113  Mutinied:  392  native  officers  and  36,358  other  ranks.  Disarmed:  331  native  officers  and  21,314 
other  ranks.  Disbanded:  41  native  officers  and  2,151  other  ranks.  Remained  loyal:  150  native  officers 
and  5,598  other  ranks.  These  figures  do  not  include  men  on  furlough  who  later  returned  to  their 
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ýiments.  For  details  see  Appendix  3.  re 
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Their  political  influence  was  also  dependent  upon  an  outward  display  of  unity  -  as  were  their  lives  in 
that  only  disciplined  troops  had  a  hope  of  defeating  European  regiments  in  the  field.  A  host  of  accounts 
confirm  this  retention  of  regimental  organization.  When  the  II  th  and  2&  N.  I.  arrived  at  Delhi  on  the 
morning  of  II  May,  one  European  officer  described  them  as  "coming  up  in  military  formation,...  in 
subdivisions  of  companies  with  fixed  bayonets  and  sloped  arms".  115  As  the  Nimach  mutineers  marched 
towards  Delhi,  via  Agra,  the  infantry  were  in  front,  followed  by  the  artillery  and  cavalry,  with  advance 
and  rear  guards  "told  off,  and  Cavalry  flanking  parties  thrown  out".  116  At  Faizabad  the  "band  played  at 
mess  every  night",  guards  "were  posted,  and  parades  ordered  at  usual".  117  Even  the  internal  disciplinary 
system  of  mutinous  regiments  was  similar  to  that  which  had  operated  under  the  British.  When  a  sepoy 
of  the  I  IdN.  I.  was  found  asleep  on  sentry  duty  at  Delhi  in  July,  he  was  tried  and  found  guilty  by  a 
court-martial  of  all  the  regiment's  native  officers.  The  only  deviation  from  the  British  system  was  that 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  Bakht  Khan,  was  asked  to  award  a  punishment  instead  of  confirming  the 
court's. 
118 
Tapti  Roy  commented  on  a  similar  degree  of  organisation  among  the  rebel  troops  in  Bundelkhand 
(the  majority  of  whom  were  from  the  splendidly-disciplined  Gwalior  Contingent): 
A  series  of  orders  issued  practically  every  day  from Kalpi  in  the  name  of  Tantia  Topey  [Nana  Sahib's  military 
commander]  strikingly  illustrates  the  meticulous  planning  and  organization  that  went  into  the  soldiers'  actions.  A 
strict  hierarchy  of  ranks  was  specified  for  each  regiment  with  a  brigadicr-major  in  command,  followed  by  a 
subahdar-major,  havildar-major,  jamadar,  naik  and  the  soldiers...  Regular  inspection,  muster  rolls  and  daily  drill 
were  compulsory.  A  change  of  guards  at  10  a.  m.,  4  p.  m.  and  10  p.  m.  was  also  mandatory.  For  hearing 
representations  or  dispensing  justice,  periodic  courts  represented  by  one  soldier,  one  sardar  and  jamadars  of 
infantry  and  artillery  together  with  moulavics  [Muslim  scholars]  and  pandits  [teamed  Brahmins]  were 
summoned...  Every  offence  would  call  for  an  appropriate  punishment...  Provisions  were  made  for  the  families  of 
those  injured  or  killed.  Strict  orders  were  given  for  enlistment,  recruitment  and  discipline.  Of  the  soldiers  who 
escaped  from  Jhansi,  five  were  apprehended  or  hanged.  '  19 
115  Examination  of  Capt.  Forrest,  S  Feb  1857,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVIIL  p.  186. 
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This  professionalism  was  evident  when  the  Bundelkhand  rebels  went  into  action.  The  assistant 
magistrate  who  was  present  during  Tantia  Topi's  successful  siege  of  Chirkhari,  in  early  1858,  noted: 
"They  had  their  bugle  calls  during  the  last  grand  assault,  and  each  separate  band  of  matchlock-men  was 
led  on  and  performed  its  task  under  the  tuition  evidently  of  some  of  the  smartest  sepoys  who  had  been 
instructed  by  us  in  the  art  of  war.  They  had  their  hospital  doolies  [litters],  and  they  appeared  to  have  a 
large  and  well  regulated  bazar  with  abundance  of  supplies.  They,  in  short,  displayed  all  the  active 
energies  of  the  battlefield.  "  120  Even  during  the  defeat  of  the  rebels  at  Kunch  in  May  1858,  Sir  Hugh 
Rose,  the  British  commander,  was  moved  to  praise  the  professionalism  and  courage  of  the  skirmishers 
of  the  52'd  N.  I.  who  "covered  the  retreat  very  well...,  facing  about  kneeling  and  firing  with  great 
coolness". 
121 
The  importance  of  military  discipline  and  financial  incentives  was  recognized  by  all  rebel 
governments.  On  6  July,  Nana  Sahib  issued  a  series  of  proclamations  detailing  the  internal 
organization  of  regiments  and  their  officers'  monthly  rates  of  pay:  colonels  would  receive  750  rupees, 
majors  500  rupees,  adjutants  250  and  quartermasters  150.  The  latter  pair  would  also  receive  their 
(unspecified)  pay  as  subedars;  the  other  subedars  in  command  of  companies  would  be  given  an 
additional  allowance  of  30  rupees.  Provision  was  also  made  for  pensions  to  be  paid  to  retired  and 
disabled  soldiers,  and  the  families  of  those  killed  in  battle.  122  But  as  pay  was  being  distributed  in  early 
July,  after  the  destruction  of  the  Europeans  at  Cawnpore,  the  rebel  troops  began  "quarrelling  about  the 
rewards"  and  "General  Tika  Singh"  and  his  men  went  to  see  the  Nana  at  Bithur  to  insist  on  their  share 
of  the  treasure.  123  Their  demands  must  have  been  met  because  the  Nana  returned  to  Cawnpore  and  - 
according  to  a  sowar  in  the  2d  L.  C.  -  distributed  two  months'pay.  124 
The  Delhi  Proclamation,  issued  in  the  name  of  the  King  in  mid-May,  promised  to  pay  Company 
sepoys  10  rupees  a  month  and  sowars  30  if  they  switched  their  allegiance  to  him.  125  Ishtihars 
(administrative  notes)  specifying  the  organization  and  pay  of  troops  were  regularly  issued  at  Delhi. 
one  such,  published  on  6  July,  stated  that  there  would  be  one  colonel  as  commanding  officer,  one 
major  as  second-in-command  and  one  adjutant  for  every  regiment  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  "Duties  and 
120  J.  H.  Came  to  the  Sec.  to  the  Govt.  of  India,  4  March  1858,  quoted  in  Roy,  ibid.,  p.  64. 
121  Rose  to  Lord  Elphinstone,  28  June  1858,  Elphinstone  Papers,  OIOC,  MSS  Eur/F87ABox  6A/4 
122  S.  C.,  NAI,  Nos.  86-9  of  31  July  1857. 
123  Narrative  of  Events  by  Nanukchund,  Forrest  (ed.  ),  State  Papers,  III,  Appx.,  pp.  CcIXXXiii-ccclvii. 
124  Rizvi  and  Bhargava  (eds.  ),  Freedom  Siniggle,  IV,  pp.  500-1. 
125  Ibid.,  1,  pp.  438-9. 254 
emoluments  commensurate  with  each  rank  were  also  spelled  oUt.,  "26  According  to  Mainodin, 
perwanahs  (warrants)  were  extorted  daily  from  the  King  and  addressed  to  Bengal  regiments,  promising 
monthly  salaries  of  30  rupees  to  sepoys  and  50  to  sowars  if  they  joined  the  King's  army.  "Inevery 
instance,  "  recalled  Mainodin,  "the  King's  perwanah  had  the  effect  of  causing  the  soldiers  to  mutiny  and 
make  their  way  to  Delhi.  At  the  sight  of  the  King's  perwanah  the  men  who  had  fought  for  the  English 
forgot  the  past,  in  the  desire  to  be  re-established  under  a  native  sovereign.  "  127 
Such  generous  rates  of  pay,  however,  were  not  realistic.  The  King  had  no  treasury  in  May  1857  and 
the  new  government's  fund-raising  efforts  could  not  keep  pace  with  its  expenses.  On  28  May,  an 
altercation  broke  out  between  the  native  officers  of  the  3rd  L.  C.  and  the  Delhi  regiments  over  the 
government's  offer  of  nine  rupees  for  sowars  and  seven  for  sepoys.  The  cavalry  are  said  to  have 
demanded  30  rupees  with  no  deductions,  while  the  infantry  were  prepared  to  accept  their  old  pay.  "The 
Meerut  sowars  accused  the  Delhi  regiments  of  having  enriched  themselves  by  plunder,  "  recorded 
Munshi  Jiwan  Lal,  "whereas  the  Meerut  men  had  by  their  good  behaviour  reaped  nothing...  The  foot 
sepoys  replied  that  the  Meerut  men  were  rebellious  and  utterly  bad.  "  The  volatile  atmosphere  was 
finally  defused  when  the  King's  servants  promised  the  cavalry  20  rupees  a  month,  128  But  the  financial 
situation  at  Delhi  steadily  worsened,  despite  the  occasional  donation  of  Company  money  to  the  King's 
treasury  by  newly-arrived  mutineers.  In  an  undated  letter,  the  King  instructed  his  son,  Mirza  Mughal, 
not  to  accept  any  more  applications  for  enlistment  in  the  royal  army  by  non-Company  troops  because 
there  was  no  money  to  pay  them.  The  regular  forces  in  Delhi  had  not  even  brought  enough  treasure  for 
their  own  expenses,  he  explained,  and  it  was  impossible  to  collect  the  land  revenue  until  the  country 
had  been  pacified.  Therefore  only  those  irregulars  who  were  financially  self-sufficient  for  at  least  two 
months  were  to  be  given  permission  to  come  to  Delhi.  They  would  be  compensated  when  order  had 
been  re-established,  but  only  after  the  pay  arrears  of  regular  troops  had  been  dealt  with.  129  These  latter 
had  become  so  acute  by  early  September  that  the  army  was  threatening  to  plunder  the  city  unless  its  pay 
demands  -  said  to  be  573,000  rupees  a  month  -  were  met.  A  partial  payment  was  made  on  2  September, 
but  only  enough  to  give  each  sepoy  one  rupee  and  each  sowar  two.  130  The  rebel  troops  at  Delhi  had 
another  reason  to  regret  their  change  of  employer.  According  to  the  spy  Jat  Mall,  the  wounded 
126  Roy,  7he  Politics  of  a  Popular  Uprising,  p.  53  -4. 
127  Metcalfe  (trans.  ),  Two  Native  Narratives,  p.  60. 
128  Ibid.,  p.  105. 
129  King  of  Delhi  to  Mirza  Mughal,  undated,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  XVI[II,  p.  172. 
130  Metcalfe  (trans.  ),  Two  Native  Narratives,  pp.  215-17. 2SS 
"contrasted  the  neglect  with  which  they  were  treated  in  Delhi,  with  the  care  they  would  have 
experienced  under  similar  circumstances  had  they  been  fighting  for  the  English".  131 
At  Lucknow,  too,  the  rebel  government  was  unable  to  redeem  its  promises  of  pay.  The  official 
salaries  ranged  from  1,000  rupees  for  colonels  and  165  for  subedars  to  30  for  troopers  and  12  for 
sepoys.  But  according  to  7he  Bengal  Hurkaru,  these  figures  were  "purely  nominal"  as  no  man  had  "yet 
received  full  salary  for  any  month".  132  Firoz  Shah,  the  cousin  of  the  King  of  Delhi,  who  took  charge  of 
the  insurrection  at  Mandesur  in  the  state  of  Gwalior  in  August,  promised  to  pay  his  sepoys  15  rupees  a 
month.  By  late  September,  however,  money  was  scarce  and  pay  had  been  reduced  to  the  pre-mutiny 
level  of  seven  rupees.  133 
But  the  inability  of  rebel  governments  to  make  good  their  pledges  over  pay  does  not  undermine  the 
importance  of  financial  incentives  as  a  motive  to  mutiny.  "I  consider  that  the  native  troops  mutinied  in 
the  hope  of  worldy  gain,  "  stated  Ahsanullah  Khan,  who  was  in  a  good  position  tojudge.  "The 
admixture  of  religion  was  only  intended  to  disguise  their  real  object.  If  they  were  really  fighting  for 
religion,  they  would  not  have  plundered  the  houses  and  property  of  the  people,  nor  would  they  have 
oppressed  and  injured  them...  11134  Some  regiments  (as  we  have  seen)  handed  the  Company  treasure 
they  had  been  guarding  over  to  the  rebel  authorities,  others  kept  it  to  pay  their  men,  and  a  few  -  like  the 
17th  N.  I.  -  simply  divided  it  among  themselves.  135  But  most  sepoys:  were  able  to  benefit  by  plunder  or 
extortion  during  the  anarchy  that  ensued.  At  Gwalior,  the  mutineers  offered  their  services  to  Scindia  in 
return  for  the  four  and  a  half  lakhs  of  treasure  the  British  had  made  over  to  him;  but  if  he  refused  to 
"lead  them  against  Agra,  which  they  would  make  over  to  him,  with  such  provinces  as  he  desired",  he 
would  have  to  pay  "  12  or  15  lacs  more",  and  provide  supplies  and  carriage  for  them  "to  move  whither 
they  pleased".  They  were  eventually  placated  by  a  "donation  of  three  months'pay,  and  the  promise  of 
service". 
"'  According  to  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  every  sepoy  killed  by  his  Central  India  Field  Force  had 
"generally  from  90  to  100  rupees  about  him".  137 
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Some  mutinous  sepoys  used  promises  of  higher  pay  to  induce  those  still  loyal  to  rise.  At  Jhansi,  for 
example,  the  52  N.  C.  O.  s  and  sepoys  of  the  12th  N.  I.  who  mutinied  on  5  June  "invited  all  men  of  the 
deen  [faith]  to  flock  to  their  standard,  offering  to  remunerate  each  man  for  his  services  at  the  rate  of 
twelve  rupees  per  month".  They  were  joined  by  the  remaining  troops  in  the  station  the  following 
day.  138  In  January  1858,  the  native  officers  of  the  mutinous  Gwalior  Contingent  offered  the  sepoys  in 
the  service  of  the  pro-British  Raja  of  Chirkhari  10  rupees  a  month  to  come  over  to  them.  Many  did, 
while  others  refused  to  fight,  giving  the  Raja  no  option  but  to  surrender.  He  was  forced  to  pay  an 
indemnity  of  three  lakhs  of  rupees,  part  of  which  was  sent  to  the  Nana  while  the  rest  was  used  to  settle 
the  soldiers'wage  arrears.  The  Nana  had  promised  his  troops  a  gratuity  of  one  month's  pay,  pensions 
for  those  who  fell  in  action  and  licence  to  plunder  goods  up  to  the  value  of  100  1  rupees  if  the  attack 
was  successful. 
139 
There  is  no  statistical  proof  that  mutineers  from  one  branch  of  the  Bengal  Army  were  any  more 
motivated  by  the  lure  of  financial  gain  than  those  from  another.  But  given  that  most  irregular 
cavalrymen  were  Muslims  -  and  therefore  had  neither  caste  nor  religion  in  common  with  the  majority  of 
military  conspirators  -  it  is  probably  fair  to  conclude  that  they  reacted  to,  rather  than  initiated,  the 
disorder,  regarding  it  as  an  opportunity  both  to  restore  the  Mughals  and  to  enrich  themselves.  No 
irregular  cavalrymen  appear  to  have  been  involved  in  the  plotting  prior  to  the  Meerut  outbreak,  and 
only  two  regiments  had  mutinied  by  the  end  of  May.  They  were,  moreover,  the  most  debt-ridden  native 
troops  in  the  Bengal  Army,  and  debt  was  an  obvious  incentive  to  mutiny.  Captain  Dennys  of  the  Kotah 
Contingent  blamed  penury  for  the  mutiny  of  his  Muslim  horse  on  4  July.  "I  always  felt  that  our  cavalry 
could  not  be  relied  upon,  "  he  wrote  later.  "They  were  well  dressed  and  fairly  well  mounted  but  their 
general  state  of  hopeless  indebtedness  was  sufficient  to  prevent  their  remaining  loyal,  if  anything  like 
absolute  anarchy  should  ever  come.  "140  The  Bengal  irregular  cavalrymen  were  in  a  similar  position.  So 
when,  for  example,  the  sowars  of  the  12ý'I.  C.  mutinied  at  Sigauli  on  23  July,  killing  their  commandant 
and  his  wife  in  the  process,  their  first  act  was  to  raid  the  regimental  bank  of  50,000  rupees  and  to 
plunder  the  shops  of  banias  [moneylenders].  Having  divided  the  proceeds,  they  headed  for  the  Opium 
Agency  at  Gobind  Gunge  which  they  also  pillaged.  141 
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By  the  end  of  1857  -  according  to  my  calculations  142 
_  an  estimated  40,412  natives  of  the  regular  Bengal 
Army  had  mutinied.  They  had  been  joined  by  3,309  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalrymen,  2,452  local  troops, 
17,129  members  of  contingents,  legions  and  various  irregular  forces  and  many  thousands  of  disaffected 
civilians.  A  further  26,681  regular  Bengal  troops  had  been  disarmed  or  disbanded,  as  had  3,120  Bengal 
Irregular  Cavalryman  and  1,396  other  irregular  troops.  Just  6,065  regulars  had  remained  loyal,  though 
their  numbers  were  boosted  by  2,149  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalrymen,  15,075  locals  and  17,129  members 
of  irregular  forces  (mainly  the  Punjab  Irregular  Force).  143  In  trying  to  estimate  the  number  of  trained 
troops  who  actually  fought  against  the  British  in  1857,  however,  two  factors  need  to  be  taken  into 
account:  on  the  one  hand,  a  significant  proportion  of  mutineers  simply  returned  to  their  villages  and 
took  no  part  in  the  fighting;  on  the  other,  a  number  of  the  disarmed  and  disbanded  troops  were 
sufficiently  disaffected  to  join  the  rebellion  regardless.  But  the  former  were  probably  more  numerous 
than  the  latter,  so  a  figure  in  the  region  of  50,000  active  mutineers  is  probably  about  right. 
This  chapter,  however,  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  pattern  of  mutiny  and  the  insight  it  affords 
into  the  motives  of  the  mutineers.  From  the  evidence  produced,  certain  conclusions  can  be  reached. 
The  first  is  that  the  mutinies  -  planned  as  well  as  actual  -  which  succeeded  the  Delhi  and  Meerut 
outbreak  were  not  all  the  result  of  a  knock-on  effect.  If  they  had  been,  they  would  have  spread 
outwards  in  roughly  concentric  circles.  Instead,  some  of  the  earliest  mutinies  took  place  in  stations  as 
far  apart  as  Nasirabad  in  Rajputana  and  Nowshera  in  northern  Punjab.  They  were  undoubtedly 
prompted  by  the  initial  outbreak;  but  their  timing  tended  to  depend  upon  the  level  of  disaffection  in 
particular  regiments.  144  The  15dN.  I.  at  Nasirabad,  for  example,  had  only  recently  moved  from  Meerut 
where  it  probably  became  tainted  by  association.  In  general,  the  ringleaders  would  have  considered  a 
regiment  ripe  for  mutiny  when  they  had  succeeded  in  convincing  a  sizeable  proportion  of  their  fellow 
sepoys  that  the  British  really  did  intend  to  take  away  their  caste  and  religion.  Then  they  either  planned 
a  mutiny  in  advance  with  conspirators  in  other  regiments  -  as  at  Lahore,  Peshawur,  Hansi,  Lucknow, 
142  See  Appendix  3. 
143  The  combined  figure  for  regular  Bengal  troops  (including  the  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry)  of  81,736 
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Bareilly  and  Cawnpore  -  or  they  simply  took  advantage  of  a  suitable  opportunity  to  encourage  their 
comrades  to  rise,  such  as  the  execution  of  the  Brahmin  zemindar  at  Aligarh,  the  movement  of  treasure 
at  Mathura  and  Azi  mgarh,  or  the  disarmament  of  native  corps  at  Benares  and  Dinapore. 
Most  of  the  joint  mutinies  were  planned  in  conjunction  with  civilian  conspirators.  Thisisentirely 
consistent  with  the  prime  aim  of  most  active  mutineers:  to  be  re-employed  by  a  restored  native  ruler. 
"All  regiments  took  their  Colours  with  them,  "  observed  Sitaram  Pandy  of  the  63d  N.  I.  "They  did  not 
break  their  oath  by  deserting  them.  They  left  the  service  of  the  English  and  were  supposed  to  have 
entered  the  service  of  another  government.  045  Tapti  Roy  has  interpreted  the  soldiers'  actions  in  a 
purely  political  light.  "The  decision  of  every  rebel  unit  to  move  towards  the  centre  [Delhi  and 
Cawnporel,  "  she  wrote,  "was 
...  part  of  an  implicit  strategy,  to  build,  uphold  and  strengthen  an 
alternative  supra-local  political  order.  "146  In  fact  this  strategy  had  been  predetermined  by  the  sepoy 
plotters  whose  original  incentive  was  probably  more  professional  than  political  in  that  they  hoped  their 
new  employers  would  provide  more  pay  and  greater  career  opportunites  than  the  British  had.  Their 
political  involvement,  therefore  was  simply  a  means  to  a  professional  end,  though  it  became  for  some 
an  end  in  itself. 
Roy  herself  noted  that  the  mutinous  sepoys  "maintained  not  only  the  military  organizations  of  their 
regiments  but  also  the  hierarchy  of  rank  and  order  within  each  regiment".  147  Yet  she  failed  to  draw  the 
obvious  conclusion:  that  the  mutinies  were  more  about  professional  than  religious,  or  even  political, 
grievances.  Some  activists  were  undoubtedly  'politicized'  in  that  they  sought  the  overthrow  of  British 
rule.  But  they  would  not  have  been  able  to  hoodwink  enough  of  their  fellow  soldiers  unless  the  Bengal 
Army  generally  had  been  unhappy  with  the  terms  of  its  employment.  Set  in  the  historical  context  of  the 
Indian  military  labour  market,  where  there  was  a  long  tradition  of  mercenary  soldiers  from  eastern 
Hindustan  who  were  liable  to  switch  employers  if  the  occasion  demanded,  the  Indian  mutiny  makes 
perfect  sense. 
A  key  factor  in  the  gradual  alienation  of  the  sepoys  from  their  employer  was,  as  stated  in  Chapters  3 
and  4,  their  deteriorating  relationship  with  their  European  officers.  The  link  between  a  commanding 
officer's  length  of  service  and  the  relative  disaffection  of  his  regiment  in  1857  indicates  that  a  familiar 
and  popular  commanding  officer  could  slow  down  the  process  of  alienation.  In  some  cases  the 
145  Lunt  (ed.  ),  From  Sepoy  to  Subedar,  p.  174. 
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presence  of  such  an  officer  was  enough  to  deter  a  regiment  from  mutinying;  in  others  it  helped  to  save 
European  lives.  But  even  a  popular  officer  was  not  always  able  to  prevent  his  men  from  succumbing  to 
peer  pressure  and  the  material  lure  of  higher  wages  and  plunder. 260 
Chapter  Nine  -  The  Peel  Commission  and  Military  Reform 
This  chapter  will  review  the  deliberations  of  the  Royal  Commission  appointed  to  advise  on  the 
reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Army.  It  will  conclude  that  a  large  chunk  of  the  Commission's  evidence, 
its  recommendations  and  the  subsequent  military  reforms  were  directed  towards  redressing  the  type  of 
professional  grievances  that  underlay  the  mutiny.  Admittedly  the  Commission  was  not  set  up 
specifically  to  identify  the  causes  of  the  military  revolt.  Nor  was  the  oral  and  written  evidence 
presented  to  it  entirely  free  from  an  element  of  hindsight.  On  the  other  hand,  a  number  of  its  key 
proposals  (particularly  those  additional  recommendations  which  went  beyond  its  original  remit)  were 
virtually  identical  to  the  military  reforms  that  were  being  urged  upon  the  Bengal  Army  before  the 
mutiny  by  far-sighted  men  such  as  Henry  Lawrence  and  John  Jacob.  These  proposals  were,  it  could  be 
argued,  an  implicit  response  to  what  the  Commissioners  (or  more  properly  their  witnesses)  had 
identified  as  the  fundamental  causes  of  mutiny. 
In  late  November  1857,  with  Delhi  recaptured  but  the  rebellion  far  from  over,  the  Court  of  Directors 
authorised  Lord  Canning  to  assemble  a  mixed  commission  of  officers  (both  Company  and  Queen's)  and 
civil  servants  to  report  on  the  future  organisation  of  the  Indian  Army.  But  Canning  was  unwilling  to 
devote  his  key  personnel  to  such  an  onerous  task  and,  in  May  1858,  despite  the  opposition  of  Sir  James 
Outram.  (a  member  of  his  Council)  and  others,  he  appointed  a  single  officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Henry 
Durand,  to  conduct  the  inquiry.  Durand  sent  a  detailed  questionnaire  to  85  military  and  civil  officers. 
They  were  required  to  provide  written  responses  to  a  series  of  questions  on  Recruiting,  Rules  of 
Discipline,  Organisation,  Promotion  and  various  other  aspects  of  army  life.  In  August,  Durand  began 
drafting  summaries  of  the  replies  for  Lord  Canning.  ' 
Meanwhile,  on  IS  July  1858,  a  Royal  Commission  had  been  set  up  in  London  "to  inquire  into  the 
organisation  of  the  Indian  Army".  Its  chairman  was  Major-General  Jonathan  Peel,  Secretary  of  State 
for  War  and  brother  of  the  late  Prime  Minister.  I-Es  ten  co-members  were:  Lord  Stanley,  Commissioner 
for  Indian  Affairs  (and  later  Secretary  of  State  for  India);  the  Duke  of  Cambridge,  Commander-in-Chief 
of  the  British  Army;  General  the  Marquess  of  Tweeddale,  the  former  Governor  and  Commander-in- 261 
Chief  of  Madras;  Lieutenant-General  Sir  George  Wetherall,  Adjutant-General  of  the  British  Army; 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  Harry  Smith,  a  celebrated  veteran  of  the  Peninsula,  Waterloo  and  I't  Sikh  War; 
Major-General  Viscount  Melville,  commander  of  a  Bombay  cavalry  brigade  in  the  2nd  Sikh  War; 
Major-General  Henry  Hancock,  the  former  Adjutant-General  of  the  Bombay  Army;  Major-General 
Patrick  Montgomerie;  Colonel  William  Burlton;  and  Colonel  Thomas  Tait,  the  Commandant  of  the  3  rd 
Bengal  I.  C.  and  the  only  member  still  a  serving  officer  in  the  Indian  Army.  2 
On  2  August  1858,  shortly  before  the  Peel  Commission  began  its  inquiries,  Queen  Victoria  gave  her 
assent  to  an  act  which  transferred  the  administration  of  India  from  the  East  India  Company  to  the 
Crown.  3  With  the  Indian  Army  now  the  direct  responsibility  of  the  Queen,  the  Commission  was  asked 
to  respond  to  eleven  questions  regarding  the  army's  future  organisation.  Six  questions  (numbers  1,3,7, 
9,10,11)  were  partly  or  wholly  concerned  with  the  native  portion,  including  the  terms  of  the  Indian 
Army's  transfer  to  the  Crown,  the  proportion  of  European  to  native  troops,  the  possibility  of  mixing 
European  and  native  troops  in  regiments  or  brigades,  the  preference  for  regular  or  irregular  native  corps 
(or  a  mixture  of  both),  the  desirability  of  retaining  native  artillery  corps,  and  the  question  of  whether 
cadets  for  native  corps  should  be  attached  first  to  European  regiments  "to  secure  uniformity  of  drill  and 
discipline".  The  remaining  five  questions  (numbers  2,4,5,6  and  8)  were  exclusively  about  European 
troops:  the  size  of  the  permanent  European  force,  the  proportion  of  local  troops  in  that  force,  the 
method  of  their  recruitment,  the  relief  of  Queen's  regiments,  and  the  possible  consolidation  of  local  and 
Queen's  regiments  so  that  troops  could  be  transferred  from  one  branch  of  the  service  to  the  other.  4 
By  December  1858,  the  Commission  had  examined  47  witnesses  and  collected  a  vast  amount  of 
written  evidence  (including  the  responses  to  Durand's  questionnaire  and  Durand's  own  summaries).  Its 
report  was  submitted  on  7  March  1859.  Much  of  the  evidence  concerning  native  corps,  particularly 
those  of  the  Bengal  Army,  has  been  dealt  with  in  previous  chapters.  Here  we  are  more  concerned  with 
the  interpretation  put  on  it  by  the  Commissioners.  Their  responses  to  the  original  eleven  questions 
were  as  follows: 
1  Shibly,  'The  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies,  1858-1879',  Ph.  D  thesis,  p.  45;  Michael  Maclagan, 
Clemenc,  y  Canning  (London,  1962),  pp.  240-1. 
2  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  i. 
3  Act  21  &  22  Vict.,  Cap.  106,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1857-8,  H,  pp.  367-94. 
4  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  P.  vi. 262 
1.  No  change  should  be  made  in  the  terms  of  employment  for  existing  Company  officers  (including  rates  of  pay, 
pensions  and  promotion  by  seniority),  but  new  regulations  could  be  applied  to  future  officers.  2.  The  total  number 
of  Europeans  necessary  for  the  security  of  India  "should 
... 
be  about  80,000;  of  which  50,000  would  be  required  for 
Bengal,  15,000  for  Madras,  and  15,000  for  Bombay".  3.  The  "amount  of  Native  force  should  not  ... 
bear  a  greater 
proportion  to  the  European,  in  Cavalry  and  Infantry,  than  two  to  one  for  Bengal,  and  three  to  one  for  Madras  and 
Bombay  rcspcctivcly".  4.  The  Commissioners  were  "unable  to  arrive  at  any  unanimity  of  opinion"  with  regard  to 
the  proportion  of  Local  European  regiments  to  regiments  of  die  Line,  but  the  majority  came  down  in  favour  of 
abolishing  the  Local  force  on  the  grounds  that  it  caused  professional  jealousies  and  was  less  disciplined  than  its 
Line  counterpart.  5.  In  the  event  that  the  European  force  was  split  between  Local  and  Line  regiments,  the  lattces 
tour  of  service  in  India  "should  not  exceed  twelve  years".  6.  The  Commissioners  could  see  "no  obstacle  to  at  once 
allowing  the  [European]  off  iccrs  of  die  junior  ranks  (second  lieutenants,  comets,  and  ensigns)  to  exchange  from 
one  Branch  of  the  service  to  the  other",  but  there  was  "a  great  difficulty  in  the  higher  ranks,  arising  from  the 
seniority  system  of  promotion".  7.  With  regard  to  the  mixture of  European  and  native  troops,  the  Commissioners 
agreed  with  die  "proponderancc  of  evidence"  that  "any  admixture  of  the  two  forces,  rcgimentally,  would  be 
detrimental  to  the  cfficicncy  and  discipline  of  both,  but  that  the  admixture  by  brigade  would  be  most 
advantageous".  8.  Recruitment  to  a  Local  European  force  "should  be  kept  up  by  drafts"  from  England  and 
$'volunteers  from  regiments  of  the  Line"  leaving  India.  9.  All  Bengal  native  cavalry  should  be  on  the  "irregular 
system"  (with  a  commandant,  an  adjutant,  a  medical  officer  and  one  European  officer  per  squadron,  and  the  sowars 
receiving  an  increase  in  pay  to  enable  them  "to  purchase  and  maintain  horses  and  arms  of  a  superior  description"), 
and  the  other  presidencies  following  suit  if  it  was  thought  necessary;  the  native  infantry,  on  the  other  hand,  should 
be  "mainly  regular".  10.  Artillery  "should  be  mainly  a  European  force"  with  exceptions  being  made  for  stations 
which  were  "peculiarly  detrimental  to  the  European  constitution  [e.  g.  mountain  artillery]".  11.  European  cadets 
for  native  corps  should  "be  thoroughly  drilled  and  instructed  in  their  military  duty"  in  Britain  before  they  were  sent 
out  to  India.  5 
Only  the  answers  to  questions  9  and  II  were  an  attempt  to  redress  the  type  of  professional  grievances 
that  many  believed  were  responsible  for  the  mutiny.  This  was  mainly  because  the  questions  themselves 
had  not  been  drafted  with  any  such  intention  in  mind:  they  were  more  concerned  with  the  deterrent 
value  of  an  enlarged  European  force,  and  therefore  concentrated  on  its  size  and  organisation  vis-ii-vis  its 
native  counterpart.  6  But  during  their  examination  of  the  evidence,  the  Commissioners  had  had  their 
5  Ibid.,  p.  ix-xiv. 
6  The  pre-mutiny  strength  of  the  European  force  in  India  was  43,000:  19,000  Company  troops  and 
24,000  Europeans.  During  the  mutiny,  three  more  regiments  of  infantry  and  four  of  cavalry  were  added 
to  the  Company's  establishment  of  nine  European  infintry  regiments;  the  27  Queen's  regiments  (four 263 
attention  drawn  to  a  number  of  "important  points",  many  of  which  were  about  issues  of  recruitment  and 
conditions  of  service.  The  Commissioners  therefore  made  nine  additional  recommendations: 
1.  That  the  Native  Amy  should  be  composed  of  different  nationalities  and  castes,  and  as  a  general  rule,  mixed 
promiscuously  through  each  regiment.  2.  That  all  men  of  the  regular  Native  Army 
...  should  be  enlisted  for  general 
service.  3.  That  a  modification  should  be  made  in  the  uniform  of  the  Native  troops,  assimilating  it  more  to  the 
dress  of  the  country,  and  making  it  more  suitable  to  the  climatc.  4.  That  Europeans  should,  as  far  as  possible,  be 
employed  in  the  scientific  branches  of  the  service,  but  that  Corps  of  pioneers  be  formed,  for  the  purpose  of 
relieving  the  European  sappcrs  from  those  duties  which  entail  exposure  to  the  climate.  5.  That  the  Articles  of  War, 
which  govern  the  Native  Amy,  be  revised,  and  that  the  power  of  commanding  officers  be  increased.  6.  That  the 
promotion  of  Native  commissioned  and  non-commissioned  officers,  be  regulated  on  the  principle  of  efficiency, 
rather  than  of  seniority,  and  that  commanding  officers  of  regiments  have  the  same  power  to  promote  non- 
commissioned  officers,  as  is  vested  in  officcrs  commanding  regiments  of  the  line.  7.  That  whereas  the  pay  and 
allowances  of  officers  and  men  arc  now  issued  under  various  heads,  the  attention  of  H.  M.  Government  be  drawn  to 
the  expediency  ...  of  adopting,  if  practicable,  fixed  scales  of  allowances  for  the  troops  in  garrison  or  cantonments, 
and  the  field.  8.  That  the  Commandcr-in-Chicf  in  Bengal  be  styled  the  Commandcr-in-Chief  in  India,  and  that  the 
General  Officers  commanding  the  annics  of  the  minor  Presidencies  be  Commanders  of  the  Forces,  with  the  power 
and  advantages  which  they  have  hitherto  enjoyed.  9.  [That]  the  eff  iciency  of  the  Indian  Army  has  hitherto  been 
injuriously  affected  by  the  small  number  of  officers  usually  doing  duty  with  the  regiments  to  which  they  belong. 
[To  reverse  this  trend]  various  schemes  have  been  suggested:  a.  The  formation  of  a  Staff  Corps  b.  The  system  of 
"seconding"  officers  who  arc  on  detached  employ...  c.  Placing  the  European  officers  of  each  Presidency  an 
general  lists  for  promotion.  Your  Commissioners  not  being  prepared  to  arrive  at  any  satisfactory  conclusion  on 
this  point,  without  reference  to  India,  recommend  that  the  subject  be  submitted  without  delay,  for  the  report  of  the 
7 
Governors  and  Conimanders-in-Chief.. 
Of  all  the  recommendations  made  by  the  Peel  Commission,  the  most  contentious  was  the  one  that 
advocated  irregular  cavalry  (at  least  in  Bengal)  but  "mainly"  regular  infantry.  In  his  evidence, 
Lieutenant-General  Sir  Henry  Somerset,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  Bombay,  had  come  out  against 
irregular  corps  because  they  were  less  disciplined  and  gave  too  much  power  to  native  officers.  But  in  a 
cavalry  and  23  infantry)  were  increased  to  76  (11  cavalry  and  65  infantry).  By  the  final  suppression  of 
the  mutiny  in  1859,  the  total  number  of  European  officers  and  men  in  India  was  98,000  (21,000 
Company  and  77,000  Queen's  troops)  [Sources:  Return  by  Col.  J.  Holland,  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  Appx  7, 
?.  371;  Shibly,  The  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies,  Ph.  D.  thesis,  pp.  47-8]. 
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minute  of  4  June  1858,  J.  P.  Grant,  the  President  of  the  Governor-General's  Council,  approved  of 
irregulars  on  the  basis  that  they  were  the  most  effective  soldiers  and  could  be  recruited  from  untainted 
areas.  Canning's  opinion  was  a  compromise.  In  a  memorandum  of  August  1858,  he  suggested  that  all 
cavalry  and  30  regiments  of  Bengal  Native  Infantry  should  be  on  the  irregular  system,  with  a  further  20 
of  the  latter  as  regulars.  3  But  others  like  Sir  Bartle  Frere,  Commissioner  of  Sind,  and  Brigadier-General 
John  Jacob,  Commandant  of  the  Sind  Irregular  Horse,  believed  that  the  system  should  be  wholly 
irregular.  Frere  observed  that  a  regular  regiment  with  a  full  complement  of  European  officers  would 
"militate  against  the  professional  efficiency  of  the  native  commissioned  officers".  9  Jacob  noted  that  the 
native  officers  would  be  "always  more  powerful,  more  obedient,  and  more  faithful  under  a  few  well- 
selected  officers  than  under  a  great  number  taken  at  hazard  with  regard  to  character  or  qualification". 
Four  European  officers  were  more  than  adequate.  The  large  number  allowed  in  a  regular  regiment,  said 
Jacob,  "prevents  the  native  officer,  whatever  his  merit,  from  attaining  a  responsible  or  very  respectable 
position  in  the  army  thereby  keeping  out  of  its  ranks  natives  of  birth,  and  family,  and  preventing  in  the 
native  soldier  the  full  development  of  that  love  for  and  pride  in  the  service  which  are  essential  to  great 
efficiency".  Irregular  sowars,  Jacob  added,  cost  less  than  half  their  regular  counterparts.  10  Frere  and 
Jacob  were  supported  by  the  members  of  the  influential  Punjab  Committee  -  Sir  John  Lawrence, 
Brigadier-General  Neville  Chamberlain  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Herbert  Edwardes  -  who  recommended 
extending  the  system  which  operated  within  the  Punjab  Irregular  Force  to  the  rest  of  the  native  army  of 
Bengal,  including  promotion  by  merit  and  substantial  powers  for  commanding  officers.  But  to  ensure 
its  success,  they  added,  the  European  officers  would  have  to  be  carefully  selected:  a  "bad  European 
officer  cannot  work  a  system  of  merit,  he  would  soon  spoil  the  best  native  officer  in  the  world".  II 
In  June  1859,  having  considered  the  Peel  Commission's  report,  the  Military  and  Political  Committee 
of  the  Council  of  India  concurred  with  the  view  that  all  Bengal  native  cavalry  regiments  should  be 
organized  on  the  irregular  system.  They  could  not,  however,  agree  about  native  infantry.  Three 
members  (J.  P.  Willoughby,  John  Lawrence  and  J.  Eastwick)  wanted  all  infantry  regiments  on  the 
irregular  system;  the  other  two  (R.  J.  H.  Vivian  and  H.  M.  Durand)  were,  like  Canning,  in  favour  of  20 
regular  and  30  irregular  corps.  Sir  Charles  Wood,  Secretary  of  State  for  India  from  1859  to  1866,  sided 
with  the  majority  on  grounds  of  economy  and  politics:  the  irregular  system  was  cheaper  and  would 
8  Shibly,  The  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies',  Ph.  D.  thesis,  p.  128. 
9  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  VIII,  pp.  701 
10  Ibid.,  pp  733  and  745. 265 
encourage  natives  of  a  higher  rank  to  enter  the  army.  European  officers,  he  added,  could  be  appointed 
to  the  irregular  regiments  by  selection  from  a  Staff  Corps.  Canning  and  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  India  from  1860  to  1865,  disagreed,  the  former  pointing  out  that  a  pool  of  regular  regiments 
was  needed  from  which  to  select  the  best  officers  for  the  irregular  corps.  But  both  Lord  Elphinstone 
and  Lieutenant-General  Sir  William  Mansfield,  Governor  and  Commander-in-Chief  of  Bombay 
respectively,  were  of  the  opinion  that  all  troops  in  India  should  be  irregular,  with  four  or  five  officers 
per  regiment  selected  from  a  Staff  Corps.  12 
The  idea  for  a  Staff  Corps  -  whereby  unattached  officers  on  a  general  list  would  be  appointed  to  staff, 
civil  and  regimental  duty  -  had  been  suggested  first  by  Sir  John  Malcolm,  the  Governor  of  Bombay,  in 
1830.  Other  officers  and  senior  officials  -  including  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Willoughby  Cotton, 
Commander-in-Chief  of  Bombay,  and  Lord  Dalhousie,  the  Governor-General  -  had  urged  the  creation 
of  such  a  corps  prior  to  the  mutiny.  But  it  had  always  been  rejected  on  the  ground  of  expense. 
However  once  the  Peel  Commission  had  accepted  that  the  "efficiency  of  the  Indian  Army"  had  been 
"injuriously  affected  by  the  small  number  of  officers  usually  doing  duty  with  [their]  regiments",  not 
least  because  those  lefl  behind  resented  such  duty,  reform  became  a  priority.  Of  the  three  options 
mentioned  by  the  Commission,  Canning  and  the  Political  and  Military  Committee  of  the  Council  of 
India  favoured  the  system  of  'seconding'  (i.  e.  replacing  officers  who  were  on  detached  employ)  because, 
they  said,  it  was  the  best  adapted  to  the  requirements  of  service  in  India  and  would  be  the  most 
economical.  But  Sir  Charles  Wood  and  the  Military  Finance  Commission  in  Calcutta  preferred  the 
formation  of  a  large  Staff  Corps  of  all  arms  because  it  would  ensure  continuity  in  detached 
appointments  and  would  enable  officers  to  be  selected  for  the  new  irregular  regiments.  13 
Supported  by  the  majority  of  Canning's  Council  and  most  other  senior  figures  in  India  bar  the 
Governor-General  and  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Wood's  preference  for  irregular  regiments  and  a  Staff 
Corps  prevailed.  Drafts  of  the  warrant  for  the  formation  of  a  separate  Staff  Corps  in  each  presidency 
were  laid  before  the  Council  on  8  January  1861.  All  Company  and  Queen's  officers  under  the  rank  of 
field  officer  were  eligible  for  admittance  (as  were  all  officers  then  in  staff  employ  under  the  substantive 
rank  of  colonel).  Henceforth  staff  employ  would  include  appointments  to  civil  and  political  posts,  to 
the  general  and  personal  staff,  and  to  regimental  duty.  Ten  days  after  the  formation  of  the  Staff  Corps, 
11  Ibid.,  pp.  649-89. 
12  Shibly,  'The  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies',  Ph.  D.  thesis,  pp.  133-5. 
13  Ibid.,  pp.  199-211. 266 
Wood  instructed  that  all  native  regiments  were  to  be  organized  on  the  irregular  system  with  six 
European  officers  (not  including  a  medical  officer).  This  alteration  would  result  in  a  "very  considerable 
saving",  said  Wood,  "as  nearly  one  half  the  charge  of  a  regular  regiment  consists  of  the  pay  and 
allowances  of  its  officers".  He  also  insisted  that  the  "efficiency  of  the  regiments  will  in  no  respect 
suffer,  whilst  an  opportunity  will  be  given  of  raising  the  character  and  position  of  the  native  officers, 
and,  probably,  of  affording  an  opening  for  the  employment  of  natives  in  a  higher  position".  14 
In  1861,  the  Bengal  cavalry  and  infantry  were  reorganised  on  the  irregular  system.  The  19  surviving 
cavalry  regiments"  (not  including  the  Guides  and  the  five  Punjabi  corps)  were  renumbered  I  sý_  I  9th 
Bengal  Cavalry  and  consisted  of  13  native  officers,  60  N.  C.  O.  s,  6  buglers  and  6  troops  of  70  sowars 
each.  Of  the  44  renumbered  infantry  regiments,  the  V'-1  lth  were  from  the  old  regular  army.  16 
Henceforth  they  contained  16  native  officers,  80  N.  C.  O.  s,  16  drummers  and  eight  companies  of  75 
sepoys  each.  By  late  1863,  the  Bombay  Army  had  followed  suit.  Madras  held  out  for  longer  because 
its  Governor,  William  Denison,  and  its  Commander-in-Chief,  Lieutenant-General  James  Hope  Grant, 
did  not  believe  that  Madras  native  officers  were  fit  to  command  troops  or  companies:  not  least  because 
they  were  mostly  low  class  and  not  able  to  use  social  position  as  a  means  to  inspire  respect.  Denison,  in 
particular,  was  fearful  of  giving  them  too  much  responsibility.  If  "they  are  to  lead  their  troops  in 
action",  he  wrote,  "and  thus  get  knowledge  and  self-confidence,  we  shall  find  that  we  have  raised  up  a 
class  of  men  more  dangerous  than  useful".  The  Madras  officials  were  supported  by  Sir  Hugh  Rose  who 
suggested  abolishing  native  officers  altogether.  But  in  1865,  with  the  replacement  of  Rose  and  Hope 
Grant  by  William  Mansfield  and  Le  Marchant  respectively,  the  Madras  Army  finally  embraced  the 
irregular  system  with  regard  to  the  number  and  duties  of  European  and  native  officers.  The  cavalry 
switched  to  the  full  silladar  system  the  following  year.  17 
The  chief  importance  of  the  irregular  system  is  that  it  did  away  with  the  tendency  of  European 
officers  to  regard  regimental  duty  as  a  sign  of  professional  failure.  Henceforth  officers  were  selected 
for  regimental  appointments  from  the  Staff  Corps,  and  after  1864  those  with  less  than  seven  years, 
service  would  have  to  serve  a  year's  probation  and  then  be  examined  by  a  committee  of  officers  before 
14  Ibid.,  pp.  144-5. 
15  They  were,  in  numerical  order,  the  I't,  2"d,  40',  Oh,  7"',  e,  17th  and  18'h  I.  C.,  the  I"  and  2nd  HodsoWs 
Horse,  the  1",  2  nd  and  4h  Sikh  I.  C.,  Murray's  Jat  Horse,  the  Multani  Horse,  the  Rohilkhand  Horse, 
Robart's  Horse,  the  2"  Maratha  Horse  and  Fane's  Horse. 
16  They  were,  in  numerical  order,  the  21't,  3  1".  32nd 
ý 
33'ý  42nd 
ý 
43'ý  47'hX  59thP  63'ý  65'h)  70'h.  An 
additional  two  corps  -  the  Regiment  ofLucknow  and  the  Loyal  Poorbeah  Regiment 
- 
had  grown  out  of 
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a  permanent  posting.  The  financial  incentive  to  avoid  regimental  duty  was  also  removed  by  the 
equalisation  of  military  allowances  with  "those  obtainable  in  the  early  stages  of  civil  ...  or  quasi-military 
employ".  Regimental  positions  were  now  regarded  as  staff  appointments  with  allowances  as  well  as 
pay.  From  October  1863,  a  commandant  of  an  infantry  regiment  received  an  additional  700  rupees  a 
month,  the  senior  and  junior  wing  commandants  270  and  23  0  respectively,  the  adjutant  200,  the 
Quartermaster  150  and  the  Doing  duty  officer  100.  "It  was  because  of  this  financial  attraction  that  there 
was,  after  the  reorganisation  of  the  native  army,  "  writes  Shibly,  "no  difficulty  in  getting  adequate 
European  officers  for  native  regiments.  "  Of  the  517  members  of  the  Staff  Corps  in  1875,370  held 
appointments  in  native  regiments.  18 
The  irregular  system  also  provided  native  troops  with  the  incentives  of  greater  responsibility  and 
higher  pay.  In  a  cavalry  regiment,  for  example,  the  six  senior  native  officers  were  in  command  of 
troops  (or  ressallahs)  and  received  from  Rs.  120  to  300  per  month,  depending  upon  seniority.  Even  the 
sowars  were  paid  Rs.  27  a  month,  with  the  maximum  good  conduct  pay  increasing  it  to  30.  Native 
officers  in  the  pre-mutiny  irregular  cavalry,  by  contrast,  had  received  a  maximum  of  Rs.  150  a  month, 
with  sowars  on  Rs.  20.  The  eight  subedars  in  the  reorganised  infantry  regiments  commanded 
companies  and  were  paid  from  Rs.  67  to  100  a  month,  with  an  extra  Rs.  25  for  the  subedar-major,  while 
the  eight  jemadars  were  on  Rs.  30  to  35  (the  pre-mutiny  rates  were  fixed  at  Rs.  67  for  subedars  and  Rs. 
24.8  forjemadars).  But  the  pay  of  havildars,  naiks  and  sepoys  remained  at  its  former  monthly  rate  of 
Rs.  14,12  and  7  respectively  until  1895.19 
By  the  late  1870s,  most  regiments  in  the  Indian  Army  were  undermanned.  General  Sir  Neville 
Chamberlain,  Commander-in-Chief  of  Madras,  put  this  down  to  the  fact  that  the  sepoys'  static  pay  had 
"not  kept  pace  with  the  relative  advantages  to  be  obtained  in  other  employments".  Moreover,  he 
added,  their  pay  had  decreased  in  actual  terms  "because  of  the  universal  rise  in  the  cost  of  living".  20 
In  fact,  according  to  one  survey  of  prices  and  wages,  the  average  pay  for  an  agricultural  labourer 
"would  seem  to  have  risen  much  in  many  districts  since  1873  and  to  have  fallen  much  in  others".  In 
Midnapore  in  Bengal,  for  example,  it  rose  from  4  to  7  rupees  a  month  between  1873  to  1880.  But  in  the 
North-Western  Provinces  and  Oudh  it  was  fairly  static  and  even  fell  in  some  districts  (like  Faizabad 
17  Shibly,  'The  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies',  Ph.  D.  thesis,  pp.  149-60,170-6 
181bid.,  pp.  156-7. 
19  Ibid.,  pp.  147,166. 
20  Chamberlain  to  the  Duke  of  Cambridge,  17  April  1879,  Chamberlain  Correspondence,  OIOC,  MSS 
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where  it  dropped  from  Rs.  4  to  Rs.  3.4.6).  The  price  of  wheat  in  the  North-Western  Provinces  and 
Oudh,  on  the  other  hand,  increased  from  an  average  of  23.8  seers  per  rupee  for  the  period  1861-4  to 
15.85  seers  per  rupee  during  1877-80.  The  latter  period  saw  "wide-spread  drought  and  scarcity  over  an 
enormous  tract  of  Central,  Western,  and  Southern  India,  causing  a  general  rise  of  prices  all  over 
India" 
.2' 
Omissi  confirms  the  trend  in  rising  prices  by  citing  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  a  sepoy's 
average  monthly  supply  of  atta,  dal,  ghi,  sugar,  salt,  firewood  and  tobacco  from  Rs.  3.6.8  in  1848  to  Rs. 
4.11.3  in  1875.  The  problem  of  declining  recruitment  was  eased,  he  says,  by  an  increase  in  the  sepoy's 
basic  pay  to  nine  rupees  in  1895  and  II  in  1911.22 
In  his  letter  about  low  recruitment  levels,  Chamberlain  also  suggested  that  a  "more  rigid  discipline" 
may  have  "lessened  the  popularity  of  the  army".  23  This  was  an  oblique  reference  to  another  crucial  area 
of  military  reform  recommended  by  the  Peel  Commission:  an  increase  in  the  power  of  regimental 
commanding  officers  to  punish.  The  vast  majority  of  witnesses  who  gave  evidence  to  the  Commission 
were  of  the  opinion  that  Bengal  officers,  in  particular,  needed  more  authority  over  their  men,  including 
enhanced  powers  to  punish  and  reward  (see  Chapter  Four).  But  some,  like  John  Jacob  and  the  Punjab 
Committee,  accepted  that  the  quality  of  commanding  officers  had  to  be  improved  if  they  were  to  be 
entrusted  with  enhanced  powers.  This  was  achieved  by  the  switch  to  the  irregular  system  and  the 
institution  of  the  Staff  Corps  in  1861:  henceforth  regimental  officers  were  selected.  Later  that  year,  the 
revised  Articles  of  War  went  a  long  way  to  satisfying  the  reformers'other  demands:  Article  3  gave 
commanding  officers  the  summary  power  to  reduce  N.  C.  O.  s  to  the  ranks  and  to  discharge  N.  C.  O.  s  and 
ordinary  soldiers  (a  punishment  that  carried  with  it  a  mandatory  loss  of  pension);  Article  67  gave 
commanding  officers  the  option  to  try  offences  normally  applicable  to  a  District  Court-Martial  by  a 
Regimental  Court-Martial;  Article  81  authorised  commanding  officers  to  hold  summary  trials  of 
N.  C.  O.  s  and  soldiers  and,  on  conviction,  to  carry  out  sentences  without  confirmation  from  higher 
authorities,  as  long  as  the  sentences  were  not  more  severe  than  could  be  awarded  by  District  Courts- 
Martial;  and  Article  83  affirmed  the  commanding  officer's  summary  power  to  award  light  sentences  - 
including  extra  drill,  restriction  to  barrack  limits,  confinement  in  the  Quarter  Guard,  defaulters'  room  or 
solitary  cell,  removal  from  staff  situations  or  acting  appointments,  piling  or  unpiling  shot  and  cleaning 
21  J.  E.  O'Conor,  Prices  and  Wages  in  India  (Calcutta,  1886),  pp.  4-20,43 
22  OMiSSi'  Yhe  Sepoy  and  the  Raj,  pp.  54-5. 
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accoutrements  -  with  the  maximum  award  at  the  discretion  of  individual  Commanders-in-Chief24  By 
1873,  commanding  officers  could  also  deprive  soldiers  of  good  conduct  pay.  25 
In  an  effort  to  bolster  further  the  authority  of  Bengal  commanding  officers,  the  Peel  Commission 
recommended  that  efficiency  should  replace  seniority  as  the  dominant  factor  in  the  promotion  of  native 
troops.  The  reforms  of  the  1860s  acted  on  this  advice.  No  sepoy  was  to  be  promoted  to  N.  C.  O.  unless 
he  possessed  "a  competent  knowledge  of  reading  and  writing  in  at  least  one  character,  except  when 
commanding  officers  may  deem  it  desirable  or  expedient  to  make  exceptions  in  the  case  of  men  who 
have  displayed  conspicuous  courage,  or  who  possess  [other  useful]  qualifications".  In  general, 
seniority  was  to  be  taken  into  account,  but  commanding  officers  had  the  discretion  to  override  it.  26 
"The  vicious  system  of  promotion  by  seniority,  in  itself  sufficient  to  destroy  the  discipline  of  any  army, 
has  been  abolished,  "  wrote  Chesney  in  1868,  "and  by  the  new  Articles  of  War  commanding  officers  are 
vested  with  considerable  powers,  both  for  reward  and  punishment.  47 
Another  recommendation  of  the  Peel  Commission  was  that  the  uniform  of  native  troops  should  be 
assimilated  "more  to  the  dress  of  the  country"  and  made  "more  suitable  to  the  climate".  The  hated 
leather  stock  had  already  been  discontinued  by  a  General  Order  of  15  February  1859.  So  too  had  the 
bulky  shako  headdress,  as  the  loyal  sepoys  of  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  took  to  wearing  their  undress 
Kilmarnock  caps  (first  introduced  in  1847)  instead 
. 
28  From  March  1860,  commanding  officers  of 
native  infantry  regiments  were  given  the  option  to  issuepugris  (turbans).  Apart  from  the  Gurkhas  and  a 
handful  of  other  corps,  who  retained  their  Kilmarnocks,  most  infantry  regiments  were  wearing  pugris 
by  the  close  of  the  century.  Another  major  alteration  took  place  in  1863  when  the  tight  coatee  was 
replaced  by  the  so-called  zouave  jacket,  said  to  be  based  on  the  coat  wom  by  French  zouaves  (colonial 
troops)  during  the  Crimean  War.  In  fact  that  coat  was  short  and  worn  open  with  large  braid  loops.  The 
model  adopted  by  the  Indian  native  infantry  was  a  long,  red  single-breasted  tunic  with  cut-away  skirts 
and  no  collar,  not  that  dissimilar  to  the  coat  wom  by  the  British  Army.  It  was  not  particularly  'native'  in 
style,  but  it  was  certainly  more  comfortable  and  durable  than  the  old  coatee  . 
29  TheIndianisation'of 
24  Articles  of  War,  Act  XXIX  of  1861,  OIOC,  L/N4IU17/11/15. 
25  Bengal  Army  Regulations  1873,  OIOC,  LJMIU17/2/443,  p.  98. 
26  Ibid.,  pp.  43,96. 
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dress  was  more  apparent  in  1869  when  sepoys  were  issued  with  baggy,  blue  knickerbocker  trousers, 
wom  either  with  white  gaiters  or  drab  puttees.  30 
Given  that  only  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry  regiments  survived  the  reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Army, 
the  reform  of  cavalry  dress  was  not  an  issue.  If  anything,  the  uniform  for  the  new  Bengal  cavalry 
regiments  was  more  formal  than  it  had  been  for  the  old  Bengal  Irregular  Cavalry.  The  exceptions  were 
the  eight  surviving  irregular  cavalry  regiments  (renamed  the  Vý41'  Bengal  Cavalry)  who  were  allowed 
to  retain  their  alkaluk  coats.  The  others  wore  kurtas  (loose  frock  coats)  for  winter  and  white  'American' 
drill  for  summer.  By  1874,  however,  all  regiments  were  wearingpugris,  curnmerbunds  and  a  loose 
lairta  of  regimental  pattern.  31  The  Bengal  Sappers  and  Miners  also  conformed  to  the  general  pattern  in 
that  shakos  and  trousers  were  replaced  by  pugris,  pyjaftias  and  dark  blue  puttees.  32  All  regular  native 
artillery  (horse  and  foot)  had  been  abolished  on  the  ground  that  it  was  too  dangerous  to  leave  such  a 
vital  branch  in  the  hands  of  Indians.  The  irregular  exceptions  were  five  mountain  batteries  of  the 
Punjab  Irregular  Force  and  four  batteries  of  the  Hyderabad  Contingent. 
The  only  other  recommendations  of  the  Peel  Commission  that  directly  concern  this  study  were  those 
concerning  recruitment:  "That  the  Native  Army  should  be  composed  of  different  nationalities  and 
castes,  and  as  a  general  rule,  mixed  promiscuously  through  each  regiment"  and  "That  all  men  of  the 
regular  Native  Army 
...  should  be  enlisted  for  general  service".  33  Both  were  aimed  at  dismantling  the 
high-caste  Hindu  brotherhood  in  the  Bengal  Native  Infantry  that  had  made  a  general  mutiny  possible. 
Interestingly  enough,  the  Commissioners'  report  made  no  specific  mention  of  religion.  If  they  had 
believed  religion  to  be  as  central  to  the  mutiny  as  most  subsequent  historians  have  done,  it  is  reasonable 
to  assume  they  would  have  referred  to  it  in  some  way:  if  only  to  recommend  the  Indian  government  to 
be  cautious  when  introducing  measures  which  might  offend  the  sepoys'  faith.  Instead  the 
Commissioners  proposed  to  weaken  the  position  of  the  high-caste  sepoys  in  the  Bengal  Army  still 
further  by  broadening  the  recruitment  base,  the  very  policy  that  is  said  to  have  contributed  to  the  mutiny 
in  the  first  place. 
Three  positions  on  recruitment  had  emerged  from  the  evidence.  The  first,  generally  held  by  officers 
and  civil  servants  familiar  with  the  Madras  and  Bombay  armies,  advocated  a  balanced  pattern  of 
recruitment  from  all  sections  of  society.  Soldierly  ability,  and  not  caste,  was  what  counted  for  men  like 
11  Mollo,  The  Indian  Army,  p.  128. 
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Sir  Bartle  Frere  and  Sir  Mark  Cubbon.  They  tended  to  agree  with  the  military  axiom  that  there  are  no 
bad  soldiers,  only  bad  officers.  Diametrically  opposed  to  this  position  was  the  view  held  by  Major- 
General  J.  B.  Hearsey  and  others  that  the  recruitment  of  all  Brahmins  and  Muslims  from  Hindustan 
should  cease.  Hearsey  particularly  mentioned  the  regions  of  Oudh,  the  Doab,  Shahabad,  Bhcjpore  and 
Robilkhand.  Both  positions  were  determined  to  prevent  caste  from  interfering  with  military  discipline. 
"Any  soldier  refusing  to  work,  "  said  Hearsey,  "because  it  interfered  with  his  caste  was  to  be  tried  by 
court-martial  and  sentenced  to  be  flogged,  or  transportation  for  life.  "  The  third  position  recommended 
using  the  best  material  available.  The  Punjab  Committee,  for  example,  wanted  to  counterbalance 
Hindustani  soldiers  by  recruiting  Christians,  Eurasians,  Santals,  Bhils  and  other  unfashionable  races,  as 
well  as  more  Punjabis  and  Gurkhas.  They  also  emphasised  the  need  to  balance  and  separate  castes.  34 
The  first  recommendation  of  the  Commissioners,  therefore,  was  a  fudging  of  the  first  and  third 
positions. 
Even  before  the  appointment  of  the  Peel  Commission,  native  levies  had  been  raised  in  Bengal  from 
mainly  low-caste  recruits.  The  Mainpuri  Levy  (later  the  35'h  N.  I.  )  were  wholly  so;  the  levies  raised  at 
Bareilly  (36dN.  I.  ),  Meerut  (37h  N.  I.  ),  Agra  (38dN.  I.  )  and  Shahjahanpur  (4&  N.  I.  )  had  been  allowed 
to  enlist  two  companies  of  Rajputs  each.  No  decision  bad  been  taken  on  their  long-term  future  by  1860 
when  Sir  Hugh  Rose,  the  new  Commander-in-Chief  of  India,  came  down  in  favour  of  mixed 
recruitment.  "The  homogenous  composition  of  the  old  Native  Army,  fostering  caste,  combination  and 
indiscipline,  "  he  remarked  to  Lord  Canning,  "was  one  of  the  springs  of  the  mutiny,  and  has  been  proved 
to  be  an  element  of  danger  in  a  Native  army.  "  He  therefore  suggested  limiting  the  proportion  of  any 
one  sect  or  caste  in  each  regiment  to  a  quarter,  with  Sikh  and  Gurkha  corps  the  only  exceptions.  35 
Sir  Charles  Wood  disagreed.  He  was  in  favour  of  a  general  mixture  system  (different  races  and  castes 
throughout  the  companies  of  regiments)  in  conjunction  with  a  district  system  whereby  each  regiment 
was  recruited  from  a  particular  locality.  "The  difference,  "  he  informed  Rose  on  25  April  1862,  "will  be 
greater  in  some  regiments  than  in  others,  some  regiments  will  be  more,  others  less  homogenous  and 
here  another  sort  of  variety  will  be  created.  "  His  intention  was  divide  and  rule.  He  told  Denison  in 
1861  that  he  never  wanted  to  "see  again  a  great  Army,  very  much  the  same  in  its  feelings  and 
11  P.  P.,  H.  C.,  1859,  V,  p.  xiv. 
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prejudices  and  connections,  confident  in  its  strength,  and  so  disposed  to  unite  in  rebellion  together.  If 
one  regiment  mutinies,  I  should  like  to  have  the  next  so  alien  that  it  would  be  ready  to  fire  into  it".  36 
A  compromise  was  finally  reached  in  November  1862  when  the  Government  of  India  authorised  four 
different  systems  of  enlistment  for  the  Bengal  regiments  of  native  infantry:  the  four  Gurkha  regiments 
(not  line  corps)  and  two  Muzbi  Sikh  regiments  (23d  and  32d  N.  I.  )  were  to  continue  to  recruit  from  a 
single  class;  the  nine  Hindustani  regiments  (1ý  2nd,  3'ý  4ti%  7th,  11"' 
, 
ffh,  16'h  and  17th  N.  I.  )  and  the 
other  two  Sikh  regiments  (14"'  and  15th  N.  I.  )  would  recruit  from  the  same  classes  under  the  District 
system;  the  Punjab  regiments  raised  in  1857-8  and  the  Assam  and  Sylhet  corps,  15  in  number  (19'h, 
20'i%  21",  22nd,  24h,  25h,  2e,  27'hV  28ý  29h,  3&,  and  31'tN.  I.,  4VO,  Ord  and  44hN.  1),  would  embrace 
the  General  mixture  system  with  no  one  class  greater  than  50  per  cent  of  the  total;  and  the  remaining  16 
regiments  would  operate  under  a  Class  company  system  (whereby  each  company  was  composed  of  a 
different  race  or  caste).  The  Bengal  cavalry  was  also  recruited  under  a  variety  of  systems:  Single  class 
(I",  le  and  15'h  B.  C.  );  General  mixture  (2d 
, 
P,  4'h,  50and  7th  B.  C.  );  and  Class  troop  (6h,  8"'Y  9d,  1&, 
I  ith,  ffh,  l3ti%  16'h,  17d,  I  8'h,  190'B  q.  37 
These  systems  remained  unchanged  for  two  decades.  But  during  that  time  more  and  more 
commanding  officers  of  the  General  mixture  regiments  began  to  report  that  long  association  removed 
any  class  or  race  differences  between  their  men,  thereby  fostering  a  general  esprit  de  corps.  This  trend 
was  seen  as  increasing  the  threat  of  a  mutinous  combination  and  the  General  mixture  system  was 
abolished  in  1883.  Thereafter,  32  regiments  of  Bengal  infantry  and  14  of  Bengal  cavalry  were 
organised  on  the  Class  company  or  troop  system;  and  the  remaining  12  regiments  of  infantry  and  3  of 
cavalry  used  the  Class  regiment  system.  By  1899,  with  a  halt  having  been  called  to  the  enlistment  of 
low-caste  men  or  menial  classes,  there  were  just  22  Class  company  and  42  Class  infantry  regiments  in 
Bengal.  Madras  and  Bombay  also  abandoned  the  General  mixture  system  between  1887  and  1889:  but 
their  regiments  were  placed  on  the  Class  company  or  troop  system,  with  the  exception  of  one  Class 
regiment  in  Madras.  In  general  terms,  the  chief  recruitment  ground  for  the  Bengal  Army  had  moved 
from  Oudh  and  its  adjacent  provinces  to  Nepal,  the  Punjab  and  the  North-West  Frontier.  In  1893,  for 
example,  only  nine  of  the  64  regiments  of  Bengal  infantry  were  composed  of  high-caste  men:  seven  of 
38  Rajputs  and  two  of  Brahmins. 
36  Wood  to  Rose,  25  April  1862  and  Wood  to  Denison,  8  April  1861,  ibid.,  pp.  336-7. 
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Shibly  has  argued  that  the  new  irregular  system  did  not  go  as  far  as  native  soldiers  wanted  it  to. 
"Before  the  mutiny,  "  he  writes,  "a  native  officer  in  the  irregular  cavalry  could  rise  to  the  command  of  a 
squadron  which  was,  under  the  new  system,  commanded  by  British  officers.  "  He  also  points  out  that 
the  intention  to  "raise  the  character  and  position  of  the  native  officers  by  affording  an  opening  for  the 
employment  of  natives  of  higher  position"  was  "not  wholly  Milled".  The  vast  majority  of  native 
officers  continued  to  be  promoted  from  the  ranks:  not  a  single  direct  commission  in  the  Bengal  infantry 
39 
was  given  until  1873,  while  only  35  were  awarded  between  1873-85.  All  this  is  true.  But  the 
introduction  of  the  irregular  system  was  still  a  significant  improvement  -  an  opinion  Shibly  shares: 
That  the  new  system  answered  better  than  the  old  one  might  fairly  be  asserted,  -  firstly,  on  the  ground  of  the  greater 
efficiency,  secondly,  from  the  achievements  of  these  regiments  in  the  field,  and  thirdly,  from  their  obedience. 
There  were  no  instances  where  any  of  the  regiments  had  refused  to  perform  pioneer  work  when  necessary,  not 
merely  in  sieges,  but  at  any  time  in  the  f  icld,  or  had  refused  to  go  on  foreign  service  when  required...  The  superior 
position  and  authority  entrusted  to  the  native  officers,  and  the  efficiency  required  of  them  in  drill  and  discipline, 
developed  and  improved  their  capacitieS.  40 
There  were  20  mutinies  in  the  Indian  Army  between  1858  and  1947,  half  of  them  during  the  First  and 
Second  World  Wars.  41  None  occurred  before  1886,  while  the  15  that  took  place  between  the  1880s  and 
the  1930s  have  been  described  by  Omissi  as  "minor".  The  smallest  involved  just  20  men,  the  largest  a 
single  regiment.  Only  one  -  the  mutiny  of  four  companies  of  the  5th  Light  Infantry  at  Singapore  in 
1915  -  resulted  in  sepoy  violence  against  their  officers.  Most  of  the  mutinies  -  including  the  seven  that 
occurred  between  1886  and  1914  -  were  little  more  than  peaceful  collective  protests  over  professional 
issues  such  as  pay,  allowances,  promotions  and  the  conditions  of  service.  "These  affairs  should  not  be 
seen  as  miniature  versions  of  1857,  "  writes  Omissi.  "They  bore  much  greater  resemblance  to  the  strikes 
and  protests  of  industrial  workers,  just  as  peasant-soldiers  had  much  in  common  with  other  labour 
39  Ibid.,  pp.  380-1. 
40  Ibid.,  p.  179. 
41  See  table  of  mutinies  in  Menezes,  'Race,  Caste,  Mutiny  and  Discipline  in  the  Indian  Army,  from  its 
origins  to  1947,  in  Guy  and  Boyden  (eds.  ),  Soldiers  of  the  Raj,  pp.  100-17. 274 
migrants.  it  42 
Yet  it  could  be  argued  that  these  mutinies  had  many  characteristics  similar  to  1857  -just  on  a  smaller 
scale.  That  they  did  not  develop  into  anything  more  significant  is  surely  down  to  the  post-1857  military 
reforms:  the  increased  ratio  of  European  to  native  troops  (which  remained  at  around  1:  2  until  1914), 
the  concentration  of  artillery  in  European  hands  and  the  brigading  of  one  European  regiment  with  every 
43 
two  native  corps  so  that  no  major  station  was  left  without  a  European  presence.  Also  significant  were 
the  improvements  made  to  the  service  conditions  of  all  three  presidency  armies,  and  the  Bengal  Army 
in  particular:  the  creation  of  a  Staff  Corps  and  the  selection  of  European  officers  for  more  lucrative 
regimental  duties  which  came  to  be  regarded  as  an  honour  rather  than  a  chore;  the  increase  in  the  power 
of  commanding  officers  to  punish  and  reward,  including  the  replacement  of  seniority  with  merit  as  the 
dominant  principle  of  promotion;  the  switch  to  irregular  regiments  with  fewer  Europeans,  which  gave 
native  officers  more  responsibility  and  greaterjob  satisfaction;  the  increase  in  pay  for  native  infantry 
officers  and  all  native  cavalrymen;  the  switch  from  tight  and  uncomfortable  European-style  uniforms  to 
those  more  suited  to  the  Indian  climate;  and,  crucially,  the  Bengal  Army's  shift  in  recruitment  from  the 
high-caste  Hindus  of  Oudh  and  the  North-Western  Provinces  to  the  Sikhs  and  Muslims  of  the  Punjab, 
the  Gurkhas  of  Nepal  and  the  lower  castes  of  Hindustan. 
A  number  of  men  were  central  to  the  creation  of  the  new  irregular  system,  including  Sir  Charles 
Wood  (later  Lord  Halifax),  Sir  John  (later  Lord)  Lawrence,  Lord  Elphinstone,  and  Generals  Sir  James 
Outram,  (Sir)  Neville  Chamberlain  and  Sir  William  Mansfield  (later  Lord  Sandhurst)  -  but  none  more 
so  than  Brigadier-General  John  Jacob  who  had  been  urging  similar  reforms  since  the  1840s.  "It  was  on 
the  basis  of  John  Jacob's  principles,  "  wrote  H.  T.  Lambrick,  "that  the  armies  of  India  were  reorganized 
after  the  Mutiny.  "44  If  Jacob  had  been  listened  to  earlier,  the  Indian  mutiny  might  not  have  occurred. 
He  died  in  December  185  8;  but  he  would  have  been  gratified  to  hear  the  judgement  passed  on  the  new 
irregular  system  by  Lord  Napier,  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  India,  in  1875:  "No  impartial  observer, 
who  knows  what  the  old  army  was,  and  what  the  present  one  is,  can  hesitate  for  a  moment  to  pronounce 
the  regiments  of  the  present  day  greatly  superior  to  those  of  the  old  army;  better  drill  [sic]  and 
disciplined,  more  obedient,  less  fettered  by  assumptions  of  religious  restraint,  more  moveable,  more 
42  OMiSSi,  77ie  Sepoy  and  the  Raj,  pp.  133-152. 
43  ibid.,  p.  132;  Shibly,  'The  Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies',  Ph.  D.  thesis,  p.  374. 
44  Lambrick-,  John  Jacob  ofJacobabad,  p.  3  84. 275 
ready  for  every  service.  ,  45  A  greater  contrast  vAth  the  indisciplined,  caste-ridden,  disaffected  Bengal 
Army  of  1857  is  hard  to  imagine. 
43  Adjt.  -Gen.  to  the  Sec.  to  the  Govt.  of  India  in  the  Military  Dept.,  14  Aug  1875,  quoted  in  Shibly,  'The 
Reorganisation  of  the  Indian  Armies',  Ph.  D.  thesis,  pp.  179. 276 
Conclusion 
For  much  of  the  last  century,  Indian  and  British  scholars  downplayed  the  importance  of  professional 
grievances  in  their  accounts  of  why  the  Indian  mutiny  took  place.  Most  viewed  the  Bengal  sepoys  as 
uniformed  peasants  who  were  affected  by  the  same  social,  economic  and  religious  concerns  as  their 
civilian  counterparts.  They  tended  to  identify  the  defence  of  caste  and  religion  as  the  key  to  the 
military  uprising,  while  regarding  the  latter  as  little  more  than  a  precursor  to  a  general  revolt.  Not  since 
the  publication  of  T.  Rice  Holmes'History  of  the  IndianMufiny  in  1882  has  a  historian  of  the  mutiny 
attempted  to  explain  it  in  terms  of  issues  internal  to  the  army.  Yet  this  study's  identification  of 
professional  concerns  as  the  essential  cause  of  the  Indian  mutiny  is  very  much  in  line  with  the  recent 
historiography  of  military  revolts.  The  mutinies  of  the  French  Royal  armies  in  1790-1  and  1830,  the 
Italian  regiments  of  the  Austrian  Imperial  Army  in  1848,  the  Russian  Army  in  1916-17,  the  French 
Army  in  1917,  and  elements  of  the  British  8h  Army  in  1943  have  all  been  attributed  chiefly  tomilitaryl 
factors.  I 
it  is,  of  course,  difficult  to  make  a  direct  comparison  between  mutinies  by  European  and  colonial 
troops,  not  least  because  of  the  ethnic  and  religious  differences  between  officers  and  soldiers  that  were 
a  feature  of  the  latter.  Proto-nationalism  in  colonial  forces  is  another  factor  that  can  contribute  to 
military  unrest.  It  would,  therefore,  be  far  more  satisfactory  to  compare  the  Indian  mutiny  to  other 
colonial  revolts.  What  is  striking  about  the  recent  history  of  colonial  forces,  however,  is  how  loyal 
they  proved  to  be.  In  his  recently  published  essay,  'Guardians  of  Empire',  David  Killingray 
acknowledged  that  colonial  soldiers  "needed  careful  handling"  and  that  "disciplinary  methods,  food, 
service  overseas,  policing  roles,  access  to  women,  and  religious  sensibilities"  all  had  to  be  taken  into 
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account.  Despite  these  precautions,  "there  was  always  the  potential  for  disaffection".  And  yet,  he 
conceded,  mutiny  among  colonial  troops  "was  relatively  rare".  Most  colordal  revolts  were  "much 
smaller-scale  protests"  than  the  Indian  mutiny,  "usually  over  conditions  of  pay  and  service,  and  easily 
contained".  In  the  vast  majority  of  cases,  the  service  of  colonial  soldiers  "was  marked  by  loyalty  to  the 
regime".  Killingray  referred  in  particular  to  the  fidelity  of  the  askaris  in  German  East  Africa  during  the 
First  World  War  "despite  the  hardships  of  defeat  and  retreat",  the  wfllingness  of  French  colonial  troops 
to  fight  in  Algeria  and  Indo-China  during  the  final  stages  of  Empire,  and  the  Portugese  mobilisation  of 
a  growing  number  of  African  soldiers  to  fight  nationalist  forces  in  Mozambique  and  Angola  in  the 
1960s  and  1970s.  2  The  obvious  conclusion  to  be  drawn  is  that  colonial  soldiers  remained  loyal  as  long 
as  their  conditions  of  service  were  acceptable  -  even  at  the  very  end  of  Empire.  This  was  the  lesson  the 
British  in  India  had  to  learn  the  hard  way. 
If  we  do  compare  the  Indian  mutiny  to  revolts  by  other  European  annies,  a  number  of  common 
factors  can  be  identified.  The  series  of  mutinies  by  British  Highland  troops  in  1743,1778-9,1783, 
1794-5,1797  and  1804,  for  example,  have  been  attributed  by  the  narrative  historian  John  Prebble  to 
Jacobite  sympathies.  3  But  Hew  Strachan  rejected  this  "single  phenomenon"  theory,  emphasizing 
instead  the  similarities  between  the  Highland  mutinies  and  the  revolt  of  the  Bengal  Army  in  1857,  and 
'$not  only  in  the  broad  context  of  a  vanishing  way  of  life  and  a  declining  social  order".  For  Strachan, 
the  "real  issues"  in  both  cases  "were  predominantly  professional":  insufficient  pay,  a  fear  of  foreign 
service  and,  above  all,  the  failure  of  officers  to  understand  their  men  or  to  inspire  trust.  He  added: 
In  particular  those  used  to  disciplining  English  recruits  had  little  fccling  for  the  pride  and  self-esteem  of  the 
Highlanders,  little  comprehension  of  their  language,  little  awareness  that  forms  of  discipline  suited  to  coarser 
spirits  (especially  flogging)  did  not  befit  their  gentlemanly  aspirations...  [All  but  one  of  the  mutinous  regiments) 
were  manifesting  the  pains  of  adaption  to  the  'professionalization  process.  This  is  most  clearly  the  case  with  the 
Fcncible  regiments...  Fcncible  indiscipline  attributed  to  the  influence  of  the  mob  manifests  that  radicial,  urban  and 
Lowland  (not  Highland)  discontent  rode  on  the  back  of  basic  and  genuine  grievances  regarding  conditions  of 
scrviCe.  4 
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The  French  Army  of  Louis  XVI  also  had  similarities  to  the  Bengal  Army  of  1857.  Both  were 
comprised  of  volunteer  troops  who  served  mainly  for  financial  reward;  both  were  officered  by  a  ruling 
caste  far  removed,  in  social  and  economic  terms,  from  their  men.  According  to  Jean  Paul  Bertaud,  90 
per  cent  of  the  pre-revolutionary  French  Army  officers  were  aristocrats,  though  "mostly  members  of 
the  lesser  provincial  nobility".  The  typical  recruit,  on  the  other  hand,  was  either  a  peasant  or  the  son  of 
an  artisan  who  was  induced  to  join  up  by  the  offer  of  a  bounty  of  up  to  120  livres  (depending  upon  age 
and  height);  an  agricultural  labourer,  by  comparison,  would  struggle  to  earn  100  livres  in  a  year.  5  The 
conditions  of  service  for  Louis  XVI's  troops  were  not  that  dissimilar  to  those  experienced  by  the 
Bengal  sepoys  in  the  1850s:  they  were  poorly  paid  Oust  6  sous  8  deniers  a  day,  of  which  2  sous  6 
deniers  was  deducted  for  army  bread),  badly  housed  and  had  little  contact  with  their  officers.  "Poverty, 
humiliation,  and  contempt,  "  wrote  Bertaud.  "The  common  soldier  was  scorned  by  his  officers,  and 
sometimes  by  the  bourgeois,  many  of  whom  shut  their  doors  and  fastened  their  shutters  on  hearing  of 
the  approach  of  the  military.  "  There  was  also  no  outlet  for  ambition:  between  1781  and  1789,  for 
example,  only  46  men  were  commissioned  from  the  ranks;  commoners  were  rarely  promoted  beyond 
lieutenant.  (' 
The  enthusiastic  response  of  many  Royal  troops  to  the  French  Revolution  is  generally  accepted  as  the 
reason  for  the  latter's  success.  The  widespread  mutinies  of  1790  and  1791,  in  particular,  made  it 
impossible  for  the  King  to  launch  a  successful  counter-revolution.  Yet  scholars  of  the  Royal  Army 
have  tended  to  attribute  its  disaffection  to  military  grievances  rather  than  ideological  beliefs.  "The 
essential  cause  of  insubordination,  wrote  Samuel  F.  Scott,  "existed  within,  not  outside,  the  Royal 
Army.  Civilians  often  provided  encouragement  to  the  soldiers  and  the  [Jacobin]  clubs  sometimes 
offered  a  forum  for  them  to  voice  their  complaints.  But,  it  was  conditions  in  the  army  that  created  the 
complaints,  and  it  was  not  the  Revolution,  but  its  overthrow  of  traditional  authority,  that  allowed  them 
to  be  expressed  as  they  were.  "7  The  same  could  be  said  of  the  Bengal  Army  in  1857.  It,  too,  was 
encouraged  to  mutiny  by  civilians  who  were  seeking  political  change.  It  did  so  not  primarily  for 
reasons  of  ideology  or  religion,  but  because  it  was  seeking  to  improve  its  conditions  of  service. 
The  most  criticial  problem  in  the  French  Royal  Army,  according  to  ScM  "was  the  hostility  between 
soldiers  and  officers".  He  added:  "Divided  by  the  chasm  of  birth  in  an  estate  society,  the  two  enjoyed 
4  H.  F.  A.  Strachan,  'The  British  Army  in  Society',  pp.  252-3. 
5  Bertaud,  7he  Army  of  the  Erench  Revolution,  pp.  17,19. 
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entirely  different  conditions  of  military  service,  including  duties,  rights,  and  prerogatives.  "  The 
Revolution  was  an  opportunity  to  redress  these  past  iniquities  and  led  to  an  outburst  of  complaints 
against  "the  monopolization  of  high  ranks  by  nobles,  harsh  and  sometimes  inequitable  discipline,  the 
disdain  with  which  they  were  treated  by  their  superiors,  and  peculation  on  the  part  of  their  officers". 
These  complaints  against  noble  officers  were  only  translated  into  political  terms,  said  Scott,  as  a  result 
of  the  drastic  constitutional  and  social  changes  introduced  by  the  revolutionary  authorities.  8  By  1857, 
the  Bengal  mutineers  were  also  alienated  from  their  European  officers.  They,  too,  embraced  political 
change  -  the  overthrow  of  the  same  ruling  class  from  which  their  officers  came  -  as  a  prerequisite  to 
achieving  their  professional  ends. 
Scott  also  identified  a  correlation  between  the  number  of  officers  absent  from  a  particular  regiment 
during  the  regular  semester  leave  from  October  1789  to  May  1790,  and  that  regiment's  propensity  to 
mutiny.  The  higher  the  number,  the  more  disaffected  the  regiment.  Scott  cited  the  absences  not  as  an 
indication  that  the  remaining  officers  were  unable  to  cope:  many  of  the  examples  of  disaffection  took 
place  after  the  officers  had  returned  from  leave.  But  rather  as  evidence  of  the  "nearly  total  separation 
between  officers  and  men".  9  A  similar  disdain  for  regimental  service  and  the  concerns  of  their  men 
was  displayed  by  most  Bengal  officers  in  their  quest  for  detached  appointments  prior  to  the  mutiny. 
Another  striking  similarity  between  the  mutinies  of  1790-1  and  1857  was  the  role  played  by  the  ranks 
immediately  below  the  white  officers:  non-commissioned  officers  in  the  French  Army  and  native 
officers  in  the  Bengal  Army.  Scott's  description  of  the  former  could  just  as  easily  apply  to  the  latter: 
"The  N.  C.  O.  s,  especially  the  sergeants,  had  extensive  military  service  ... 
but  until  1789  their  ambitions 
in  the  army  had  been  frustrated.  The  Revolution  brought  them  greatly  expanded  opportunities  for 
advancement,  and  most  of  them  embraced  it  warmly.  "  In  1790  and  1791,  wrote  Scott,  they  organized 
and  led  mutinies.  "The  hostility  of  many  officers  to  the  Revolution,  intensified  after  the  King's 
attempted  flight  [to  Varennes  in  June  1791],  provided  many  N.  C.  O.  s  with  an  opportunity  to  serve  both 
the  new  regime  and  their  personal  ambitions  by  purging  the  army  of  counter-revolutionary  officers.  " 
As  aristocratic  officers  were  forced  out,  most  of  their  replacements  were  former  N.  C.  O.  s.  10 
The  other  group  that  made  a  significant  contribution  to  undermining  their  noble  superiors  was  that  of 
officers  promoted  from  the  ranks,  commonly  known  as'officers  of  fortune!.  They  came  from  the  same 
7  Scott,  yhe  Respoine  of  the  RojalArmy  to  the  French  Revolution,  p.  100. 
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lower-class  background  as  N.  C.  O.  s  and  had  had  similar,  if  slightly  more  successful,  careers.  "Their 
frustration  and  resentment  at  never  being  fully  accepted  as  officers,  "  wrote  Scott  "made  them  at  least 
as  hostile  to  the  Old  Regime  as  were  the  sergeants.  "  As  evidence  he  cited  the  prevalence  of  grenadier 
companies,  whose  officers  were  invariably  'officers  of  fortune',  in  incidents  Of  insubordination  during 
the  critical  years  of  1789  to  1791.11  The  aspirations  of  French  N.  C.  O.  s  and  'officers  of  fortune,  during 
the  French  Revolution,  therefore,  are  roughly  analagous  to  those  displayed  by  Bengal  native  officers  in 
1857:  they  all  sought  to  further  their  careers  by  expelling  the  dominant  officer  caste  that  had  held  them 
back. 
Professional  concerns  are  also  said  to  have  been  largely  responsible  for  the  mutiny  of  the  French 
Army  in  1830.  Pay  was  poor  for  all  ranks,  but  particularly  so  for  N.  C.  O.  s  and  soldiers  who  earned 
about  a  third  as  much  as  their  British  counterparts.  They  also  had  to  put  up  with  slow  promotion, 
dilapidated  and  overcrowded  barracks,  insanitary  latrines  and  -  because  most  Restoration  regiments 
were  under  strength  -  almost  constant  guard  duty.  Douglas  Porch  is  of  the  opinion  that  even  minor 
reforms  could  have  "dispelled  the  pessimism  permeating  the  army".  12  But,  as  with  the  Bengal  Army, 
they  were  only  carried  out  after  the  troops  had  mutinied. 
According  to  Porch,  the  disaffection  was  orchestrated  by  N.  C.  O.  s  who,  on  receiving  the  news  of  the 
July  Revolution  in  Paris,  encouraged  the  troops  to  disobey  their  officers.  Many  led  groups  of  soldiers 
to  Paris  with  the  avowed  intention  of  defending  the  revolution  from  a  Bourbon  counter-stroke. 
However  their  primary  motive,  wrote  Porch,  was  the  "prospect  of  higher  pay  and  a  promotion  promised 
to  those  who  joined  the  Paris  National  Guard".  In  the  army  generally,  the  N.  C.  O.  s  were  quick  "to 
denounce  their  superiors  as  Carlists  and  counter-revolutionaries"  because  they  wished  to  take  their 
places.  Their  ambition  was  particularly  keen  because  the  social  distinction  between  N.  C.  O.  s  and  most 
officers  was  barely  discernible  in  the  Restoration  army.  Successive  revolutionary  governments  had 
democratized  the  officer  corps  to  the  extent  that  more  than  half  of  Charles  X's  officers  had  come  up 
through  the  ranks.  Napoleon's  dictum  that  every  French  soldier  carried  a  marshal's  baton  in  his 
knapsack  was  still  widely  believed.  "Young  soldiers  from  a  lower  middle-class  background 
...  formed 
the  NCO  class  in  the  army  and  they  resented  the  low  pay,  lack  of  privacy  and  inhuman  barrack 
conditions  forced  on  them  by  the  Restoration.  Consequently,  they  were  eager  for  a  commission  even  at 
ibid.,  pp.  111-12. 
Ibid.,  p.  112. 
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the  price  of  revolution,  and  not  unwilling  to  aid  in  the  overthrow  of  a  regime  which  neglected  their 
interests.  The  Restoration's  alienation  of  the  NCO  class  explains  why  this  group  was  quick  to  join  the 
revolutionaries  in  1830.  "  13 
Republican  ideology  had  "only  limited  appeal"  for  Charles  Xs  army,  wrote  Porch,  "and  had  served  as 
little  more  than  a  rallying  point  for  discontent  with  conditions  of  service".  As  proof  he  cited  the 
decline  of  republicanism  in  France  after  1834,  explaining  that  the  "simultaneous  repression  of  the 
republican  movement  [in  1834]  and  the  reform  of  conditions  of  service  brought  open  political  dissent 
within  the  army  to  a  near  end".  He  also  referred  to  the  Algerian  conquest  of  the  1830s  which  promised 
promotion  and  the  opportunity  for  plunder.  By  1848,  with  its  grievances  mostly  redressed,  the  army 
was  largely  apolitical  and  played  no  part  in  the  February  revolution  which  overthrew  the  OrMans 
dynasty.  When  it  was  called  upon  to  act,  it  did  so  without  hesitation.  "The  army's  June  crackdown  on 
the  revolutionary  movement  initiated  a  European  counter-revolution,  "  wrote  Porch,  "and  placed  the 
army's  loyalty  to  the  government  beyond  serious  question  for  more  than  a  century.  it  14  The  Bengal 
Army  underwent  a  similar  metamorphosis  thanks  to  the  military  reforms  of  the  1860s.  "The 
Government  of  India  made  sure  that  military  service  was  well  rewarded,  "  wrote  David  Omissi,  "thus 
cementing  its  vital  alliance  with  the  communities  that  provided  the  bulk  of  army  recruits.  The  Rai  was 
safer  if  the  men  who  defended  it  won  honour  and  made  a  profit.  They  did,  and  the  discipline  of  the 
troops  usually  remained  steady.  The  authorities  had  learned  the  lesson  of  1857,  and  paid  careful 
attention  to  the  needs  and  grievances  of  the  ranks.  ""  Despite  global  conflict,  growing  civil  unrest  and 
the  rising  tide  of  nationalism,  the  Indian  Army  gave  no  further  indication  of  serious  disaffection  until 
the  Second  World  War  when  thousands  of  Indian  soldiers,  captured  by  the  Japanese  at  Singapore, 
joined  Subas  Chandra  Bose's  anti-British  Indian  National  Army.  "By  then,  however,  "  wrote 
Killingray,  "the  imperial  structure  in  India  was  starting  to  fall  apart  and  the  British  departure  seemed  to 
many  only  a  question  of  time.  Despite  these  pressures-the  Indian  Army  remained  a  loyal  instrument 
of  the  fading  Rai  ...... 
6 
The  central  role  played  by  professional  grievances  is  also  evident  in  the  mutiny  of  Italian  regiments 
of  the  Austrian  Imperial  Army  during  the  revolutions  of  1848,  though  some  soldiers  were 
understandably  influenced  by  patriotic  sentiment.  There  were,  of  course,  significant  differences 
13  Ibid.,  pp.  29,424. 
14  Ibid.,  pp.  138-9. 
15  omissi,  Yhe  Sepoy  and  the  Raj,  p.  192. 282 
between  the  Austrian  and  Bengal  armies  of  that  era.  The  former  was  a  polyglot  force,  conscripted 
from  the  various  ethnic  groupings  that  made  up  the  Austrian  Empire:  including  Germans,  Italians, 
Czechs,  Hungarians  and  South  Slavs.  But  there  was  one  important  similarity:  both  were  officered  in 
the  main  by  the  ruling  caste  which,  in  the  case  of  the  Austrian  Army,  was  ethnic  German  and  of  noble 
birth.  In  his  study  of  the  Austian  Imperial  Army  in  1848,  Alan  Sked  confirmed  that  up  to  three- 
quarters  of  officers  in  Italian  regiments  wcrc'forcign',  most  of  them  German.  The  language  problem 
was  therefore  a  "very  serious  one"  and  "it  was  commonly  held  that  German-speaking  soldiers  were 
always  promoted  more  quickly  since  these  were  the  only  troops  the  officers  could  depend  on  to 
communicate  orders".  The  nationalities  understandably  "resented  being  officered  by  German-speaking 
foreigners",  wrote  Sked,  "and  seeing  German  troops  promoted  more  quickly  than  anyone  else".  17  A 
similar  language  problem  was  evident  in  the  Bengal  Army  by  the  1850s  as  fewer  officers  bothered  to 
learn  native  tongues. 
But  the  alienation  between  officers  and  men  in  the  Austrian  Army  was  not  simply  a  racial  issue. 
There  was  also  the  social  gulf,  with  most  ordinary  soldiers  the  sons  of  the  poorest  peasants  who  could 
not  afford  to  buy  an  exemption  from  military  service.  Officers  tended  to  regard  such  recruits  with 
contempt  and  the  fccling  was  mutual.  "There  were  few  ofticers  who  enjoyed  any  popularity  amongst 
their  subordinates,  "  wrote  one  enlightened  staff  officer.  "The  majority  of  them  lack  the  capacity  to 
adjust  themselves  to  the  way  of  thought  of  the  common  man..  The  officer  supervises  and  conducts  the 
exercises,  the  drilling  of  recruits;  he  holds  school  for  the  men;  in  short,  while  on  duty  he  spends  most  of 
his  day  with  them.  Yet  he  never  takes  the  trouble  to  study  the  character  of  the  men,  to  speak  with  them 
in  their  mode  of  speech  or  to  teach  them  their  duties  by  example.  "18 
if  the  Bengal  Army  in  the  1850s  was  too  soft  on  its  native  troops  with  commanding  officers  denied 
adequate  powers  to  punish,  the  Austrian  Army  was  too  harsh.  According  to  Sked,  it  "expected  blind 
obedience  from  its  soldiers  and  was  prepared  to  do  everything  possible  to  secure  it".  Most 
punishments  were  either  corporal  or  capital.  Violence  to  superiors,  for  example,  was  punishable  by 
death  whether  the  superior  was  injured  or  not.  Corporal  punishment  with  a  hazel  stick  (the  equivalent 
of  a  rattan  cane)  was  a  summary  power  enjoyed  by  a  number  of  officers:  from  colonels,  who  could 
order  50  strokes,  to  captains  in  command  of  companies,  who  could  award  25.  There  was  also  the 
16  Killingray,  'Guardians  of  Empire',  p.  17. 
17  Sked,  77)e  Stirvivvi  of  ihe  Habsburg  Empire,  pp.  29-30,524. 
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infamous  'running  of  the  gauntlet'whereby  offenders  were  made  to  pass  between  two  rows  of  150  men 
armed  with  birch  switches.  "The  result  of  punishments  such  as  these,  "  wrote  Sked,  "  ...  was  naturally  to 
degrade,  humiliate  and  brutalise  the  men  and,  not  surprisingly,  to  encourage  violence  and 
disobedience.  "  Austrian  soldiers  were  also  very  badly  paid.  A  private  received  5  kr.  a  day,  of  which  3 
kr.  was  deducted  to  meet  his  mess  bill.  The  average  peasant,  after  paying  all  his  taxes  and  feudal  dues, 
would  still  be  left  with  about  9  kr.  a  day.  The  common  soldier  was  therefore  the  economic  equal  of  a 
landless  labourer  and  could  only  make  ends  meet  by  finding  a  part-time  job.  In  addition,  pensions  were 
paltry  (the  equivalent  of  four  shillings  per  year  for  every  year  they  had  served  over  six)  and  only  four 
men  in  each  company  of  200  men  were  permitted  to  marry.  19 
Sked  attributed  the  desertion  of  thousands  of  Imperial  troops  from  their  colours  in  1848  to  a  number 
of  factors:  the  revolutionary  atmosphere,  the  alienation  be  een  o  icers  and  so  diers,  the  anti-  tw  ff  I 
Habsburg  stand  of  the  Church,  and  the  fear  of  being  sent  away  from  one's  homeland.  He  added  that 
Italian  soldiers  found  it  difficult  to  resist  the  blandishments  of  their  fellow  countrymen:  "instead  of 
discipline,  they  offered  hospitality  -  free  bread,  free  wine  -  and  even  money".  As  with  the  French 
Army  in  1790-1  and  1830,  when  political  upheaval  preceded  mutiny,  unacceptable  conditions  of 
service  clearly  played  a  significant  role  in  the  mass  defection  of  Italian  troops  in  1848.  Sked 
acknowledged  this  with  the  remark  that  the  deserters  were  often  accompanied  "by  these,  perhaps  key 
figures,  the  N.  C.  O.  s".  20  Their  ambition  to  become  officers  in  the  newnational'  armies  was  almost 
certainly  a  major  incentive  to  revolt  -just  as  it  was  for  N.  C.  Os  in  the  French  Army  in  1790-1  and  1830, 
and  for  native  officers  in  the  Bengal  Army  in  1857. 
It  is  not  ideal  to  compare  the  Indian  mutiny  with  revolts  by  conscripted  armies  during  the  two  World 
wars.  Not  least  because  a  new  factor  is  evident  in  both  of  the  latter:  war  weariness.  But  the  central 
argument  that  mutinies  are  primarily  about  unacceptable  service  conditions  still  seems  to  hold  true. 
Alan  Wildman's  authoritative  account  of  e  End  of  the  Russiat  Imperia  A  y,  for  e  mple,  7h  II  rin  xa 
concludes  that  "battle  fatigue  and  war  weariness  with  the  war  in  general,  rather  than  revolutionary 
agitation  or  infection  from  the  rear,  was  the  more  immediate  and  fiindamental  factor"  in  the  mutinies  of 
1916,  "and  they  do  not  in  themselves  reflect  an  incipient  politicization  of  the  army".  He  added: 
--politicization,  when  it  did  come  about  on  a  massive  scale  in  1917,  emanated  from  the  rear  and  was 
most  pronounced  in  the  garrisons  and  transfer  points,  from  whence  it  found  its  way  to  the  front.  The 
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mutinies,  on  the  other  hand,  reflected  primarily  the  desperate  situation  at  the  front:  the  grinding  effect 
of  unending  casualties,  costly  and  futile  attacks,  and  deteriorating  organization  and  leadership  on  the 
most  battered  units.  1121  Wildman  referred,  in  particular,  to  the  gradual  deterioration  in  the  quality  and 
quantity  of  food  for  frontline  soldiers.  During  the  peak  of  the  food  crisis,  which  hit  the  front  in 
December  1916-January  1917,  bread  rations  were  reduced  from  three  pounds  a  day  to  one,  and 
sometimes  replaced  entirely  by  cash  payments  (which  were  meaningless  without  supplies)  or  other 
products.  "One  common  substitute  was  lentils  (chechevifsa),  "  wrote  Wildman,  "which  the  soldiers 
despised  so  thoroughly  that  it  can  almost  be  accounted  as  a  major  cause  of  the  Revolution.  02 
The  widespread  mutinies  in  the  French  Army  in  1917  are  also  generally  acknowleged  to  have  been 
fmilitaryl  rather  than  'political'  in  origin.  Main,  who  took  over  as  Commander-in-Chief  at  the  end  of 
the  first  phase  of  mutinies  on  15  May  1917,  later  cited  three  main  causes.  The  first  was  the  "launching 
and  exploitation  of  a  pacifist  propaganda  campaign"  in  the  winter  of  1916-17,  with  soldiers  in  the 
trenches  bombarded  by  "antimilitarist  and  anarchist  leaflets"  and  their  confidence  in  their  commanders 
further  undermined  by  the  "reprehensible  habit"  in  the  civilian  press  of  editorials  criticizing  military 
operations.  Second,  Main  referred  to  the  poor  physical  conditions  at  the  front,  including  inadequate 
leave  and  bad  food.  Third,  was  the  overconfidence  of  the  the  military  commanders  -  Nivelle  and 
Mangin  -  who  convinced  the  troops  that  they  had  discovered  the  formula  for  offensive  success.  When 
the  so-called  Nivelle  offensive  in  the  Chemin  des  Dames  failed  to  achieve  a  breakthrough,  the 
disappointment  of  the  soldiers  made  them  all  the  more  susceptible  to  pacifists  and  other  traitors.  But, 
added  Ntain,  soldiers  became  "politicized"  only  when  they  felt  down  by  their  leaders.  Restoring 
discipline  was  therefore  a  matter  of  restoring  appropriate  leadershi  P.  23 
French  historians  have  tended  to  downplay  the  role  of  subversion  from  the  interior.  Jean  Ratinaud 
characterized  the  mutinies  in  1960  as  a  "quasi-professional  strike"  that  ended  when  "intelligence  and 
friendship  took  their  place  alongside  discipline  and  order"ý4  Some  English-language  historians,  alive 
to  early  signs  of  the  French  moral  collapse  in  1940,  have  paid  more  attention  to  the  part  played  by  the 
subversives.  In  1962,  for  example,  John  Williams  wrote  of  "weary  and  demoralized  poilus  who  found 
20  Ibid.,  pp.  59,206. 
21  Wildman,  Yhe  End  ofthe  Russian  IniperialArmy,  pp.  119-20. 
22  Ibid.,  p.  108. 
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themselves  "egged  on  to  rebellion  by  home-front  traitors  and  pacifists".  A  year  later,  Richard  Watt 
came  to  roughly  the  same  conclusion:  but  with  the  rider  that  politics  and  the  subversives  played  a 
"distinctly  secondary  role  in  intitiating  the  mutinies".  He  added:  "This  is  not  to  deny  their  importance 
or  the  growing  influence  that  the  pacifist-defeatist  group  was  to  gain  among  the  troops.  But  it  is  most 
certainly  a  fact  that  at  the  end  of  May  the  troops  that  were  revolting  did  not  constitute  a  revolutionary 
force,  as  was  later  to  be  claimed.  Rather  they  were  the  symptoms  of  an  almost  mortal  disease  within 
the  Army:  the  disease  of  despair.  "25  Here,  too,  there  are  similarities  with  1857  in  that  most  Bengal 
mutineers  would  not  have  characterised  themselves  as  revolutionaries  (but  rather  as  mercenary  soldiers 
seeking  to  obtain  improved  conditions  of  service  with  a  new  employer). 
The  most  exhaustive  study  of  the  1917  mutinies  -  and  the  first  based  on  archival  evidence,  including 
the  military  justice  records  -  was  published  in  1967  by  the  French  historian  Guy  Pedroncini,  He 
concluded  that  the  mutinies  were  a  limited  and  sophisticated  protest  against  three  years  of  fruitless 
offensives,  culminating  in  the  Chemin  des  Dames  fiasco.  He  was  able  to  demonstrate  that  the 
mutinous  acts  always  took  place  in  "active"  sectors  where  troops  believed  they  were  about  to  be 
ordered  'over  the  top'.  The  significance  of  pacifist  propaganda  was  exaggerated  by  the  military 
commanders,  he  claimed,  as  an  excuse  for  their  failings.  To  Pedroncini,  the  mutinies  were  strictly 
military  protests  and  therefore  "nonpolitical".  The  soldiers  revolutionary  rhetoric  was  simply  a  "more 
human  desire  to  save  one!  s  life".  He  added:  "The  revolution,  according  to  the  evidence,  was  simply 
something  to  cling  to,  without  thereby  taking  on  a  great  sigrificance.  06 
In  1994,  in  his  study  of  one  particularly  disaffected  French  infantry  division  -  the  5h  -  the  American 
historian  Leonard  Smith  concluded  that  Pedroncini  had  underestimated  the  political  element  of  the 
protests.  In  support  of  his  argument,  Smith  stressed  the  diversity  of  soldiers'  demands  during  the 
mutinies  in  the  5h  Division:  from  calls  for  more  regular  leave  and  better  food,  to  appeals  for  peace  and 
an  end  to  the  butchery.  Soldiers  could  juxtapose  a  demand  for  peace  with  the  reform  of  leave  policy, 
wrote  Smith,  because  they  were  both  attempts  to  establish  links  with  civilian  life:  "Consequently,  the 
'political'  significance  to  soldiers  of  this  link  can  scarcely  be  overestimated...  Once  links  to  the  home 
front  were  guaranteed  by  leave  reform,  soldiers  could  give  up  their  demand  for  immediate  peace.  " 
Smith  argued  that  the  soldiers'  perception  of  themselves  as  citizens  rather  than  subjects  was  the  all- 
24  Jean  Ratinaud,  1917  ou  LaNvolle  despoilus  (Paris,  1960),  pp.  15,19. 
25  Richard  M.  Watt,  Dare  Call  It  Treason  (New  York,  1963),  pp.  195-6,3  03. 
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important  factor  that  "opened  the  door  to  tacit  negotiations  with  Main",  and  that  the  latter's  "offer  of 
repression,  reforms,  and  proportionality"  was  what  "he  and  French  soldiers  could  persuade  each  other 
to  accept"  . 
27  No  doubt  Smith  has  a  point.  But  he  cannot  get  away  from  the  central  fact  that  the 
mutinies  would  not  have  taken  place  if  life  on  the  front  line  had  been  more  bearable.  In  this  sense, 
conditions  of  service  -  albeit  extreme  wartime  conditions  -  were  chiefly  responsible  for  the  mutinies. 
once  they  were  improved  -  with  better  food,  more  regular  leave  and,  most  importantly,  no  more  futile 
offensives  -  the  loyalty  of  the  French  Army  in  World  War  I  was  never  again  in  doubt. 
Smith  does  make  one  point  that  strikes  a  chord  with  the  mutinies  of  1857:  that,  according  to  the 
postal  censorship  records,  the  grievances  of  the  10%  or  so  of  troops  who  were  "participants"  in  the 
mutinies  in  1917  were  "essentially  the  same"  as  those  held  by  the  "waiting,  and  otherwise  silent, 
Majority,,. 
213  In  other  words,  the  army  as  a  whole  was  disgruntled,  but  only  a  minority  were  prepared  to 
follow  words  by  deeds.  The  actual  instigators  of  mutiny  -  the  group  analagous  to  the  conspirators  of 
1857  -  were  a  smaller  proportion  still. 
The  disturbances  by  British  and  Dominion  troops  at  the  Etaples  base  camp  in  September  1917  have 
also  been  explained  in  terms  of  'military'  factors.  The  main  outbreak  of  indiscipline  occurred  on  9 
September  afler  the  arrest  and  assault  of  a  New  Zealand  gunner  by  the  Military  Police.  It  worsened 
when  the  outnumbered  policemen  shot  into  the  crowd  and  killed  a  popular  corporal  in  the  Gordon 
Highlanders,  prompting  thousands  of  men  to  invade  the  town  of  Etaples  in  pursuit  of  the  police.  The 
unruly  demonstrations  continued  for  six  days.  According  to  the  camp  adjutant,  Major  Guinness,  the 
"chief  cause  of  discontent"  was  the  fact  that  men  who  had  already  done  much  service  at  the  front  had  to 
undergo  "the  same  strenuous  training  as  the  drafls  of  recruits  arriving  from  home".  Guinness  also 
referred  to  the  lack  of  familiarity  between  officers  and  men:  "It  should  be  realised  that  each  Infantry 
Base  Depot  was  commanded  by  an  elderly  retired  officer  who  had  an  adjutant  to  help  him.  The 
remaining  officers,  like  the  men,  were  either  reinforcements  from  home,  or  had  been  sent  down  the  line 
on  account  of  ill-health,  and  therefore  did  not  know  them.  49 
In  their  analysis  of  the  disturbances,  Gill  and  Dallas  referred  to  the  "particular  hatred"  directed 
towards  the  Military  Police  at  Etaples  -  who  had  not  seen  active  service  and  who  were  trying  to  impose 
"the  disciplinary  standard  of  the  glasshouse"  -  and  the  rioters'  intention  to  release  military  prisoners. 
27  Smith,  Between  Mutiny  and  Ohedience,  pp.  178,188-91,195. 
28  Ibid.,  p.  188. 
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They  also  commented  upon  the  prominent  role  played  by  Anzac  soldiers  -  who  had  a  tendency  to  be 
"contemptuous  of  the  narrow  discipline  to  which  British  troops  subscribed,  and  [who]  were  led  by 
officers  who  had  invariably  first  shown  their  qualities  as  privates  in  the  ranks"  -  and  their  close 
relationship  with  the  Scottish  troops  "who  gave  the  mutiny  its  force".  There  was  also  the  inevitable 
factor  of  low  morale  after  three  years  of  seemingly-futile  offensives.  30 
David  Englander  is  of  the  opinion  that  all  military  disorder  in  1914-18  "arose  primarily  from  the 
circumstances  of  the  war".  He  added:  "Soldier  grievances  invariably  were  concerned  with  the  conduct 
of  the  war  in  respect  of  themselves  and  their  families.  Apart  from  questions  concerning  food  and  drink, 
soldiers  were  exercised  by  issues  respecting  pay  and  allowances,  clothing  and  comforts,  shelter, 
warmth,  and  rest.  Dominating  all  was  the  question  of  leave  and  family  income  support.  Soldiers  lived 
01 
and  died  in  the  trenches  while  directing  their  conscious  life  homewards. 
Similar  preoccupations  lay  behind  the  relatively  small-scale  mutiny  by  193  veterans  of  the  50'h  (Tyne 
Tees)  and  5  1"  (Highland)  Divisions  at  the  Salerno  beachhead  in  September  1943.  Proud  members  of 
Montgomery's  illustrious  8h  Army  that  drove  Rommel  out  of  Africa,  the  veterans  had  been  wounded  or 
taken  sick  during  the  Sicilian  campaign  and  sent  to  hospitals  in  North  Africa  to  recuperate.  By  early 
September  they  had  been  transferred  to  a  transit  camp  at  Tripoli  to  await  a  posting  back  to  their  units  in 
Sicily.  Instead  they  were  sent  as  emergency  reinforcements  to  British  divisions  serving  with  the  U.  S. 
51  Army  at  Salerno.  Their  refusal  tojoin  unfamiliar  units  at  Salerno  resulted  in  their  arrest,  court- 
martial  and  subsequent  conviction  for  mutiny. 
Those  involved  have  always  insisted  that  the  transit  camp  authorities  told  them  that  they  were 
returning  to  their  units  -a  claim  corroborated  by  documentary  evidence  32 
-  and  that  this  deliberate 
deception  encouraged  many  who  were  medically  unfit  to  accompany  the  draft.  No  doubt  this 
breakdown  of  trust  between  officers  and  men  genuinely  outraged  some  mutineers  who  could  not 
envisage  service  with  units  other  than  their  own;  but  it  certainly  gave  others  a  useful  excuse  to  demand 
a  return  to  their  original  units.  For  my  own  detailed  study  of  the  mutiny  has  revealed  a  more 
fundamental  incentive  to  disobey  orders  at  Salerno:  the  widely-believed  rumour  (true  as  it  turned  out) 
that  the  50'h  and  51"  Division  had  been  ear-marked  for  return  to  Britain  to  take  part  in  the  invasion  of 
30  Ibid.,  pp.  98-102. 
31  Englander,  Mutinies  and  Military  Morale',  p.  201. 
32  David,  Mutiny  at  Salerno,  p.  209. 288 
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France.  Some  of  the  veterans  had  not  seen  their  families  for  over  two  years,  during  which  time  they 
had  been  almost  constantly  in  action.  They  were  battle  weary  and  homesick,  and  the  thought  of 
missing  the  boat  home  must  have  been  more  than  many  could  bear  (as  it  happened,  those  veterans  who 
did  agree  to  join  units  at  Salerno  were  later  returned  to  their  divisions  before  they  set  sail  for  Britain). 
But  whichever  grievance  is  accorded  the  highest  priority  -  deception  by  officers  or  lack  of  home  leave  - 
its  essential  'military'  nature  is  not  in  doubt. 
The  Salerno  mutiny  shares  one  other  characteristic  with  earlier  military  insurrections:  the  central  role 
played  by  N.  C.  O.  s.  The  senior  mutineers  at  Salerno  were  three  sergeants.  They  later  claimed  that  they 
did  not  use  their  rank  to  influence  their  juniors.  34  That  may  not  have  been  their  intention:  but  when 
such  respected  and  experienced  soldiers  (one  had  fought  in  the  Dunkirk  campaign)  made  their  position 
clear  -as  they  did  repeatedly  -they  were  to  bound  to  affect  the  actions  of  others.  The  court-martial 
recognized  the  key  role  played  by  the  sergeants  when  it  sentenced  all  three  to  death  (later  commuted  to 
12  years'  penal  servitude  and  finally  suspended  altogether). 
By  comparing  the  Indian  mutiny  with  other  military  revolts,  it  is  possible  to  draw  two  conclusions: 
first,  that  mutinies  tend  to  originate  with  professional  grievances;  second,  that  disaffected  troops  only 
become  'politicized'  as  a  means  to  redress  those  grievances.  It  is,  of  course,  extremely  difficult  to 
pinpoint  the  motives  of  a  group  of  men  -  even  one  as  apparently  homogenous  as  the  Bengal  Native 
Infantry.  Yet  it  is  probably  fair  to  say  that  the  pre-1857  Bengal  Army  was  riddled  with  the  same  type 
of  generic  military  problems  which  often  cause  mutinies:  low  pay,  poor  career  prospects  and  worsening 
relations  between  the  men  and  their  officers.  Other  factors  relevant  to  the  1857  mutiny  were  unique  to 
the  Bengal  Army:  in  particular,  the  indulgence  with  which  European  officers  treated  issues  of  caste, 
thereby  encouraging  the  sepoys  to  use  caste  as  an  excuse  both  to  avoid  unwelcome  duty  and  to  provide 
a  redress  for  other  grievances;  and  the  gradual  relaxation  of  discipline  so  that  that  by  1857  the  sepoys 
were,  in  the  words  of  the  Rriend  ofIndia,  "confident  of  their  power  to  dictate  terms  to  their  masters".  35 
The  extent  to  which  these  'military'  factors  became  clothed  with  wider  issues  rooted  in  society  is  one 
of  the  great  imponderables.  Many  sepoys  may  well  have  convinced  themselves  that  their  caste  and 
religion  were  in  danger  in  1857,  however  irrational  that  belief  was  in  relation  to  the  cartridge  question 
itself  It  may  even  have  provided  a  personal  justification  for  mutinying  that  mere  service  grievances 
33  Ibid.,  pp.  25,73. 
34  Ibid.,  pp.  54-5. 
35  rwend  of  India,  7  May  18  57 289 
could  not.  But  there  seems  little  doubt  that  the  cartridge  question  was  manipulated  to  provide  a  pretext 
for  mutiny  by  a  loose  network  of  military  conspirators  and  disgruntled  civilians.  These  ambitious 
soldiers  -  including  a  surprisingly  high  proportion  of  native  officers  -  were  probably  united  by  a  shared 
exasperation  with  the  limitations  of  Company  service.  Their  pre-mutiny  plotting  with  civilians  -  and 
the  way  in  which  many  mutinous  regiments  strove  to  retain  their  command  structure  and  organisation  - 
is  entirely  consistent  with  the  chief  aim  of  most  'active'  mutineers:  to  be  re-employed  by  a  restored 
native  ruler.  They  were  simply  exercising  the  traditional  right  of  mercenary  soldiers  to  choose  an 
alternative  employer.  It  could  be  argued,  therefore,  that  the  sepoys  mutinied  because  they  imagined 
that  service  under  the  new  native  rulers  of  India  would  be  more  rewarding  than  it  had  become  under  the 
British. 290 
Appendix  I-  The  disposition  of  Bengal  troops  as  of  10  May 
1857 
Station  Native  European 
PRESIDENCY  DIVISION 
Alipore  Calcutta  Native  Militia 
Akyab  (Arracan)  Arracan  Bn. 
--  Barrackpore  340',  43d  and  70'h  N.  I.  F, 
Berhampore  6P  N.  I.;  I  Ph  I.  C. 
Bhagalpur  Bhagalpur  Hill  Rangers 
Calcutta  25'h  N.  I. 
Chera  Punji  Sylhet  L.  I.  Bn. 
Chinsurah  H.  M.  8e  Foot* 
Chota  Nagpore  Ramgarh  Force 
Darjeeling  Sebundy  Corps  of  Sappers  and 
Miners 
Dibrugarh  I"  Assam  L.  I. 
Dum-Dum  I't/9"',  2d/9'h,  P/90and  5h/9P' 
F.  A. 
3rd/5th  F.  A.  (No.  20  F.  B.  );  H.  M. 
53d  Foot 
Gowhatty  2"d  Assam  L.  I. 
Jalpigori  73d  N.  I. 
Mian  Owng  (Pegu)  Pegu  L.  I.  Bn. 
Midnapur  Shekhawati  Brigade 
Sonthal  District  32d  and  63rd  N.  I.;  5h 
I.  C. 
DINAPORE  DIVISION 
Allahabad  6h  N.  I.;  OhN"  F.  A.;  Ferozepore 
Regt. 
Azamgarh  170'N.  I. 
Benares  37h  N.  I.,  13"'  I.  C.;  Ludhiana  Regt  2nd/3rd  F.  A.  (No.  12  F.  B.  ) 
Dinapore  7r,  8th  and  400'N.  I.  H.  M.  1"/I&  Foot;  4h/5hF.  A. 
(No.  IIF.  B.  ) 
Ghazipur  65th  N.  I. 
Gorak-hpur  12th 
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CAYINPORE  DIVISION 
-  -  Cawnpore  C,  I",  53d  and  566  N.  1,  201 
&/7'h  and  I't/8dF.  A. 
I"/60'F.  A. 
Dariabad  5h  Oudh  I.  I. 
Fatehgarh  I  O'h  N.  I. 
Faizabad  5h/7h  F. 
. 
(No.  13  F.  B.  );  22d 
N.  I.;  15dI.  C.  (I  tp);  6d'Oudh  I.  I. 
Gonda  3rd  Oudh  I.  I. 
-  Lucknow  (No.  2  F.  B.  );  71S  L.  C, 
13th 
, 
48d'  and  7  I't  N.  I.;  2d,  3rd  and 
Reserve  Oudh  Art.;  2d  Oudh  I.  C.; 
and  7h  Oudh  I.  I. 
H.  M.  32"d  Foot;  41h/l"  F.  A.  (No.  9 
F.  B.  ) 
Persidpur  I'  Oudh  I.  I. 
Pertabgarh  3rd  Oudh  I.  C. 
Secrora  I'  Oudh  Art.;  I'  Oudh  I.  C.;  2!  d 
Oudh  I.  I. 
-  Sitapur  h  I.  I.;  I"  41"N.  I.;  9'  and  100'Ouj 
Oudh  M.  P. 
-  --  Sultanpur  Oudh 
. 
C,  8h  Oudh  I.  I.;  F  15FI 
M.  P. 
MEERUT  DIVISION 
-  -  -  Almora  . 
A.;  66h  N.  I.  (Gurkhas);  --7r/  8'5  F 
Sirmur  Bn. 
Aligarh  90'N.  I. 
Agra  4e  and  67dN.  I.  Yd  B.  E.  R.;  Vd/5h  F.  A.  (No.  21 
F.  B.  ) 
Bareilly  18'  and  68h  N.  I.;  8dIT;  6/8h 
F.  A.  (No.  15  F.  B.  ) 
-  -  Delhi  iTnd  740'N.  I.;  3/ýýF 
.A 
--T81-,  5-T 
(No.  5  F.  B.  ) 
Hansi  4uI.  C.,  Hurrianah  L.  I.  Bn. 
-  Meerut  LC.;  I  Ifi'and  20'h  N.  I.  3"r  H.  M.  Oh  D.  G.;  H.  M.  1'/60'h 
Rifles;  2rd/l"  H.  k;  3d/3d  F.  A. 
(No.  14  F.  B.  ) 
Moradabad  29h  N.  I. 
Rurki  Sappers  &  Miners 
Shahjahanpur  28h  N.  I. 292 
SIRHIND  DIVISION 
-  -  -  -  Ambala  4"7  C,,  5h  and  60'h  N.  I.  -,  45  L  Sik  h 
I.  I. 
H.  M.  9th  L.;  2nd/3rd  and  3rd/3  rd  H.  A. 
Dehra  Dun  Kemaon  Bn. 
Dagshai 
-  - 
I"  B.  E.  F. 
Hoshiapur  N 
. 
I.;  9'h  I.  C.;  50'/1"  H.  A.  33'T 
Jullundur  60'L.  C.;  360'and  61'N.  I.  H.  M.  I"/8h  Foot;  I"/I'H.  A. 
Kasauli  H.  M.  75h  Foot 
Phillour  Yd  N.  I.  4h/6h  F.  A. 
Nurpur  4h  N.  I. 
Jutogh  New  Nasiri  Bn. 
Subathu  To  B.  E.  F. 
LAHORE  DIVISION 
Amritsar  59ýi  N.  I.,  3"h/80'F.  A.  (No.  16  F.  B.  ) 
Ferozcpore  10  L.  C.;  45hand57hN.  I.  H.  M.  6  1"  Foot;  F.  A.  (No. 
19  F.  B.  ) 
Gardaspur  (check)  2nd  I.  C. 
Govindghur 
-  - 
2nd/l"  F.  A. 
Lahore  81ý  L.  C.,,  160',  260'and  45's  N.  1.  H.  M.  8  1"  Foot;  2nd-3d/2nd  H.  A.; 
I  ý4th/4h  F.  A. 
Multan  62d  and  69h  N.  I.;  I"  I.  C.;  4h/3rd 
H.  A. 
- 
4h/3rd  F.  A. 
Sialkot  9M  LC.;  3  5h  and  46h  N.  I.  Fr  H.  M.  52d  L.  I.;  3d/l"  H.  A.;  3  ilF- 
F.  A.  (No.  17  F.  B.  ) 
PESHAWUR  DIVISION 
Asni  Yh  Punjab  I.  C. 
Attock  4h/8h  F.  A. 
Bunnu  Yd  Punjab  I.  C.;  5h  Punjab  I.  I. 
Dera  Ghazi  Khan  2nd  Punjab  I.  C.;  4h  Punjab  I.  I. 
--  -  -  -  -  Dcra  Ismail  Khan  I'Pu  nj  abI.  C.;  6h  Pu  rj  ab  I  I 
.; 
3  7 
Sikh  I.  I. 
Hazara  V  Sikh  I.  I.;  1",  2%  3rd  and  4u' 
Hazara  Mountain  Batteries 
Hoti  Mardan  Corps  of  Guides 
Jhelum  14uand  39h  N.  I.;  4th/7h  F.  A.  (No. 
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Kangra  2d  Sikh  I.  I. 
--  -  Kohat  T  Punjab  I.  C.;  I",  2d  and  P 
Punjab  I.  I. 
Nowshera  55'b  N.  I.;  I&  I.  C. 
- 
H.  M.  27'  Foot 
Pcshawur  5"'  L.  C.;  21",  24ý  27  'hs  51"  and 
64'h  N.  1;  7h  and  18'h  I.  C. 
H.  M.  7&  and  87h  Foot;  I  "/2nd  and 
I"/3d  H.  Aý;  I't/1"  (No.  7  F.  B.  ), 
I  st/2nd  (No.  10  F.  B.  ),  2  nd-4th/2d 
F.  A. 
Rawalpindi  58"'N.  I.;  16'hI.  C.  H.  M.  I  "/24h  Foot 
Shumshabad  17'h  I.  C. 
RAJPUTANA 
Ajmer 
Bewar  Mharwarra  Bn. 
Erinpura  Jodhpur  Legion 
Karauli  Kotah  Cont. 
--  -  -  Nasirabad  17  an  d  50th  N.  I.;  I'  Bo.  L.  C**; 
2'd/7th  F.  A.  (No.  6  F.  B.  ) 
DUNDELKHAND 
-  -  Jhansi  IF  N.  I.  (left  wing);  IT  I 
. 
C., 
4'h/9'h  F.  A.  (half  company,  with 
half  No.  18  F.  B.  ) 
Lalitpur  Inf,  Gwalior  Cont. 
CENTRAL  INDIA 
-  Agar  2'ý'  Cav.,  Gwalior  Cont.;  7h  Inf 
, 
Gwalior  Cont. 
Chanda  2"  NaSpur  I.  I. 
Jabalpur  52d  N.  I. 
Kharwarra  Mewar  Cont. 
Mhow  I'  L.  C.  (wing);  23"'  N.  I.  2:  d/6th  F.  A. 
Mehidpur  United  Malwa  Cont. 
Nagode  S&  N.  I. 
Nimach  I"  L.  C.;  72d  N.  I.;  4M/7  HA 294 
Nowgong  12'h  N.  I.;  14'h  I.  C.  (wing);  4h/9h 
F.  A.  (half  company,  with  half  No. 
18  F.  B.  ) 
Rajpur  P  Nagpur  I.  I. 
Sagar  3  1'  and  42d  N.  I.;  P  I.  C.  I"/3d  F.  A.  (No.  4  F.  B.  ) 
Sehore  Bhopal  Cont. 
Sirdarpur  Malwa  Cont. 
Sitabuldi  I'  NaSpur  I.  I. 
Takli  Nagpur  I.  C. 
GWALIOR 
-  -  -  Gwalior  7,  F  and  OArt.,  Gwalior  Cont.; 
I'  Cav.,  Gwalior  Cont.;  Is'.  2nd,  3rd 
and  4"'  Inf,  Gwalior  Cont. 
Sipri  3  Id  Art.,  Gwalior  Cont.;  5h  Inf., 
Gwalior  Cont. 
SIND 
Jacobabad  Oh  I.  C.;  Sind  I.  H**. 
PEGU  H.  M.  2W"  and  3  5"'  Foot 
IN  TRANSIT  OhN.  I.  (to  Mirzapur) 
Note:  Unless  specified,  the  reference  to  a  corps  denotes  its  headquarters. 
*  Arrived  at  Calcutta  from  Rangoon  on  20  March  1857  to  assist  in  the  disbandment  of  the  19'h  N.  I. 
**  Bombay  army 
European  troops  in  Bengal  army:  2  regiments  of  British  cavalry;  16  regiments  of  British  infantry  (2 
in  Pegu);  3  regiments  of  Bengal  infantry;  9  troops  of  Bengal  horse  artillery;  24  companies  of  Bengal 
foot  artillery  (with  13  field  batteries  attached).  Total  (including  European  officers  and  N.  C.  O.  s  in 
native  corps) 
Regular  native  troops  in  Bengal  army:  10  regiments  of  Bengal  light  cavalry;  74  regiments  of  Bengal 
native  infantry;  4  troops  of  Bengal  horse  artillery;  18  companies  of  Bengal  foot  artillery  (with  8  field 
batteries  attached);  12  companies  of  Bengal  sappers  and  miners;  18  regiments  of  Bengal  irregular 
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Irregular  native  troops  commanded  by  Bengal  officers:  Punjab  Irregular  Force  (5  infantry 
regiments,  6  cavalry  regiments,  3  troops  of  Guide  cavalry,  6  companies  of  Guide  infantry,  4  batteries  of 
Hazara  mountain  artillery);  Oudh  Irregular  Force  (3  cavalry  regiments,  10  infantry  regiments,  4  artillery 
companies);  15  local  infantry  corps  (including  2  Sikh  and  3  Gurkha);  4  Sikh  infantry  regiments; 
Sebundy  Corps  of  Sappers  and  Miners;  Shekhawatee  Brigade;  Assam  Local  Company  of  Artillery; 
Ramgurh  Local  Force  (I  cavalry  regiment,  I  light  infantry  regiment,  I  artillery  company  of  artillery); 
Gwalior  Contingent  (2  cavalry  regiments,  7  infantry  regiments,  4  artillery companies);  Joudpore  Legion 
(3  cavalry  ressallahs,  8  infantry  companies);  United  Malwa  Contingent  (8  cavalry  ressallahs,  8  infantry 
companies,  I  artillery  company);  Bhopal  Contingent  (3  cavalry  ressallahs,  6  infantry  companies,  I 
artillery  company);  Kotah  Contingent  (4  cavalry  ressallahs,  8  infantry  companies;  I  artillery  company); 
Nagpore  Irregular  Force  (I  cavalry  regiment,  3  infantry  regiments,  I  horse  artillery  troops);  Malwa 
Bheel  Corps  (7  infantry  companies);  Mewar  Bheel  Corps  (I  infantry  regiment). 296 
Appendix  2-  When  and  where  Bengal  regiments  mutinied, 
were  disarmed  or  disbanded  in  1857-58 
MUTINIED: 
Date  Place  Corps 
26  February  Berhampore  19'h  N.  I. 
29  March  Barrackpore  3e  N.  I. 
2  May  Lucknow  7'h  Oudh  I.  I. 
10  May  Meerut  3rd  L.  C.;  11"'  and  20"'  NI 
II  May  Delhi  385,54v'  and  74h  N.  I.;  3rd/7h  F.  A.  (No.  5  F.  B.  ) 
13  May  Ferozepore  45h  N.  I. 
-  14  May  Ferozepore  5T  N.  I. 
14  May  Mozaffarnagar  2&  N.  I.  (29  men) 
15  May  Kasauli  Nasiri  Bn.  (Treasury  Guard) 
16  May  Meerut  Bengal  sappers  &  miners  (4  coys) 
18  May  Rurki  Bengal  sappers  &  miners  (2  coys) 
20  May  Aligarh  9h  N.  I. 
21  May  Nowshera  55"'  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
22  May  Mainpuri  9h  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
22  May  Bolundshahr  90'N.  I.  (I  coy) 
23  May  Etawah  Vh  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
24  May  Hatrass  I"  Cav.,  Gwalior  Cont. 
24  May  Hod  Mardan  55h  N.  I. 
28  May  Nasirabad  15  th  and  300'N.  I.;  2nd/7h  F.  A.  (No.  6  F.  B.  ) 
29  May  Hansi  4h  I.  C.  (det.  );  Hurrianah  L.  I. 
30  May  Sirsa  4h  I.  C.  (det.  );  Hurrianah  L.  I.  (det.  ) 
30  May  Hissar  Hurrianah  L.  I.  (det.  ) 
30  May  Mathura  44h  N.  I.  (I  coy)  and  67h  N.  I.  (I  coy) 
-  -  30  May  Lucknow  48h  and  7  1'  N.  I.;  2!  d  and  Res.  Oudh  Art.  13"' 
, 
31  May  Lucknow  Th  L.  C. 
31  May  Bareilly  18W  and  68h  N.  I.;  8h  I.  C.;  6h/e  F.  A.  (No.  15  F.  B.  ) 
31  May  Shahjahanpur  28h  N.  I. 
31  May  Hodal  Bharatpur  Legion 
May  (undated)  Near  Cawnpore  4h  Oudh  I.  I.  (wing) 
I  June  Near  Mainpun  2nd  Oudh  I.  C. 
2  June  Saharanpur  5h  N.  I.  (17  men) 
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3  June  Azimgarh  17'h  N.  I. 
3-  June  Moradabad  290'N.  I. 
3  June  Nimach  I"  L.  C.;  72ý  N.  I.;  1"14'h  H.  A.;  7h  Inf,  Gwalior  Cont. 
3  June  Sitapur  41"  N.  I.;  9h  and  I  Oh  Oudh  I.  I.;  I'  Oudh  M.  P. 
4  June  Benares  37th  N.  I.;  13'h  I.  C.;  Ludhiana  Regt 
4  June  Cawnpore  2d  L.  C.;  I"  N.  I. 
5  June  Cawnpore  53d  and  56h  N.  I.;  &/7h  and  1"18'h  F.  A.;  Yd  Oudh  Art. 
5  June  Jhansi  12'h  N.  I.  (I  coy) 
5  June  Jaunpur  Ludhiana  Regt.  (2  coys) 
6  June  Allahabad  60'N.  I.; 
elVh 
F.  A;  Yd  Oudh  I.  I. 
6  June  Jhansi  120'N.  I.  (4  coys);  14'h  I.  C.;  4h/9h  F.  A.  (half  company, 
with  half  No.  18  F.  B.  ) 
7  June  Chobeypur  7h  L.  C.  (2  tps);  48h  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
7  June  Jullundur  Oh  L.  C.;  36h  and  61"  N.  I. 
8  June  Phillour  3rd  N.  I. 
8  June  Faizabad 
th  22  N.  I.;  15g'I.  C.  (det.  );  5h/7h  F.  A.  (No.  13  F.  B.  );  6 
Oudh  I.  I. 
9  June  Dariabad  5'  Oudh  I.  I. 
9  June  Ludhiana  Yd  N.  I.  (I  coy) 
9  June  Near  Nimach  United  Malwa  Cont. 
9  June  Secrora  I"  Oudh  I.  C.;  2d  Oudh  I.  I.;  I'  Oudh  Art. 
9  June  Salone  I"  Oudh  I.  I. 
9  June  Sultanpur  15'h  I.  C.;  8"'  Oudh  I.  I.;  2nd  Oudh  M.  P. 
10  June  Fatehpur  6h  N.  I.  (I  coy) 
io  June  Pershadipur  I'  Oudh  1.1.  (4  coys) 
-  -  10  June  Nowgong  72  =N 
. 
I.,  14th  I.  C.  (wing);  4th/9h  F.  A.  (half  company,  with 
half  No.  18  F.  B.  ) 
10  June  Rohtak  60'h  N.  I. 
II  June  Gonda  3rd  Oudh  I.  I. 
II  June  Orai  53d  N.  I.  (I  coy)  and  56h  N.  I.  (I  coy) 
12  June  Aurungabad  I'  Cav.,  Hyderabad  Cont. 
12  June  Lalitpur  6h  Oudh  I.  I. 
13  June  Sitabuldi  NagpurI.  C.;  I"  NagpurI.  I. 
14  June  Gwalior  2nd  and  4"'  Inf,  Gwalior  Cont.;  I"  and  2"d  Art.,  dTalior 
Cont. 
14  June  Hamirpur  5&  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
14  June  Banda  I"  N.  I.  (3  coys) 
Mid-June  Malthoni  31'N.  I.  (I  coy) 298 
16  June  Etawah  I"  Inf,  Gwalior  Cont. 
-  17/18  June  Sipri  3"'r  Inf,  Gwalior  Cont.;  P  Art.,  Gwalior  Cont. 
18  June  Fatehgarh  I&N.  I. 
21  June  Mozuffurnugger  40'1.  C.  (det.  ) 
30  June  Lucknow 
June  (undated)  Almora  P/e  F.  A. 
June  (undated)  Kussowlie  4 
th  I.  C.  (det.  ) 
Early  July  Bhopawar  Malwa  Bheel  Corps 
I  July  Indore  2  Indore  infregts  (no  Europ.  officers) 
I  July  Lucknow  F.  A.  (No.  2  F.  B.  )  check 
I  July  Mhow  Pt  L.  C.  (wing);  23  rd  N.  I. 
I  July  Sagar  P  I.  C.;  42nd  N.  I. 
------  2  July  Sasni  F  Cav.,  Gwalior  Cont.;  40'Art.,  Gwalior  Cont. 
3  July  Agar  5h  Oudh  I.  I. 
4  July  Near  Agra  Kotah  Cont. 
7  July  Jhelum  140'N.  I. 
7  July  Rawalpindi  14th  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
9  July  Sialkot  9h  L.  C.;  46uN.  I. 
II  July  Saharunpur  29  N.  I.  (I  coy) 
12  July  Jagadhri  5"'  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
25  July  Sagauli  12'h  I.  C.  (HQ  wing) 
25  July  Dinapore  70%  8h  and  40'h  N.  I. 
30  July  Hazaibagh  8"'  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
I  August  Ramghur  Ramghur  L.  I.  (det.  )  and  Ramghur  Art.  (det.  ) 
2  August  Ranchi  Ramghur  L.  I. 
6  August  Sehore  Bhopal  Cont. 
14  August  Bhagulpur  5h  I.  C. 
14  August  Doomka  5h  I.  C.  (det.  ) 
15  August  Rohni  5h  I.  C.  (det.  ) 
19  August  Ferozepore  I&  L.  C. 
21  August  Mount  Abu  Jodhpur  Legion  (det.  ) 
22  August  Erinpura  Jodhpur  Legion 
28  August  Peshawur  5  1"  N.  I. 
31  August  Multan  62nd  and  69P  N.  I.;  &Vd  H.  A. 
16  September  Nagode  50'  N.  I. 
18  September  Jabulpur  52nd  N.  I. 
19  September  Patun  52'd  N.  I.  (I  coy) 
September  (undated)  Sehore  52d  N.  I.  (2  coys) 299 
September  (undated)  Kalabagh  90'I.  C.  (det.  ) 
9  October  Deogurh  32-  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
17  October  Rampur  Haut  32"d  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
18  November  Chittagong  340'N.  I.  (3  coys) 
22  November  Dacca  73d  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
4  December  Madarigunj  I  luI.  C.  (det.  ) 
5  December  Jalpigori  I  luI.  C.  (det.  ) 
January  1858  Rajput  P  Nagpur  I.  I.  (partial) 
DISARMED: 
Date  Place  Corps 
3  May  Lucknow  7"'  Oudh  I.  I. 
13  May  Lahore  WFL.  C.;  16'ý  26'ý  ýý  ýNI. 
14  May  Ferozepore  450'and  57'h  N.  I.  (partially) 
16  May  Meerut  Bengal  sappers  &  miners  (2  coys) 
-  22  May  Peshawur  56  LC.  -,  E4ý  27'ý  5  1"  and  64h  N.  I. 
28  May  Ambala  4h 
L.  C. 
29  May  Ambala  50'N.  I. 
31  May  Agra  44h  and  67h  N.  I. 
5  June  Ambala  4"h  L.  C.  (det.  ) 
10  June  Multan  62 
nd 
and  69h  N.  I. 
14  June  Barrackpore  V6,  Ord  and  70'h  N.  I. 
14  June  Calcutta  25h  N.  I. 
22  June  Dera  Ismail  Khan  39"'  N.  I. 
25  June  Phillour  3rd  and  350'N.  I. 
June  (undated)  Attock  4t4/-O'  F.  A. 
June  (undated)  Barrackpore  32"d  N.  I. 
-  June  (undated)  Dum-Dum  e/797,  27ýr,  51%  3d/9h  and  T/(-9w-F-.  A 
June  (undated)  Lahore  4b/7th  F.  A.  (No.  I  F.  D.  ) 
June  (undated)  Multan  4th/3rd  H.  A. 
June  (undated)  Nurpur  I't/7'h  F.  A. 
June  (undated)  Peshawur  7%  16th  and  18th  I.  C. 
June  (undated)  Rawalpindi  4h/-2nd  H.  A. 300 
7  July  Rawalpindi  58"'  N.  I. 
9  July  Amritsar  Wh  N.  I. 
10  July  Amritsar  9uL.  C.  (wing) 
10  July  Ferozepore  I  O'h  L.  C. 
14  July  Futtehpore  IT-I.  C(det.  ) 
Mid-July  Thannesur  5h  N.  I.  (I  coy) 
July  (undated)  Kohat  5  8h  N.  I.  (3  coys) 
I  August  Gorakhpur  17u'I.  C.  (2  coys);  ffh  I.  C.  (det.  ) 
2  August  Berhampore  63d  N.  I.;  I  I'h  I.  C. 
9  August  Delhi  4  th  I.  C. 
10  August  Ghazipur  65th  N.  I. 
August  (undated)  Delhi  P  N.  I.  (I  coy) 
September  (undated)  Shamshabad  17th  I.  C. 
15  December  Indore  Indore  troops 
16  May  1858  Nurpur  4h  N.  I. 
16  May  1858  Kangra  4h  N.  I.  (wing) 
DISBANDED 
Date  Place  Corps 
31  March  Barrackpore  19'J'N.  I. 
6  May  Barrackpore  34'h  N.  I, 
30  May  Ambala  5uN.  I.  (two  coys) 
26June  Nowshera  IOh  LC.  (HQ  wing) 
26  June  Peshawur  IOh  I.  C.  (left  wing) 
June  (undated)  ta  ui  Nagpur  1. 
. 
7  July  Rawalpindi  14"'  N.  I.  (2  coys) 
Note:  unless  specified,  the  reference  to  a  corps  denotes  its  headquarters 301 
Appendix  3-  Estimate  of  the  number  of  Bengal  native  troops 
who  mutinied,  were  disarmed  and  disbanded,  or  stayed  loyal 
Corps  Mutinied  Disarmed  Disbanded  Stayed  Loyal 
BENGAL  HORSE 
ARTILLERY 
4'ý  Tp/1"  Bde  1+90* 
5'  Tp/1"  Bde  1+90* 
46'Tý/ý  Bde  1+90* 
4'  Tp/P  Bde  1+90* 
Total:  2+  180*  1+90*  1+90* 
BENGALFOOT 
ARTILLERY 
I"  Co/70'Bn  2+85* 
2'  Co/70'Bn  I+  72*  1+13 
3'  Co/70'Bn  2+85* 
40'Co/70'Bn  2+85* 
Sth  Co/7dBn  2+85* 
6d'Co/7'h  Bn  2+85* 
I"  Co/8h  Bn  2+85* 
2'd  Co/8tb  Bn  2+85* 
3rd  Co/8th  Bn  2+85* 
---W-  "  Co/8uBn  2+  85* 
5'h  Co/8h  Bn  2+  85* 
&  Co/8b  Bn  2+85* 
I'  Co/9h  Bn  2+85* 
2'd  Co/9"'  Bn  2+  85* 
Yo  Co/9h  Dn  2+  85* 
4'h  Co/9h  Bn  2+85* 
5'h  Co/9h  Bn  2+85* 
e  Co/91h  Bn  1  +28*  1  +57* 
Total:  18  +  780*  17  +  737*  1+13 BENGAL  LIGHT 
CAVALRY 
I"  L.  C.  8+  400* 
2 
nd  L.  C.  7+  450*  1+6 
P  L.  C.  6+  325*  2+  75* 
4'h  L.  C.  8  +-400* 
SO'L.  C.  8+  400* 
Oh  L.  C.  280  156 
7'h  L.  C.  325*  75* 
8'h  L.  C.  4+273 
90'L.  C.  3+238  150* 
10'h  L.  C.  200  100 
Total  (L.  C.  ):  24  +  2,218*  20  +  1,479*  3+  156* 
BENGAL  NATIVE 
INFANTRY 
I"  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
2nd  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
P  N.  I.  760  90 
4"'  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
5'h  N.  I.  139  11+666  3+180 
6"'  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
7'J'N.  I.  7+792  4+65 
8"'  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
9'h  N.  I.  10+747  1 
1  O'h  N.  I.  12+850 
I  Ph  N.  I.  650*  200 
12'h  N.  I.  9+  750*  3+100 
1P  N.  I.  252  10+584 
14"  N.  I.  13+769  100  (Sikhs) 
15'h  N.  I.  7+834  1+15 
16'h  N.  I.  8+736 
17'h  N.  I.  7+746  2+115  13 
18'h  N.  I.  12  +  850*  -- 
19"'  N.  I.  18+1,092 
20'h  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
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A 21"N.  I.  12+850 
22'd  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
23'd  N.  I.  12  +  844*  6 
24'h  N.  I.  21+875 
25'h  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
26"'  N.  I.  7+634  12+897 
27'h  N.  I.  16+836 
280'N.  I.  11  +  845*  1+15 
29'h  N.  I.  12  +  843*  8 
3&  N.  I.  5+  762*  5+52  4+9 
3  1'  N.  I.  120*  20+831 
32!  'd  N.  I.  4+375  8+  600*  1+27 
33 
Id  N.  I.  13+874 
340'N.  I.  6+  300*  6+408  3+7 
35g'N.  I.  12  +  850* 
3e  N.  I.  6+  650*  2+  109* 
37'h  N.  I.  12+869  2+126 
3  8h  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
39"'  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
4e  N.  I.  10+915  7+100 
41"  N.  I.  12  +  830*  20 
42"d  N.  I.  10+630  2+220 
43d  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
44'h  N.  I.  1+112  10  +  750*  1+2 
45'h  N.  I.  4+482  9+391 
4e  N.  I.  9+907 
Oh  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
480'N.  I.  2+465  1+311  22  7+80 
49'h  N.  I.  14+833 
50'h  N.  I.  4+645  10+140 
5  1"  N.  I.  17+715 
52'd  N.  I.  12  +  950*  2+16 
53'd  N.  I.  4+  810*  10+37 
540'N.  I.  12  +  850* 
55'h  N.  I.  8+945  8+1361  8  (Sikhs) 
6'h  N.  I.  11  +  845*  1  +5 
57'h  N.  I.  286  11+613 
'Joined  the  disarmed  5  1'  N.  I.  at  Peshawur  and  later  shared  their  fate 
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580'N.  I.  16  +  820* 
59'h  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
6e  N.  I.  10+800 
61'N.  I.  2+827  10+126 
62'd  N.  I.  650  12  +  850* 
63'd  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
640'N.  I.  22+968 
65'h  N.  I.  14  +  950* 
66'h  N.  I.  20+1,140 
670'N.  I.  1+90  12+894 
680'N.  I.  12  +  850* 
690'N.  T.  650*  12  +  850* 
W  N.  I.  12  +  850* 
71'N.  I.  1+620  11  +  100* 
72"d  N.  I.  14+953  1+14 
73'd  N.  I.  200*  6  5+524 
74"'  N.  I.  12  +  850*  - 
Total:  392+ 
36,358* 
331+ 
21,314* 
41  +  2,151*  150  +  5,598* 
BENGAL 
IRREGULAR  CAVALRY 
111I.  C.  12  +  566* 
2"d  I.  C.  12  +  566* 
P  I.  C.  236  12  +  220* 
40'I.  C.  8+333  94  1+10 
5'h  I.  C.  5+366  5+59 
6  th  I.  C.  12  +  566* 
7"'  I.  C.  10  +  450* 
8th  I.  C.  439*  12+11 
gth  I.  C.  1+29  9+  421 
I  01h  I.  C.  10  +  450* 
1  Ith  I.  C.  4+200  6+250 
12  th  I.  C.  8+  350*  2+83 
13th  I.  C.  10  +  400*  40 
W  I.  C.  10  +  450* 
15th  I.  C.  10  +  450* 
le  I.  C.  10  +  450* 305 
170'I.  C.  10  +  450* 
18"'  I.  C.  10  +  450* 
Total:  56  +  3,253*  46  +  2,184*  19  +  871*  68  +  2,081 
BENGAL  SAPPERS  & 
MINERS 
Total:  440  500*  53 
LOCAL  INFANTRY: 
CATEGORY  A2 
Ferozepore  Regt.  (Sikhs)  20  +  920* 
Ludhiana  Regt.  (Sikhs)  8+497  7+232 
Sirmur  Bn.  (Gurkhas)  20  +  920* 
Kemaon  Bn.  (Gurkhas)  20  +  920* 
New  Nasiri  Bn.  (Gurkhas)  20  +  920* 
Kelat-I-Ghilzie  20  +  920* 
Total:  8+497  107  +  4,832* 
LOCAL  INFANTRY: 
CATEGORY  B 
Affacan  Bn.  20  +  920* 
I"  Assam  L.  I.  Bn.  I+1  16  +  934* 
2nd  Assam  L.  I.  Bn.  20  +  920* 
Bhagalpur  Hill  Rangers  20  +  920* 
Calcutta  Native  Militia  20  +  920* 
Hurrianah  L.  I.  Bn.  14+750 
Mharwara,  Bn.  20  +  920* 
Pegu  U.  Bn.  20  +  920* 
Sylhet  L.  I.  Bn.  20  +  920* 
Total:  15+751  158  +  7,395* 
OTHER  LOCAL  CORPS 
Bengal  M.  P.  Bn.  14  +  800* 
Ramgarh  Force: 
Artillery  2+80 
I.  C.  19  +  350*  1+30 
'  Paid  and  organized  like  regular  corps 306 
10  +  720* 
Sebundy  Corps  of  Sappers 
&  Miners 
4+  200* 
Shekhawati  Brigade: 
Artillery  2+  80* 
I.  C.  12+  500* 
1.1.  20  +  920* 
Total:  31+1,150  53  +  2,530* 
PUNJAB  IRREGULAR 
FORCE 
I"I.  C.  18+  566* 
2n"  I.  C.  3  N.  O.  s  15  +  566* 
3td  I.  C.  18  +  566* 
4"'  1.  C.  18  +  -566* 
5"'  I.  C.  18  +  566* 
114  1.1.  16  +  912* 
2nd  1.1.  16  +  912* 
Yd  1.1.  16  +  912* 
4"'  1.1.  16  +  912* 
5th  1.1.  16  +  912* 
60'1.1.  16  +  912* 
Hazara,  Mountain  Battery: 
I"  L.  F.  B.  -3  +  110* 
2n'j  L.  F.  B.  3+  110* 
Yd  L.  F.  B.  3+  110* 
4'h  L.  F.  B.  3+  110* 
Corps  of  Guides: 
Cavalry 
Infantry 
I'  Sikh  Inf.  20  +  920* 
2"d  Sikh  Inf  20  +  920* 
Yd  Sikh  Inf.  20  +  920* 
4'  Sikh  Inf  20  +  920* 
Total:  3  N.  O.  s  275  +  12,422* 
OUDH  IRREGULAR 
FORCE 307 
I'  Art.  2+85* 
2"d  Art.  2+  85* 
P  Art.  2+85* 
Reserve  Art.  2+85* 
I,,  I.  C.  9+  460* 
2'd  I.  C.  9+  460* 
3"'  1.  C.  9+  420*  40 
I,,  1.1.  12  +  750* 
2!  0  1.1.  12  +  750* 
P  1.1.  12  +  750* 
4'h  1.1.  12  +  750* 
5u'I.  I.  12  +  750* 
&  1.1.  12  +  750* 
7'h  1.1.  6+  350*  300*  6+15 
8 
th  I.  1.  12  +  750* 
91h  1.1.  12  +  750*  - 
101h  1.1.  12  +  750* 
Total:  149  +  89780*  340  6+15 
OUDH  MILITARY 
POLICE 
-  I'tRegt.  12  +  750* 
26d  Rcgt.  12  +  750* 
Total:  24  +  1,500* 
GWALIOR 
CONTINGENT 
I'  Artillery  2+  85* 
2'd  Artillery  2+  85* 
3'd  Artillery  2+85* 
4'h  Artillery  2+85* 
I'  Cavalry  9+  460* 
2"d  Cavalry  9+  460* 
I'  Infantry  12  +  750* 
Vd  Infantry  12  +  750* 
P  Infantry  10  +  748*  2+2 
4'h  Infantry  12  +  750* 
5'11  Infantry  12  +  750* 308 
6'  infantry  6+  375*  6+  375* 
7'h  Infantry  12  +  750* 
Total:  102  +  6,133*  6+  375* 
BHARATPUR  +  ULWAR 
LEGIONS3 
5,000* 
BHOPAL  CONTINGENT 
Artillery  1  +30* 
Cavalry  4+  200* 
Infantry  8+  400* 
Total:  13  +  630* 
INDOREIRREGULAR 
FORCE4 
V4  Infantry  10  +  700* 
2nd  Infantry  10  +  700* 
Total:  20  +  1,400* 
JODHPUR  LEGION 
Artillery  1  +30* 
Cavalry  5+158 
Infantry  8+376 
Total:  14  +  564* 
KOTAH  CONTINGENT 
Artillery  1  +30* 
Cavalry  4+  200* 
Infantry  10  +  550* 
Total:  15  +  780* 
UNITED  MALWA 
CONTINGENT 
Artillery  I+  60* 
Cavalry  10  +  600* 
Infantry  10  +  600* 
'  Troops  of  independent  states  not  commanded  by  European  officers 
4  Ibid. 309 
Total:  21  +  1,260* 
MALWA  BHEEL  CORPS  10  +  500* 
MEWAR  BHEEL  CORPS 
(check) 
14  +  850* 
NAGPURIRREGULAR 
FORCE 
Artillery  15  45 
Cavalry  3  N.  O.  s  9+  600* 
I"  Infantry  14  +  800* 
2'd  Infantry  14  +  800* 
P  Infantry  2  14  +  798* 
Total:  3+17  9+  645*  42  +  2,398* 
NIMAR  POLICE  CORPS 
Cavalry  10  +  400* 
Infantry  14  +  700* 
Total  24  +  1,100* 
*  Estimate 
Note:  double  figures  are  used  for  native  officers  and  other  ranks,  eg.  3+  103  =3  native  officers  and  103 
other  ranks. 310 
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